Just to be clear, I don't think there is an answer to this "why." I think it's a pseudo-question, however lyrical. — t0m

Yet there has to be a reason for protesting that there is no obvious reason why possibility ought to be limited. You can't have it both ways here.

Either you are happy with laws as brute fact, or you feel it is reasonable to challenge that. And that very challenge has to ground itself in the openness of "anything might have been the case". Then from there, logically we must continue to the actual consequences of "anything being the case". Laws prove to be emergent via the symmetry/equilibrium argument.

given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected — Hempel

That now brings in the issue of initial conditions as well as boundary conditions. And so it is explanation directed at particular being. Or individuated being. I was arguing in general terms for the emergence of regularity.

These top level laws are "brute fact." For you these brute facts seem to include some kind of random variation and the laws of mathematics at least. These variations are assumed to be quantifiable. So your'e not starting from nothing — t0m

Well no, as the initial conditions for the emergence of lawful regularity are specified as "vagueness". I'm stating pretty plainly that I'm starting from less than nothing, not from nothing, let alone something.

Vagueness is more an everythingness in being unbounded possibility. But that is less than nothing, because nothingness is an actualised absence of things. It may be an empty place, but it is still a place of some kind. It was once there, even if it is no longer there now.

And nothing needs quantification if we are arguing dialectically or dichotomously - in terms of pure metaphysical qualities. Values are being defined reciprocally or inversely - each in terms of being not its "other".

So if the dichotomy is discrete~continuous, then each is quantified as the inverse of its other. To be discrete is to be as little continuous as possible. And vice versa. To be continuous is to be as distant as possible from being discrete. So continuous = 1/discrete, and discrete = 1/continuous.

Each measures or quantifies the other. And if there is no apparent distance or difference, then the categorisations themselves become vague descriptors. There just isn't a fact of the matter whether things are discrete or continuous.

Vagueness and generality are defined in the same reciprocal fashion. You are imagining that one has to stand outside the totality of the world to see that it has vagueness as some quantified foundational quality. There must be some amount of this stuff that I'm calling a potential anythingness.

But that is just the usual habit of explaining by imagining being outside the thing to be explained. And that is precisely why attempts to account for the Cosmos and the Mind always flounder. By definition, we can't step outside existence itself to explain existence.

However we can minimise the mystery of existence by taking the internalist position. And this is what I'm doing. Or what dialectical metaphysical argument has always done. We can reason about the divisions that arise in mutually-definitional, mutually-necessary, fashion.

And so for there to be the generality of law, there must also be the reciprocally-defined thing of the vagueness of potential. Particular quantities of either fall out of it as we are talking about a self-quantifying relation. Each exists to the degree it isn't its other.

Of course I don't think it's possible to start from nothing, so that's not a fault in your system. — t0m

Again please respect that I am very clear that I don't start from nothing. I start from less than nothing. The fact that you try to put me back in that frame - talking about the presence or absence of particulars - shows that you are not really dealing with my actual argument.

There's also Hume's problem. Your system (I think) assumes the metaphysical necessity of scientific laws? But I don't know of any deduction of this necessity. It seems to be a hardwired prejudice. — t0m

The argument is inductive, or rather abductive. It is pragmatism, which accepts internalism, as I say.

So a belief in nature's laws is a hypothesis that looks well justified. It is the reasonable guess that has been working out ever since.

And of course you only have to look at the history of metaphysics and science to see that the very idea of "laws" is itself not really much believed. Physics believes in limiting symmetries, generalised constraints.

The analogy with human laws sounds too much like nature might require a "law giver". Symmetries, being emergent invariances, do away with that kind of externalist metaphysics.

Vagueness is more an everythingness in being unbounded possibility. — apokrisis

I understand that. But how is this vagueness itself not your brute fact?

Either you are happy with laws as brute fact, or you feel it is reasonable to challenge that. — apokrisis

I like it. I didn't start with it, but thinking about explanation led me to my current position. Brute fact is "God" without the mask. I suppose that's the aesthetic appeal. But we are also "thrown" into our individual lives, thrown in an interpretation of our past in terms of our possible futures. So there's a nice analogy. To be clear, this is a for-pleasure issue, just like Hume's problem of induction. It's not a "spiritual" difficultly by any means.

