This is obviously a decoupling of truth (and metaphysics) from reality as we see and feel it, and problematizes how far we can know given that we are fooled by the Will. — Agustino

No one is being fooled by anything. There is no 'fooler". The moment one starts anthromorphizing nature, everything gets lost in illusion stories. The Mind is unfolding but all is not accessible and it always changing. The more one develops ones own skills to observe, the more one sees. The biggest problem are those who wish to handcuff our ability to evolve.

Good topic. I watched the video and liked it. Not that this was necessarily what he was getting at, but certainly if the we claimed that the truth of the world is its instrumentality (its need to strive forward for no reason without much end in sight), and people are wont to viscerally deny this through whatever means necessary to keep their own organism (and their offspring) moving forward, then indeed fitness for survival will always outcompete truth. Truth would die out in a few generations and explains most people's vigorous defense in this matter. Cultural traditions (for lack of a better term "memes") for defending life itself gets passed down in the culture as it is a survival strategy to keep self-reflective beings (who do have the ability to deny life's goodness) to keep going and embrace life for the next generation.

Schopenhauer's metaphysics is most unique and beautiful. The world is really will- a striving force that has no aim or purpose. The world of appearance makes us think that there is time/space/causality and creates for us a little umwelt where we think that attaining goals will give peace, but are maniacally designed to trick us into continuing the goal-seeking process. At bottom all is aimless striving of will, and thus nothing in the world of appearance will ever truly satisfy. The goal then of the enlightened individual is to turn the will against itself, live an ascetic life where will becomes gradually diminished, until it loses its grip completely thus somehow diminishing the reign of will's supremacy in some fashion.

However, though I admire the philosopher and his descriptive elaborations on the striving nature of man and reality, I have some criticisms of his metaphysics.

1) If it is will that is thing-in-itself, and there is no causitive nature to the thing-in-itself (logically or temporally), then there cannot be a before or after. There cannot be a will and then something else. Thus, representation being secondary to will, cannot come after but be concomitant all the way down. Thus the thing-in-itself must logically be will AND representation and not just will.

2) If representation started with the first organism to represent its world (he used an analogy of the eye of a fish), then this makes the tricky situation of time itself starting with the first representational animal. This gets into problem that this organism then becomes extremely important in his ontology, as if the representation is always the flip side of will, then the organism would have to be a being in time, yet timeless, as if we look at my first argument, there was no before and after prior to representation, thus representation would have to be there from the beginning, or the animal that represents would have to be there from the beginning, which is an odd conclusion.

3) What is the nature of this representation? Even if we were to say that representation is an "illusion", then this has to be explained. Clearly the illusion exists, so can it really be called an illusion? This is the problem that other philosophies suffer that use illusion for the internal experiences of the individual organism. If all is will, then how can this illusion of time/space/causality be its flip side? Where did this time/space/causality come from? Will tricked itself into have these physical structures? Again, if will is not temporal, then these structures were not created as a secondary thing, but were concomitant with will all along. Thus Schopenhauer seems to waiver between this "will is primary, appearance is secondary" notion with a neutral monism of "will and appearance are always together one being the flip side of the other".

if the we claimed that the truth of the world is its instrumentality (its need to strive forward for no reason without much end in sight), and people are wont to viscerally deny this through whatever means necessary to keep their own organism (and their offspring) moving forward, then indeed fitness for survival will always outcompete truth. — schopenhauer1

No, the claim was more radical than that - we cannot know the truth of the world as such - the truth of the world for us is will.

The world is really will- a striving force that has no aim or purpose. — schopenhauer1

It does have an aim. That's why it is willing. Willing is the aim.

The goal then of the enlightened individual is to turn the will against itself, live an ascetic life where will becomes gradually diminished, until it loses its grip completely thus somehow diminishing the reign of will's supremacy in some fashion. — schopenhauer1

I would disagree with Schopenhauer at this point. In the process of denial of the will I think compassion, rather than renunciation and asceticism, is the driving engine and most important factor. It is love if anything that opens the gate beyond willing.

1) If it is will that is thing-in-itself, and there is no causitive nature to the thing-in-itself (logically or temporally), then there cannot be a before or after. There cannot be a will and then something else. Thus, representation being secondary to will, cannot come after but be concomitant all the way down. Thus the thing-in-itself must logically be will AND representation and not just will. — schopenhauer1

I agree about the concomitance of representation and will - except that I disagree with the identification between Will and thing-in-itself, and old Schopenhauer would very likely have disagreed too.

