Say that to Samson.

If you deny states, then you deny things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all; things can be conceived as agents or manifestations of activity, rather than as bearers of states. Things must then be thought of as extended instantiations of temporal activity, rather than as entities that exist merely in successions of static point-instants.

See, you are faced with a question here. Which is real, what is depicted by the model, a series of states, or what you call "actual motion"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Actual motion is motion as experienced; which is continuous. It is not experienced as a succession of discrete states or positions. Motion as experienced is the territory, and motion as a succession of discrete positions is the map. The the map is a reduction, the map is not the territory.

hey don't flatter yourself ;-)

Indeed, concepts are not necessarily in the mind, because they are first abstracted from the particulars. E.g. 'triangle-ness' is abstracted from particular triangles we observe. — Samuel Lacrampe

The abstraction occurs within the mind, a process which the mind carries out. So how does this make an argument that concepts are outside of a mind?

There may be an ambiguity of the term 'concept'. In philosophy, concepts are the essence of things. In informal language, it is indeed synonymous to a mere idea. I think ideas are essentially in minds, but concepts are not, because they are abstracted into the mind, from "somewhere outside of it", so to speak. — Samuel Lacrampe

"Abstracted into the mind" makes no sense to me. A mind abstracts. Abstraction is a process which the mind carries out, completely within the mind. If there is a thing called an abstraction, it must exist within a mind. Nothing is abstracted into the mind.

E.g. we can all use the word 'justice' correctly in a sentence, but we don't necessarily know its essential properties. — Samuel Lacrampe

So what happens if no one can say what the essential properties of "justice" are, or, like in Plato's republic, there is no agreement as to what the essential properties are? What makes you think that there is such a thing as the essential properties of "justice"?

Let's try it with fineness. I think its essence is: "IIIII" (or whatever other object, as long as there are five of them). — Samuel Lacrampe

How does that make sense? You say that the essence of "fiveness" is that there is five of them. So the essence of justice is that it is just? And the essence of greenness is that it is green? That doesn't make any sense.

Not at all; things can be conceived as agents or manifestations of activity, rather than as bearers of states. Things must then be thought of as extended instantiations of temporal activity, rather than as entities that exist merely in successions of static point-instants. — Janus

OK, if you want to take that route, and deny that a thing is a state, then the laws of logic do not apply to any thing. An activity, is by definition a change. So instead of explaining activity as a thing which is active, carrying out an activity, for you the activity is the thing. There is no thing which is carrying out that activity, because the activity is the thing. As an activity, then,what that thing is, or is not, cannot be stated because it is changing, and this depends on one's perspective. It is relative. Are you satisfied with an ontology which denies that the laws of logic can be applied toward understanding real things?

The abstraction occurs within the mind, a process which the mind carries out. So how does this make an argument that concepts are outside of a mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because abstraction is a process, from A to B, from input to output. Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place.

So what happens if no one can say what the essential properties of "justice" are, or, like in Plato's republic, there is no agreement as to what the essential properties are? — Metaphysician Undercover

It just means they have not yet found the explicit definition of the concept. Not a big deal in everyday discussions because we still all have the implicit definition of it. E.g. you and I can still agree on whether a particular event is just or unjust; we just could not figure out general truths such as if justice is by definition always more profitable than injustice. For this one, we need the explicit definition.

What makes you think that there is such a thing as the essential properties of "justice"? — Metaphysician Undercover

A property is essential to a concept if, should it be removed, the concept would no longer be present. Thus, if there exists a case (1) that is undeniably just, and a case (2) that is undeniably unjust, then there must be some properties in case (1) to make it just, which are not found in case (2) to make it unjust. And these, by definition, would be the essential properties of justice.

• Case (1): Two workers having the same work qualities (skills, seniority, quality of work, etc) are paid the same.
• Case (2): The same two workers are not paid the same; one's pay is the double of the other.

How does that make sense? You say that the essence of "fiveness" is that there is five of them. So the essence of justice is that it is just? ... — Metaphysician Undercover

I have mislead you by adding the things in parentheses. I meant that fiveness can be represented by IIIII or *****. The particular object doesn't matter, as long as the quantity is correct. So the essence of triangle-ness is not to be a triangle (that would be circular), but to be a flat surface with three straight sides.

Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think you’ve put that well.

Because abstraction is a process, from A to B, from input to output. Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place. — Samuel Lacrampe

So, how do you conclude that because the input is not in the mind, therefore the abstraction is not in the mind? "Abstraction" refers to either the process, or the output, it doesn't refer to the input. The input is what the abstraction is abstracted from.

