apokrisis - check out this blog article - I'm sure you'll appreciate it if you don't know it already. — Wayfarer
I am talking about reporting how experience seems to us in its 'first person' immediacy, not its objective contents but its subjective quality. I believe this is something we all know; we know what it is, subjectively speaking, to experience ourselves in relation to a world of others, not as some objectivist description about it, but as subjective immediacy. — Janus
The raw feels only seem to come into view because we have stepped back far enough as a distanced “self” - some idealised notion of a disinterested viewer. — apokrisis
I say that this metaphor and allusion (the arts) is an alternative discourse to the so-called scientific understanding, and of at least equal importance. In fact I would say it is primary and that scientific understanding is secondary and derivative. — Janus
Care to take the challenge? — charleton
In other words, although knowing the concept is not a necessary effect of knowing the language, knowing the language can still be a necessary cause. I accept the correction.You argument is non sequitur. Just because a person may know a language without knowing a particular concept, does not imply that a person can know a concept without knowing a language. — Metaphysician Undercover
My turn to call non-sequitur. Just because the word "red" refers to the thing which causes the concept redness in the mind, it does not follow that the word "red" is necessary for the existence of the thing, and by extension, the existence of the concept. (Note that I have used the term "concept" to refer to both the thing outside the mind and the idea inside the mind, and as Wayfarer points out, this could be inconsistent with Aquinas who differentiates between form and concept).There is no such thing as redness unless there is such a thing as what the word "red" refers to. And, there is no such thing as what the word "red" refers to unless there is language. Therefore there is no such thing as redness without language. — Metaphysician Undercover
But according to google, a plane is a flat surface, and so we are really saying the same thing, and in which case our concepts of triangle-ness does coincide.You said "exact same properties", so if I am not picky I have not carried out my obligation of due diligence to determine whether the conditions of "exact same" have been fulfilled. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that 'universal' implies that accidentals have been excluded, by definition of 'universal'. But why would 'exact same' implies that accidentals have been included? As a side note, I thought your position from an earlier post was that universal forms (2) existed, in addition to particular forms (3).That's the problem. "Exact same" implies that accidentals have been included. "Universal" implies that accidentals have been excluded. The two are incompatible by way of contradiction. Yet you insist upon using the two together, to say that I have the exact same concept as you. — Metaphysician Undercover
Although I find this topic interesting, I will drop out of it because it drifts away from the main topic of forms.Space is one of the concepts which we use to understand relations between things. — Metaphysician Undercover
Where we differ is that you believe nothing at all is to be known without the dualistic rational "stepping back" or "stepping out" of the living process. — Janus
I say that this metaphor and allusion (the arts) is an alternative discourse to the so-called scientific understanding, and of at least equal importance. In fact I would say it is primary and that scientific understanding is secondary and derivative. — Janus
But I also plead guilty to equivocating 'meaning' and 'information', which, even though there's an overlap, have many different connotations. — Wayfarer
I'd suggest (and I think you'll agree) that the usual conception of 'raw feels' is already too theoretical. — 0rff
We start from an immersion in a shared world with shared language. — 0rff
But let's be fair. There is something like a raw feel. Redness just 'is,' in a certain sense, even if it's only revealed by a sophisticated way of looking at things, by peeling it off of the apple — 0rff
So there does seem to be a stubborn or dogmatic stupidity in any position that ignores 'consciousness' and 'meaning.' — 0rff
Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of what [is real]. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything [that is real] is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical stuff that exists—namely, mental stuff. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists [ I would rather say, ‘is real’] as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists [is real] as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray.
In other words, even if it were possible to map out the exact pattern of brain waves that give rise to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it wouldn’t be them.
All information relies on its physical existence, be that a tape, a CD ROM, a flash drive or a book. — charleton
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