But that is just the usual habit of explaining by imagining being outside the thing to be explained. And that is precisely why attempts to account for the Cosmos and the Mind always flounder. By definition, we can't step outside existence itself to explain existence. — apokrisis

I agree with the general idea that we can't step outside. I also see that your trying to do a kind of metaphysical explanation that evades Hempel's definition. Hegel roughly did the same thing. Assuming that your or his narrative is rhetorically plausible, is this enough for its adoption? For me ideas are tools. Your theory may indeed prove to be a valuable tool within the sciences. I'm not qualified to say. But I don't see a personal use for it. I do like the later part of the theory, where order emerges in order to speed the general dissolution. That's aesthetically dazzling.

Again please respect that I am very clear that I don't start from nothing. I start from less than nothing. The fact that you try to put me back in that frame - talking about the presence or absence of particulars - shows that you are not really dealing with my actual argument. — apokrisis

Your argument isn't easy to follow. Some of your individual points are quite digestible. But, for instance, you now seem to be recanting the minimization of brute fact and denying it altogether.

The analogy with human laws sounds too much like nature might require a "law giver". Symmetries, being emergent invariances, do away with that kind of externalist metaphysics. — apokrisis

Maybe I'm in the dark, but I was taught university physics in terms of laws. I'm not imprisoned by the metaphor either. To me these laws are postulated necessities, codified expectations. Our trust in them is not strictly logical but merely psychological.

But how is this vagueness itself not your brute fact? — t0m

I said ultimately it is. But the tiniest possible scrap of a brute fact.

Remember that quantification has fallen out of the picture, so it is the dichotomy of vague~general that is the actual brute fact. And being the pure relation of qualities - an internalist deal - there is no external "thing" in want of explanation. The usual requirement - to have some substantial first cause - is itself cancelled away by metaphysical logic. The only fact left is the fact that the logic of a dichotomy seems inescapably true. And perhaps - in some illogical way we can sort of wave a vague sceptical hand at - it might have been false.

So it is only now logically brute, rather than substantially brute. It is brute as a generality, not brute as individuated being.

So we can doubt that 1+1=2. The next time we do the sum, it might just turn out different. Or at least language allows us to voice such scepticism, even if reason itself really doesn't.

Brute fact is "God" without the mask. I suppose that's the aesthetic appeal. — t0m

Exactly. Presented with logic, you are free to turn around and simply say you reject logic. Absolutely free in fact when the rejection has no pragmatic consequences.

Assuming that your or his narrative is rhetorically plausible, is this enough for its adoption? — t0m

Rhetorical? Either it is logical and worth adopting for that reason, or it is not. Either as belief it has pragmatic consequences, or it does not.

It is not about "sounding truthy". There is an actual argument here.

Your theory may indeed prove to be a valuable tool within the sciences. I'm not qualified to say. But I don't see a personal use for it. — t0m

Fine. You don't. I do.

Or at least you say you don't. And then you argue that in terms of dialectical reasoning. My view may be scientifically objective, but yours is subjectively personal. My view may be rational and inductive, but yours is intuitive and aesthetic.

So you rely on antithesis to put the maximum possible distance from my thesis.

In short, you employ the very tool of thought you seek to deny here. So - whomfff - the sound of a house of cards falling.

I do like the later part of the theory, where order emerges in order to speed the general dissolution. That's aesthetically dazzling. — t0m

Hah. The whole discussion is just for fun. Really, having a theory about the existence of reality - even a "scientific" one - is more an aesthetic enterprise at the end of the day. It is not as if we could use the answer to do much than dazzle and entertain ourselves.

Your argument isn't easy to follow. Some of your individual points are quite digestible. But, for instance, you now seem to be recanting the minimization of brute fact and denying it altogether. — t0m

I tried to show that the minimisation is not in the notion of vagueness itself - as that still sounds like a quantifiable or substantial concept. It is in the dichotomy of the vague~general. So vagueness is a limit and not a thing, or a state, or even a lack of either of those.

Rhetorical? Either it is logical and worth adopting for that reason, or it is not. Either as belief it has pragmatic consequences, or it does not. — apokrisis

But do you not speak here as if "logic" had a fixed meaning? What you or anyone offers metaphysically is not formal logic, a mechanically checkable tautology. It's a narrative. I agree with you about pragmatic consequences. But those seem potential rather than actual, excepting the aesthetic value which is already present. Try to see this theory from the outside, as one more grand narrative among others. It's yours. Even if it aims at objectivity, it strikes me as perhaps your central creative investment. I'm your fellow poet, working on my own themes. I don't expect you to like this "poet" metaphor, but that's how I see it. The prestige of science, the ground of its "rationality," is the technology it provides to even those who doubt it. The old proofs of the old God were "logical" enough.

