For any two things to be the same (sharing 100% of all properties and attributes) then doesn't that mean that for any two things to be the same they'd have to occupy the same space at the same time? Wouldn't that be impossible?

When you take a look at two different portions of reality and see that there is no difference between their contents then we say that these two portions of reality are the same. — Magnus Anderson

This seems to be a contradiction. You are saying that they occupy two different portions of reality, therefore they can't be the same.

Through a socratic dialogue, either with yourself or with others, which serves as a falsification method. Much like the correctness of a scientific theory is tested through particular experiments, we can test the correctness of a definition through particular examples. Say your first attempt to define triangle-ness is "a plane with three angles". I falsify this by pointing out that this shape is a plane with three angles but is not a triangle. So we must add to the definition that the sides must be straight. Then, I might add the property "red" to the definition, and you falsify this by pointing out that some triangles which are not red remain triangles. So we remove "red" from the definition, and the result is "a plane with three angles and straight sides." If it cannot be falsified any more, then we have obtained the perfect definition. — Samuel Lacrampe

What you have described here, is us discussing and agreeing on a description. If this is what the concept is, then we have created the concept through this discussion. I don't see how this supports your claim that the concept already exists within us, prior to this discussion. The fact that we are both described as changing what we already thought was part of the concept, indicates that what was already in us was not the concept, but something different which needed to be changed, in order that the concept could exist within us.

But... notice that we both seem certain about the correctness of the examples used to falsify the definitions. Where does this knowledge come from? It must come from the concept which we already had. As such, the exercise was never to find the concept, but to express it correctly with words. In other words, we all have the implicit knowledge of concepts, and we just try to obtain explicit knowledge from this. This explicit knowledge is useful to deduce universal truths such as "no triangle can fill up a circle", because we now know that all triangles have straight sides where as no circles do. — Samuel Lacrampe

Now you have lost me. I cannot follow what you are arguing here. You speak about "examples used to falsify the definitions". I assume that these examples are drawings on a paper or some other medium, or in some cases a verbal description. These examples are constructs, created by the person drawing, doing the demonstration. So when an understanding is produced in this way, why do you conclude that it comes from a concept already within? I see that the person must have the capacity to understand the demonstrations, but this is not the same as saying that the concept already exists within the person. To me it appears like you are referring to the capacity to understand as "the concept within". But the capacity to understand the concept is not the same as having the concept actually existing within.

So why would to decide to have a discussion with strangers if there is a possibility that none of the words used have the same meaning? — Samuel Lacrampe

It's the same reason why we communicate with anyone, in general. We want something from them, or want to give them something. That is the reason behind communication, we have intentions. So for instance, if I want you to help me with something, and you are a total stranger who speaks a different language, I will try to communicate with you despite the fact that we don't understand each other's words.

Actually, inasmuch as a 'better' implies a 'best'; and a 80% mark implies a 100% mark, then a 'more correct' implies a 'fully correct' or 'ideal'. This is necessary. If the ideal does not exist, then neither does the 'more correct' in any objective sense. As such, if you believe that no ideal definition for triangle-ness exist, then it follows that the definition "three angles" is no more correct than "four angles", which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe

Exactly, this is the point I am making. Concepts do not exist in any "objective sense". They are property of subjects and so are subjective. The "more correct" doesn't exist in an objective sense, it is something agreed upon by the various subjects. Some call this inter-subjectivity, but inter-subjectivity doesn't create a true objectivity. But "correctness" is created by inter-subjective agreement, so "three angles" is more correct than "four angles" because it is what is agreed upon by convention. This is what constitutes "correctness", what is agreed upon by convention, not some "objective" concept.

This claim sounds ad hoc. Can you back it up? If I obtained a 100% mark on a math exam, then my answers have reached the ideal, and I cannot better myself on that exam. — Samuel Lacrampe

Your example is of one particular math exam. Just because you got 100% on one exam, this does not mean that you have the ideal understanding of mathematics. You have a lot more to learn.

Does a 100% similar = the same? And if not, how not? — apokrisis

Unless you didn't read my posts, you know I already answered this at least twice. 100% similar does not = the same. It cannot because this would be contradiction. I've made this clear to you already.

We are talking about a similarity with a lack of any actual difference. — apokrisis

This statement is contradictory. You might just as well ask me a question about a square circle. Just because you can say it, and ask the question doesn't mean that it's a coherent question If there is no difference, then we are not talking about similarity, we are talking about the same. Similar and the same are clearly not equivalent. Similar implies a difference. So, "similarity with a lack of any actual difference" is contradiction, plain and simple. "Similar" implies difference, and "lack of any actual difference" contradicts this.