2) If representation started with the first organism to represent its world (he used an analogy of the eye of a fish), then this makes the tricky situation of time itself starting with the first representational animal. This gets into problem that this organism then becomes extremely important in his ontology, as if the representation is always the flip side of will, then the organism would have to be a being in time, yet timeless, as if we look at my first argument, there was no before and after prior to representation, thus representation would have to be there from the beginning, or the animal that represents would have to be there from the beginning, which is an odd conclusion. — schopenhauer1

I don't think so, since the Will is atemporal, temporality only exists in the objectification of the Will qua representation. Will projects time.

What is the nature of this representation? — schopenhauer1

The representation is the objectification of the Will - the Will projects an external world, in time, etc. for itself. By projecting its own striving, it projects the world, including the structures of representation. For example, by projecting the failure of its striving to attain, it projects an external world in which it is a suffering victim and unable to control what happens to itself.

I think your reading misses precisely the point I'm trying to put my finger on. Schopenhauer never does metaphysics. The illusion isn't representation and Will is truth - rather they are both illusions. The Will is just the truth of the representation, but it is not truth in-itself, except perhaps in some partial and incomplete sense.

he illusion isn't representation and Will is truth - rather they are both illusions. The Will is just the truth of the representation, but it is not truth in-itself, except perhaps in some partial and incomplete sense. — Agustino

Are you attempting inquiry?

Is all this an illusion?

Everything is exactly as we observe it, but it is not all and it is constantly changing - changing because of the Mind (Will is one aspect) is continuously shaping and reshaping it. Why always with illusions? What is it with philosophers and scientists that they enjoy this concept so much. Because of its mystery?

It's not an illusion but we are only grasping it bits at a time. That is the fun of life. It is detective work, it is mysterious, but it is not an illusion. How could it be? What or who is creating the illusions? Chemicals??

No, the claim was more radical than that - we cannot know the truth of the world as such - the truth of the world for us is will. — Agustino

I didn't hear much or anything about will in there, but I can have another listen. Indeed, the world for us could be equated with what he said about doing what is fittest not doing what is seeking truth. I'd still say the main gist of what he was saying is truth can be in conflict with fitness and a species that survives does what is fit not what is truthful.

It does have an aim. That's why it is willing. Willing is the aim. — Agustino

I think you're putting the cart before the horse. The process of aiming (with no avail) is the will process. We do not aim at willing, it is the underlying process that causes one to aim in the first place. I am guessing you are trying to do some unique reading of this, and thus the claim where I am supposedly misguided, but I don't see it when reading Schopenhauer, and logically it seems to be a little word play you're doing that doesn't make sense. Will does what it does. It is the ground of being in his philosophy. Will plays itself out in the world of appearance (i.e. time/space/causality) in its restless nature, but no goal ever achieves satisfaction.

I would disagree with Schopenhauer at this point. In the process of denial of the will I think compassion, rather than renunciation and asceticism, is the driving engine and most important factor. It is love if anything that opens the gate beyond willing. — Agustino

I'm sure you are aware, compassion is part of Schopenhauer's ethical system. Indeed there is a conflict between other-oriented ethics and seemingly self-oriented denial of will. I tend to synthesize both tendencies with antinatalism. Dialogue with others about the conditions of existence (i.e. instrumentality) can include the other, and compassion and consolation of will can be included in one as it becomes discussion in the public forum.

I agree about the concomitance of representation and will - except that I disagree with the identification between Will and thing-in-itself, and old Schopenhauer would very likely have disagreed too. — Agustino

I'm not sure what you mean here. Schopenhauer identified Will with thing-in-itself constantly.

I don't think so, since the Will is atemporal, temporality only exists in the objectification of the Will qua representation. Will projects time. — Agustino

The representation is the objectification of the Will - the Will projects an external world, in time, etc. for itself. By projecting its own striving, it projects the world, including the structures of representation. For example, by projecting the failure of its striving to attain, it projects an external world in which it is a suffering victim and unable to control what happens to itself. — Agustino

See this is where I find Schopenhauer in a contradiction. If all is monistic, then Will is all there is. There is no projection. In fact, there is no-thing that even remotely can be an analogue to a predicate (project, objectify, manifest, etc.). Will either "is" alone or it is a multiplicity and really not the ground behind being. Rather, instead of being the "true" ground, it has to be concommitant. In other words, even though time is only in appearance, somehow it has to be atemporal as well because it has always been there as flipside of Will. This is a contradiction there as time cannot be temporal and atemporal.

