'Does reality contain universal features as well as particular entities?' — Wayfarer
Quod erat demonstrandum...case closed! — Janus
I think that, for example, that the Pythagorean theorem describes something that is real whether or not perceived by humans. However it is is something that can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. So that is an example of an 'intelligible principle', i.e. something which is expressible in terms of a mathematical formulae; but that feature is not 'created by humans', only the notation is a human creation. — Wayfarer
The problem is that there aren't any right angle triangles except those created by human beings. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you defining nominalism as the rejection of abstract objects or the rejection of universals, or of both? — Janus
Thomists and other critics of Ockham [the major source of nominalism] have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence.
Were any other species of beings - non human but sentient - to evolve on some other planet, then I'm sure they would discover the same thing. — Wayfarer
We all like to think that our understanding of reality is "the" understanding of reality, but this is just vain conceit. — Metaphysician Undercover
You keep making statements that are confusing (and then don't have the stamina to back them up). What does it mean for something to be real but not "physical"? Why use that term, "physical", anyway? Numbers are real because they have an effect on other things, including on what many call "physical" and "mental". So it seems that numbers would either be both "physical" AND "mental", or we should just dispense with these two terms and talk about causation.And I maintain that number is real, but not physical. — Wayfarer
I thought we agreed that the input cannot come from the same place as the output, and that we cannot conceive simple concepts we have not yet observed, as was the case for the blind person not conceiving colours, a deaf person not conceiving sound, and an emotionless person not conceiving sadness. I accept that the abstraction process is happening in the mind, but the input must come from outside. Or else, how would we test that what I conceive as green is the same as what you conceive as green, if not by both of us observing the same colour located outside of our minds?Abstracted things are artificial, and decided upon too. What else, other than a human mind would perform the act of abstraction, and whether the abstraction is correct or not, is decided upon by the human mind as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure I understand your distinction between "recognizing a concept within things" and "apprehending a thing as meeting the conditions of the concept". If we apprehend a particular object which has a flat surface with three straight sides, then we recognize a triangle in that object. And if our perceptions are true, then the object truly has triangle-ness as part of it.I don't get this at all. We do not recognize a concept within things. The concept is within the mind, and when we apprehend a thing as meeting the conditions of the concept, we feel justified in calling the thing by the name which corresponds to that concept. — Metaphysician Undercover
I thought we agreed that the input cannot come from the same place as the output, and that we cannot conceive simple concepts we have not yet observed, as was the case for the blind person not conceiving colours, a deaf person not conceiving sound, and an emotionless person not conceiving sadness. I accept that the abstraction process is happening in the mind, but the input must come from outside. Or else, how would we test that what I conceive as green is the same as what you conceive as green, if not by both of us observing the same colour located outside of our minds? — Samuel Lacrampe
If we apprehend a particular object which has a flat surface with three straight sides, then we recognize a triangle in that object. And if our perceptions are true, then the object truly has triangle-ness as part of it. — Samuel Lacrampe
You keep making statements that are confusing — Harry Hindu
If our concepts, what we supposedly "discover", are the way that they must be, because they are some type of independent form, then there is no room for error, it is impossible that our concepts are incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover
The concept of the form as being what makes knowledge possible dates back to the time of Socrates.
This is the argument, yes? — Srap Tasmaner
So, in your argument, it is not that there are multiple representations in different media that leads to the conclusion that what is represented is not physical; it is that what is represented is said to be an idea, not a particular three-masted ship, but a generic object, any member of the class "three-masted ships". — Srap Tasmaner
If I draw a picture of my house, the picture is a physical representation of a physical object. — Srap Tasmaner
Well, it's certainly a symbol: my hoisting a flag indicates that I am in such a state. I don't think that's exactly what we usually mean by "representation", but I suppose we could make that work by defining our terms suitably. — Srap Tasmaner
Platonic Realism is the view, articulated by Plato, that universals exist. 1 A universal is a property of an object, which can exist in more than one place at the same time (e.g. the quality of "redness") 2. As universals were considered by Plato to be ideal forms, this stance is also called Platonic Idealism, whereas in medieval philosophy, it was called 'realism'.
