Perception involves being able to see "that cat there", a judgement grounded in the matching development of a generalised capacity for categorising the world in terms of the long-run concept of "a cat"
— apokrisis

Physiological sensory perception is prior to language on my view.
— creativesoul

Do you agree?
— creativesoul

Well of course. Animals have minds and selfhood. Our models of perception have been built from experiments on cats and monkeys mostly.
— apokrisis

What then did you mean by "perception" in the first quote above? — creativesoul

A pigeon can make the same perceptual discrimination. Human perception is of course linguistically scaffolded and so that takes it to a higher semiotic level. — apokrisis

emphasis mine

Human perception is of course linguistically scaffolded and so that takes it to a higher semiotic level. — apokrisis

emphasis mine...

So, then, make yourself clear.

Higher level than what, exactly?

What does pigeon perception consist in?

What is the criterion, which - when met by a pigeon - counts as being the same case of perceptual discrimination as humans?

It's certainly not this...

Perception involves being able to see "that cat there", a judgement grounded in the matching development of a generalised capacity for categorising the world in terms of the long-run concept of "a cat".

That sort of perception requires (is existentially contingent upon) written language... and thus what helped prompt the post regarding what it takes to know what we're talking about when comparing different creatures' perception.

I can't work out what it is you are so fussed about. Pigeons are a famous example in mainstream psychology of just how easy it is to train up human-like categorisations in birds with pretty small brains. You can coach them not just to recognise flowers and people, cars and chairs, but you can get then reliably to classify flowers and people as natural stimuli, cars and chairs as artificial ones.

This is psychology's most celebrated example of how similar animals are to humans in their ability to go beyond "direct experience" to categorise their experience abstractly.

In summary, the basic features of object category learning in pigeons are the following. First, pigeons can learn a variety of complex object categories and transfer this learning to novel objects. Second, pigeons can flexibly classify the same object according to different criteria (e.g., pseudocategories and superordinate categories). Third, pigeons extract a rich variety of visual properties from photographic images and use them in combination to learn the structure of object categories. Finally, pigeons learn common abstract representations for all members of the same trained category.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4195317/

In the study, 16 pigeons were trained to detect cancer by putting them in a roomy chamber where magnified biopsies of possible breast cancers were displayed. Correctly identifying a growth as benign or malignant by pecking one of two answer buttons on a touchscreen earned them a tasty 45 milligram pigeon pellet. Once trained, the pigeons’ average diagnostic accuracy reached an impressive 85 percent. But when a “flock sourcing” approach was taken, in which the most common answer among all subjects was used, group accuracy climbed to a staggering 99 percent, or what would be expected from a pathologist. The pigeons were also able to apply their knowledge to novel images, showing the findings weren’t simply a result of rote memorization.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/using-pigeons-to-diagnose-cancer/

Your move.

Or you could always just willfully neglect to directly answer germane questions, in lieu of some fallacious answer or another. That's unacceptable. Offering conclusions without argument is gratuitous assertion. That's unacceptable. Focusing upon the person rather than the substance of the argument is an ad hominem. That's unacceptable. Offering researchers' conclusions about pigeon behaviour during experiments regarding what pigeons are capable of learning without offering a detailed account of the experiments themselves is highly suspect, possibly a case of confirmation bias, and quite possibly constitutes the beginnings of an appeal to authority. That's unacceptable.

I'm still curious. Is there an answer somewhere in there to either of the following questions?

What does pigeon perception consist in?

What is the criterion, which - when met by a pigeon - counts as being the same case of perceptual discrimination as humans?

I'll refrain from saying much about those summaries, given I do not know the specifics of the experiments themselves, and they're pretty much irrelevant to our debate, as far as I can see. The one point I would make is that they are couched in language that assumes the conclusion.

This is psychology's most celebrated example of how similar animals are to humans in their ability to go beyond "direct experience" to categorise their experience abstractly. — apokrisis

That does not follow from anything within those snippets.

If I ignore the language used to describe the pigeon behaviour and grant that the pigeon learned to recognize some object or another and learned to associate different objects and behaviours with getting food, then I'm unsure how that would support indirect perception. Seems like direct perception of exactly what we train them to associate with food, regardless of the object we choose.

