The thing about virtual trees is that they are not trees. — Banno

Irrelevant, the difference is still only between the objects perceived.

Well both cases use a sense that I do not. So, there are at least three at work...

It is impossible to have any idea at all about 'appearances' in the sense you're using prior to learning about our own perceptual/conceptual limitations.

We do not need to learn about our own limitations in order to name. — creativesoul

So, give an account of your "third sense".

If I understand how to use the words 'appearance' and 'tree' then I know enough to be able to say that the tree appears when I look at it. I imagine that many children play such games; making objects appear and disappear by opening and closing their eyes (I did). No sophisticated understanding in terms of "perceptual/ conceptual limitations" is required.

I do agree, though, that we do not need such an understanding in order to name either; in fact that is exactly my point; that we only need to understand the use of the names "appearance" and "tree" (in the context of the requisite minimal proficiency in English language use of course) in order to understand that the tree appears.

Even if that entity appears differently to others? Doesn't the tree appear to others? — creativesoul

I don't directly experience the tree's appearing to others, although in the inter-subjective context it is of course taken for granted.

We say we're looking at a tree, because we have an experience of seeing a tree that can be backed by other people, instruments, etc.

This isn't the case with dreams, hallucinations, etc. Although pre-scientific cultures may have thought otherwise. — Marchesk

We say we're looking at a tree, because that's what we're doing.

Are we looking at our experience, or are we looking at the tree?
— creativesoul

Of course we are looking at the tree. We cannot look at our experience; our experience is the looking.

If I look at a tree and if I call it a tree, then I directly experience looking at a tree. I do not directly experience looking at an entity that also appears to others.
— Janus

Even if that entity appears differently to others? Doesn't the tree appear to others? — creativesoul

I don't directly experience the tree's appearing to others, although in the inter-subjective context it is of course taken for granted. — Janus

If you look at a tree and call it a tree, then you directly experience looking at a tree. If I look at a tree and if I call it a tree, then I directly experience looking at a tree. The tree is the entity that appears to each of us, albeit perhaps a bit differently to each. So...

We most certainly do directly experience looking at an entity that also appears to others.

So, give an account of your "third sense". — Janus

It's the one underwriting everything you've said here. It's what you're looking at.

If I understand how to use the words 'appearance' and 'tree' then I know enough to be able to say that the tree appears when I look at it. I imagine that children play such games; making objects appear and disappear by opening and closing their eyes. No sophisticated understanding in terms of "perceptual/ conceptual limitations" is required. — Janus

That's not the sense of 'appearance' you're employing here.

I do agree, though, that we do not need such an understanding in order to name either; in fact that is exactly my point; that we only need to understand the use of the names "appearance" and "tree" (in the context of the requisite minimal proficiency in English language use of course) in order to understand that the tree appears. — Janus

You're agreeing with something I've not said. Naming the tree does not require knowing how to use the term "appearance" in either the sense you've employed in the thread or the sense you've mentioned above.

My point here is that there is no ability to talk about the "appearance" of tree in the Kantian or similar sense, without first looking at and naming the entity that appears to each of us, and then becoming aware of the limitations inherent to our perceptual capabilities.

We most certainly do directly experience looking at an entity that also appears to others. — creativesoul

Now you are equivocating. When I said we don't directly experience looking at an entity that also appears to others; I didn't intend to assert that the entity we are looking at doesn't appear to others; and I believe you are very well aware of that. Perhaps it wasn't worded as well as it could have been, but it should have been obvious from many other things I have said that I intended to state that we do not directly experience the fact of its appearing to others.

When I directly experience the tree there is nothing in that simple experience which shows me that it also appears to others. That it also appears to others is a conceptual inference which is derived from my discourse with others about the tree and recognition of our agreements as to its distinguishing features. Really no one knows what ultimately explains the fact that we seem to experience the same entities and events. But for logical purposes, metaphysics aside, of course we experience the same objects and people. The priority, though, belongs to my own direct experience of things, and other's experience of the those things is not part of that direct experience; it is at one inferential remove, so to speak.

So, it is in that sense that we can speak about two senses of 'tree' or whatever. That has been my point all along.

That's not the sense of 'appearance' you're employing here. — creativesoul

What are you talking about?

You're agreeing with something I've not said. Naming the tree does not require knowing how to use the term "appearance" in either the sense you've employed in the thread or the sense you've mentioned above. — creativesoul

I didn't say it was; so again, what are you talking about? You seem to be intent on misunderstanding
me.