It just means they have not yet found the explicit definition of the concept. Not a big deal in everyday discussions because we still all have the implicit definition of it. E.g. you and I can still agree on whether a particular event is just or unjust; we just could not figure out general truths such as if justice is by definition always more profitable than injustice. For this one, we need the explicit definition. — Samuel Lacrampe

If we both agree, then this indicates that we both have a similar concept within our minds. What is being discussed is the possibility of a concept which is not within our minds. If your claim is that a concept exists as a definition, that definition is only symbols on a piece of paper, which needs to be interpreted by a mind.

Thus, if there exists a case (1) that is undeniably just, and a case (2) that is undeniably unjust, then there must be some properties in case (1) to make it just, which are not found in case (2) to make it unjust. And these, by definition, would be the essential properties of justice. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't buy this at all. By the method you've proposed, accidentals can be mistaken for essentials. Suppose I want to know the essential properties of the concept of "wet". I have some cold water which is undeniably wet. And I have some warm sand which is undeniably dry. According to your logic, this property, "cold", which is found in the water, but not in the sand, is an essential property of "wet".

I have mislead you by adding the things in parentheses. I meant that fiveness can be represented by IIIII or *****. The particular object doesn't matter, as long as the quantity is correct. — Samuel Lacrampe

So you are saying that the essence of fiveness is a particular quantity. I do not agree with this. I think that the essence of five is defined by order. I learned what five is by learning to count. Five comes after four, and before six. That five is a particular quantity of counts, one, two, three, four, five, is accidental, not essential, because one could start at zero, then five would be six counts, or one could start at a negative number. Therefore, what is essential to five is that it holds a place between four and six, within a particular order, not that it represents a particular quantity. I think that you are wrong because you've already demonstrated that you use faulty principles in determining what is essential, such that you may confuse accidentals with essentials.

Since we cannot agree on the essence of fiveness, what makes you think that there really is an essence of fiveness? What if we were to trade places between five and three? Then five would represent a different quantity, and a different place in the order. In reality, the essence of fiveness is just a convention, one which we can't even agree on. What kind of convention is that?

So the essence of triangle-ness is not to be a triangle (that would be circular), but to be a flat surface with three straight sides. — Samuel Lacrampe

Suppose I agree with you, that the concept of a triangle exists by means of this definition "a flat surface with three straight sides". Would you agree with me, that this definition only exists as physical symbols? How do you propose that we get beyond this, to say that the concept, or definition, has an immaterial existence, without being read and interpreted by a mind? In which case, the immaterial existence would only be within a mind? The definition would be material symbols, but the immaterial concept would be in the mind. So we have a division between the definition, being material and outside of minds, and the concept being immaterial and within minds. How do you propose that the immaterial concept could exist within the material symbols, independently of a mind?

you seem to be confused by the cause of red being seen in different objects. For apples, it is an indicator of ripeness but not so for cars and post boxes.

OK, if you want to take that route, and deny that a thing is a state, then the laws of logic do not apply to any thing. An activity, is by definition a change. So instead of explaining activity as a thing which is active, carrying out an activity, for you the activity is the thing. There is no thing which is carrying out that activity, because the activity is the thing. As an activity, then,what that thing is, or is not, cannot be stated because it is changing, and this depends on one's perspective. It is relative. Are you satisfied with an ontology which denies that the laws of logic can be applied toward understanding real things? — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say the laws of logic do not apply to things, but to our understanding of our experience, which is given in terms of 'things'. On the other hand, maybe there are no things beyond our understanding of our experience, in which case the laws of logic would apply to things. The phenomenal life of which the things are manifestations, though, cannot be captured in terms of the laws of logic.

The idea that being is a manifestation of life is really a phenomenological, not strictly a metaphysical or ontological, idea; unless you count the latter as being founded upon the former, as I would say the great phenomenologists would (think of Husserl and Heidegger among others here), when they didn't reject metaphysics and ontology altogether.

So, how do you conclude that because the input is not in the mind, therefore the abstraction is not in the mind? "Abstraction" refers to either the process, or the output, it doesn't refer to the input. The input is what the abstraction is abstracted from. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, I agree that the abstraction is likely in the mind. Just not the input. My point was that concepts are abstracted from outside of the mind to inside of it.

What is being discussed is the possibility of a concept which is not within our minds. If your claim is that a concept exists as a definition, that definition is only symbols on a piece of paper, which needs to be interpreted by a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I claim concepts exist as things in themselves, found in particulars, and later abstracted in the mind. We describe concepts with words and definitions, but these are merely signs pointing to the concepts.

