The thing about virtual trees is that they are not trees. — Banno
Well both cases use a sense that I do not. So, there are at least three at work...
It is impossible to have any idea at all about 'appearances' in the sense you're using prior to learning about our own perceptual/conceptual limitations.
We do not need to learn about our own limitations in order to name. — creativesoul
Even if that entity appears differently to others? Doesn't the tree appear to others? — creativesoul
We say we're looking at a tree, because we have an experience of seeing a tree that can be backed by other people, instruments, etc.
This isn't the case with dreams, hallucinations, etc. Although pre-scientific cultures may have thought otherwise. — Marchesk
Are we looking at our experience, or are we looking at the tree?
— creativesoul
Of course we are looking at the tree. We cannot look at our experience; our experience is the looking.
If I look at a tree and if I call it a tree, then I directly experience looking at a tree. I do not directly experience looking at an entity that also appears to others.
— Janus
Even if that entity appears differently to others? Doesn't the tree appear to others? — creativesoul
I don't directly experience the tree's appearing to others, although in the inter-subjective context it is of course taken for granted. — Janus
So, give an account of your "third sense". — Janus
If I understand how to use the words 'appearance' and 'tree' then I know enough to be able to say that the tree appears when I look at it. I imagine that children play such games; making objects appear and disappear by opening and closing their eyes. No sophisticated understanding in terms of "perceptual/ conceptual limitations" is required. — Janus
I do agree, though, that we do not need such an understanding in order to name either; in fact that is exactly my point; that we only need to understand the use of the names "appearance" and "tree" (in the context of the requisite minimal proficiency in English language use of course) in order to understand that the tree appears. — Janus
We most certainly do directly experience looking at an entity that also appears to others. — creativesoul
That's not the sense of 'appearance' you're employing here. — creativesoul
You're agreeing with something I've not said. Naming the tree does not require knowing how to use the term "appearance" in either the sense you've employed in the thread or the sense you've mentioned above. — creativesoul
My point here is that there is no ability to talk about the "appearance" of tree in the Kantian or similar sense, without first looking at and naming the entity that appears to each of us, and then becoming aware of the limitations inherent to our perceptual capabilities. — creativesoul
You're agreeing with something I've not said. Naming the tree does not require knowing how to use the term "appearance" in either the sense you've employed in the thread or the sense you've mentioned above.
— creativesoul
I didn't say it was; so again, what are you talking about? You seem to be intent on misunderstanding
me. — Janus
My point here is that there is no ability to talk about the "appearance" of tree in the Kantian or similar sense, without first looking at and naming the entity that appears to each of us, and then becoming aware of the limitations inherent to our perceptual capabilities.
— creativesoul
And again I haven't said otherwise. Even the simple understanding of the notion of appearance that I outlined (which is neither Kantian nor similar if 'similar' is taken to denote sophistication) obviously cannot precede the simple understanding of naming objects ( things which appear). (Of course it could precede the understanding of naming trees, if a child were raised somewhere trees are not found). But, in any case, so what? I can't see the relevance. — Janus
I'm looking at the tree that appears to me. What I am looking at cannot "underwrite" anything other than the fact that I experience seeing it. What "underwrites everything (I) have said here" is the idea of a publicly available entity; the tree. I am not looking at that because it is merely an idea, a formalized externality. The tree I look at is embedded in my experience, outside that I cannot see it. — Janus
The idea of a publicly available entity; the tree, consists of very complex metacognition.
Thinking/believing that that is(called) a tree does not. The former is existentially contingent upon the latter. — creativesoul
Then they create a shared tree through various interactions - linguistic, social, and so on.
Is that your argument? — Banno
The idea of a publicly available entity; the tree, consists of very complex metacognition.
Thinking/believing that that is(called) a tree does not. The former is existentially contingent upon the latter.
— creativesoul
I don't believe it's all that complex; everyone who just unreflectively assumes that the entities available to their experience are also available to others holds such an idea, even if it is not explicitly couched in high-sounding terms like "publicly available entity".
Of course one must be able to see the tree in order to later infer that it is available to the seeing of others; I wouldn't want to disagree with that. — Janus
When objects begin to be noticed by a child, I imagine it has no idea about those objects being publicly available. Of course we can say that the idea that objects are publicly available precedes the individual. But phenomenological speaking it does not; I don't think you get that I am making a phenomenological, not a logical, distinction here. — Janus
I'm looking at the tree that appears to me. What I am looking at cannot "underwrite" anything other than the fact that I experience seeing it. What "underwrites everything (I) have said here" is the idea of a publicly available entity; the tree. I am not looking at that 'tree' because it is merely an idea, a formalized externality. The tree I look at is embedded in my experience, outside that I cannot see it. — Janus
I'm pointing out that trees are publicly available prior to our being able to talk like that. Being publicly available does not require language. An idea of being publicly available does. — creativesoul
The idea of a publicly available entity; the tree, consists of very complex metacognition.
Thinking/believing that that is(called) a tree does not. The former is existentially contingent upon the latter. — creativesoul
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