Where I might disagree with MU is with his apparent claim that "the same" means "the one". If two things are the same that does not mean they aren't two things. Sameness is a relation and as such it exists "between" two things and not within a single thing. In order to say that two things are same they must first be two things i.e. distinct things. — Magnus Anderson

I disagree with this. What is expressed by the law of identity, is that a thing is the same as itself. There is no relation here between two distinct things, there is only a relation between a thing and itself. This is the crucial point of the law of identity, any relationship which allows us to say "the same" is necessarily a relationship between a thing and itself.

This is also expressed by Leibniz as the "identity of indiscernibles". If two things are said to have the exact same properties then they are necessarily one and the same thing. Some will disagree with the law of identity, as you may, but disagreement has extensive logical consequences

He's defining similarity to mean "the percentage of elements the two sets have in common". Thus, "100% similarity" means "the percentage of elements the two sets have in common is 100%" or in plain terms "the two sets have all of their elements in common". But that's not the standard definition. The standard definition of similarity, as Google can tell us, is "having a resemblance in appearance, character, or quantity, without being identical". Similarity, in other words, implies difference. But even if we accept his definition, it does not follow that "the same" is "the limit of the similar" or in plain terms "the value similarity can approach but never attain". The problem is created by his inability to fix his attention. — Magnus Anderson

Great. Glad you agree. — apokrisis

As I told apokrisis already, to define "similar" and "same" in such a way that two sets which are 100% similar are the same, while maintaining that they are two distinct sets and not one and the same set, is to use definitions which are inconsistent with the law of identity.

The problem which occurs with these definitions of "same" and "similar" which apokrisis introduces is that they still leave Wayfarer's argument unsound. Wayfarer's use of "same" cannot be replaced with 100% similar, for the reasons I have already indicated in this thread, so "same" in Wayfarer's argument really means "less than 100% similar". Once we replace "same" in Wayfarer's argument with "less than 100% similar, then the difference in the information value, no matter how slight it is, must be accounted for. The argument does not hold up because these differences may be attributable to physical differences.

So, in the case of 'the triangle', you are denying that a triangle is the same for you and Apokrisis - that because your idea of a triangle, is different from his idea of a triangle, that they're not two instances of the same thing? — Wayfarer

Correct, that's what I am saying, two distinct instances of a triangle is not two instances of the same thing. Nor are you and I, as two instances of human beings, two instances of the same thing. These are instances of similar things. The purpose of the law of identity, as stated by Aristotle, "a thing is the same as itself", is to prevent the sophistry of logical arguments which proceed by referring to two distinct things as two instances of the same thing.

For instance, a sophistic argument could be derived from the following.. If you and I have the same model of car, and I am allowed to refer to these two cars as two instances of the same thing, then it follows logically that your car is the same thing as my car. Therefore you should give me your car, because it is my car.

Because that is what you seem to keep saying, again and again and again, so it seems to me that you're the one participant in this debate who is 'arguing nonsense' which you have accused him of doing. — Wayfarer

I am just adhering to the firm ontological principles which form the basis for good epistemology. If you think that's nonsense, that's your opinion. However, the principle which you have stated above, allows that two distinct things can be referred to as "two instances of the same thing", just because they have been judged to be similar. Any reasonable person can see that this is where the nonsense really lies, in such principles as that, which allow for two distinct things to be called two instances of the same thing.

Sameness isn't something that can only be approached. It is something that is regularly attained. This is, in fact, why sameness is a perfectly meaningful term. The fact that we can think of infinite series where a value, such as sameness, is approached without ever being attained does not mean that every infinite series is of that kind. — Magnus Anderson

This is very true. Sameness, as described by the law of identity, allows for the temporal extension of existence. So the computer in front of me is the same computer which was in front of me two minutes ago. That is why "same" is a meaningful term, it is used to signify that one particular object is being referred to whether it is at the same time or not. It has nothing to do with similarity.

Another sense of "same" is derived from "similar", and this is what apokrisis is drawing from. But these are distinct meanings of "same" and equivocation is what is causing the problem here.