I think your reading misses precisely the point I'm trying to put my finger on. Schopenhauer never does metaphysics. The illusion isn't representation and Will is truth - rather they are both illusions. The Will is just the truth of the representation, but it is not truth in-itself, except perhaps in some partial and incomplete sense. — Agustino

I'm not sure what you are getting at here. In so far as Will itself is only seen to us through the representation, it is never seen in and of itself, only gleaned at through introspection and logical analysis. However, as a general understanding of what is going on, Schopenhauer obviously believed we can understand this and even do something about it. He was not skeptical of his own insight. If anything, Schopenhauer was pretty confident in his thoughts.

Are you attempting inquiry?

Is all this an illusion? — Rich

Yes, I am obviously attempting inquiry.

Is all this an illusion? — Rich

That depends on what you mean by illusion. When we say the representation is an illusion, we don't mean that the representation doesn't exist, only that it's not what it appears to be. The world of representation is thus dream-like. So representation is an illusion simply means that, for example, there is something that appears to be an external world, like in a dream, while it's actually all subjectively generated. In this manner, you too - being a Daoist - believe the world is an illusion. What did Zhuangzi say - one time I dreamed I was a butterfly, and then I woke up. I am not sure if it is now that I am a butterfly dreaming that I am a man, or that I was then a man dreaming I was a butterfly. This is precisely what it means that representation is illusory.

Everything is exactly as we observe it, but it is not all and it is constantly changing — Rich

Well, this is either tautologically true (sort of like A = A), or it is a misunderstanding of illusions. What is an illusion? In a sense, an illusion is nothing - it's not an additional substance out there - it's just the wrong conception that something is the case when it isn't. It's a deception of the mind.

It's not an illusion but we are only grasping it bits at a time. That is the fun of life. It is detective work, it is mysterious, but it is not an illusion. How could it be? What or who is creating the illusions? Chemicals?? — Rich

Nobody argued everything is illusory. As I said, Schopenhauer wasn't doing metaphysics there.

I'd still say the main gist of what he was saying is truth can be in conflict with fitness and a species that survives does what is fit not what is truthful. — schopenhauer1

More - a species that survives does not know (leaning towards cannot know) what is true.

I think you're putting the cart before the horse. The process of aiming (with no avail) is the will process. We do not aim at willing, it is the underlying process that causes one to aim in the first place. I am guessing you are trying to do some unique reading of this, and thus the claim where I am supposedly misguided, but I don't see it when reading Schopenhauer, and logically it seems to be a little word play you're doing that doesn't make sense. Will does what it does. It is the ground of being in his philosophy. Will plays itself out in the world of appearance (i.e. time/space/causality) in its restless nature, but no goal ever achieves satisfaction. — schopenhauer1

Yes, Will is like the serpent that eats its own tail - Will consumes itself, and thus goes on Willing.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Schopenhauer identified Will with thing-in-itself constantly. — schopenhauer1

He started to shy away from this identification towards the end of his life, when he reverted more to the Kantian understanding of thing-in-itself as an unknown X.

If all is monistic, then Will is all there is. — schopenhauer1

We don't know what is beyond the Will.

Rather, instead of being the "true" ground, it has to be concommitant. — schopenhauer1

I would say that the Will is the ground of the phenomenon, and thus there is a logical priority in the Will. The phenomenon is static. Time wouldn't flow for example if there was no Will. The flow of time is the Will. That's what grounds time, its flow, and the whole structure of the representation.

In other words, even though time is only in appearance, somehow it has to be atemporal as well because it has always been there as flipside of Will. — schopenhauer1

Yep, Schopenhauer says exactly this. Time is atemporal since the Will is always there, that's why from within representation time has an infinite past as it were - the Will projects itself in time, and thus time appears as infinite.

I'm not sure what you are getting at here. In so far as Will itself is only seen to us through the representation, it is never seen in and of itself, only gleaned at through introspection and logical analysis. — schopenhauer1

I think this is the most profound misunderstanding. Quite the contrary, the Will is seen DIRECTLY unlike the representation which is perceived through the principle of sufficient reason. When you will something, you feel it instantaneously, there is no separation, like there is temporal, spatial, etc. separation in the representation. So if anything, it is the representation that is not seen directly, but mediated through the categories.