I don't buy this at all. By the method you've proposed, accidentals can be mistaken for essentials. Suppose I want to know the essential properties of the concept of "wet". I have some cold water which is undeniably wet. And I have some warm sand which is undeniably dry. According to your logic, this property, "cold", which is found in the water, but not in the sand, is an essential property of "wet". — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you. My method was not to separate the essential from the accidental properties, but merely to demonstrate that the essential properties existed. Thus in your example, 'cold' is not necessarily an essential property of 'wetness', but we know that 'wetness' has essential properties because some things are wet and some things are not.

I think that the essence of five is defined by order. [...] What if we were to trade places between five and three? Then five would represent a different quantity, and a different place in the order. In reality, the essence of fiveness is just a convention, one which we can't even agree on. What kind of convention is that? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure we can say that five is defined by order, but that is by order of its quantity. 4 comes before 5 comes before 6 because IIII < IIIII < IIIIII with respect to quantity. We cannot trade 5 and 3 in order of quantity, because IIIII > III. The only thing we can do is switch the symbols so that 5 points to III and 3 points to IIIII; but we cannot switch the concepts.

How do you propose that the immaterial concept could exist within the material symbols, independently of a mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

I side with Hume and Descartes, among others, when they say that we acquire most of our concepts from observation of the outer reality. The proof is that a blind man born blind has no concept of greenness, because he cannot conceive the difference between different colours. Therefore the concept is not conceived in the mind, but is abstracted from observation of outer reality. One might argue that since colours are physical, then so is the concept of greenness; but I counter-argue that since size and location is not an essential property of greenness, then the concept is not physical.

I just mean that the world as we value and know it as humans is only here while we are. If an asteroid wipes us out, the substratum will still be here. But I can only think or say this while I'm here. Where was the world before I was born? It was here, of course. But only because I arrived to think the world before my birth. To my knowledge, the human world (the world I care about) is only experienced first-person. — t0m

I would say the world "as we inhabit it", or "as we experience it" is only here while we're here. But there's no reason to suppose that the world as we inhabit it is "the whole world". We only get a glimpse of the world, even while we're here. That's all. Or so it seems.

Why should the idea that the existence of the world is not independent of first-person experience conflict with the observation that the world continues when other animals sleep? — sime

I don't think the two views conflict. They seem compatible to me, but one seems supported by experience and the other doesn't.

We can imagine a wide variety of metaphysical scenarios compatible with the evidence that the world continues while other animals sleep. The fact that they're compatible with this evidence, and the fact that we can imagine them, is no reason to suppose that they are true depictions of how things really are in the world.

Why the single-standard assumption that what is true to say of the third-person must also be true to say of the first-person?

Why the prejudice against solipsism? — sime

It's not an assumption or a prejudice.

The preponderance of evidence suggests that, in general, what is true of others is also true of me, and vice versa. If you want to make the case that you're so very special, the burden's on you to provide a warrant for the claim. The fact that we can imagine things being so gives no such warrant. We can imagine things being so, and we can imagine things being otherwise. Imagination is not enough. Possibility is not enough. Logical consistency with the evidence is not enough, because the contrary claim is also consistent with the evidence, and arguably far better supported by the evidence.

Actually, I agree that the abstraction is likely in the mind. Just not the input. My point was that concepts are abstracted from outside of the mind to inside of it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ok, so this is where we disagree. I think that in the process of abstraction, the concept is created within the mind, it is an act of creation. I do not believe that the concept is pulled into the mind from a location outside of the mind, I believe that it is created by the mind.

Thus in your example, 'cold' is not necessarily an essential property of 'wetness', but we know that 'wetness' has essential properties because some things are wet and some things are not. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is faulty logic though. We call things wet. I say water is wet, you agree that water is wet. We agree that certain things are wet, and that certain things are not wet. But this does not produce the conclusion that "wetness" has essential properties, it just means that we agree about which things we should call wet and which things we should call not wet. In order that we can say that wetness has essential properties, we need to agree again, as to what the essential properties of wetness are. Otherwise I might say that the essential properties are such and such, and you might say something completely different. Since "wetness" is a word that we are using, then if we can't agree on what it means, there can't be essential properties of wetness.

Sure we can say that five is defined by order, but that is by order of its quantity. 4 comes before 5 comes before 6 because IIII < IIIII < IIIIII with respect to quantity. We cannot trade 5 and 3 in order of quantity, because IIIII > III. The only thing we can do is switch the symbols so that 5 points to III and 3 points to IIIII; but we cannot switch the concepts. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't agree that order necessarily implies quantity. One comes after the other, which comes after the other, and so on. That is order. Now, unless you insist that there is necessarily a first, then this order exists without quantity. So I can recognize an order, of one after the other, without having any idea of the quantity. I come into the middle of a succession, and recognize the order of one after the other, without any idea of the quantity.