For any two things to be the same (sharing 100% of all properties and attributes) then doesn't that mean that for any two things to be the same they'd have to occupy the same space at the same time? Wouldn't that be impossible? — Harry Hindu

That's exactly the point, by the law of identity, "same" refers to one thing, and one thing only. The law of identity relates that thing to itself, saying a thing is the same as itself. But there are not two things which are the same as each other, there is one thing, which related to itself, is the same as itself. This is expressed by Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. If two things are said to have 100% properties the same, then they are necessarily one and the same thing. Calling them two things is a mistake, they were only identified as two distinct things until it was determined that they are one and the same.

The law of identity relates that thing to itself, saying a thing is the same as itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is your mistake. According to you, there are no types.

Any reasonable person can see that this is where the nonsense really lies, in such principles as that, which allow for two distinct things to be called two instances of the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Two instances of ‘a triangle’ are two instances of the same thing. If you added ‘a square’, then you would have two of the same things, and one different thing. Apparently this simple fact is contradicted by your view.

That's precisely what Epp means.
That's what Leibniz underscored with his principle of the identity of indiscernables.
You guys are refering to relative identity, "x is the same A as y".

There is no absolute sameness, though; it's always a matter of generalization within a context to say that two things are the same.

then you would have two of the same things — Wayfarer

No you would have two of the same kind of things, not two of the same things; to say the latter is to abuse language.

No two triangles are the same any more than two objects of any kind are the same.

No two triangles are the same any more than two objects of any kind are the same. — Janus

OK then - the same kind of thing - which is what 'two instances of the same kind' means. If you were given a test to categorise groups of objects which have something in common, and there were 5 triangles of completely different shapes, and a circle, and a square, there would be 5 of the same kind. They're not the same in the sense of 'being identical' but in the sense of all being of the same type.

The argument about triangles started with this passage:

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.

Feser, Some Brief Arguments for Dualism

Emphasis added.

That's precisely what Epp means. — Akanthinos

And what precisely does 'Epp' mean?

That is why "same" is a meaningful term, it is used to signify that one particular object is being referred to whether it is at the same time or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to this, 'the law of identity' means only 'a particular thing is identical with itself'. So, it's not true that A equal to A - it's only ever true that one particular instance of A is equal to A. This is Metaphysician Undercover's rendering of 'the law of identity'. In other words, it doesn't recognise types, which then undermines the entire discipline of taxonomy.

They're not the same in the sense of 'being identical' but in the sense of all being of the same type. — Wayfarer

Yes, but even this is a matter of generalization, because there are also different types of triangle: isosceles, equilateral, scalene, right, acute and obtuse.

To think of perfect triangularity as Feser explains it in that passage is just to specify a set of conditions that must be satisfied.

But that's the whole point! 'Generalisation' is the entire nub of the argument! That is what the whole thread is about. Here we are, more than 1,100 replies in, and this is the basic point at issue.

From the Feser post, above:

For Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and other ancients and medievals, the main reason why the mind has to be immaterial concerns its affinity to its primary objects of knowledge, namely universals, which are themselves immaterial.

So, 'generalisation' is 'abstraction' which is the ability to see what a 'type' is - which is, ultimately, derived from the eidos, the forms. That is what this is all about.

The problem is that others disagree with your position regarding the implications of the phenomenon of generalization. It's not clear to me what could be meant by saying that generalizations are immaterial, when they are in fact about material things and the activities of material things.

If the fact of generalization itself constituted a knock-down argument that it, and hence the mind that generalizes, must be "immaterial" (even assuming that we knew what that even meant) then everyone who thought about it would be convinced by it and no one would be able to deny it.

The problem with wistfully harking back to ancient, Eastern and medieval thinkers is that they were not aware of many things about the world which we moderns take for granted, and cannot, if we wish to be intellectually honest, ignore. The ancients and the medievals were modern in their own times, and would not have contributed anything new if they had not been.

When you take a look at two different portions of reality and see that there is no difference between their contents then we say that these two portions of reality are the same.
— Magnus Anderson

This seems to be a contradiction. You are saying that they occupy two different portions of reality, therefore they can't be the same. — Harry Hindu

Does that mean that when we say that two balls are the same, in the sense that they have the same color and the same size, that we are wrong because the two balls occupy different positions in space?

I don't think so. I don't think anyone would say so. Except for the philosophers who overthought the problem.

If you think a lot that does not mean you know better than those who think less. Thinking more is not necessarily better than thinking less. He who thinks more usually thinks he knows better than those who think less (whom he considers naive) but it is not as common that he really knows better than those who think less.

You need to stick to the definition. The definition of sameness says that two portions of reality are the same only if their contents are the same. Thus, two balls can be the same even though they occupy different positions in space. This is because the position of a ball is not defined as being a part of the ball itself (in the same way that what surrounds a ball is not defined as being a part of the ball.) You can redefine the concept of ball to include position in space. Doing so, however, would change the portions of reality we are looking at. We would no longer be looking at the same objects.

