Why would I dismiss semantics? — Srap Tasmaner
We have meaning, but machines only have syntax. We have language, but other living things have signaling at best. It's tempting to identify the two hierarchies, to say that animals must have only syntax but no meaning.
But I think this is a mistake. — Srap Tasmaner
Actually, the fact that some things are wet and some are not, is sufficient to prove that wetness has essential properties, as so: — Samuel Lacrampe
This might get a bit off topic, but I think your claim here is a non-issue, because in real life, there is no such thing as a negative number in the absolute sense. E.g. there is no negative absolute temperature, pressure or mass. So I agree that quantities do not allow for negative values, but this is in conformance to reality. — Samuel Lacrampe
Greenness, the thing in itself, is not this 'range of wavelength of light' you describe. If it were, then it would be logically impossible for us to imagine greenness without imagining a light source, inasmuch as we cannot imagine a triangle without imagining three sides; but we can imagine greenness by itself. The true concept of greenness is not about wavelengths, but is simply this. Rather than being one and the same thing, this 'range of wavelength of light' is a cause of us sensing greenness, or to use Aristotle's terminology, it is an efficient cause of greenness, not its formal cause. — Samuel Lacrampe
It is species-specific categorisation and interpretation which decodes physical information (received through sensory stimulation and/or interoception), producing semantic information. — Galuchat
philosophy is a science. — Harry Hindu
t's funny to see them ignore our comments, — Harry Hindu
Unless I misunderstood what you said, I think I agree with you that just because we agree on the meaning of the concept 'wet', it does not follow that the particular thing we observe is in fact wet. It could be a false perception of wetness. But this is besides the point about essential properties. If you and I mean the same thing when using the word 'wet', then the meaning has some essential properties. More explanation further down.The point is. that things are only "wet" because we call them "wet". That constitutes "the fact" that some things are wet, we agree to call them wet. If we didn't call them wet, then there would be no fact that they are wet. If we agree to call certain things wet, this does not prove that wetness has certain essential properties, it proves that we can agree about which things to call wet. — Metaphysician Undercover
But it does. Let's say you and I observe a chair. Assuming no false perceptions are present, you would be confused if I said "This is a lake", and rightfully so. Because the observed things correspond to the properties attributed to a chair, not a lake. Sure, some of the observed properties would be accidental, like its colour and location, but some would be essential like having a backrest or being a structure. And no observed properties would correspond to properties essential to the concept of lake, like 'a large body of water'.[...] but this does not mean that any particular word necessarily refers to any particular set of essential properties. — Metaphysician Undercover
This concept is so basic that it has only one essential property: being green, or this; which does not help. Another reason why 'greenness' was a bad example to prove my point. I should really stick to triangle-ness haha.If we cannot define "greenness", only experience it, then how can it have essential properties? — Metaphysician Undercover
Essential properties are essential to the concept; not necessarily essential to the particular things we observe. We could have false perceptions of the things we are observing. And when you call the thing green and we call it blue, we may disagree on the fact, but we still understand what each other mean by green and blue.According to what you say, I assume that I am correct in calling this green, and the others are correct in calling this blue, because this is how we each experience the colour. How can there be essential properties of greenness when the same colour is correctly called green by me, and blue by others? — Metaphysician Undercover
Let's say you and I observe a chair. Assuming no false perceptions are present, you would be confused if I said "This is a lake", and rightfully so. Because the observed things correspond to the properties attributed to a chair, not a lake. Sure, some of the observed properties would be accidental, like its colour and location, but some would be essential like having a backrest or being a structure. And no observed properties would correspond to properties essential to the concept of lake, like 'a large body of water'. — Samuel Lacrampe
No. You wanted to have a discussion about Jerry Coyne, remember? You wanted to focus on a small sentence that wasn't even that important in my post, remember? And I told you that I'm not being dismissive - that I have done a 180 on my worldview before and that I can do so again if the explanation and answer to my questions are reasonable. You seem to think that I should accept an unreasonable question. You do believe that there are such things as nonsensical questions, don't you? If I said that a question is nonsense, then make an attempt to clarify, or tell me why it's not nonsense. When I've seen you "waste your time" with others who are actually thick-headed, I know that your complaint against me here isn't actually true. You just don't have the answers to the difficult questions that you should be asking yourself.Actually, Harry Hindu, the reason I ignored your comments is because of your dismissive attitude - 'the question is nonsense' - and your (I'm sorry to say) obvious lack of understanding of anything beyond pop science. It's not rudeness, but life being too short. — Wayfarer
What does that even mean? No, I'm not being dismissive. I'm asking a question that, if you have a legitimate, reasonable, answer to, then I can be swayed to see your side of things. So, instead of getting frustrated at difficult questions, that you should be asking yourself, try to answer them because it will do you as much good as it would for me.The difference between philosophy and science is a philosophical distinction. — Wayfarer
The difference between philosophy and science is a philosophical distinction.