When we allow for negative as well as positive integers, then quantity becomes irrelevant. The numbers simply express an order. There is no such thing as a quantity of negative two, or negative three, these are completely imaginary, and nonsense quantities. If I owe you two dollars, this does not mean that I have a quantity of negative two dollars. The number line expresses an order, not quantities.

The proof is that a blind man born blind has no concept of greenness, because he cannot conceive the difference between different colours. — Samuel Lacrampe

But this doesn't make sense. What if the blind person learns about the different wavelengths of light, and learns which wavelengths produce the sensations of green. Would you not agree that this blind person has a concept of greenness? Would you think that human beings have no concept of xray, ultraviolet, infrared, and such wavelengths, just because we cannot see these colours?

I would have thought that the law of identity, a=a, is central to logic and meaning. 'a' is not similar to 'a', it is the same. That's what '=' means. — Wayfarer

What light does this shed on the point in question? Or is this more "skating"?

The law of identity merely expresses the logical form of judgments of identity. It doesn't inform any such judgment. It doesn't tell us whether any two items introduced into conversation are identical or nonidentical.

For instance, the law of identity doesn't by itself determine for us whether, or in what respect, something we call a thought in my head is identical to something we call a thought in your head. At first glance, it seems there's good reason to call these two things nonidentical, though they may resemble each other in various ways.

But, whether something is 'the same' or 'similar', in both cases, the faculty that makes that judgement is essential to the matter. That is the faculty of abstract judgement. You and I, as rational beings, are able to make such judgements; it is the source of such judgement that interests me. That's why I included the long quotation from Steve Pinker in this post. He is confident that 'the computational theory of mind' accounts for such judgements; he tries to give a materialist account of how this works, in terms of 'bits that are arranged to bump into other bits'.Whereas, I'm arguing (not very well, perhaps) for a dualist view: that the symbolic and the physical are ontologically distinct. Also, I argue that even if computers are analogies for the processes of thought, that is only because humans have specifically manufactured them for that purpose, so the fact that they reflect the operations of human thought, doesn't explain the nature of thought. — Wayfarer

I'm inclined to agree that artificial simulations of human intelligence are not adequate to explain human cognition, as Searle for one has argued. It seems AI designers produce increasingly accurate simulations or representations of human thinking. Simulating or representing is not the same as explaining, though representations may be of use in various explanations.

You may recall my favorite take on ontology is that "there is no privileged ontology", as Rorty puts it. We use different ontological models for different purposes.

What is the "faculty of abstract judgment"? Isn't that just a term of art for our capacity or power to make abstract judgments? Isn't it a philosopher's high-level placeholder, that provides a way for us to refer to a human capacity without making assumptions about what in the world the capacity is grounded in?

I take it talk about a "faculty of abstract judgment" is compatible with a view that physical bodies in a physical world are the source of that capacity, and compatible with a view that angel's whispers are the source of that capacity, and with diverse other views. An attempt to isolate such cognitive powers and analyze them at an abstract level leaves no necessary path back from abstract representation to "real source". The abstraction will be multiply realizable in principle, and compatible with an infinite range of views of what the world may be in fact if it contains such minds.

The same goes for abstract theories or formalizations of signs and language, and for computational models of mind and information. The abstract formal representation is no explanation or reproduction of the real system it represents or simulates. You and I agree with Searle and disagree with many cognitive scientists in this regard: Even if computational models of mind may yield perfect simulations of human intelligence, it seems there's no reason to suppose they'll ever explain human consciousness or produce real sentient beings.

Symbols and language are the province of semiotics and linguistics, respectively, and they're enormous disciplines in their own right; to become conversant with them takes considerable study. That's why I admit to 'skating over' a lot of major issues. It's a very general and high-level argument based on a single observation. — Wayfarer

So much skating, it's hard for me to tell what connection your claims have to the rigorous disciplines you cite. It's as if you suggest your skating is informed by these disciplines, but so far as I can see, the only connection is that you borrow a few of their words and phrases, then point to the disciplines as if they are justifications for any claim you make with those words and phrases.

What's gained by that sort of gesture but confusion?

It seems you have yet to clear up your own thoughts on what "symbol" and "information" mean in your own discourse, but before you think that through, you rush into proofs that "information is not physical" and that the "symbolic and physical are ontologically distinct".

What is the "single observation" that informs your argument?