For example, it is quite misleading and probably just plain wrong to claim that a pigeon learned to recognize a malignant group of cells from non-malignant ones simply as a result of being able to effectively distinguish between the two kinds. Categorizing, in rudimentary form, requires noting similarity between different 'objects'. While a pigeon may very well be quite capable of being trained to pick out malignant formations, the pigeon doesn't recognize them as malignant formations. Rather, it recognizes the similarities between such structures and draws causal associations between their behaviour and getting food.

We could just as easily train them to incorrectly categorize them.

While a pigeon may very well be quite capable of being trained to pick out malignant formations, the pigeon doesn't recognize them as malignant formations. — creativesoul

Well, that is stating the bleeding obvious. The point of the pigeon research is that animal brains can in fact categorise to quite a human degree ... when linguistically-scaffolded in human fashion. So that shows both that our biology of perception/conception has much more in common than most might expect, but also that language then really makes a particular kind of difference we can add to the discussion.

You are confusing the epistemic issue of direct vs indirect realism with the ontological commitments I might then argue concerning the mind~world issue. — apokrisis

I'm not confusing anything. I'm just trying to ask a question and to show you the consequences of your answer. If you don't want to answer because you fear the consequences, just say so.

Not much I can say if you can’t work out your problem.

I've worked it all out. It seems that it is you that hasn't worked out his problems. I'm trying to show you, if you'd answer the question. Halloween is over, Apo. No need to be scared anymore. Answer the question. What is it that you fear - you being wrong? Believe me, it's not that bad.

While a pigeon may very well be quite capable of being trained to pick out malignant formations, the pigeon doesn't recognize them as malignant formations. — creativesoul

Well, that is stating the bleeding obvious. The point of the pigeon research is that animal brains can in fact categorise to quite a human degree ... when linguistically-scaffolded in human fashion. — apokrisis

The point of the research isn't proven. The evidence doesn't warrant such a conclusion. Thus, you're overstating the case. Pigeons aren't recognizing malignant formations as malignant formations. Thus, they do not - cannot - 'perceive' them as such (scarequotes intentional). That requires language. They are not categorizing in linguistically - scaffolded fashion. To quite the contrary, we are the ones who categorize their mental ongoings and behaviour in linguistically scaffolded fashion.

Thus, this raises the crucial importance of getting it right. Ockham's razor applies here.

They become aware of and recognize the differences between kinds of cell structures. They draw mental correlations between their own behaviour, the cell structures, and getting food. They are attributing causality. I would be surprised if their behaviour did not also clearly indicate that they begin to form expectation. None of that requires language. All of it requires thought formation. All of it also clearly lends support to direct perception.

So, all of what can be rightfully said about pigeon mental ongoings is quite rudimentary when compared to the highly complex degree of categorizations that humans discover, invent, or employ.

So that shows both that our biology of perception has much more in common than most might expect, but also that language then really makes a particular kind of difference we can add to the discussion.

We agree here, in some sense. However, we're right back to where we were.

What does pigeon perception consist in?

What is the criterion, which - when met by a pigeon - counts as being the same case of perceptual discrimination as humans?

They become aware of and recognize the differences between kinds of cell structures. — creativesoul

Does that not cover perception?

All of it also clearly lends support to direct perception. — creativesoul

Really? After wasting so much time on irrelevancies, you seem to have forgotten to address the OP.

They become aware of and recognize the differences between kinds of cell structures.
— creativesoul

Does that not cover perception? — apokrisis

Of course it entails perception. However, it seems apparent that you and I have incommensurate notions regarding what counts as perception. I've been justifying my position; bearing the burden as it were. Care to do the same?

All of it also clearly lends support to direct perception.
— creativesoul

Really? After wasting so much time on irrelevancies, you seem to have forgotten to address the OP.

Recently I've addressed what you've put forth.

How one arrives at thinking that I've forgotten to address the OP, given what I've written here, is beyond me. Everything I've said here develops the notion of perception. There's quite a bit more involved. It's rather nuanced.

What does pigeon perception consist in?

What is the criterion, which - when met by a pigeon - counts as being the same case of perceptual discrimination as humans?

