But some philosophers claim that if something is physiologically and behaviourally identical to conscious people then ipso facto it is conscious. — Michael
they're claiming that the notion of p-zombies doesn't make sense. — Michael
P-zombies lack consciousness. Only if consciousness is to be understood as qualia would a lack of qualia mean a lack of consciousness. But some, e.g. Dennett, claim that this isn't the case. — Michael
Just take them at their word. — Michael
So of course if you define p-zombies in such a way that it means they lack any and all qualia — darthbarracuda
Aren't p-zombies just people with no qualia? — The Great Whatever
I'm coming to this thread rather late, but it intrigues me as to why TGW thinks that consciousness must be defined in terms of qualia. I wonder whether he has an argument to support that contention? I'm also wondering what TGW's descriptive account of qualia is. — John
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