I said ultimately it is. But the tiniest possible scrap of a brute fact. — apokrisis

And I reiterate that I see nothing wrong or bad about this. Minimization is desirable. I get that.

Fine. You don't. I do.

Or at least you say you don't. And then you argue that in terms of dialectical reasoning. My view may be scientifically objective, but yours is subjectively personal. My view may be rational and inductive, but yours is intuitive and aesthetic. — apokrisis

To be clear, I didn't mean to be rude. I was just trying to make a point.

My views indeed are intuitive and aesthetic, as well as rhetorically or dialectically supported. But it was only the passionate pursuit of rational, objective truth that led me to question what really constituted objectivity and rationality. We believe what makes us feel good (what works). If we endure unpleasant realizations, this is both because we are future oriented beings and because the deep pleasure we feel in possessing the objective truth (God for the rationality-identified person) can make up for the pain involved. That's an oversimplification, but perhaps you see what I'm getting at. We are tool-users all the way down. Conceptual thought is a means. This spiel itself is self-referentially a tool that has worked for me.

I also don't believe that you think un-intuitively or non-aesthetically--that you are truly the agent of induction and rationality alone. You're a metaphysician. You may be a scientist, too, but you have the theological itch, it seems to me. So do I, in my own way. I respect the repression of the personal in thought --the taking of the impersonal personally. But I still think we identify with our theories. They are the crystallization of what is sublime in us. So the impersonal man is a deeply personal man, bored with mere triviality or idiosyncrasy. I relate. I've just chosen a different center of interest

Hah. The whole discussion is just for fun. Really, having a theory about the existence of reality - even a "scientific" one - is more an aesthetic enterprise at the end of the day. It is not as if we could use the answer to do much than dazzle and entertain ourselves. — apokrisis

As soon as this using the answer becomes manifest, it's no longer just aesthetics. I realize that Popper's theory is a bit of an idealization of science as it is practiced, but is this theory falsifiable? In some ways I'm being less aesthetic than you are, by insisting on falsifiability and practical utility as the measure of science. I'm the worldly skeptic here waiting to see what happens in the "real" world of ordinary, tangible experience.

To be sure, I'm hardly ideally qualified to anticipate whether or not these results will manifest. But life is short, and that which is not practical now must be either "aesthetic" or some promising development in my own objective/normalized field, where I'll (hopefully) be an accurate judge of world-changing potential.

I empathize with how frustrating it must be to present a philosophy that includes non-elementary science. I'm guessing that (generally) the scientists aren't sufficiently metaphysical and the philosophers aren't sufficiently scientific to appreciate what you're doing.

If you happen to have a systematic presentation of the system online somewhere, I'll check it out if you give me a link.

This spiel itself is self-referentially a tool that has worked for me. — t0m

Still, I was pointing out the degree to which any force your argument could carry would be down to its rational structure. Or are you saying that hinging your argument on metaphysical dichotomies, like aesthetic vs rational, or subjective vs objective, are merely rhetorical tropes - said for poetic effect here, and not something you believe, or that should in fact sway me other than as poetic?

Still, I was pointing out the degree to which any force your argument could carry would be down to its rational structure. Or are you saying that hinging your argument on metaphysical dichotomies, like aesthetic vs rational, or subjective vs objective, are merely rhetorical tropes - said for poetic effect here, and not something you believe, or that should in fact sway me other than as poetic? — apokrisis

That's a fair question. I think that "world" or logical space is a dimly perceived background or frame. Someone could argue, perhaps, that the correspondence theory of truth is incorrect or false. What what be argued is perhaps that it doesn't make sense away from the world of public objects. We can check whether the cat is on the mat, but whether world history is an evolution of the consciousness of freedom is another matter, for instance. What does it mean to act as if such is the case? For Hegel it involved an affirmation of the slaughterbench of history and a way of looking down on the small morally indignant minds who didn't see that the ideal was actual. He insisted that philosophy wasn't about some mere ought that didn't have the power to manifest but with what is.