My point here is that there is no ability to talk about the "appearance" of tree in the Kantian or similar sense, without first looking at and naming the entity that appears to each of us, and then becoming aware of the limitations inherent to our perceptual capabilities. — creativesoul

And again I haven't said otherwise. Even the simple understanding of the notion of appearance that I outlined (which is neither Kantian nor similar if 'similar' is taken to denote sophistication) obviously cannot precede the simple understanding of naming objects ( things which appear). (Of course it could precede the understanding of naming trees, if a child were raised somewhere trees are not found). But, in any case, so what? I can't see the relevance.

I'm looking at the tree that appears to me. What I am looking at cannot "underwrite" anything other than the fact that I experience seeing it. What "underwrites everything (I) have said here" is the idea of a publicly available entity; the tree. I am not looking at that 'tree' because it is merely an idea, a formalized externality. The tree I look at is embedded in my experience, outside that I cannot see it.

You're agreeing with something I've not said. Naming the tree does not require knowing how to use the term "appearance" in either the sense you've employed in the thread or the sense you've mentioned above.
— creativesoul

I didn't say it was; so again, what are you talking about? You seem to be intent on misunderstanding
me. — Janus

Well, actually I was attempting to clear up the misunderstanding, but it seems that you understand. So, nevermind that...

The second sentence remakes my earlier point. It seems we agree upon that.

My point here is that there is no ability to talk about the "appearance" of tree in the Kantian or similar sense, without first looking at and naming the entity that appears to each of us, and then becoming aware of the limitations inherent to our perceptual capabilities.
— creativesoul

And again I haven't said otherwise. Even the simple understanding of the notion of appearance that I outlined (which is neither Kantian nor similar if 'similar' is taken to denote sophistication) obviously cannot precede the simple understanding of naming objects ( things which appear). (Of course it could precede the understanding of naming trees, if a child were raised somewhere trees are not found). But, in any case, so what? I can't see the relevance. — Janus

The relevance applies to the origen of the notions of "experience" and "perception". If both are existentially contingent upon X in terms of their constitution, then whatever X requires and/or consists in, so too do those notions. However, given that it seems that we agree with regard to directly perceiving the tree, there's not much sense in getting into that.

I'm looking at the tree that appears to me. What I am looking at cannot "underwrite" anything other than the fact that I experience seeing it. What "underwrites everything (I) have said here" is the idea of a publicly available entity; the tree. I am not looking at that because it is merely an idea, a formalized externality. The tree I look at is embedded in my experience, outside that I cannot see it. — Janus

The idea of a publicly available entity; the tree, consists of very complex metacognition.

Thinking/believing that that is(called) a tree does not. The former is existentially contingent upon the latter.

@Janus

So there is a tree.

Ten people see it, and see (perceive, behold, and so on) a different tree each.

Then they create a shared tree through various interactions - linguistic, social, and so on.

Is that your argument?

The idea of a publicly available entity; the tree, consists of very complex metacognition.

Thinking/believing that that is(called) a tree does not. The former is existentially contingent upon the latter. — creativesoul

I don't believe it's all that complex; everyone who just unreflectively assumes that the entities available to their experience are also available to others holds such an idea, even if it is not explicitly couched in high-sounding terms like "publicly available entity".

Of course one must be able to see the tree in order to later infer that it is available to the seeing of others; I wouldn't want to disagree with that.

Then they create a shared tree through various interactions - linguistic, social, and so on.

Is that your argument? — Banno

No, they don't create a tree; they infer the independent existence of the tree; which is only logically proper. The point is that the independent existence of the tree is not something I experience, but is rather, from my point of view, an idea; which may or may not represent an actuality. Of course for practical everyday purposes and logical consistency we unreflectively assume that our inference to an independently existing tree does represent an actual independent existence. That independent existence though, for obvious reasons, can never be an experience for me, as the living tree can.

IT is in that sense that we can say there are two senses of 'tree'; the tree of my lived experience, and the inferred independently existent tree that is publicly available. Logically they are the same; whereas experientially, or phenomenologically if you like, they are not. I hope that explanation makes it clear to you.

The idea of a publicly available entity; the tree, consists of very complex metacognition.

Thinking/believing that that is(called) a tree does not. The former is existentially contingent upon the latter.
— creativesoul

I don't believe it's all that complex; everyone who just unreflectively assumes that the entities available to their experience are also available to others holds such an idea, even if it is not explicitly couched in high-sounding terms like "publicly available entity".