The problem of universals is an ancient problem (introduced by Pre-Socratic philosophers like Thales, Heraclitus and Parmenides) about what is signified by common nouns and adjectives, such as "man", "tree", "white", etc. What is the logical and existential status of the type that these words refer to? Is it in fact a thing, or a concept?3 Is it something existing in reality, external to the mind, or not? if so, then is it something physical or something abstract? Is it separate from material objects, or a part of them in some way? How can one thing in general be many things in particular?
Plato's solution is that universals do indeed exist, although not in the same way that ordinary physical objects exist, but in a sort of ghostly mode of existence, outside of space and time, but not at any spatial or temporal distance from people's bodies4. Thus, people cannot see or otherwise come into sensory contact with universals, and it is meaningless to apply the categories of space and time to them, but they can nevertheless be conceived of and exist.
Consider such a proposition as "Edinburgh is north of London." Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. This is, of course, denied by many philosophers, either for Berkeley's reasons or for Kant's. But we have already considered these reasons, and decided that they are inadequate. We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation "north of," which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation "north of," which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.
My understanding is, there is plenty of room for error - we may fail to comprehend or see the Forms. — Wayfarer
This is because, as you should know, Plato's Socrates questions the reliability of the senses; knowledge of sensory objects is pistis, or doxa; knowledge of mathematical and geometrical objects is dianoia; knowledge of the forms, noesis. The 'higher' you go, the more certain is knowledge - knowledge of math. is 'higher' than knowledge of material things, knowledge of the Forms is 'higher' than knowledge of math. This is in the Analogy of the Divided Line. — Wayfarer
My point is that we need to allow a separation between human concepts, and the Ideals, which are supposed to be independent from the human mind. That is the conclusion which Plato came to in "The Republic" — Metaphysician Undercover
They are deficient because they are produced by human beings and are thus dependent on the material body of the human being. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think you are correct about not all concepts coming from outside the mind. Just because I have a concept of a unicorn, it does not follow that unicorns exist outside the mind (sadly). Only 'simple impressions' as Hume says, like colours, sounds, and basic shapes, must exist outside the mind.I agreed that the input could come from outside the mind. I see no reason to believe that it necessarily does, nor do I see reason to believe that all of the input comes from outside the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes... We are back to that special case when perceptions of objects are false. But if we assume that the perceptions are true (I don't think this is a stretch), then the test would work, would it not? You and I observe a ball and both agree that it has roundness. Conversely, you and I observe a cube and both agree that it does not have roundness.As for your test, it's as I told you, a matter of whether or not we agree, and often we do not. As I told you, I often disagree with people as to the colour of something. So your test, and the fact that we often disagree about things, indicates that input must come from within the mind as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
Honestly, I don't see a difference. The concept of X is by definition composed of all and only those properties essential to X. If you recognize a certain object as a car (again assuming no false perceptions), then some of the properties of that object must be essential to the concept of a car; or else, you would not recognize it as such. And if so, then the object has the concept of a car, by definition.I still do not understand your use of English. I would not say that I recognize a triangle in the three sided object, I would say that I recognize the three sided object as a triangle. Do you see the difference? I recognize a certain object as a car, or another object as a house, meaning that for me these objects fulfil the conditions required for calling them by those names. I do not see the concept of a car, or the concept of a house within these objects. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is completely mistaken. The principle of intelligibility in ancient philosophy, was based on the exact opposite of what you’re saying. — Wayfarer
This is not true at all. No Platonist would ever say that. You're instinctively modernist in your responses. — Wayfarer
The idea that mathematics could be 'the product of a brain' would never occur to Plato or Aristotle. — Wayfarer
That is completely mistaken.
...
