I'm not sure what your point here was? — creativesoul
1. All thought/belief consists of mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent itself(it's own state of 'mind' when applicable). — creativesoul
There is an "external world" in the sense that when one considers the mind as a discrete, individual property that's enclosed, but then this gets into a sort of problematic philosophy - where you'll have free-standing beliefs, a type of rampant cartesianism, or a problem with interpretation because meaning becomes a private affair. — Marty
1. There are good people and other animals suffering [†]
2. Either all suffering, without exception, is warranted — jorndoe
Suffering is an inevitable aspect of physical existence, because whatever is physical is necessarily subject to decay, disease and illness. — Wayfarer
Soberly considering available evidence uniquely suggests an indifferent universe. — jorndoe
I think I know what you mean, but can you elaborate? — Marty
I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians [i.e., skeptic philosophers], who say, “What if you are deceived?” For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token, I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. — “St Augustine”
...so there’s no correlation between correlation and correspondence? Because it sure seems that way. — Wayfarer
1. All thought/belief consists of mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent itself(it's own state of 'mind' when applicable).
2. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
3. Thought/belief presupposes the existence of it's own content.(from1,2)
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief.
5. All thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world.(from3,4)
6. All meaning is attributed by virtue of drawing mental correlation(s) between that which becomes symbol/sign and that which becomes symbolized/signified.
7. The attribution of meaning happens entirely within thought/belief formation.(from1,6)
8. All meaning is existentially contingent upon presupposing the existence of an external world.(from5,7)
9. All philosophical positions consist entirely of meaningful thought/belief.
10. All philosophical positions presuppose the existence of an external world.(from8,9)
Is that a bit more convincing?
X-)
It effectively refutes solipsism as well, and not merely 'by definition' mind you. The 'definition' of thought/belief contained in 1. is not arbitrarily chosen. To quite the contrary, it is arrived at by virtue of looking at all meaningful use of the terms "thought" and "belief". All thought/belief consists of mental correlations. All mental correlation counts as thought/belief. All predication is correlation. Not all correlation is predication. Thought/belief is not existentially contingent upon language. To quite the contrary, it's the other way around.
Thought/belief formation happens prior to language. Thought/belief is accrued. That which rudimentary thought/belief is existentially contingent upon and/or consists in/of, so too is/does the more complex. Thought/belief begins with drawing rudimentary correlations(think Pavlov's dog) and gains in complexity in direct accordance with/to the complexity of the correlations drawn between object(s) and/or self. — creativesoul
Is that a bit more convincing? — creativesoul
Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognising it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object.
It is basically still about correspondence, though. But that isn't to say that it is, therefore, a false argument. It's a very difficult philosophical problem, because you're trying to articulate the foundations of knowledge, the conditions for knowledge. — Wayfarer
...But I think it is still subject to the criticisms that I quoted from those text books, the basic problem being that, if you're going to try and talk about both the agent, on the one side, and the object, on the other, then you're assuming a position above or outside them. You're trying to sketch how we know what we know, from some point where you can see both sides of the correlation - the agent, and the object of knowledge. But how can you get above or outside of that, in such a way that you can see both sides at once?
↪Marchesk
Actually existence is ideal - you have no other reference but yourself. — charleton
Are you Marchesk or are you referencing something other than yourself by virtue of using "Marchesk"? — creativesoul
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