However, it seems apparent that you and I have incommensurate notions regarding what counts as perception. — creativesoul

You’d have to explain how. I’ve asked in the past and you haven’t explained.

I’ve made the point that human language changes the way we are aware of the world deeply. Yet also we share the same basic brain biology.

So for instance, I am happy to talk about pigeons recognising, but I wouldn’t believe they can recollect. They have memories and can categorise experience. But they don’t have the structure of language that would allow for a narrative or autobiographical use of those memories.

Likewise they would have anticipatory imagery. They could search their environment with an expectation in mind. But not having language, they couldn’t have what we mean by imagination - the ability to generate mental imagery that is not closely tied to what the world around demands.

So the difference that language makes is an issue I’ve written books about. It is perfectly familiar to me. I’m not getting why you’ve got your knickers so in a twist about me talking about pigeon perception in a routine psych 101 way. Yes, in psych 101 they do skate over the difference that language makes. But that is excusable as talking about the general biological case before getting into the qualifications of the specifically linguistic human case.

What bugs me about your approach in this thread is that you keep using your own weird neologisms without proper explanation and you fail to provide grounding citations for whatever position you think you take. So it is hard to discuss the issues with you rationally. You are coming across as a crackpot. Yet I also think you are trying to make the same point as I also make. So that remains confusing.

However, it seems apparent that you and I have incommensurate notions regarding what counts as perception.
— creativesoul

You’d have to explain how. I’ve asked in the past and you haven’t explained. — apokrisis

That is false.

I've been explaining throughout this thread. It might be worth stating some basics about comprehension. In order to understand an author, a reader must employ the same sense of the key operative terms. In this case, the discussion revolves around what counts as being direct or indirect perception. So, in order for either of us to understand the other, we must understand what is meant when either of us use the term perception.

Our discussion has revolved around precisely those differences. Perhaps this be better put differently: I have been extrapolating upon the differences between our notions of perception. Doing so involves attending to the way we've employed the term respectively.

You've employed the term as a proxy for all sorts of mental ongoings ranging from brute direct perception of objects external to mental ongoings (such as what we call "malignant cellular structures") to highly complex linguistic conceptions such as seeing "that cat there".

Simply put, on my view, perception is not equivalent to mental correlations. Whereas you fail to draw and maintain that distinction, I draw and maintain that perception is one necessary but insufficient element of mental ongoings. You're not alone though. It is an historical shortcoming pervading the whole of philosophy, philosophy of mind (psychology) notwithstanding.

I’ve made the point that human language changes the way we are aware of the world deeply. Yet also we share the same basic brain biology.

So for instance, I am happy to talk about pigeons recognising, but I wouldn’t believe they can recollect. They have memories and can categorise experience. But they don’t have the structure of language that would allow for a narrative or autobiographical use of those memories. — apokrisis

Here, I would largely agree. However, I would note that the notion of "recollect" above presupposes recollecting to someone or something. On my view, recollecting doesn't require reporting upon that recollection.

Human language most certainly changes the way that we are aware of the world deeply. But for that notion to have any bite, in order for it to be robust, we must have a relatively good grasp upon what our awareness of the world is without language. Lest, we have no ability to compare our awareness prior to language with our awareness post language acquisition. Without that comparison, any talk of change after language or as a result of language is groundless.

Likewise they would have anticipatory imagery. They could search their environment with an expectation in mind. But not having language, they couldn’t have what we mean by imagination - the ability to generate mental imagery that is not closely tied to what the world around demands. — apokrisis

That appears to be self contradictory. If they have anticipatory imagery, then they must have the ability to generate such imagery. We agree that animals form and hold expectations. What those expectations consist in seems to be where we differ.

What bugs me about your approach in this thread is that you keep using your own weird neologisms without proper explanation and you fail to provide grounding citations for whatever position you think you take. So it is hard to discuss the issues with you rationally. You are coming across as a crackpot. Yet I also think you are trying to make the same point as I also make. So that remains confusing. — apokrisis

Not much I can do about what bugs you other than to point out that philosophical arguments stand or fall on their own merit. Nothing I've said requires citations. I'm not referencing anyone else's work.

I suggest that you spend less time thinking about me personally and more time addressing the substance of my posts...