No, but it's the widespread assumption of e.g. Steve Pinker above. I would say that the cultural mainstream is generally physicalist in its orientation to these issues. I think that the account of 'how the mind works' is generally a lot nearer to Steve Pinker's view (that was the title of the book I quoted, by the way) than anything I am likely to advocate, and that it's probably a much less contentious view than my own. — Wayfarer

In this case you used the claim in responding to me, not to Pinker, and you put the claim in my mouth. That's just one example of the way you seem to conflate the views of your interlocutors till you wind up skating circles around straw men. At least, I often feel that you've mistaken the claims of a skeptical naturalist like me for the claims of an extreme materialist.

I am addressing what I see as the issue at hand. I don't regard that as a process of stereotyping but of analysis of the implications of the physicality, or otherwise, of ideas and symbols, in the context of philosophy and history of ideas. Now the fact that you will characterise yourself as a 'thoughtful, perceptive and introspective animal', is, I think, significant - incidentally, you are extremely thoughtful and highly perceptive, not to mention articulate, so let's put that aside - it's the 'animal' tag that I'm questioning. Rational animal, yes; animal, no. And it's a difference that makes a difference. — Wayfarer

Isn't a rational animal a sort of animal? I recall we've spent some time trying to distinguish our use of terms like "rational", "intelligent", and "sentient" in our conversations, for it seems we have different dispositions in the use of such terms. In my view, traditional English translation of Aristotle's zoon logikon muddies the distinction between language and rationality. Humans are the only full-fledged language-users we know of, and our capacity for language seems closely associated with our distinctly human practice of reasoning, of "giving and taking reasons". But it makes most sense to me to say that many nonhuman animals are rational, intelligent, and sentient, like human beings.

What are the "implications of physicality"?

We may distinguish i) conversations that proceed from the assumption of some metaphysical or theological dogma, such as materialism or idealism, theism or atheism; ii) conversations in which no such assumption is granted, while one or more such assumptions are contested; and iii) conversations in which no such assumption even comes into play, where discourse remains consistent in principle with a wide range of conflicting metaphysical biases external to the conversation.

For many years now, I prefer to have conversations of the third sort. Engagement with interlocutors making metaphysical claims of any stripe tends to drag me into conversations of the second sort. Occasionally I'm induced to play along in conversations of the first sort by granting the required assumption hypothetically.

I might say the reason I prefer the third sort of conversation is that I've become agnostic about metaphysics in general. I say this agnosticism is not a metaphysical point of view, but an epistemological point of view on metaphysical claims. My agnosticism about metaphysics is one feature of a broader epistemological skepticism that's closely aligned with methodological naturalism and with a phenomenologically grounded conception of nature and the physical.

In keeping with that point of view, I say there is no "implication of the physical" that we may firmly grasp, that clearly points beyond the physical. Though we may imagine anything we please in a logical space we call "beyond the physical".

Right - are the issues being discussed here empirical in nature? Is the basic question one for empiricism at all? — Wayfarer

Do you mean the question, "Is information physical"? I ask again, what would it mean to deny that information is physical? If information is not physical, then what is it, and how do we come to know of it, and how do we determine that it is not physical?

Clearly we pursue empirical investigations that inform us increasingly about cognition, including about perception and speech. Clearly we construct and analyze formal models of language and communication that abstract away from physical contexts, but the fact that we jot abstract representations in a notebook is no evidence that those symbols correspond to abstract "entities" that exist somehow independent of the physical instantiations they're designed by us and taken by us to represent.

I make the same sort of argument with respect to concepts of number and symbolic representations of numerical concepts.

This, incidentally, is why I provided that excerpt from the article on the 'indispensability of mathematics'. That article likewise notes the incorporeal nature of number, as I have done with 'information'. It says that the non-materiality of mathematical objects is very difficult to reconcile with the fact that 'our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects'. And why do 'our best arguments' do that? I suggest it's because they're empiricist in the sense you are defending. The difficulty is, that rationalist philosophy indicates the reality of rational truths that are not justifiable on solely empirical grounds. So the whole point of the argument is 'an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight'. (My emphasis. By the way, I can't help but find this conclusion ironic, considering the degree to which empirical science goes on about 'reason'.)

I am not going to come to any conclusions on this point, but I think it's worth considering why such an argument has to be made, in the context of modern analytical and empirical philosophy.

(Now, also, I acknowledge that my attitude is tendentious - I was accused of that as an undergraduate, and it's probably true. And I know it goes against the grain. I am trying to have these arguments, therefore, in a fairly detached manner, so they're not directed at persons, but ideas. And also that these are difficult questions - especially yours.) — Wayfarer

I do find your arguments tendentious. I suspect they'd be more clear and persuasive for me, if you'd spend more time bearing down in small spaces to tighten up your discourse before reaching out to synthesize whole disciplines in quick runs around the rink. But you put it together with intelligence, imagination, creativity, and passion. It's challenging and enjoyable exercise for me.