What is the rational structure in propositions like this? What is the rational structure of "any force your argument could carry would be down to its rational structure"? This sounds like a psychological hypothesis. Is this an equating of force and "rational structure"? Is seems more realist to understand force in terms of successful persuasion. It may indeed be the case that my argument has no persuasive force with you, but that is arguably because of your contingent investment in a particular notion of the rational or that which ought to be persuasive. I suggest that personalities "compute" from a basis of liquid or fuzzy re-programmable "axioms." These are dearly held, self-esteem-grounding beliefs involving virtue, especially intellectual virtue among philosophers ('intellectual conscience.') These core beliefs are the "handles" by which we can be persuaded, if we can be persuaded at all. This thought itself might not be a live option for those invested in the possibility of trans-practical objective truth.

I do see that this vision of generalized "sophistry" has a self-subverting edge. Hence "ironism" and "groundlessness." Non-practical objective truth is problematized, but so therefore is this problematizing. Yet one doesn't go back to the "naive" value-free or innocent notion of metaphysics. One stands (anxious or amused )in this irony and groundlessness.

I suggest that personalities "compute" from a basis of liquid or fuzzy re-programmable "axioms." These are dearly held, self-esteem-grounding beliefs involving virtue, especially intellectual virtue among philosophers ('intellectual conscience.') — t0m

Again, the issue is what is one to make of your language use when it employs dialectical structure as if attempting a rational argument. It could be merely just an effect chosen for it aesthetic quality, which is what you seem to be claiming. You don’t mean to be doing philosophy. It is enough to play at sounding like you are philosophising.

That’s fine. It’s fun. It’s an art. And you then give a metaphysical justification for it. We can’t in fact know reality. Rational explanation is always pragmatic and so always just a form of workable pretence. Because I am a pragmatist, even I would have to go along with that, is indeed the strong reply you can make.

But then my reply to that is still that my position takes account of all that and indeed uses it to bolster itself.

My dialectical approach says that what is logical is only a separation towards limits. So aesthetics and rationality could only be two ends of a spectrum, not two actually separated absolutes. It is not a problem that a little of each always remains part of its other.

But by the same token, the separation is the productive thing to achieve - if the object is to objectivise. Being able to switch between aesthetic mode and rational mode is the skill to be cultivated. One can only be rational to the degree one knows how also to be its other, as being rational requires knowing the other to be in fact excluded during the time spent acting in that mode.

So while you appear to be celebrating the possibility of confused mixes of aesthetics and rationality - philosophical discourse as a poetic chain of rhetorical flourishes - my own concern is to achieve the ability to switch crisply between one and the other as modes of discourse. I might agree they spring from the same ground - the muzziness of creative speech as social performance. But then there is a reason to be able to be switch as purely as possible into the mode required for some particular socially agreed domain.

If we are speaking in the metaphysical register, logic has to win. Substance over style, meaning over rhetoric, rational structure over whimsy and political commitments.

Other agendas can be in play. PoMo may play at speaking metaphysics in a way designed to undermine its analytic authority. The politics of disruption are pretty transparent. But why would one grant that legitimacy?

So I am claiming that there is a right way to do metaphysics. The fact that it underwrites good science is no surprise. And also it is not unreasonable to suspect ulterior motives in those who seek to undermine the possibility of rational certainties.

My pragmatic approach already accepts that no truths are certain. So that isn’t even the point. However it also says that knowing how not to let aesthetics or other modes of discourse get mixed up in the discussion is crucial for making metaphysical speech anything much at all.

Again, the issue is what is one to make of your language use when it employs dialectical structure as if attempting a rational argument. It could be merely just an effect chosen for it aesthetic quality, which is what you seem to be claiming. You don’t mean to be doing philosophy. It is enough to play at sounding like you are philosophising. — apokrisis

I'm questioning the strength of the distinction between the aesthetic and the rational, emphasizing that thinking is purpose driven. Roughly speaking, truth is a means. We act on a map of the world. For us this map is the world, even if it includes the assertion of its own incompleteness or tendency to change. But we know that others have other maps, and we try to map their maps so as to anticipate their behavior, persuade them. It's this mapping of mapping that gets complicated.

