What I make, I will call "banana bread", and what you make, you will call "banana bread". But what I make, and what you make are not both the same thing, they are similar. — Metaphysician Undercover

Jeez. And so you agree that there are differences that don't make a difference!

Sameness - like difference - is just the idealised limit. All real things are never absolutely the same, nor absolutely different. They are just relatively alike or relatively unalike.

Where is the problem?

Where is the problem? — apokrisis

Checked, no problem here. Must be at the other end. ;-) (not *your* end...)

OK, ordinary probability is fine. So if I roll a 7 with a pair of dice, does it make a difference if I roll a 4 and a 3 instead of a 2 and a 5?

Sometimes differences don’t make a difference. And that is determined by the context. — apokrisis

Of course it makes a difference. You can only make the decision that this difference doesn't make a difference in reference to some intent, or purpose. But we're talking metaphysics, ontology, and the foundations of epistemology, we can't make our principles concerning the nature of reality relative to our purposes. That is the context here, ontology. And since it is the truth which we are concerned with here, we cannot decide that there is a difference which doesn't make a difference in relation to the truth, as this is contradictory.

And so you agree that there are differences that don't make a difference! — apokrisis

No, I do not agree. Just because I call two distinct things by the same word does not mean that I agree that the difference between them doesn't make a difference. That I think is a ridiculous conclusion. One is mine, and the other is Wayfarer's. I respect that difference, and I would not steal Wayfarer's banana bread, claiming that it must be mine because it is the same as mine.

Despite the fact that we use the same word to refer to different things, we still respect that the difference between them makes a difference. If you disregard this difference to produce a logical argument, as wayfarer did, it is a category mistake, and you engage in sophistry.

Where is the problem? — apokrisis

Checked, no problem here. Must be at the other end. ;-) (not *your* end...) — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe such sophistry is a very big problem which has infiltrated most modern metaphysics. Disrespect for the law of identity ought to be exposed for what it is, a complete undermining of epistemological principles. Sure, it's not a problem for you, because it doesn't make a difference to you. But by insisting that it's not a problem just because it doesn't make a difference to you, in complete disrespect for the fact that it does make a difference to me, you insist on making your epistemological principles completely subjective.

All real things are never absolutely the same, nor absolutely different. They are just relatively alike or relatively unalike. — apokrisis

"Absolutely different" means "completely different". Two objects are said to be completely different if they have nothing in common. Are you saying there is no such a thing as two objects that have nothing in common? Of course not. I can easily give you an example of two sets that are completely different in the sense that they have no elements in common. Let A = {1, 2, 3} and B = {4, 5, 6}. A and B, we can clearly see, are two completely different sets because they have no elements in common. Not a single one. I don't think you're denying this obvious fact i.e. that there are objects that have nothing in common. So what exactly are you saying? What do you mean when you say there is no such a thing as "absolute difference"?

Two objects are said to be completely different if they have nothing in common. Are you saying there is no such a thing as two objects that have nothing in common? — Magnus Anderson

I think you will find that objects have being objects in common. Sets have being sets in common. Etc.

Sometimes differences don’t make a difference. And that is determined by the context. — apokrisis

Yes, there are details that are irrelevant. And it is us who determine which details are relevant and which details are not relevant. For example, when we measure the length of an object we do so by counting how many objects of the same length (e.g. centimeters) can be put next to each other so that they appear to be the same length as the object we are measuring. When we say "the same length" we do not mean "the same length from any point of view". Rather, what we mean is "the same length from those points of view that are of interest to us". It is possible for two objects to appear the same from those points of view that are of interest to us and different from those points of view that are of no interest to us. Centimeters may appear the same from a distance but seen up close they may look different. When you move closer to a centimeter, new details may appear in your view of that centimeter. If this happens, then the two centimeters may no longer appear to be of the same length. And this is why it is extremely important to define the boundaries of a centimeter. You need to know what is a centimeter and what isn't. When you know what is a centimeter and what isn't then it becomes straightforward to determine whether any two centimeters are of the same length or not. There is no longer any room for "but if you take a closer look you will see that they are different!" because the concept of centimeter limits the set of vantage points that belong to this concept. Differences that can be observed from those vantage points that fall outside of the definition of the concept of centimeter can be dismissed on the ground that they are irrelevant. They are simply NOT part of the concept of centimeter.

Yes. The problem is that "being a set" is usually not an element of sets. Consider set A with elements 1, 2 and 3; and set B with elements 4, 5 and 6. Comparing the two sets means comparing those elements that belong to them. We didn't include "being a set" in these two sets, so it makes no sense to count it as an element when comparing the two sets.