If my line of questioning is difficult, it may be in part because I try to speak carefully and to avoid biting off more than I can chew, and in part because I'm more sympathetic to your point of view than you're inclined to suppose.

I would have thought that the law of identity, a=a, is central to logic and meaning. 'a' is not similar to 'a', it is the same. That's what '=' means.
— Wayfarer
What light does this shed on the point in question? — Cabbage Farmer

The fact that very different types of symbols can mean the same thing. The harbourmaster receives an exact account of what vessel is arriving, not simply something 'similar' to that.

Were the topic at hand vastly more complicated - the instructions for construction of a complex machine, for example - the text might comprise millions of words and hundreds of thousands of diagrams and measurements. That two could be represented in different languages and media. Yet if there was a mis-translation of a single term in one of them, then the different sets would no longer be identical. (This is what caused a European Mars Lander to fail - a metric unit being mis-understood as imperial. Similar, but not the same!)

What is the "faculty of abstract judgment"? — Cabbage Farmer

I am arguing that it is the basic ability to recognise similarity and to abstract. It is 'basic', in the sense that language and representation relies on that ability; we employ it all the time, simply to think and speak, and perhaps for that reason it might be somewhat 'hidden in plain sight' - taken for granted. It might suit you to say that animals display that ability (and I suppose some might in a rudimentary sense) but I believe there is a truly fundamental distinction between animal and human communication and thought. (Indeed I think the blurring of this distinction, is an indication of a basic confusion in a lot of current thought about the matter; I think the uniqueness of being human, and the challenges and freedoms it offers, are part of the existential plight of human life, and the feeling that we are, after all, 'only animals', is actually a source of comfort to us. It defuses the challenge. Nagel has some perceptive things to say about that; I also think it's part of the meaning of Fromm's 'Fear of Freedom.)

I take it talk about a "faculty of abstract judgment" is compatible with a view that physical bodies in a physical world are the source of that capacity — Cabbage Farmer

That doesn't say anything about the nature of rationality; and in itself, it's an abstract argument. 'Look, a rational thing!' Actually, such a thing, is not a thing, but a being.

Do you mean the question, "Is information physical"? I ask again, what would it mean to deny that information is physical? If information is not physical, then what is it, and how do we come to know of it, and how do we determine that it is not physical? — Cabbage Farmer

What it would mean is that physicalism is shown to be false - that no coherent philosophy can be created on the basis of the claim that only what is physical is real.

When you ask 'what is information?', I don't think there is a single answer to that question, as 'information' is a polysemic term. But in this context, the kind of information concerns relatively simple subject matter, and a discussion of what is involved in translating it between media types. Again, the central argument is that whilst the physical representation can be changed entirely, the information remains the same. So the question is, in this scenario, what changes, and what stays the same?

But behind the question, is the whole issue of the ontology of abstract objects. That's why I included the reference to the 'argument for the indispensability of mathematics'. I don't know if you noticed it, but I think it is germane to the question - 'this argument says that the non-materiality of mathematical objects is very difficult to reconcile with the fact that "our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects". And that's because I think there's something fundamentally wrong with 'our best epistemic theories' - because they're essentially physicalist!

I suspect they'd be more clear and persuasive for me, if you'd spend more time bearing down in small spaces to tighten up your discourse before reaching out to synthesize whole disciplines in quick runs around the rink. — Cabbage Farmer

You're absolutely right - I do write at much too high a level. What it would take to really develop my arguments is more patient groundwork. Actually I am going to lay off posting so much for the time being, I have a pretty big list of things I know I ought to read and try and absorb better. Appreciate your comments.

I am arguing that it is the basic ability to recognise similarity and to abstract. It is 'basic', in the sense that language and representation relies on that ability; we employ it all the time, simply to think and speak, and perhaps for that reason it might be somewhat 'hidden in plain sight' - taken for granted. It might suit you to say that animals display that ability — Wayfarer

Bees like certain types of flowers, not particular individual flowers. Vervet monkeys make a certain type of a call when they spot a certain type of predator. Most of nature seems to operate with some degree of abstraction, doesn't it?

Bees like certain types of flowers, not particular individual followers. Vervet monkeys make a certain type of a call when they spot a certain type of predator. Most of nature seems to operate with some degree of abstraction, doesn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes - but I still say that bee languages and animal communications can be understood behaviourally, in terms of stimulus and response. There are patterns of stimuli, and patterns of responses. I suppose they provide a prototype for the elements of abstract ideas, but h. sapiens make the leap to a level of abstraction that is different in kind - general and universal.