When you say that I'm not doing philosophy, this is an implicit definition of philosophy that excludes the dissonance that might otherwise be said to constitute philosophy. Thinking investigates thinking "rationally" and finds that perhaps there is only (I ought to act as if there is only) creative adjustment, a dialectic of theory, action, and environment. We act as if the environment is one way, change it in those terms, and experience feedback. Our map changes and the process continues. But this is a map of mapping itself within the map and itself subject to the dialectic. Of course the map-territory distinction is part of the "mapterritory."

That’s fine. It’s fun. It’s an art. And you then give a metaphysical justification for it. We can’t in fact know reality. Rational explanation is always pragmatic and so always just a form of workable pretence. Because I am a pragmatist, even I would have to go along with that, is indeed the strong reply you can make. — apokrisis

It's not only fun, though. I include the deep and important matters of "spirituality" and a basic sense of sanity and self-esteem in this. In fact I think they are the center. Our basic commitments open and foreclose certain possibilities of mapping the world.

We agree on workable pretense. I agree with a point you made in some other thread that we filter or exclude so that only what is important or relevant to us is visible. Beings are revealed against the background of "existential time," which is to say as tools. "Care" is fundamental. We are engaged revealers, creators, and interpreters of entities. I think you'll agree. So even the most objective system is arguably just a tool of maximum durability. We succeed as theorists all the more if we create a tool that will last indefinitely like some mathematical theorem. I actually share this impulse with you. It's just that our theory creations are dissonant --which might only help us both along in our projects.

So aesthetics and rationality could only be two ends of a spectrum, not two actually separated absolutes. It is not a problem that a little of each always remains part of its other. — apokrisis

I agree. We really have a spectrum. Some discourses are more rational or normalized. We know what kind of statements are legitimate. We agree on the criterion. But philosophy is, among other things, a criterion of criteria.The fantasy or hope is that some eternal meta-criterion can ground itself presuppositionlessly. But it would have to be self-justifying or circular. Yet, in fact, despite its presentation as a deduction from nothing, it emerges within time, within history. Speculative thinking can negate the "common sense" of this emergence within time and history. But I don't think "common sense" or "ordinary experience" can be abolished. So such theories are merely "laid over" a more primordial sense of being among objects and persons. We don't stop seeing the table at a place where we eat with our family, even if we "know" that it's "really" particles, etc. Any such "really" smashes against the limit of how we actually experience the world when not in a speculative mode.

So while you appear to be celebrating the possibility of confused mixes of aesthetics and rationality - philosophical discourse as a poetic chain of rhetorical flourishes - my own concern is to achieve the ability to switch crisply between one and the other as modes of discourse. I might agree they spring from the same ground - the muzziness of creative speech as social performance. But then there is a reason to be able to be switch as purely as possible into the mode required for some particular socially agreed domain. — apokrisis

I agree. The difference is only where we draw the line. Math is my other concern, the one that pays my bills. So perhaps we're both using our free time to let the creative metaphysician (earnestly) play. For me the Turing machine is about as purely rational as one could ask. Discrete and finite math is about as normalized as it gets. There's not much room for feeling or preference, though even here creativity opens "entities" that are otherwise hidden. Once disclosed, these entities say non-controversially disclosed.

Switching domains is part of the charm of my theory for me. I try to "tolerate" and empathize with the maps or world-visions of others. The less I cling to a world-vision, the more I can "safely" (without the pain of feeling threatened) feel myself into a local "game" or conversation.

Other agendas can be in play. PoMo may play at speaking metaphysics in a way designed to undermine its analytic authority. The politics of disruption are pretty transparent. But why would one grant that legitimacy?

So I am claiming that there is a right way to do metaphysics. The fact that it underwrites good science is no surprise. And also it is not unreasonable to suspect ulterior motives in those who seek to undermine the possibility of rational certainties.

My pragmatic approach already accepts that no truths are certain. So that isn’t even the point. However it also says that knowing how not to let aesthetics or other modes of discourse get mixed up in the discussion is crucial for making metaphysical speech anything much at all. — apokrisis

Respectfully, I think you are being willfully "blind" in this collapsing of many thinkers into a single "PoMo." Your criticism of PoMo is itself along PoMo lines. You look into politics, legitimacy, ulterior motives. But what of your own ulterior motives?

Is there also not some tension between "no truths are certain" and "there is a right way to do metaphysics"? By no means am I saying that we ought not propose such a "right way." Such a proposal would violate its own spirit. I embrace the spirit of trial and error. Creativity is the source, including the source of the criteria for evaluating this creativity. There is a world out there that constrains our creativity, but we are seemingly never finished creatively mapping this constraint.