That's exactly the point, by the law of identity, "same" refers to one thing, and one thing only. The law of identity relates that thing to itself, saying a thing is the same as itself. But there are not two things which are the same as each other, there is one thing, which related to itself, is the same as itself. This is expressed by Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. If two things are said to have 100% properties the same, then they are necessarily one and the same thing. Calling them two things is a mistake, they were only identified as two distinct things until it was determined that they are one and the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

One and the same thing can be different at different points in time. For example, a man in his 60's can be very different from the man he was in his 20's. We wouldn't say that the young version of that man is an entirely different person than the old version of that man.

Conversely, two different things can be identical at different points in time. For example, a man and his clone are two different persons that are identical. We wouldn't say that they are one and the same person simply because they are identical.

If the fact of generalization itself constituted a knock-down argument that it, and hence the mind that generalizes, must be "immaterial" (even assuming that we knew what that even meant) then everyone who thought about it would be convinced by it and no one would be able to deny it. — Janus

Yep. This is the interesting point. But then that is why Wayfarer would at least be right about the relevance of the information theoretic turn in fundamental scientific ontology. An appropriate form of immateriality is being introduced in the notion of information.

Science used to deal in the "laws of nature". Reality was some mass of atomic particulars. And yet for some reason, that material state of affairs was regulated by universal laws. It was all rather spooky.

But now science is shifting to a more clearly constraints-based view of reality. Laws are emergent from states of information. We have new principles like holography and entropy driving the show. The regulation of nature is now something that arises immanently rather than being imposed transcendently. Newton required a law-giving God to explain the fact of their being universal physical rules. Now we can see how nature's law's might just develop, emerge, evolve.

So this is a big metaphysical shift. But what is really going on?

As I said, information represents the immaterial aspect of reality that always seems philosophically necessary. Matter alone can't cut it. We've known that since Plato hammered it home.

But then neither are mind, or divine, much good as the other half of reality - the bit that does the constraining, or the forming and purposing. The mind is patently complex, not fundamentally simple. It claims to be free and open, not constrained and closed. It is all about a particular lived point of view and not universalised "view from nowhere".

So our concept of mind as the immaterial half of the ontic equation just offers all the wrong properties. The divine is just the mind taken to another level - minding that is even more potentially capricious, unrestrained, the author of material and efficient causes as well as formal and final cause. Talk of God just collapses all the useful distinctions we were trying to build up and so winds up explaining nothing.

Science - as the only place real metaphysics continues to get done - accepted that the maths of form does represent the immaterial part of the reality equation. This was the revolution wrought by Galileo, Keppler, and especially Newton.

It started out as a mechanical notion of form - the computation of the mechanics of moving bodies and rippling waves. Then moved on to become focused on the maths of symmetries and symmetry-breakings. Also probability theory and statistical mechanics became central as descriptions of emergent patterns and the self-organisation of constraints. And of course, conceptions of space and time were expanded to include geometries that were non-Euclidian, conceptions of mechanics were expanded to include behaviours that were non-linear or feedback.

So science was on a journey. It recognised that its metaphysics needed an immaterial aspect to balance the material one. It started out with mathematical forms that were transcendent - Newton style laws, Newton style dimensions - and has steadily worked towards a picture of reality where the maths is describing immanent self-organisation. The laws and dimensionality simply started to appear as regularities - self-organising attractors that governed dynamics quite directly.

It became possible to see how matter could form rules to shape its own behaviour - even perhaps form the forms that actually produced "matter" in the first place. Particles became individuated events, localised excitations, persistent resonances.

Then along comes information theory as the latest improvement on this trip from transcendent cause to immanent self-organisation. Reality still needs its immaterial aspect to explain its material aspect. But now science has a new maths that is suitable for describing and measuring reality in terms of actual "atoms of form".

The materiality of the world is reduced to pretty much a nothing - just the vague hint of an action with a direction, a bare degree of freedom. And at that point where reality approaches its limit of dematerialised nothingness, it can become semiotically united with an immaterial notion of mathematical form coming the other way. The maths proving itself useful for describing reality was becoming steadily less immaterial and transcendent, or "spooky action at a distance". It was becoming steadily more material and immanent in that it talked about symmetry breakings and statistically probable approaches to limits.