Furthermore, prior to there being living organisms, which do behave in such ways, where can nature be said to exhibit a 'degree of abstraction'? Would you find any examples on Mars? or other uninhabited planets? In interstellar space? Even at simple levels of organic life, sentience itself embodies a certain degree of abstraction, which is absent in inorganic matter.

The minimal meaning-bearing elements of human languages—word-like, but not words—are radically different from anything known in animal communication systems. Their origin is entirely obscure, posing a very serious problem for the evolution of human cognitive capacities, language in particular. There are insights about these topics tracing back to the pre-Socratics, developed further by prominent philosophers of the early modern scientific revolution and the Enlightenment . . . though they remain insufficiently explored.

According to Berwick and Chomsky, this ability to grasp meaning amounts to an ontological discontinuity between animal and human communications (in review of 'Why only us: Language and Evolution' by Stephen M. Barr. A less friendly review in New Scientist.)

I think there is an underlying assumption in our current worldview that there is no discontinuity or leap involved; we naturally think of reason and language in terms of adaptive necessity - they evolved by the same means as other biological features, and so have the same essential rationale.

I wasn't just talking about communication. Animals of all sorts clearly respond to types of things. You don't flee a predator because it's Shere Kahn, but because it's a predator, and you flee in a way appropriate to the type of predator it is, if you can. So it is with eating, with building, with mating.

I would even say that a rock becomes part of a landslide based on the momentum of whatever strikes it, not, say, the color of what strikes it. That's a sort of abstraction. For any phenomenon you consider, some elements are relevant and some aren't.

Fair enough.

I will speak unguardedly for a moment:

Semantics seems to be the big mystery. How do we symbolize? How can something mean something? And there's a view, the sort of thing we associate with Searle, to the effect that machines are merely syntactical, that they can manipulate symbols but not know what they mean.

So here's humanity standing above the rest of creation. We have meaning, but machines only have syntax. We have language, but other living things have signaling at best. It's tempting to identify the two hierarchies, to say that animals must have only syntax but no meaning.

But I think this is a mistake. Chomsky's work has always suggested that the key difference between human language and signaling is recursive, hierarchical, generative syntax. Semantics is not what distinguishes us from other critters, but syntax. It may very well be that "having semantics" is coextensive with "living", or at least with "having sense(s)".

It may feel like Landauer's claim that information is physical is part of an attempted reduction of semantics to syntax, to treating living things like computers, but is it really?

We agree that certain things are wet, and that certain things are not wet. But this does not produce the conclusion that "wetness" has essential properties, it just means that we agree about which things we should call wet and which things we should call not wet. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, the fact that some things are wet and some are not, is sufficient to prove that wetness has essential properties, as so: Properties of a concept are essential if, should these properties be removed, then the concept would no longer be present. Conversely, properties are accidental if, should they be removed, the concept would still be present. Now, some things (1) have wetness and some things (2) don't. It means that properties of wetness are present in (1) and not in (2). If all these properties were accidental, then their absence in (2) would not result in the absence of wetness. But wetness is absent in (2). Therefore some of the properties of wetness absent in (2) must be essential to the concept of wetness.

I don't agree that order necessarily implies quantity. One comes after the other, which comes after the other, and so on. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I was going to object, but I find I have trouble arguing about this topic. If you don't mind, I will drop it to focus on the other topics.

When we allow for negative as well as positive integers, then quantity becomes irrelevant. [...] There is no such thing as a quantity of negative two, or negative three, these are completely imaginary, and nonsense quantities. [...]. — Metaphysician Undercover

This might get a bit off topic, but I think your claim here is a non-issue, because in real life, there is no such thing as a negative number in the absolute sense. E.g. there is no negative absolute temperature, pressure or mass. So I agree that quantities do not allow for negative values, but this is in conformance to reality.

But this doesn't make sense. What if the blind person learns about the different wavelengths of light, and learns which wavelengths produce the sensations of green. Would you not agree that this blind person has a concept of greenness? Would you think that human beings have no concept of xray, ultraviolet, infrared, and such wavelengths, just because we cannot see these colours? — Metaphysician Undercover

Greenness, the thing in itself, is not this 'range of wavelength of light' you describe. If it were, then it would be logically impossible for us to imagine greenness without imagining a light source, inasmuch as we cannot imagine a triangle without imagining three sides; but we can imagine greenness by itself. The true concept of greenness is not about wavelengths, but is simply this. Rather than being one and the same thing, this 'range of wavelength of light' is a cause of us sensing greenness, or to use Aristotle's terminology, it is an efficient cause of greenness, not its formal cause.

We have concepts of ultraviolet and infrared as wavelengths, but have no concept of the colour they may produce if we were able to see these. By the way, I think it is impossible for us to conceive a new colour, for the same reasons.