I also think you are trying to make the same point as I also make. So that remains confusing. — apokrisis

We are most certainly focused upon the same problem. Our methodological approaches stand in stark contrast to one another however. Hence, the issues hinge upon and stem from the differences therein. Specifically speaking, the framework will limit or delimit what can coherently be said according to it. Explanatory power.

Nothing I've said requires citations. I'm not referencing anyone else's work. — creativesoul

That's how crackpottery starts. Right away, I can't take you seriously.

So, in order for either of us to understand the other, we must understand what is meant when either of us use the term perception. — creativesoul

Well I can point to any standard psychology textbook. If your definition is all your own work, then unless I develop telepathy, you are going to have to do a lot better job of explaining yourself.

Simply put, on my view, perception is not equivalent to mental correlations. Whereas you fail to draw and maintain that distinction, I draw and maintain that perception is one necessary but insufficient element of mental ongoings. You're not alone though. It is an historical shortcoming pervading the whole of philosophy, philosophy of mind (psychology) notwithstanding. — creativesoul

Great. You've just come out with a bunch of your private definitions and tell me it is not just me that is wrong, but the whole of philosophy and science.

The crackpot-ometre is reading off the dial right now.

So what's a mental correlation? What's a mental ongoing?

However, I would note that the notion of "recollect" above presupposes recollecting to someone or something. — creativesoul

Clearly it is the self doing the recollecting. Clearly that is also a potentially homuncular way of putting it. Clearly then, we don't want to be led into a hard claim about a self that both recollects experiences and experiences those recollections - a rather overdetermined position to take.

So your "big insight" here seems merely well-worn commonsense. It itself is a feature mentioned in any sensible, citable, theory of how language makes a difference to human mentality. Take Mead's Symbolic Interactionism for instance. We are born into a world where we find everyone talking grammatically in terms of I, you and them. And from there, a notion of "being a self" gets learnt.

Philosophy and psychology then have to go along with those grammatical conventions, just to get things said in a way people can start to understand. It doesn't make it impossible to turn around and expose the homuncularity of those conventions. That is exactly what Symbolic Interactionism and other such schools of psychology did.

You would know all this if you read the books.

But for that notion to have any bite, in order for it to be robust, we must have a relatively good grasp upon what our awareness of the world is without language. — creativesoul

Great. And I have a very good grasp on that having written a number of books on the subject (that were in turn based on the vast amount of relevant research that exists).

If they have anticipatory imagery, then they must have the ability to generate such imagery. — creativesoul

Do I sense a linguistic notion of selfhood creeping into your thinking just there? You say "they" must have the ability to generate. Is there a "they" without linguistic scaffolding? Isn't there just the brain doing its thing in Bayesian brain fashion?

Surely what you meant to say was that with animals, there can be no socially-constructed self that can imagine itself being at the control of a flow of anticipations. The animal mind is extrospective, not introspective. There is no linguistic self to turn attention away from the world and direct it towards an internal world of rumination and day-dream.

You would know all these things if you read the right books.

I suggest that you spend less time thinking about me personally and more time addressing the substance of my posts... — creativesoul

Sure. Is that substance arriving any time soon? Have you done attacking both my ignorance and the general ignorance of all philosophy and psychology?

Our methodological approaches stand in stark contrast to one another however. — creativesoul

Yep. Me scholar, you crackpot. Me cite sources, you complain the world doesn't understand.

Specifically speaking, the framework will limit or delimit what can coherently be said according to it. — creativesoul

Who would'a thunk? Social constructionism 101.

Emotional maturity is not a strong suit of yours is it? Ironic given the subject matter at hand...

Be well apo...

Ah, what the hell. Why not?

From the first Critique, here's Kant on judgment...

Introduction: Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General.

If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules, the faculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of subsumption under these rules; that is, of distinguishing whether this or that does or does not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis). General logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgement, nor can it contain any such. For as it makes abstraction of all content of cognition, no duty is left for it, except that of exposing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions, judgements, and conclusions, and of thereby establishing formal rules for all exercise of the understanding. Now if this logic wished to give some general direction how we should subsume under these rules, that is, how we should distinguish whether this or that did or did not stand under them, this again could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule. But this rule, precisely because it is a rule, requires for itself direction from the faculty of judgement. Thus, it is evident that the understanding is capable of being instructed by rules, but that the judgement is a peculiar talent, which does not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise. This faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother wit, the want of which no scholastic discipline can compensate.