Now with information theory, you have the exact point (hopefully) where each of these realms - the dematerialising materiality and the steadily materialising formality - finally converge and become one. They translate. Pan-semiosis is achieved as the material description and the immaterial description are two ways of saying the same thing. The measure of one is the same unit for measuring the other. We can go back and forth across an epistemic cut that formally relates the two realms or aspects of being.

This is a tremendous and historical achievement in metaphysics. It is stupendous that it is happening right now in our own lifetimes.

Science of course is still going off in all directions in the scramble to finalise the details of a final theory of reality. But at the level of metaphysics, we can sit back and be entertained by the spectacular outlines of an understanding that is now coming in to dock.

Conversely, two different beings can be the same at different points in time. For example, a man and his clone are two different beings that are identical. We wouldn't say that they are one and the same person simply because they are identical. — Magnus Anderson

So we can say that the same thing can exist at two different moments in time, but not that the same thing can be in two different locations at once.

That is, where change is the rule - as in time - you find instead the counterfactual of persistence. And where continuity is the rule - as in spatial locations - you find instead the counterfactual of the discontinuous.

Hmm. See where your own arguments are leading you yet? Hint: metaphysics is always about the dialectics of limits. :)

The problem is that others disagree with your position regarding the implications of the phenomenon of generalization. — Janus

Actually, it's not. I've had a fair amount of consensus on many points, as can be noted from @Apokrisis' reply to yourself.

Anyway, the point I was clarifying, is Metaphysician Undiscovered's continual obfuscation over the meaning of the fundamental word, 'the same':

Obfuscation is the obscuring of the intended meaning of communication by making the message difficult to understand, usually with confusing and ambiguous language.

Of which he is an undoubted perpetrator in my view. So, you enter the fray, fail to address Metaphysician Undiscovered's continual obfuscation, show no understanding of the basic point at issue ("It's not clear to me....") and then cast aspersions on the basis of the provenance of the arguments.

Pan-semiosis is achieved as the material description and the immaterial description are two ways of saying the same thing. — apokrisis

This is where I disagree with Apokrisis. The 'triadic relation' of Peirce's semiotics is between sign, thing signified, and interpreter. I will never understand how, in the absence of mind, there can be 'an interpreter'. I think Peirce got around this, because he had a somewhat panentheistic understanding of the nature of mind, which he derived from Emerson, Schelling and other forms of idealist philosophy; in short, he remained a theist. Apokrisis wants to do away with that notion of 'mind' - sounds suspiciously like 'religion' - but still retain some of the related concepts where they are indispensable for simulating a model of how life and mind works.

So we can say that the same thing can exist at two different moments in time, but not that the same thing can be in two different locations at once. — apokrisis

I don't see why you shouldn't be able to say that the same thing can be in two different locations at once. Concepts are human inventions. You can create any kind of concepts you want. If you say that a thing can only be in one location at a time, then when you say that a thing is in two different locations at the same time you are contradicting yourself. This contradiction can be resolved either by saying that what is at two different locations is not one but two different things or by redefining the concept of thing so that it can be at two different locations at once.

This is your mistake. According to you, there are no types. — Wayfarer

Of course I allow for types, why would you think that I don't? But if two things are members of one type, that does not mean that the two are the same thing, it means that they are of the same type. The latter is a qualified "same", where "same" refers to the type, not the things themselves.

In your argument for information being non-physical, you do not qualify "same" in this way, you say the "same information", not "the same type of information". So you have used "same" in the unqualified way, the same. If, in your argument "same" does not mean the same in the unqualified sense, the argument fails. It fails because if the information is not the same in the unqualified sense, then differences in the information is implied, just like there are differences between two things of the same type. And, these differences may be the result of the physical medium. So the conclusion that information is non-physical cannot be drawn if you use "same" in this way.

Two instances of ‘a triangle’ are two instances of the same thing. — Wayfarer

That's clearly not true. A triangle drawn on one paper, and a triangle drawn on another paper are very obviously not two instances of the same thing, they are very different. If, by "the same thing" you are referring to the concept "triangle", then you must respect the fact that the physical representations on the paper are not instances of the concept itself, they are representations of the concept. This is fundamental to Platonism. So the physical triangles on the paper are not instances of one concept, they are two distinct representations of that concept

Apparently this simple fact is contradicted by your view. — Wayfarer

Calling this falsity a "simple fact" gets you nowhere. You would have done better to say that two distinct instances of "a triangle" are two examples of the same thing, the concept triangle. In this way, you allow that the concept referred to by "triangle" is a thing. But we then need to be careful not to confuse the physical representation, the instances of "a triangle" which are on the paper, with the concept itself.