Does the Cosmos care about your centimetres? What is it that makes a difference from the Universe’s point of view?

The Cosmos does not care about anything.

Seems you are trying to build a lot from some logical contrivance when the conversation is about physical reality.

Really, all your responses are off the point.

Yes, this conversation is about reality, and about reality I am talking.

Your replies are all over the shop. Focus a minute. What essential point do you mean to dispute? I can’t see one.

I am denying your claim that there is no such thing as absolute difference.

OK. So I am saying that out there in the real world, there is only dissimilarity in the limit.

Absolute difference is a “thing” only in the sense of being the limit towards which reality can approach, yet never actually reach.

This is supported by the various fundamental physical laws that science has arrived at.

A merely logical argument against my position doesn’t hold water here. Likewise, saying that humans can impose measurement frames on the Cosmos is not an argument as all such frames are based on choices and so on the principle of indifference. Coordinate systems are mathematical conveniences, not the material reality of which I speak.

What physical evidence do you have to offer that says material being can reach either the limit of the exactly alike in all possible respects, or the exactly unalike in all possible respects?

Well, I'm no IBM engineer either. But, I will say this. I think information has the potential to become physical through acting upon it. That doesn't mean it happens all the time, a counselor counseling a client doesn't physically have the answer when they speak, they have it mentally or from within. However, when the head of a construction company decides to build a building that information is physical. It's not so black and white.

This is supported by the various fundamental physical laws that science has arrived at.

A merely logical argument against my position doesn’t hold water here. — apokrisis

If it has sound premises, and sound deduction, then the "merely' logical argument must be given higher respect than fundamental physical laws whose premises are often based in not so sound inductive conclusions.

I made no mention of causation, that's your interpretation. What I said is that without the word "red" there is no such thing as what the word red refers to. Do you not recognize that the word "red" is an essential part of "what the word red refers to"? And so there is no such thing as what the word red refers to without the word "red". — Metaphysician Undercover

Your claim is a tautology and thus unproductive. Now, either a thing is red, that is, it participates in the form of redness, prior to us calling it "red", or it is not.

• If it is, then the word "red" is not the cause of the existence of redness. And our mind, abstracting concepts by mere observation, does not necessitate words.
• If it is not, then the word "red" is the cause of the existence of redness in things, which is absurd.

The defining term is not the same as the term defined. In Aristotelian logic the defining concept is within the concept defined, as an essential feature. So "man" is defined by "animal", as the concept of animal is within the concept of man as an essential property but animal is not the same as man. Likewise, you define "plane" with "flat surface". One is not the same as the other. The defining term is the more general. If defining terms had the same meaning as the words being defined, then we would never get anywhere in our attempts to understand meaning. It would all be circular. "Flat surface" would mean the exact same thing as "plane", and it would be pointless to define one with the other because it would not help you to understand anything. It is the very fact that "flat surface" means something other to you than "plane" does, that it can be used to help you to understand what "plane" means. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Man" is not defined merely as an animal, but "plane" is defined merely as "a flat surface". Then you have it backwards: If I defined "plane" as a "plane", then it would be circular. But to define "plane" as "flat surface" is not; precisely because I may know what "flat surface" means and not know what "plane" means. Then the definition of "plane" as a "flat surface" proves that they have the same meaning. If 2+2=4, then it proves that they are logically the same. I.e., having 2 apples and another 2 apples is logically identical to having 4 apples. Thus if "plane" = "flat surface", then they are logically identical.

That is exactly what is at issue here, and why there is so much misunderstanding and disagreement about what universal forms are. Apokrisis, following Peirce argues that there is vagueness, and violation of the law of non-contradiction which is an inherent aspect of all universals, it is essential to universals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alright. Although I don't agree, I appreciate the consistency in the whole system.

How do you propose that we ought to determine, and compare, the properties of the concepts within each others minds, other than by discussion? — Metaphysician Undercover

Discussion or dialogue is adequate, as is the case for finding the essence of the concept for triangle-ness. I gave another argument before: the fact that if concepts could possibly be different in individuals, then all attempts for communication would be hopeless. Consequently, we must have faith that concepts are, if not identical, then at least exact duplicates in everyone's mind. Finally, if concepts are different in individuals, then most of Plato's dialogue are pointless, because Socrates and his peers, attempting to find forms through arguments, all assume that the form they are looking for is the same for everyone.