For although education may furnish, and, as it were, engraft upon a limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power of employing these rules correctly must belong to the pupil himself; and no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is, in the absence or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse.*...

...A physician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his head many admirable pathological, juridical, or political rules, in a degree that may enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular science, and yet in the application of these rules he may very possibly blunder--either because he is wanting in natural judgement (though not in understanding) and, whilst he can comprehend the general in abstracto, cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concreto ought to rank under the former; or because his faculty of judgement has not been sufficiently exercised by examples and real practice.

Indeed, the grand and only use of examples, is to sharpen the judgement. For as regards the correctness and precision of the insight of the understanding, examples are commonly injurious rather than otherwise, because, as casus in terminis they seldom adequately fulfil the conditions of the rule. Besides, they often weaken the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws in their universality, independently of particular circumstances of experience; and hence, accustom us to employ them more as formulae than as principles. Examples are thus the go-cart of the judgement, which he who is naturally deficient in that faculty cannot afford to dispense with.

[*Footnote: Deficiency in judgement is properly that which is called stupidity; and for such a failing we know no remedy. A dull or narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree of understanding, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to deserve the epithet of learned. But as such persons frequently labour under a deficiency in the faculty of judgement, it is not uncommon to find men extremely learned who in the application of their science betray a lamentable degree this irremediable want.]

This seems like the perfect time to allow Kant to place apo's recent ad hom's in proper perspective.

Wake me up when you've ready to answer on your definition of mental correlations and mental ongoings.

Please stop/quash/cease/desist/end/cut out/pull the plug on/put to bed/kill/bring to a halt this annoying thing that you do.

Love you too Sap!

X-)

Yes, can anyone here explain what creative means when he doubles up his terminology. I've asked him so many times, but he can't/won't explain. (Or is that explain/confabulate?)

So we have as our example...

This seems/appears like the perfect time to allow/permit Kant to place/put apo's latest/most recent ad hom's in proper/rightful perspective and/or point of view.

Now take seems/appears. Is one the animal level of perception, the other the human level? Is that what Creative hopes to signal? Or is one the proposition, the other the truthmaker? Does one imply some generality, the other some more specified circumstance?

Why should I be forced to be kept guessing like this? Does Creative actively require that I don't understand him for some reason of his own. That is certainly what it seems/appears like to me.

What about allow/permit, place/put, latest/most recent, proper/rightful. Then now even "perspective and/or point of view".

Aren't these all synomynous pairs with nary a meaningful difference? Or can someone else crack Creative's linguistic code, find a rule behind it?

On The Mechanics Of Thought/Belief

Join in there apo. This thread is tangential. It regards direct vs indirect perception...

...and be on your best behaviour, if you would.

Well, just so the two of you know. That post was moderated and part of the changes were adding most of the portions in question. Although, I do the same thing when I want to express the same thing in multiple ways, and/or show different ways to say much the same thing...

Join in there apo. — creativesoul

It's your private theory that the whole world doesn't understand. I remember now your recent lament that you can't seem to bring the academic world to proper account for its failings in your eyes.

So if there is a key to your code, you can just reveal it right here. I don't mind if that involves you having to go cut and paste that answer from wherever you might have done just that in your best honest fashion.

But I am tired of chasing you around in circles. This has been going on for quite a few years, hasn't it?

Aren't these all synonymous pairs with nary a meaningful difference? — apokrisis

Yes. It's redundant, idiosyncratic, and does not conform with a decent editorial standard. I wish he would stop doing it. It's a bad habit.

Although, I do the same thing when I want to express the same thing in multiple ways, and/or show different ways to say much the same thing... — creativesoul

So why is saying the same thing two different ways of any importance? What does that idiosyncrasy mean?

Clear that up. Then you can tackle mental correlations/mental ongoings. If you can't point towards some basis in standard scholarship when it comes to that jargon, you really do need to make an effort to explain yourself.