...thinking is purpose driven. Roughly speaking, truth is a means. We act on a map of the world. — t0m

Yep. So we agree on pragmatism and its approach to rationalism?

What is distinctive is that purpose is included in epistemology. The map is not claimed to be a map of the world, but a map of a self in relation with a world. The ontological assumption here is that even "the self" is a modelled construction.

And so pragmatism simply takes for granted the socially constructed nature or truth, incorporating it into its very epistemology. It is upfront that every act of modelling has an agenda. And this is not a problem, given that the forming of "selfhood" - both personally and collectively - is how purposes or agendas could even arise.

So analytic philosophy is characterised by its desire for objective truth - truth without messy observers projecting their wishes and prejudices on to the reality being mapped. But pragmatism is quite different on that score.

When you say that I'm not doing philosophy, this is an implicit definition of philosophy that excludes the dissonance that might otherwise be said to constitute philosophy. — t0m

I did more that assert that. I'm arguing it.

If you want to narrow "philosophy" to "metaphysics", that's cool. But metaphysics grounds "proper philosophy" anyway. Or that is the position I will argue.

But this is a map of mapping itself within the map and itself subject to the dialectic. — t0m

OK. You want to argue for infinite regress.

Again, pragmatism handles that already. Sure the sign relation is open-ended. You can build a hierarchy of maps as high as you like. But also - because pragmatism is about the feedback of "serving a purpose" - that puts the brakes on the actual building up endlessly. You would only build as many meta- levels as were proving to be useful.

So pragmatics both demands a hierarchical organisation to inquiry, and provides the rationale for it having a functional limit.

I include the deep and important matters of "spirituality" and a basic sense of sanity and self-esteem in this. In fact I think they are the center. — t0m

Fine. Sanity and self-esteem are valued social goods. They speak directly to the forming of selfhood (in relation to the physical, then the social, world). If spirituality is the pragmatic vehicle for delivering these social goods, great. If instead it is medical or psychological science, also great. We can try both and see what works best.

We agree on workable pretense. — t0m

Yes. But I'm sure we disagree about there being a hierarchy of workable pretense, with something having to be on top as it were.

Although this top might itself be a dichotomy - say the maximally objective view vs the maximally subjective one? So a clear separation of powers or modes of discourse. For me, that cashes out in being able to switch between stark scientific objectivity and being authentically part of "my world" in terms of a network of social relations, obligations and engagements.

So what I reject is that subjectivity is to be found "within oneself" - the Romantic story. But one wants to be fully part of the social world which is where one finds one's "true self" as a social animal.

So even the most objective system is arguably just a tool of maximum durability. — t0m

Yes. But "just"?

It is significant that a social animal equipped with a habit of speech could even work out what the heck was going on in the Universe in any fashion at all, let alone down to a story with mathematically logical necessity, like the Standard Model of particle physics.

But philosophy is, among other things, a criterion of criteria.The fantasy or hope is that some eternal meta-criterion can ground itself presuppositionlessly. But it would have to be self-justifying or circular. — t0m

But that is the advantage of pragmatism's epistemology. It accepts the need for suppositions - abduction - to get the game going. And it accepts also that purposes are part of the business of truth-seeking. All of this gets bundled up in the method.

Sure, it is always possible something has been left out. But can anyone point to what that is?

The circularity is avoided by hierarchical organisation. The modelling relation may rely on feedback, but theory and measurement are made as hierarchically different as possible. So the circularity is iterative and designed to converge on a limit. That limit is the limit of our indifference. At some point, we could still be wrong, but we no longer have reason to care. Uncertainty is minimised for all practical purposes. And only an analytic philosopher or romanticist would - due to the social construction of their selfhood - persist in worrying about differences that don't make a difference.

We don't stop seeing the table at a place where we eat with our family, even if we "know" that it's "really" particles, etc. — t0m

Of course. That is all part of what I've argued. The rational objective view stands in sharp contrast to the everyday business of living authentically in some actual physical and social milieu. It would be insane to mix up these modes of discourse.

You don't want to treat your family and living room as abstract metaphysical constructs. But by the same token, you don't want to claim commonsense, traditional belief, or folk wisdom, as the better base for metaphysical insight.