But these accidental differences are still there, and this disallows us, according to the law of identity, from saying that it is the same concept in your mind, as in my mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

You contradict yourself with the earlier claim that you believed in concepts being universal forms. If universals, then these forms or concepts cannot have accidentals.

when the head of a construction company decides to build a building that information is physical. I — MountainDwarf

But it starts from an idea. A building is a possibility that is realized physically.

I find your argument to be illogical.

Your claim is a tautology and thus unproductive. — Samuel Lacrampe

If the tautology contradicts your claim, then you are wrong.

Now, either a thing is red, that is, it participates in the form of redness, prior to us calling it "red", or it is not. — Samuel Lacrampe

What is at question is whether or not there is a "form of redness" prior to us calling something red. I say no, you say yes.

"Man" is not defined merely as an animal, but "plane" is defined merely as "a flat surface". — Samuel Lacrampe

That's totally untrue. My dictionary has a quarter of a page of entry under the word "plane". What is at issue here is whether or not there is ambiguity in word usage, and clearly there is. The ambiguity is reduced by producing definitions. So when you define "plane" as a flat surface, then through this definition you are reducing the possibility of ambiguity.

Once it is defined as "flat surface" we can proceed toward understanding the ambiguities within "flat surface". What exactly do you mean by a surface, and what exactly constitutes 'flat". Ambiguity is never removed in an absolute way.

I gave another argument before: the fact that if concepts could possibly be different in individuals, then all attempts for communication would be hopeless. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is not true though. It is not required that individuals have the same concepts in order to communicate. If that were the case, then communication could not be a learned ability. This is the problem which lead Plato to introduce the doctrine of recollection. From your premise, we cannot learn concepts, because then we wouldn't be able to communicate in order to learn them. So Plato posited the principle of recollection, stating that we already know the concepts when we're born, and we just remember them. But this is an untenable position which is refuted in other dialogues, because it produces the absurdity that everyone must already know when they are born, everything which they
will ever come to know, throughout their lifetimes. Then, since these concepts must be passed from one life to another, everyone must already know everything which will ever be known. And that's an absurdity.

Instead of accepting and promoting this absurdity, we ought to consider the proposition that communication is less than perfect. When you say something, I do not understand it exactly in the way which you intend. That is because the conceptual structure within my mind is not exactly the same as that in your mind. But this imperfection does not necessitate the conclusion that we cannot communicate. On the contrary, it is an essential aspect of communication, and it manifests as the fact that communication takes effort. If my concepts were exactly the same as yours, then whatever you said would automatically be received by me exactly in the way that you intended. Communication would not take any effort. But this is not the case, communication takes effort. It is not perfect, and this is because of differences within our conceptual structures'.

The claim that our various conceptual structures (world views) are the same, is just an over-simplification, used to bypass the very difficult question of what is a concept. As soon as the lazy philosopher accepts this (false) premise, that concepts are the same for different individuals, then the real, and very difficult to understand, nature of concepts, can be simply ignored in favour of this false premise.

Finally, if concepts are different in individuals, then most of Plato's dialogue are pointless, because Socrates and his peers, attempting to find forms through arguments, all assume that the form they are looking for is the same for everyone. — Samuel Lacrampe

I believe you misunderstand Plato. Plato's intent is to go beyond this false premise of Pythagorean Idealism, to determine the real nature of concepts. That is why he worked to expose all the difficulties of it. He continually took words with very ambiguous concepts, and worked to expose that ambiguity. This is known as Platonic dialectics. This flies in the face of Pythagorean Idealism, in which ambiguity is not possible.

You contradict yourself with the earlier claim that you believed in concepts being universal forms. If universals, then these forms or concepts cannot have accidentals. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is only according to your definition of "universal form". Your definition doesn't seem to allow a distinction between what the concept says (means) and what the concept is ( its ontological existence). This seems to be because you have no principle which allows for a concept to have any ontological existence. You take the lazy route, just assuming that concepts exist, with no principles to demonstrate how this is possible.


Show me where I've gone wrong.