— Wayfarer
What does that even mean? — Harry Hindu
Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once. And so forth. In general, to grasp a concept is simply not the same thing as having a mental image.
Now the thought you are having about triangularity when you grasp it must be as determinate or exact as triangularity itself, otherwise it just wouldn’t be a thought about triangularity in the first place, but only a thought about some approximation of triangularity. Yet material things are never determinate or exact in this way. Any material triangle, for example, is always only ever an approximation of perfect triangularity (since it is bound to have sides that are less than perfectly straight, etc., even if this is undetectable to the naked eye). And in general, material symbols and representations are inherently always to some extent vague, ambiguous, or otherwise inexact, susceptible of various alternative interpretations. It follows, then, that any thought you might have about triangularity is not something material; in particular, it is not some process occurring in the brain. And what goes for triangularity goes for any thought that involves the grasp of a universal, since universals in general (or at least very many of them, in case someone should wish to dispute this) are determinate and exact in a way material objects and processes cannot be. — Edward Feser
For Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and other ancients and medievals, the main reason why the mind has to be immaterial concerns its affinity to its primary objects of knowledge, namely universals, which are themselves immaterial. When properly fleshed out and understood, this sort of argument is in my view decisive.
How do you go about determining the factual basis for values and meaning without measurements of values and meaning?Mainly, it means that philosophy is primarily concerned with a ‘metaphysic of value’ - some factual basis for values and meaning. Science doesn’t provide any such basis, as it is concerned with what is measurable, with objective fact. This is what underlies the ‘is-ought’ distinction that Hume is associated with. — Wayfarer
Words point to concepts. Words are man-made and decided upon; concepts are abstracted. — Samuel Lacrampe
2. The fact is that we recognize a concept in some things X, and not in other things Y.
3. This means that properties of that concept exist in X and not in Y.
4. If all the properties in X were accidental to the concept, then the concept would still be present in Y, — Samuel Lacrampe
He gives another example elsewhere using a figure called a chilliagon, which is a bounded geometric object comprising 1,000 sides. To the naked eye, at first glance, it looks damn like a circle - but it isn't a circle, it's a chilliagon. If you were asked to draw such a figure, you might find it a very difficult thing to do, but you would have to produce a thousand-sided figure, not a circle - because you would understand the concept. — Wayfarer
You can describe it as knowledge of an abstract object if you like, but what really matters here is knowing how to proceed. — Srap Tasmaner
That stipulation gives you a rule to follow. — Srap Tasmaner
That doesn't add anything to the point; you know how to proceed, because you grasp the idea. — Wayfarer
There's all this "grasping" in your approach, as if this explains things. — Srap Tasmaner
All due respect, the debate about the reality or otherwise of concepts, laws, numbers, and so on, is one of the central questions of philosophy. I'm not 'slipping away' from anything but if you don't see the significance of it, then there's no point in discussing it.This puts them out of the domain of philosophy, and into the domain of the poetic imagination. — Janus
I still do not get it. — Πετροκότσυφας
That I get is that because universals are "exact" and not "messy" like their instantiations they're somehow thoughts unlike others, they're "not some process occurring in the brain". — Πετροκότσυφας
All due respect, the debate about the reality or otherwise of concepts, laws, numbers, and so on, is one of the central questions of philosophy. I'm not 'slipping away' from anything but if you don't see the significance of it, then there's no point in discussing it. — Wayfarer
Regularity" is turned into a being itself, when it's an abstraction of our own making, born out out of particulars. In Robinson's words: — Πετροκότσυφας
Your cited text seems to make a distinction between thoughts of universals (i.e. triangularity) and other (common?) thoughts, where the former does not occur in the brain. — Πετροκότσυφας
Can you name a philosopher or two for whom this is a "central question"? — Janus
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