Switching domains is part of the charm of my theory for me. — t0m

Sure. I am arguing for that too. But I am saying that metaphysics is the ur-rational discourse. It has to be to ground maths and science. Dialectical categories like discrete~continuous, matter~form, chance~necessity, one~many, and scores more, were how the whole rational/objective view of existence got started.

And so next you might agree that metaphysics needs pure rationality, no aesthetics. But "philosophy" is big enough to accept both modes of discourse. Well, in the end, I don't think it does. I think people who argue that always have a hidden pragmatic agenda - social goals in mind.

Respectfully, I think you are being willfully "blind" in this collapsing of many thinkers into a single "PoMo." Your criticism of PoMo is itself along PoMo lines. You look into politics, legitimacy, ulterior motives. But what of your own ulterior motives? — t0m

The question of motives is built into pragmatic epistemology. So no hidden agenda on my part. I seek to legitimise pragmatic epistemology. An important part of that is showing how others - PoMo, theism, even AP - have social reasons to de-legitimate that.

But PoMo especially is a political movement. It's purpose is social change. Well, in France especially, it is a route to being a public person, with all the personal advantages that can bring. C'mon. We can all see the game going on!

Scientists do it too. They get even more "sciency" to push for their social agendas, get their moment in the social limelight.

Mathematicians are different I guess. Always so unworldly. :)

Creativity is the source, including the source of the criteria for evaluating this creativity. There is a world out there that constrains our creativity, but we are seemingly never finished creatively mapping this constraint. — t0m

Again, not an issue. Creativity is essential both for rational metaphysics or authentic daily life. I am just arguing horses for courses. Both get done better by mixing them up as little as necessary.

Yep. So we agree on pragmatism and its approach to rationalism?

What is distinctive is that purpose is included in epistemology. The map is not claimed to be a map of the world, but a map of a self in relation with a world. The ontological assumption here is that even "the self" is a modelled construction.

And so pragmatism simply takes for granted the socially constructed nature or truth, incorporating it into its very epistemology. It is upfront that every act of modelling has an agenda. And this is not a problem, given that the forming of "selfhood" - both personally and collectively - is how purposes or agendas could even arise.

So analytic philosophy is characterised by its desire for objective truth - truth without messy observers projecting their wishes and prejudices on to the reality being mapped. But pragmatism is quite different on that score. — apokrisis

Yes, I agree with all of this. But I think we should be reasonably upfront about the intensity of selfhood in ordinary experience. Speculatively the self and non-self emerge as a dichotomy from something neither-both. But non-speculatively a particular person in the world as we know it makes such a speculative "outlandish" claim.

Another example: I understand that "concept" in the speculative sense can be neither physical nor mental. By 'concept' I aim at the distinction itself. The "sign" or the "concept" escapes the "what-is-it?" that constitutes philosophy as that which reveals "what is" in the first place. The concept or the sign is "being" or the meaning of being. Intelligibility itself is perhaps the brute fact. (This is slippery stuff at the edge of language, admittedly.)
Anyway, Hume leaves his study believing in induction and I non-theoretically move among objects and persons. I think this non-theoretical realm is epistemologically crucial.

I did more that assert that. I'm arguing it.

If you want to narrow "philosophy" to "metaphysics", that's cool. But metaphysics grounds "proper philosophy" anyway. Or that is the position I will argue. — apokrisis

Fair enough on the first point. I'm very much enjoying our conversation. On the second point, narrowing is the opposite of what I want to do. I'm not in the least trying to exclude what you're doing. I stress that philosophy is abnormal discourse, the clash of proposed criteria. "Anything goes."

So what I reject is that subjectivity is to be found "within oneself" - the Romantic story. But one wants to be fully part of the social world which is where one finds one's "true self" as a social animal. — apokrisis

I think you are neglecting the anxiety of influence. We want to create and impinge upon this social world. If we are truly social, then we are also truly anti-social in our revolutionary ambitions. We negate the given, go around it, puncture it. "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world." Before a discourse can be normalized and socialized, it is invented or revealed by "poetic" (creative) language.

We do want recognition, but this might just be a love affair: Bonnie and Clyde against the world at one extreme. I suggest that groups are founded on exclusion. Nothing binds like a common enemy.

Yes. But "just"?