Of course one must be able to see the tree in order to later infer that it is available to the seeing of others; I wouldn't want to disagree with that. — Janus

Do you draw a distinction between an idea of a publicly available entity and a publicly available entity?

Of course there is a logical distinction between those two.

Does the logical distinction point out a difference in elemental constitution?

The tree is available to the public prior to our being able to say that. In other words, the idea cannot be had by us, despite the fact that those relations exist(what counts as being available to the public) until we're able to talk in such terms.

Naming the tree begins our awareness of what is already available to the public, without our being able to conceptualize the tree in such terms. Realizing the limitations of our visual perception is the key component of questioning our vision. It is that questioning that gives rise to the notion of a difference between the tree and how the tree appears.

I don't know what you are asking.

↪creativesoul

I don't know what you are asking. — Janus

See my post immediately preceding yours...

When objects begin to be noticed by a child, I imagine it has no idea about those objects being publicly available. Of course we can say that the idea that objects are publicly available precedes the individual. But phenomenological speaking it does not; I don't think you get that I am making a phenomenological, not a logical, distinction here.

Learning to name a tree for sure includes taking it for granted that trees are also visible to others; but this understanding is unreflective. It is not realizing the limitations, but rather the private nature of our visual perception that first leads to the idea that others may not see the tree the same way (in terms of colour, or size, for example) and even to question whether it is in fact the same tree we see. I can remember raising this question when I was a child less than ten years old. I noticed that I do not experience your experience of the tree; that your experience of the tree is, for me, merely presumed. It's not all that sophisticated.

I am not sure which post before which post of yours you refer to.

Much more agreeable - my apologies that my slowness caused you aggravation.

My only qualm is I'm not convinced that the independent existence of the tree is inferred. I think our awareness of stuff like trees and rocks is far more visceral than that.

So now that we have some agreement, I have a further question for you: do you think that the tree has, say, a mass that you and I might agree on?

When objects begin to be noticed by a child, I imagine it has no idea about those objects being publicly available. Of course we can say that the idea that objects are publicly available precedes the individual. But phenomenological speaking it does not; I don't think you get that I am making a phenomenological, not a logical, distinction here. — Janus

I'm pointing out that trees are publicly available prior to our being able to talk like that. Being publicly available does not require language. An idea of being publicly available does.

I'm looking at the tree that appears to me. What I am looking at cannot "underwrite" anything other than the fact that I experience seeing it. What "underwrites everything (I) have said here" is the idea of a publicly available entity; the tree. I am not looking at that 'tree' because it is merely an idea, a formalized externality. The tree I look at is embedded in my experience, outside that I cannot see it. — Janus

I'm pointing out that trees are publicly available prior to our being able to talk like that. Being publicly available does not require language. An idea of being publicly available does. — creativesoul

The idea of a publicly available entity; the tree, consists of very complex metacognition.

Thinking/believing that that is(called) a tree does not. The former is existentially contingent upon the latter. — creativesoul

Thus, the tree underwrites everything you've written here. It is the existential basis of all musing...

No aggravation caused, so no need for apology, Banno. :)

Yes, I agree that the independent existence of things may plausibly be thought to be part of our lived experience (in a way that other's experience of them is not) insofar as they just seem independent of us; we experience them as being external to our bodies and so on. This is controversial though, obviously, with some philosophers.

I do agree that the tree has a mass that we could agree upon. We could cut it all up into pieces, weigh them and sum the results, for example.

If trees are indeed publicly available, as they certainly seem to be, then, sure they are " publicly available prior to our being able to talk like that". Unless I am mistaken, I haven't anywhere claimed otherwise. If I have seemed to claim otherwise then it must have been due to poor expression.

My central concern has only been to point out that the public availability of objects is not directly given to me in experience. It is on that basis that I draw the distinction between the tree as experienced in living perception and the tree conceived as an independently existent. publicly available entity.

I don't think it makes sense to say that entities, thought of as being utterly pre-conceptual existents, underwrite anything. If you want to say that entities are necessarily conceptual, or even less robustly, to use McDowell's term "in conceptual shape" (see for example Hegel, John McDowell and Robert Brandom with their different takes on this) then you may be able to consistently say that they are capable of justifying ("underwriting") beliefs and judgements, otherwise I can't see how you could make the leap, or bridge the gap, unless you brought God into it.

This is a tricky thing to talk about; language has so many pitfalls.