Which philosophers claim to be p-zombies?

I highly doubt there are actually p-zombies. It'd be begging the question to assume that a structurally similar human being doesn't have consciousness...just because.

Those who deny qualia don't deny the seduction of appeals to qualia. You need to understand what people are talking about when they refer to qualia in order to even argue against it. Dennett does not deny that there are prima facie qualitative experiences, for example.

I would like to know which philosophers claim they are p-zombies. P-zombies are entities that distinctively lack something, while philosophers like Dennett don't think they lack something while others have it - they think that qualitative experience as a whole is a myth.

I am completely blind, I don't experience sight at all. But I can function just as well as someone who does see, in every way. If we hung out you wouldn't even notice I was blind.

What would you think of someone who made that claim?

I'd think they were lying (like the aforementioned philosophers) ;)

Which philosophers claim to be p-zombies? — csalisbury

I would like to know which philosophers claim they are p-zombies. — darthbarracuda

The majority of mainstream analytic philosophers.

Dennett don't think they lack something while others have it - they think that qualitative experience as a whole is a myth. — darthbarracuda

Right, so since this view is obviously false, one hypothesis is that Dennett thinks this because he has no qualitative experiences, so they're incomprehensible to him.

Well it's obviously false that the majority of mainstream analytic philosophers profess to be p-zombies. But I see your point. I guess it's more that they move the goalposts.

One thing Dennett does a lot is give proust-if-proust-were-really-shitty sketches of e.g. watching the light play across the floor of his study. Or listening to some classical piece. (You almost expect him to nostalgically recount the twilight splendor of 18th century Versailles. When Dennett tries to prove he 'gets' the 'myth,' he always strives to be refined and delicate. Like Chaplin's tramp trying to appear a gentleman.) If he were really a p-zombie, the whole thing becomes almost a tragically beautiful pinocchio story. He's doing his best! 'Perhaps being conscious is like this? Is this not what it's like to see light? To hear music? See, I'm real!' Except I guess it would be a pinocchio story where pinocchio wants to be just real enough to prove that real boys are puppets too.

I think the answer is probably more like: people who rail against qualia
(1) have rigid self-images of being v serious, no-bullshit ppl (like more refined, socially respected, versions of those ppl who put darwin-jesus-fish stickers on their car)
(2) prob have a past of traumatic humiliation which they've tried to overcome via mastery of abstract language-games, to the point where they have trouble admitting there's anything outside the game. And so
(3) have a need - prob largely unconscious - to attack others who undermine the self-sufficient enclosure of their game.

That's a little psychoanalytical. I don't think an entire cultural or professional tendency can be reduced to individual quirks, unless these are somehow common to a large number of philosophers.

Not just a little, but unabashedly psychoanalytical. Institutions (including, natch, academic ones) attract certain tendencies and then reinforce them. Vast echo chambers that not only confirm your beliefs but make it difficult to network or get tenure without doubling down.

(+ are you not making the same appeal to individual eccentricity by positing the existence of p-zombie types? As in "I don't think an entire cultural or professional tendency can be reduced to individual p-zombiehood, unless this is somehow common to a large number of philosophers" )

(+ are you not making the same appeal to individual eccentricity by positing the existence of p-zombie types?) — csalisbury

What if there's qualia gene buried somewhere? Outward signs include professing belief in qualia, being homosexual, and browsing DeviantArt?

lol I think it'd make a good Time cover story. "Could your children be having 'Experiences'?

The magical new breed of Indigo Children: kids claim to 'see' colors.

Right, so since this view is obviously false, one hypothesis is that Dennett thinks this because he has no qualitative experiences, so they're incomprehensible to him. — The Great Whatever

But Dennett is a typical human being with a similar structure to other human beings that profess having qualitative experiences. If those other people are right in that qualia is something, then Dennett most likely also experiences qualitative episodes. If those other people are wrong that qualia is something, then Dennett is right and everyone does not have qualia.

Should we think that those who believe in god are somehow structurally different than those who do not? No, one group just lacks a belief in what another group has. The phenomenon is the same, the interpretation is different. Otherwise it's basically begging to question.

The phenomenon is the same, the interpretation is different. — darth

hmmmmmm

Should we think that those who believe in god are somehow structurally different than those who do not? — darthbarracuda

I think that's a realistic possibility.

Absurd. Those who believe in god are not so radically different from those who do not in the way that someone without qualia is different from someone with qualia. A belief regarding the ontology of qualia does not lead to you actually representing this ontology.

What's wrong? The phenomenon is the existence of the world. The explanation or interpretation of this are various appeals to god (theism) or a rejection of these appeals (atheism).

Yes, but you mention this as analogous to qualia. What's the phenomenon which Dennett interprets one way and qualia-supporters another?

Subjective, qualitative experiences. Dennett uses intuition pumps to try to break down this qualia and make it seem like a concept of folk psychology. He doesn't deny the prima facie ontology of qualia, though. Qualia is just a myth, according to Dennett.

It's not as if when defenders of qualia try to point out flaws in Dennett's reasoning, Dennett is metaphorically plugging his ears "lalala I can't hear you!" It's not as if Dennett and his opponents are talking about two different things. Dennett seems to be able, like any other rational human being, to change his mind. Should we automatically think that those who believe qualia is non-real are p-zombies? Shouldn't we give them the benefit of the doubt?