So to come back to the idea of the "first creature opening its eyes" - that is nonsense. The Will exists eternally, it does not need this "first creature". This creature only appears as a "first" within the representation. But the representation exists before this first creature as Will. The representation doesn't suddenly pop up when this creature emerges - that would be to locate the ground of the representation within the representation, which is obviously wrong.

When we say the representation is an illusion, we don't mean that the representation doesn't exist, only that it's not what it appears to be. — Agustino

We only see bits. Saying that individual observations are incomplete is different than saying that an observation is still illusion. I have a tendency to suspect any inquiry into life that leans on illusion.

Observations are past. They are memory. Everything is constantly changing. It doesn't mean it is some sort of an illusion. The nature of life is that each individual mind is participating and doesn't have a complete view. That is why we share experiences. There is only a problem if one seeks Truth/Constancy in a Nature in flux.

An illusion is not a substance, it has no being. An illusion is a misunderstanding. So when you say that it's not some sort of an illusion, I have no clue what you mean. What does that mean, that it isn't an illusion? :s It is as it appears to natural consciousness, to use a Hegelian term? That is the correct conception of reality? Or what?

An illusion is a misunderstanding. — Agustino

An illusion is not a misunderstanding. When I tell someone that there is a misunderstanding I don't tell them they are having illusions. The two words have different flavors. But I am saying something different. I am saying that observations are real but necessarily incomplete. No illusions because illusions lead no where. It is lazy philosophy.

An illusion it's not a misunderstanding. When I tell someone that there is a misunderstanding I don't tell them they are having illusions. — Rich

What is an illusion? Can you offer me an example as well please?

What is an illusion? Can you offer me an example as well please? — Agustino

An illusion is a word that is inspired by magic. It has a connotation of the mysterious. It is a fun word to use but when I am investigating the nature of nature, I don't use it not do I encourage it. No one is trying to trick us nor are we trying to trick ourselves. We are simply trying to learn the skill to observe more.

I think this is the most profound misunderstanding. Quite the contrary, the Will is seen DIRECTLY unlike the representation which is perceived through the principle of sufficient reason. When you will something, you feel it instantaneously, there is no separation, like there is temporal, spatial, etc. separation in the representation. So if anything, it is the representation that is not seen directly, but mediated through the categories. — Agustino

I was responding to what you said earlier here:

The Will is just the truth of the representation, but it is not truth in-itself, except perhaps in some partial and incomplete sense. — Agustino

So I thought you were saying that we cannot know Will in-itself which I was trying to refute. Now, yes Schopenhauer did say that we can feel the immediacy of Will in our very willing movements, but it is still will as mediated by appearance. To allude to something you yourself said earlier:

He started to shy away from this identification towards the end of his life, when he reverted more to the Kantian understanding of thing-in-itself as an unknown X. — Agustino

Thus, Will as thing-in-itself is not fully realized. It is through our mediated Will in the world as appearance dual-aspect going on. Thus, we can use our own introspection to glean at Will but the full picture may be only analyzed as it is rather an unknown being atemporal/aspatial/alogical etc. and fully monistic. We can glean it is a striving principle and that we are part of the striving itself in our own natures.

An illusion is a word that is inspired by magic. It has a connotation of the mysterious. It is a fun word to use but when I am investigating the nature of nature, I don't use it not do I encourage it. — Rich

Ok, so what does it mean exactly? And what is magic?

Thus, Will as thing-in-itself is not fully realized. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but don't forget that the Will appears as "nothing" to those where no Will is present, and inversely, everything else (non-Will) appears as "nothing" to those full of will. So no - Will is not thing-in-itself - at least not the complete thing-in-itself.

Now, yes Schopenhauer did say that we can feel the immediacy of Will in our very willing movements, but it is still will as mediated by appearance — schopenhauer1

I don't see how it's mediated by appearances at all. The feeling of pain just is pain, there's nothing "mediating" it. There's no separation between experiencing it and itself.

and fully monistic. — schopenhauer1

Schopenhauer denied this "one" for neither one nor two.

We can glean it is a striving principle and that we are part of the striving itself in our own natures. — schopenhauer1

I would disagree with Schopenhauer that there is one Will. Rather the World is the summation of Wills, which are similar to Leibniz's monads - I think that is a better way to think of it, one that I have only started investigating recently. Or perhaps even better said - the Will is a fragmentary process.