This is not true at all. — Wayfarer
4. The 'existing in a ghostly or ethereal domain' is the entire problem and error of the understanding of forms, in a nutshell. This is what almost anyone thinks nowadays, and then rejects the idea on the basis of this poorly-formed understanding. Universals don't exist - that's why they're called 'transcendental', they're logically prior to 'what exists'. But, they're real, in a way that phenomenal objects are not. The 'ghostly domain' that is misleadingly named here, is sometimes referred to as the 'formal realm' - it's not actually 'a realm', but a domain, like 'the domain of natural numbers'. But it's the 'domain of form', namely, that of numbers, possibles, universals, and so on, that in some sense is logically prior to the 'phenomenal realm'. — Wayfarer
I guess I don't know what you mean by "the principle of intelligibility". — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.
….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.
My point is that we need to allow a separation between human concepts, and the Ideals, which are supposed to be independent from the human mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
The "is north of" relation is simply the logical consequence of London and Edinburgh being located where they are in a physical world with poles. Without those particulars, no logical consequence follows and so there is no relation. — Andrew M
Aristotle...firmly refutes Pythagorean Idealism in Bk. 9 of his Metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover
In philosophy, intelligibility is what can be comprehended by the human mind (in contrast to sense perception). ... Plato referred to the intelligible realm of mathematics, forms, first principles, logical deduction, and the dialectical method. The intelligible realm of thought thinking about thought does not necessarily require any visual images, sensual impressions, and material causes for the contents of mind.
An intelligible form in philosophy refers to a form that can be apprehended by the intellect. According to Ancient and Medieval philosophers, the intelligible forms are the things by which we understand.
Nevertheless, the fact of there being 'north' is not dependent on whether there is a city called 'Edinburgh' or not. — Wayfarer
Book 9 of the metaphysics is online here. Kindly indicate where in it Aristotle 'refutes Pythagorean idealism'. — Wayfarer
Wikipedia entry 'intelligible forms' — Wayfarer
For Aristotle, the empirical (or phenomenal) world just is the intelligible world. So you won't find universals prior to or separate from the particulars that they are predicated of. — Andrew M
I didn't ask about the implications of your statement. I asked what it meant. I asked you why you used to the term, "physical", as it isn't necessary. All we need to do is talk about causation.The significance of something being 'real but not physical', is that if there are things which are real but not physical, then physicalism is false. As physicalism is the de facto philosophical attitude of today's secular intelligentsia, then this is significant. — Wayfarer
Of course numbers have a causal effect on things. Take for instance the numbers in a recipe. If the recipe calls for 1 teaspoon of cayenne pepper and you put 10, the food will give the consumers a serious case of heart burn, not to mention mouth-burn. Numbers influence our behavior just as much as any word, law, or thunderstorm does.And, numbers don’t cause anything. Not unless, say, you walked under a clock-tower at the precise time the numeral 7 fell off the clock-face and landed on your head. But, facetiousness aside, the ontological question concerning number is not whether numbers are materially efficient; I don't see how they can be. The question is about whether they're real and not simply the products of brains, as we are inclined to think. — Wayfarer
It is at Bk. 9, ch. 8 & 9, specifically 1050b, 1051a. It is first argued at 1050b, that actuality is prior to potency, and therefore nothing which exists potentially can be eternal. Imperishable things must be actual. — Metaphysician Undercover
in Aquinas' "Summa", and he said that God, being an intelligible object, is in essence, most highly knowable. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course numbers have a causal effect on things. Take for instance the numbers in a recipe. If the recipe calls for 1 teaspoon of cayenne pepper and you put 10, the food will give the consumers a serious case of heart burn, not to mention mouth-burn. — Harry Hindu
I really don't see any relevance to the topic, nor any ' firm refutation of Pythagorean idealism'. True, he argues that geometric constructs cannot be eternal ideas, but eternal ideas are nowhere denied in Aristotle. — Wayfarer
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