You are saying that my claim that there are objects that are absolutely different is not a claim about reality. That's not true. It might be the fact that I am expressing myself in abstract, mathematical, terms such as sets that creates the problem. This can be easily solved by substituting abstract terms with terms that are sufficiently concrete. For example, instead of speaking in terms of sets and elements I can speak in terms of baskets and fruits. Suppose that we have two baskets. One is dark brown in color and another is light brown. The dark brown contains three apples and two oranges. The light brown, on the other hand, contains five bananas. Note that the two baskets and the fruits that they contain is not something that has been imagined. Rather, it is something that has been observed. It is a portion of reality. It is not, as you say, a mere logical contrivance. Based on these facts, we can say that the two baskets are "absolutely different" to mean that they have no fruit in common. This is hardly disputable. Nonetheless, someone like you may come along and attempt to dispute this claim by saying that that two baskets have one thing in common: that they both contain fruits. He may go further than that and say that they also have in common the fact that the fruits are ripe. He may go even further than that and say that the fruits the two baskets contain also have certain molecules and atoms in common. However, in any case, he would miss the point because he would be comparing portions of reality that we are not interested in. Note that whenever we talk about reality we only talk about a portion of reality. There is no way around this. All you can do is you can change the portion of reality you are talking about. For example, you can move away from a smaller portion of reality towards a bigger portion of reality. But you can never go beyond the fact that whenever you talk about reality you are talking about a portion of reality.

Sure, information has potential to be physical as I said.

Sure, information has potential to be physical as I said. — MountainDwarf

I feel a better way of putting that would be that the physical has potential to be informational.

I guess I can't see much of a point in pursuing this line of inquiry through Plato's or Aristotle's lenses.

The information gets transformed into work, and work is physical.

The information gets transformed into work, and work is physical. — MountainDwarf

Can you distinguish meaningfully between the "work" of interpreting the information and the "work" of the information taken as instruction? I don't think it's possible. Information is already and always work, which would support the claim that its already and always physical.

However, in any case, he would miss the point because he would be comparing portions of reality that we are not interested in. — Magnus Anderson

Right. So as I was saying about the principle of indifference....

Ambiguity is never removed in an absolute way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. So as I was saying about the principle of indifference....

I think what you said is the very opposite:

The principle of indifference is a fundamental constraint on actuality in that view. It explains why we get the “weird” statistics of quantum entangled states and the quantum indistinguishability of particles among other things.

So sure. Reality appears composed of concrete particulars. But the emphasis is on appears. It isn’t really. — apokrisis

See, your principle of indifference doesn't allow that this difference is real. What I claim is fundamental to reality, particulars, with differences, you are saying is just an illusion. The problem with your stated position is that we know and understand things through the differences between them. We differentiate. So if difference is just an illusion then our knowledge is fundamentally flawed and reality is inherently unintelligible.

But I already knew that your ontology of vagueness first, leaves reality unintelligible. So you have just confirmed this point in another way. If difference were just an illusion then vagueness would be confirmed and reality would be unintelligible. However, the presupposition that reality is unintelligible is a dead end road for anyone who wants to understand (a philosopher), so it is exposed as nothing more than a meaningless statement of opinion.

See, your principle of indifference doesn't allow that this difference is real. What I claim is fundamental to reality, particulars, with differences, you are saying is just an illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hardly. It allows me to distinguish between accidents and necessities for a start.

Is an oak tree still an oak tree if it is bent and twisted, blasted by lightning, ravaged by pests?

We are right to say an oak tree is an oak tree because we can point to some shared information - a genome and a history of adaptation which that genome represents. So the genome stands for what is necessary. And then that defines what are merely accidents that particularise oak trees - the differences in form that make this one distinct from that one. It is a matter of indifference if one oak tree has a broken limb, or a different pattern of branching, or whatever.

So my approach introduces a sound basis for separating reality into its formal necessities and accidental differences. Forms, constraints, bounds or limits are "real" to the degree that they "care".

Now humans can pretend they care about absolutely every detail. You can take the point of view where the slightest crinkle in the 1001st leaf of an oak tree is enough to distinguish it from its twin. There is no limit that you are willing to place on your ability to care.

Fine. That is a very idealistic and absolutist philosophical position. It is a very familiar stance, being the reductionism that underlies the classical mechanical/atomistic view of reality.

But here I am talking about a full Aristotelian four causes view of reality, one that is based on systems thinking or holism. This seeks to distinguish between formal necessities and material accidents. And so it talks of the constraints that encode a finality or general desire.

The flip-side of this is then that the constraints must also encode a limit to that desiring. The principle of indifference is what makes finality even possible. It says desires can be satisfied well enough for the purpose in mind. The fact that we can care is made a definite causative fact by their being, in complementary fashion, a limit to the degree we need to care. Accidents can be allowed to happen once they don't make a difference.

So your approach to this is metaphysically lop-sided. You want to argue for the primacy of form and finality. Yet in pretending that all differences can matter equally, you talk yourself into an incoherent position.

your ontology of vagueness — Metaphysician Undercover

By the way, what happened to dichotomistic.com? It worked fine up until recently.