It is significant that a social animal equipped with a habit of speech could even work out what the heck was going on in the Universe in any fashion at all, let alone down to a story with mathematically logical necessity, like the Standard Model of particle physics. — apokrisis

Of course it's amazing. But my "just" is just a lack of worshipping the tools. For me the image of the divine is (roughly) the virtuous human being as a whole. Science is absolutely one of humanity's most glorious achievements. But there's also Bach, Shakespeare, etc. To me there's a Romanticism or asymmetry in your prioritizing of the objective. I'm by no means against it. But I can't help but see you as an individual against a background of other individuals with other priorities.

OK. You want to argue for infinite regress. — apokrisis

No, I'm just pointing out the complexity and self-referentiality of our mapping. Generally I'm just sharing a general way of looking at things, not arguing a particular thesis.

Of course. That is all part of what I've argued. The rational objective view stands in sharp contrast to the everyday business of living authentically in some actual physical and social milieu. It would be insane to mix up these modes of discourse.

You don't want to treat your family and living room as abstract metaphysical constructs. But by the same token, you don't want to claim commonsense, traditional belief, or folk wisdom, as the better base for metaphysical insight. — apokrisis

I agree. But I maintain that ordinary life is at least largely the testing ground of metaphysical beliefs. Even if the self is an "illusion," it's a more dominant "illusion" than the logical-rational points that can indeed be made for its status as a fiction or part of the map. So it's not about common sense or folk wisdom (which isn't stable anyway) but about our (relatively) non-theoretical mode of being in the world. This non-theoretical mode isn't stable either. It may include getting on planes these days. But the "know how" involved in navigating this world is perhaps "invisible" to a metaphysics of the "present-at-hand." (Yes, I'm studying Heidegger at the moment. He's, among other things, a "pragmatist.")

Sure. I am arguing for that too. But I am saying that metaphysics is the ur-rational discourse. It has to be to ground maths and science. Dialectical categories like discrete~continuous, matter~form, chance~necessity, one~many, and scores more, were how the whole rational/objective view of existence got started. — apokrisis

I think math and science are grounded in the successful use of tools. Calculus worked before it was made rigorous. Only after a flurry of successful applications did mathematicians get ontological about the real numbers. What the hell had they been talking about and using all along? I think Fourier series were the breakdown in "equipment" that made the real numbers visible or present-at-hand as entities to be explained (rigorously defined).

I suggest the hermeneutic circle. We have a fuzzy notion of things to begin with. We go back and forth from theory to practice, this word in relation to that word, clarifying. I do respect the German Idealist project of deducing reality from a minimum presupposition. I still find it somewhat fictional or artistic. The actual presupposition is the life history of the author.

But "philosophy" is big enough to accept both modes of discourse. Well, in the end, I don't think it does. I think people who argue that always have a hidden pragmatic agenda - social goals in mind. — apokrisis

The same kind of critique could read this exclusion as "scientism," a social goal that legitimates only the discourse of rational experts, a "priesthood." The Marxists spoke of "bourgeois sentimentality" and had no choice but to misread existentialists like Stirner, Sartre, and Heidegger. For them thinking was absolutely social. The individual was a dangerous fiction, a temptation. But this anti-individuality can be read as an expression of individuality. The individual identifies completely with dialectical materialism, for instance, blind to the choice involved. That choice threatens the fundamental pose, which is one's view is grounded, necessary, universal.

But PoMo especially is a political movement. It's purpose is social change. Well, in France especially, it is a route to being a public person, with all the personal advantages that can bring. C'mon. We can all see the game going on! — apokrisis

I'm sure there's some general truth in what you say, but details matter. And one can learn from someone whose politics one is not interested in. I think Heidegger (before WWII) is great, and this "peak" Heidegger is apolitical. A person can sniff around in retrospect for hints of the latent Nazi, but it's anything but obvious. Indeed, you'd probably find this Heidegger "Romantic" and too asocial when he wasn't being laudably pragmatic.

Emergence is one of the forms of Spiritualist mumbo-jumbo for trying to explain a "Mind" separate from body.

We;re the animal. The animal is unitary. (not separate body and mind).

Our experience, our point of view is that of the animal.

In objective, 3rd-person terms, the experience or point-of-view of an animal or other purposefully-responsive device, is its surroundings and events in those surroundings, in the context of the purposes built into that purposefully-responsive device (along with acquired modifications of those purposes).

Michael Ossipoff