There is no absolute sameness — Janus

There is absolute sameness, it's described by the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This refers to the thing in relation to itself.

So, it's not true that A equal to A - it's only ever true that one particular instance of A is equal to A. — Wayfarer

To be equal to, and to be the same, is not the same thing. "Equal" refers to an equivalence of value, it is a mathematical term which relates quantity. This is where we have to be careful not to allow the arguments of mathematicians and logicians to mislead us. Some might argue that all qualities are reducible to quantities and therefore we can express "the same" as "equal". The problem though, is that even if this were true, that we could reduce all qualities to quantities and express "same" as "equal", this is not at all how "equal" is used by mathematicians. Mathematics allows that things which are not the same, are equal, we overlook certain differences to claim equality. Two apples is equal to two oranges in the sense of two. However, we know that the differences exist, so if we proceed to argue that "equal" means "same", we engage in self-deception because we already know that the differences exist and equal things are not the same. Clearly, "2+2" is not the same as "4", yet they are equal.

Does that mean that when we say that two balls are the same, in the sense that they have the same color and the same size, that we are wrong because the two balls occupy different positions in space? — Magnus Anderson

When you use "same" in this way, you use it in a way which is other than the way prescribed by the law of identity. It is not wrong to use "same" in this way, it is just a different way of using the same term, and that is common with most words. Where it becomes wrong is when someone equivocates to make an argument. That is my charge against Wayfarer's argument of the op, it relies on equivocation. It uses "same" in the sense of "similar", like your example of two balls, but the conclusion to the argument can only be made if "same" means the same in an absolute sense.

One and the same thing can be different at different points in time. For example, a man in his 60's can be very different from the man he was in his 20's. We wouldn't say that the young version of that man is an entirely different person than the old version of that man. — Magnus Anderson

This is why the sense of "same" which is defined by the law of identity is completely different from the other sense of "same" which is developed in relation to similar. The law of identity allows that one and the same thing may undergo changes through time, while continuing to be the same thing so long as the temporal continuity may be identified. Without the law of identity, a single object would necessarily be a different but similar object at each moment of time with each tiny change to it. Instead, we associate "sameness" with temporal continuity rather than similarity. So, we have two very distinct ways of using "same". The most common way, is that of temporal continuity, so that the object is the same object from day to day. Logicians, like apokrisis want to base "sameness" in similarity, so we must recognize that this is a completely different meaning of "same".

Conversely, two different things can be identical at different points in time. For example, a man and his clone are two different persons that are identical. We wouldn't say that they are one and the same person simply because they are identical. — Magnus Anderson

This is what Leibniz disputes with the "identity of indiscernibles". If they are in fact identical, in every aspect, then they are necessarily one and the same thing. To say that two different persons are identical is to overlook some differences which make them different persons, or else they are really one and the same person.

Anyway, the point I was clarifying, is Metaphysician Undiscovered's continual obfuscation of the meaning of the term 'the same': — Wayfarer

Actually, I am clarifying two distinct ways of using "same". And, I've already demonstrated that your argument of the op relies on equivocation between these two different ways, to make the conclusion that you do. You have not yet addressed this charge of equivocation, just continually reasserting that I am obfuscating, without addressing the matter of the two distinct ways of using "same".

In your argument for information being non-physical, you do not qualify "same" in this way, you say the "same information", not "the same type of information". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's because it's the same information, represented differently.

But we then need to be careful not to confuse the physical representation, the instances of "a triangle" which are on the paper, with the concept itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is what the whole thread is about from the word dot, you've been too busy wanting to argue to actually notice it. This is definitely my last response to you in this thread.

The 'triadic relation' of Peirce's semiotics is between sign, thing signified, and interpreter. I will never understand how, in the absence of mind, there can be 'an interpreter'. — Wayfarer

The point about semiosis is that Peirce worked out a fundamental notion of self-organising relations that could apply both to "the mind" and to "the world". Philosophy had become broken by a duality - realism vs idealism - and he picked it up and put it back together. He showed how the material and the immaterial could be related via the mediation of "a sign".

So it was a deflationary and universalising move. It accepted that reality is formed by becoming fundamentally divided. All our talk about the real vs the ideal, the material vs the immaterial, wasn't simply hot air.

But then Peirce was the one who made sense of it by pointing to the third thing which is the sign that mediates this epistemic cut. The end of one thing could be the beginning of the other. Where materiality left off and found its dimensional limit - the zero entropic dimensions of "a mark" - then that is exactly where immateriality could pick up and get started on its interpretive or modelling game.