Maybe greenness was a bad example to use. Instead, imagine if you were incapable of feeling the emotion sadness. I can do my best to describe to you that it is the emotion one gets when being aware of a good that no longer exists; and from this, you may be able to infer that it is a painful thing; but it would not substitute the experience of the feeling itself. And the concept is the thing in itself.

By the way, I think it is impossible for us to conceive a new colour, for the same reasons. — Samuel Lacrampe

It may feel like Landauer's claim that information is physical is part of an attempted reduction of semantics to syntax, to treating living things like computers, but is it really? — Srap Tasmaner

Well when I started thinking about the question of 'whether information is physical', I googled that very question, as you do nowadays, and Landauer's name came up as the #1 reference. But he was a computer scientist - actually the head of IBM research labs - rather than a philosopher, as such. So to be honest, I probably don't really understand Landauer's work very well, but it is a reference point for the discussion.

Semantics is not what distinguishes us from other critters, but syntax. — Srap Tasmaner

I really don't see how that stacks up. Humans have the ability to imagine, to think in the past and future tense, to invent stories and artefacts and artworks. No other animals have that ability, aside from in the most rudimentary forms. So the ability of bees to dance and baby chicks to duck hawk shadows, doesn't say anything about semantics in the sense that it applies to language. At best it's an analogy - and again, maybe it's why semiotics is so applicable to biology, as organisms seem to function along lines that are much more explicable in terms of metaphors of language, then metaphors of machines. That is my take on what Apokrisis points to, and I think it's perfectly true. So I can't agree that animal behaviour denotes meaningful ideation in the sense that the human is capable of. 'Rational animal', again - the adjective is significant.

That book by Chomsky I referred to was called 'Why Only Us?' - I think, for naturalism, it is an embarrassing question. (Similar to why, according to 'our best epistemological theories', number ought not to be considered real, when it's so embarrassingly effective.)

So here's humanity standing above the rest of creation. — Srap Tasmaner

And we can't have that; not the kind of thing that Darwinism would endorse. (Although it's instructive that Alfred Russel Wallace had a completely different view of the matter.)

Hey! Don't make the topic more confusing than it already is.

So the ability of bees to dance and baby chicks to duck hawk shadows, doesn't say anything about semantics in the sense that it applies to language. — Wayfarer

I think it does. I think the shadow means hawk to them in the same way it would mean hawk to us, and that the sense (!) in which the word "hawk" means [[hawk]] is derivative of exactly this "natural meaning". At least that's my working hypothesis. We'll see.

for naturalism, it is an embarrassing question — Wayfarer

No it's not.

I think the shadow means hawk to them in the same way it would mean hawk to us, and that the sense (!) in which the word "hawk" means [[hawk]] is derivative of exactly this "natural meaning". At least that's my working hypothesis. We'll see. — Srap Tasmaner

While I understand that the human cognitive capacity evolves from the simpler forms of communication in other animals, I think the idea that the understanding of meaning in birds and humans amounts to the same thing, is mistaken.

Speaking of Chomsky, he gives a reason why animal and human communications are basically different, which I thought I had already mentioned earlier - it has to do with the fact that 'human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences', which rely on syntactical order to indicate meaning in a way that neither birds nor other species can do.

for naturalism, it is an embarrassing question
— Wayfarer

No it's not. — Srap Tasmaner

Oh, sorry. The remark you made about 'humanity standing above the rest of creation' seemed to me an idea that you wished to avoid.

Speaking of Chomsky, he gives a reason why animal and human communications are basically different, which I thought I had already mentioned earlier - it has to do with the fact that 'human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences', which rely on syntactical order to indicate meaning. — Wayfarer

Are you even reading my posts?

Chomsky's work has always suggested that the key difference between human language and signaling is recursive, hierarchical, generative syntax. — Srap Tasmaner

Are you even reading my posts? — Srap Tasmaner

I read what you said about Chomsky, but I don't get how you can reconcile that with this:

I think the shadow means hawk to them in the same way it would mean hawk to us, and that the sense (!) in which the word "hawk" means [[hawk]] is derivative of exactly this "natural meaning". At least that's my working hypothesis. — Srap Tasmaner

Because that seems to negate the meaning of what you've quoted from Chomsky- because he's basically saying that the hierarchical syntax operates in the service of semantics - whereas you appear to dismiss semantics. Although perhaps I'm misunderstanding.

you appear to dismiss semantics. Although perhaps I'm misunderstanding. — Wayfarer

Why would I dismiss semantics? What does that even mean? I think it's safe to say you have misunderstood.

Maybe this would we a good point for us to take a breather. Work and reading call.