A person sitting with a friend who is hallucinating would probably think there is a difference if that person heard the friend begin to speak to people who weren't there or called attention to a tree if there was no tree. That person would, I think, believe the friend was not seeing a tree or people who weren't there, thereby noting a significant difference between the experience of seeing and the experience of hallucinating. Likewise, if that person's friend said "I had a dream about a tree" I think the person would not think his friend saw a tree while the friend was dreaming. — Ciceronianus the White
Presumably seeing a tree is when a tree is causally responsible for the tree-experience, dreaming of a tree is when brain activity during REM sleep is causally responsible for the tree-experience, and hallucinating a tree is when psychedelic drugs are causally responsible for the tree-experience? — Michael
What is this tree that is causally responsible for tree-experience if not some sort of tree-experience? — Magnus Anderson
Well if you can make sense of what a thing looks like when there is no looking involved, then be my guest. — StreetlightX
Science attempts to be creature independent, and describe the world as it is. That's why we arrive at theories like QM. — Marchesk
I don't want to pretend that I've kept up with the direct realism debate, but I think this would be an issue only if it's assumed that what happens when we hallucinate or dream is exactly what happens when we're not hallucinating or dreaming... — Ciceronianus the White
There is no logical link of 'non-realism' to solipsism. If there were one, it would have been published by now, — andrewk
My attempt to explain this is that people who find it important do so because they believe that non-acceptance of the 'realist' (ie materialist) account logically entails solipsism, which in turn seems to signify ultimate loneliness, and that one's closest and most important relationships are a delusion. — andrewk
It is remarkable how much sound and fury this issue generates (eleven pages showing now on my computer) when there is so little at stake. — andrewk
My attempt to explain this is that people who find it important do so because they believe that non-acceptance of the 'realist' (ie materialist) account logically entails solipsism, which in turn seems to signify ultimate loneliness, and that one's closest and most important relationships are a delusion. — andrewk
For the eudaimonia of sentient beings.So little at stake for what?
It seems reasonably likely that discoveries about Higgs Bosons may lead to technological advances that help sentient beings to attain eudaimonia. So there is likely something useful at stake there. I am not so sure about P vs NP, since plenty of P problems are still intractable in feasibly available computing time.Who cares about a Higgs Boson or whether P = NP?
It seems reasonably likely that discoveries about Higgs Bosons may lead to technological advances that help sentient beings to attain eudaimonia — andrewk
Anyone can ask whether what they perceive is real or not, and plenty of people do at some point, even if it's over a joint. — Marchesk
Even if this was "in" the Matrix (and it sorta is in terms of mediation), it would still be 'real' in the most emotionally relevant sense, at least for me. — t0m
What do we mean by "real"? Or do we mean all sorts of things in all sorts of contexts? I think a primary meaning involves "being-with-others." That's the real real world, I tempted to say. What matters is how shared a situation is. If we're all in the Matrix together, then the Matrix is as real as we might want it. — t0m
There is an assumption behind idealism~realism which is about being an immaterial soul locked in a material body, a physical world. So selfhood is taken for granted. It is all about starting with the bare givenness of experience. Then we have to work out what is really real.
And a corrective to that is instead not making self primary. The real first ground of being is the communal one. We are already in a world - the social tribal one. Our first experiences as babies is human contact. It is everything. So the communal mind - in some very important sense - is there before the private self becomes individuated (and aware of being trapped in a body that is trapped in a world).
So this seems to go against Heidegger. Maybe you will correct me on that. — apokrisis
But it is definitely pragmatism - Peirce's ultimate theory of truth being based on "that judgement towards which a community of thinkers would eventually tend". — apokrisis
And it is completely in line with my social constructionist viewpoint of human psychology. We are not born selves, but become individuated beings via the shaping constraints of our family, our tribe, our culture, our era. — apokrisis
I would point out how it is theistic notion of supernatural spirit or soul - the Romantic notion of human psychology - which is at odds with this view. So while you talk about it in an appealing warm and cosy ways, the emotional value, that fits quite happily with a naturalistic perspective. — apokrisis
What realism is after is the God's eye view. Naive realism supposes we just have that already - we look and we can see those colours and shapes which just are the objective facts of the world. — apokrisis
There is no logical link of 'non-realism' to solipsism. If there were one, it would have been published by now, and no non-solipsist 'non-realist' that understood logic would dare to deny the link. — andrewk
I think it primarily means there is a larger world humans are but a small part of. We are late on the evolutionary scene, we only occupy the land surfaces of this planet, for the most part, and there are tons of other stars and planets out there.
The real world is the far bigger and older world, where only a little tiny bit of it has human society. — Marchesk
nd one characteristic feature of all realists is that they REFUSE to explain in sufficient detail what they mean with their statements. — Magnus Anderson
ou can avoid solipsism by arguing that the most parsimonious explanation for the occurrence and regularity of experience is the existence of an independent world of stimuli that are causally covariant with these experiences. It's the exact reasoning that the realist uses. — Michael
The difference is in whether one believes that the immediate object of perception is these experiences or the external stimuli, and in whether or not the properties of the experiences are (also) properties of these external stimuli. — Michael
For example, one might say that the pain and the feeling of heat when putting one's hand in a fire are the immediate objects of perception – that then allows one to correctly infer the existence of a fire – and that the pain and the feeling of heat are not properties of the fire but are properties of the experience – the phenomena that emerges from the brain activity stimulated by sensory receptors in one's skin. — Michael
Again, I agree that there is a physical world that exists in space and time regardless of whether or not human beings are around to perceive it. My question is: what does that mean? I gave you my answer in one of my previous posts. You never gave yours. — Magnus Anderson
True, but that's the exact reasoning the indirect realist uses. The direct realists doesn't need to infer an independent world. We already perceive it. — Marchesk
And what reasoning does the realist have to support his claim that we perceive an independent world (of other people and inanimate objects)? Presumably they believe it to be the most parsimonious explanation for the occurrence and regularity of experience? So as I said, the reasoning is the same. — Michael
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