So it is like origami perhaps - the point at which twists or folds serve to translate from one realm to the other. A flat piece of paper at some point becomes a swan or fox.

Now you can keep insisting that interpretance = mind. But surely Peirce would have called interpretance the interpreter if he meant to reify the semiotic process in that fashion. Remember, he was trying to fix the subject~object dualism of philosophy with his holistic triadism, not simply perpetuate it in some more obscure and complex way.

Peirce was generalising the notion of interpretance to the point where really you could see how if could be a material or physical process. You could see that even the Comos was a pan-semiotic development.

So it would be ironic if you claim to be arguing for the validity of generalisations - agreeing they are real - and yet denying Peirce's rather absolute metaphysical generalisation of whatever people might mean by "mind"

I'm not over-thinking it. Are an object's coordinates in space-time a property of the object, or no? Is the object's position in space-time just as important to know as its size and color, yes or no?

We don't need to keep definitions if they don't work. I can think of a lot of words that are poorly defined and inconsistent with what we know. Just look at my "Artificial vs. Natural vs. Supernatural" thread.

So you are fine to say the same object can have the two locations at the one time?

Cool. We're making progress.

The 100% similar obeys the principle of indifference. The weirdness of the quantum is coming into sight.

Are an object's coordinates in space-time a property of the object, or no? Is the object's position in space-time just as important to know as its size and color, yes or no? — Harry Hindu

It depends on how you define the concept of object. You can define it any way you want. It depends on your needs. Sometimes, we define it to include the coordinates; sometimes, we define it to exclude the coordinates. When we say that two balls are equal, more likely than being wrong, we are defining the concept of ball to exclude the coordinates that someone else would include in the definition of the concept of ball. You can stretch concepts any way you like. You can stretch the concept of ball to include not only the coordinates that you want to include in the concept but also portions of the environment that surrounds objects under your consideration such as for example other objects of the same kind (so that instead of speaking of single balls we are now talking about pairs of balls.) By stretching the definition of concepts, you can prove anything you want.

An object is nothing but a portion of reality. If you want to have a meaningful conversation, then parties must focus their attention on the same portion of reality. This is why definitions are important. We want to make sure we are talking about the same portion of reality.

So you are fine to say the same object can have the two locations at the one time? — apokrisis

No problem at all.

Cool. We're making progress. — apokrisis

Well, you certainly are making progress in the sense that you are getting closer to understanding my position.

The point about semiosis is that Peirce worked out a fundamental notion of self-organising relations that could apply both to "the mind" and to "the world". Philosophy had become broken by a duality - realism vs idealism - and he picked it up and put it back together. He showed how the material and the immaterial could be related via the mediation of "a sign". — apokrisis

Very interesting and informative post. I will continue to meditate on this idea.

But I think the 'self-organising relations' idea is not from Peirce, but from 20th century organic chemistry - Prigogine, Kauffmann, and the like. And then by analogy, the idea of self-organising substances and the semiotic attributes of organisms are fused to become 'pan-semiosis'. That wouldn't be too far off the mark, would it? (By the way, I don't know if you noticed but Kauffman was one of the authors on the QM paper I mentioned earlier. Their statement:

“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,”

Is very close in meaning to what I'm getting at with the reality of number, I feel.)

he was trying to fix the subject~object dualism of philosophy with his holistic triadism, not simply perpetuate it in some more obscure and complex way. — apokrisis

He rejected Cartesian dualism, to be sure, but I don't think it's equally obvious that he rejected idealist metaphysics tout courte.

it would be ironic if you claim to be arguing for the validity of generalisations - agreeing they are real - and yet denying Peirce's rather absolute metaphysical generalisation of whatever people might mean by "mind" — apokrisis

Don't know yet! My only real point of divergence with you, is that you seem to think the whole process is fundamentally physical, still, whereas I think in the overall scheme of things, matter is not causative - in other words, it can't be truly 'self-organising'. It's not 'mind-stuff', either. Perhaps, dual-aspect monism, a reality that appears to us in some perspectives as physical, and in others as mental - meaning that it is neither of those. But I acknowledge it's a very difficult question and I'm simply going on intuition and hunches. I will keep studying it. I do read that Pattee paper, Physics and Metaphysics of biosemiosis, from time to time, still.