There is no exact meaning for anything. Words like illusion are used to to imply the mysterious. For me there is nothing mysteries. Just something that needs to be investigated and observed and better understood. Do you think something mysterious and magical is going on. Or v is it just incomplete and continuously changing?

Do you think something mysterious and magical is going on. Or v is it just incomplete and continuously changing? — Rich

Once you define what this mysterious, magical, or illusory are (since now you're just giving me synonyms right now), I will be able to tell you what I think. If you cannot point me to the meaning of these words, then clearly I can't tell you in a way where we both agree on the meanings.

Well, I wasn't the one to use the word illusion. To me it denotes some sorry if magically trickery. By whom? By what? For what reason? I have no idea why illusions are introduced into philosophy.

To me it denotes some sorry if magically trickery. — Rich

Well you're not providing a definition or showing me what it is :s - so of course you have no idea why illusions are introduced into philosophy when you don't define them in any clear way :s

I would disagree with Schopenhauer that there is one Will. Rather the World is the summation of Wills, which are similar to Leibniz's monads - I think that is a better way to think of it, one that I have only started investigating recently. Or perhaps even better said - the Will is a fragmentary process. — Agustino

If that's the case, skip Leibniz and go right to Whitehead's process philosophy.

I don't see how it's mediated by appearances at all. The feeling of pain just is pain, there's nothing "mediating" it. There's no separation between experiencing it and itself. — Agustino

Man, you would debate a wall if it got in your way. Can you ever incorporate the other's ideas rather than pure me vs. you dialectic? Doesn't this way of debating wear you out and frustrate? Anyways, pain is pain, but if all were pure will, (or rather X), then there is no pain, no you, no nothing except Will. It is the world of appearance that this pain takes place as a "manifestation" of will. But keep arguing.

There are no illusions and illusions are not misunderstandings. However, I understand the appeal for those who wish to create an aura if mystery. The Hindus call it the Maya.

If that's the case, skip Leibniz and go right to Whitehead's process philosophy. — schopenhauer1

I have not studied Whitehead.

Man, you would debate a wall if it got in your way. — schopenhauer1

>:O - and would it move out of my way then?

“Truly I tell you that if anyone says to this mountain, ‘Be lifted up and thrown into the sea,’ and has no doubt in his heart but believes that it will happen, it will be done for him. — Mark 11:23

Can you ever incorporate the other's ideas rather than pure me vs. you dialectic? — schopenhauer1

It's a me vs you dialectic not because you said it, but rather because I really disagree with your ideas on those points. I haven't bothered to comment on things I agree with, obviously.

Doesn't this way of debating wear you out and frustrate? — schopenhauer1

I don't take debate personally. I'm not pained if you disagree with me, I'm not here to convince you.

Anyways, pain is pain, but if all were pure will, (or rather X), then there is no pain, no you, no nothing except Will. — schopenhauer1

But isn't willing a pain, a suffering? When you're hungry, that is willing. The feeling of hunger is an aspect of Will.

There are no illusions and illusions are not misunderstandings. However, I understand the appeal for those who wish to create an aura if mystery. The Hindus call it the Maya. — Rich

Well right, if you define illusion as that which doesn't exist, no wonder then that you struggle to say what an illusion actually is or feel perplexed when representation is called maya or an illusion.

But isn't willing a pain, a suffering? When you're hungry, that is willing. The feeling of hunger is an aspect of Will. — Agustino

It is a manifestation of willing in the subject/object relationship.. one step down from Will, that mysterious force in-itself.

@Agustino

I think you especially would get a lot out of Whitehead.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whitehead/

http://www.iep.utm.edu/whitehed/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_North_Whitehead

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process_and_Reality

It is a manifestation of willing in the subject/object relationship.. one step down from Will, that mysterious force in-itself. — schopenhauer1

I know that Schopenhauer would say that, but I'm not quite sure. In hunger, the subject and object are the same it seems to me. That's why I said:

The feeling of pain just is pain — Agustino

Here, subject and object are identical it seems to me. Am I wrong?

Thanks.

Well right, if you define illusion as that which doesn't exist, no wonder then that you struggle to say what an illusion actually is or feel perplexed when representation is called maya or an illusion. — Agustino

Not struggling with anything. It is a meaningless word that says nothing about nothing. I call it lazy philosophy, or another way to put it, all illusions are illusions.