A philosophical zombie wouldn't even be able to comprehend the very concept of qualia. It would be like a blind man denying the color spectrum. Dennett is not a philosophical zombie (from the perspective of a supporter of qualia) because he clearly understands what qualia is supposed to be, and tries to reduce qualia to something non-qualitative. To his opponents, Dennett does not lack qualia, and to his supporters, everyone lacks qualia because qualia is seen as a myth.

I happen to disagree with Dennett on his position, but I certainly don't think that just because Dennett thinks qualia isn't real means that Dennett somehow is a philosophical zombie. I just think he's missing some pieces, and I believe that if these pieces were adequately brought forth, he might change his mind on his position.

Should we automatically think that those who believe qualia is non-real are p-zombies? Shouldn't we give them the benefit of the doubt? — darthbarracuda

I don't understand. Wouldn't believing they're p-zombies be giving them the benefit of the doubt?

A philosophical zombie wouldn't even be able to comprehend the very concept of qualia. — darthbarracuda

But philosophers claim precisely not to be able to understand it, or that it's fundamentally confused, mistaken, or unintelligible. Aren't you just helping my case?

But philosophers claim precisely not to be able to understand it, or that it's fundamentally confused, mistaken, or unintelligible. Aren't you just helping my case? — The Great Whatever

You're equivocating not being familiar with something with not understanding what it is. Dennett, for example, is familiar with the concept of qualia, but does not seem to understand it in the way that qualia-supporters do.

If I give good reasons for denying the reality of color (say I create an argument that attempts to reduce color to something non-colorful in the same way Dennett attempts to reduce qualia to something non-qualitative), you wouldn't call me blind. I'm just arguing that color as an actual thing is a myth, better understood by appeals to reduction.

So Dennett isn't plugging his ears and claiming the elephant in the room doesn't exist. He's just claiming that the elephant (simpliciter) isn't an elephant but something else.

So Dennett isn't plugging his ears and claiming the elephant in the room doesn't exist. He's just claiming that the elephant (simpliciter) isn't an elephant but something else. — darthbarracuda

I'm not saying he's plugging his ears. I'm saying maybe he doesn't understand the concept because he has no qualia.

What's the phenomenon which Dennett interprets one way and qualia-supporters another?

Darth: Subjective, qualitative experiences.

But this is to say that some people interpret qualitative experience as qualitative experience (which is not an interpretation) and that others interpret qualitative experiences as non-existent, even as phenomenon (which would mean there would be nothing to interpret at all, rendering the very idea of interpretation nonsensical.)

The analogy to religion doesn't work so well. What we interpret when we interpret religion (qua phenomenon, with ourselves at a distance) is human behavior, speech, texts. If Dennett's giving an interpretation of qualitative experience, as you say, then he's already conceded the point. (Now Dennett does want to interpret qualitative experience in a way similar to the interpretation of religion. Hence his goofy 'heterophenomenological method.' But this means evaulating claims about qualia based only on third person accounts, on the accounts of others or self-as-other. Just the way a p-zombie would go about handling the problem, since for him qualitative experience is necessarily always somewhere else, somewhere other.)

I'm not saying he's plugging his ears. I'm saying maybe he doesn't understand the concept because he has no qualia. — The Great Whatever

But this begs the question. Do we all have qualia? I'm apt to say that anything conscious does have qualia. But to say that Dennett is a p-zombie because he denies qualia is to beg the question that it is already proven that we have qualia.

Of course we can't prove that Dennett has qualia, just as we can't prove that Dennett or anyone else outside of our own even have minds. This is Witty's box-beetle analogy all over again.

From a naive point of view, pain in the left big toe actually is in the big toe. But after contemplation we understand that there is no actual pain in the left big toe. It just seems that way. Should those who adhere to the naive point of view think that we don't actually feel pain in our left big toe when we stub our toe? Both camps feel pain, but identify them in different areas.

So Dennett "feels" (tongue in cheek) qualia but does not think there is actually any qualia at all. He does not assert this, he actually goes to great lengths attempting to show how our feelings of qualia are misguided. He attempts to deconstruct qualia.

Now, if we could adequately show or prove that qualia is a real thing, and Dennett still did not change his mind, then we would think him dogmatic or mentally compromised. We might even be able to claim that he is a p-zombie. But until we show the qualia is an actual thing, we're begging the question.

How would you define qualia?

Individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. If Dennett can succeed in deconstructing qualia, he must show that somehow there is no such thing as conscious experience (what it is like-ness) and that this concept is somehow fundamentally flawed.

We shouldn't think Dennett to be a p-zombie for suggesting this. We should think of him as a rather dogmatic materialist, though. Someone who has made up his mind about materialism without considering all the angles.

How can you be conscious of qualia enough to 'get the myth' without being conscious?

This is as I suspected: the thread is going to devolve into a thread about qualia itself, since without arguing for qualia, we can't assert that Dennett is a p-zombie without begging the question.

I don't really get Dennett's position. He has some good points but overall they don't convince me. Like I said before, I think this shows that Dennett is hell-bent on materialism, not that he is a p-zombie.