That's precisely what Epp means.
— Akanthinos

And what precisely does 'Epp' mean? — Wayfarer

"In logic, the law of identity states that each thing is identical with itself. By this it is meant that each thing (be it a universal or a particular) is composed of its own unique set of characteristic qualities or features, which the ancient Greeks called its essence. It is the first of the three classical laws of thought.

In its symbolic representation, "a=a", "Epp", or "For all x: x = x"."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_identity

Actually, it's not. I've had a fair amount of consensus on many points, as can be noted from Apokrisis' reply to yourself. — Wayfarer

Yes, but why are jumping to conclusions that are unwarranted? I didn't say that all others disagree with you.

show no understanding of the basic point at issue ("It's not clear to me....") and then cast aspersions on the basis of the provenance of the arguments. — Wayfarer

You are jumping to more unjustified conclusions: that I don't know what 'obfuscation' means and that I don't understand the point at issue. I have noticed many times that you deal with those who disagree by assuming they don't understand what you are arguing, apparently presuming that if they did understand the argument they would necessarily agree with it.

In fact up until a few yesrs ago I used to produce just the same arguments you are offering up now in support of the very same kinds of assertions you are making now, so I am very familiar with the arguments. This you should know, since in the early days we were mostly in agreement on these issues; a fact which you have. acknowledged many times.

In its symbolic representation, "a=a", "Epp", or "For all x: x = x"." — Akanthinos

Thanks for the explanation. At issue was a what I considered a nonsensical argument about whether two pieces of information were 'the same information'. Or that my idea, and your idea, of what constitutes 'a triangle' were different. This was followed by pages of arguments about whether the basic intention of the 'law of identity' is to establish the difference between individuals.

Notice that the Wiki article says 'whether universals or particulars'. As far as I'm concerned, this thread is mainly about the identity of universals, and in that case, any 'A' is equal to any other 'A'. There's not 'my A', and 'your A', which are subtly different, because you and I think of them in slightly different ways.

But I think the 'self-organising relations' idea is not from Peirce, but from 20th century organic chemistry - Prigogine, Kauffmann, and the like. — Wayfarer

You might be surprised. Peirce was Harvard's top of the class for his first degree in chemistry. He was up with the thermodynamics of his time.

So yes, self-organisation has only become real maths since computers showed up to make the calculations tractable, reveal that complex natural patterns really do emerge from simple rules or constraints. But Peirce was already talking about the mysterious self-organising properties of protoplasm. He was looking for a proper account of nature's "vitality". He already could see that Darwinian natural selection could only explain the removal of variety, not its creation. He was already a believer in tychism or productive spontaneity.

By the way, I don't know if you noticed but Kauffman was one of the authors on the QM paper I mentioned earlier. — Wayfarer

Sure, I too am arguing the point that the potential is real. That's Peirce's Firstness or Anaximander's Apeiron.

But the trick is to get the ontic structure right. You can't just have a good old simple duality like the potential and the actual. You need a Peircean triad, or hierarchical relation, where actuality is the hylomorphic meat in the sandwich. It emerges due to the interaction of the potential with the necessary. Or the interaction of material possibility and formal constraints, in other words.

He rejected Cartesian dualism, to be sure, but I don't think it's equally obvious that he rejected idealist metaphysics tout courte. — Wayfarer

In the end, if he was a genuine god-botherer, it doesn't make any difference to the ontic structure that is his legacy. But even the most theistic reading of his writings won't find a traditional theist.

You may get that impression because Peirce clearly puts the ideal at the top of the hierarchy. Physical law is "a habit of interpretance". It is interpretation all the way down as nature does not have atomistically material underpinnings. Drill down and you only get quantum vagueness.

So if anything creates reality, it is some kind of "mind" or interpretive process.

You can see that as affirmation of a theistic worldview if you like, or even another way of talking about Plato's realm of form. But really, it is incredibly more radical than that.

My only real point of divergence with you, is that you seem to think the whole process is fundamentally physical, still, whereas I think in the overall scheme of things, matter is not causative - in other words, it can't be truly 'self-organising'. — Wayfarer

But we agree that the material "stuff" drops right out of things. So this is a physicalism in which we see only constraints all the way down. The material bit is just a vague potential that gets shaped or excited in some direction.

So yes, I am fundamentally physicalist in thinking that the connection between formal and material cause must be there. These are the two halves of the equation. We can't just turn one or other side into some monistic ground like realism and idealism want to do.

But that is about as far as my "materialism" goes. I mean I'm even rejecting any notion of "mind" or "divine" which just presumes them to be "other kinds of stuff".