I don't think you're correct in this analysis. The Aristotelian notions are signposts which signal to some relevant aspects of reality. Do those aspects of reality exist? If they do, then the notions are valid. I haven't seen a relevant argument from the non-Aristotelians which show that those aspects of reality don't exist - maybe I've missed it cause I haven't read all posts here, so I'd appreciate if you could point me to it.It became apparent - after a long discussion - that if one accepts the Aristotelean view of the world, in which notions like 'potential, 'essence' and 'directed' are believed to have meanings beyond their everyday pragmatic meanings, then the OP argument has some bite, and if one doesn't, then it has none. — andrewk
It goes straight back to the A vs non-A divide. The As believe that reality has those aspects and that they have objective meanings, and the non-As do not. The As have no proof of their view, and the non-As have no proof of theirs. It comes down to core beliefs. They seem to be what Alvin Plantinga calls 'properly basic beliefs'. One either believes them or one doesn't. There are no arguments for or against them.The Aristotelian notions are signposts which signal to some relevant aspects of reality. — Agustino
Even though the referenced aspects are open to observation? Take the case of the match. We observe that it consistently produces fire when we strike it in the right place on the matchbox in favourable conditions. Why is that? Is that even a valid question?The As believe that reality has those aspects and that they have objective meanings, and the non-As do not. — andrewk
Right, but that's not the question I was asking. I wasn't asking why it catches fire in this or that particular instance. Clearly, it does because of the friction which produces heat. I was asking why does it always and consistently catch fire in that particular set of circumstances?The explanation for the match lighting up is that heat arises from friction between the match and the match box. The friction is particularly high because of the roughened match tip and matchbox side. The match is coated with material that has a combustion point lower than the temp generated by the friction, so the material ignites. — andrewk
Sure, I preempted you being a pedant, that's why I said:Plus, being a pedant (sorry) I'd probably correct the child's use of 'always' and point out that sometimes it doesn't catch fire, and there can be various reasons why that happens. — andrewk
Take the case of the match. We observe that it consistently produces fire when we strike it in the right place on the matchbox in favourable conditions. — Agustino
Every particular set of circumstances happens only once. Each match strike is different. There is no 'always and consistently' to explain. For a particular strike, current scientific theories predict that, If certain conditions are met, ignition will almost certainly occur.I was asking why does it always and consistently catch fire in that particular set of circumstances? — Agustino
Why will it occur if certain conditions are met?For a particular strike, current scientific theories predict that, If certain conditions are met, ignition will almost certainly occur. — andrewk
why does friction always produce heat? — Agustino
Friction always produces heat because it is directed towards the production of heat. That's part of its nature, what being friction is in the first place.I'm still not seeing the A-connection. — andrewk
There will be a straightforward explanation involving physics and chemistry and the interactions of particles of certain types. I'm afraid this is getting beyond my area of expertise. I haven't done any Chemistry since high school.Why will it occur if certain conditions are met? — Agustino
It means, for example, that friction always produces heat. It doesn't one time produce heat, and the next time produce butterflies. It always produces heat, and only heat. That's what the concept of "being directed towards" means.What I do know is that, if one is not an A, there is no need to use the concept of being 'directed towards' in the explanation, which is just as well, because I don't know what that concept means. — andrewk
As I recall reading, and this was actually mentioned in Edward Feser's Scholastic Metaphysics, powers are just formal-final causes under a different name. — Marty
As for counterfactual dependence, I'm not sure what it means to say “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred” without wondering why that claim is the case. In virute of what? — Marty
I like to learn wherever I can from discussions, and the lesson from this one has been that the gulf between Aristoteleans and non-Aristoteleans is immense. I am starting to think that it is bigger than that between theists and anti-theists. — andrewk
The As have no proof of their view, and the non-As have no proof of theirs. It comes down to core beliefs. — andrewk
That difference in standard of proof is part of the divide. It appears that the As and non-As differ in that respect. There's no point in arguing over definitions. I expect we can at least agree on the following statements.You simply redefine "proof" in such a way that the A's proof does not qualify as proof under you restrictive definition of proof. — Metaphysician Undercover
So... if someone genetically engineered a horse to become a unicorn, then the unicorn would be fictional? :s — Agustino
What makes them different, apart from existence? If existence is what makes them different, then you're granting Feser's point that existence is a property, and denying Kant's. — Agustino
There's no point in arguing over definitions. — andrewk
I expect we can at least agree on the following statements.
1. The OP would be considered by an A to be a proof.
2. The OP would not be considered by a non-A to be a proof. — andrewk
Maybe that's another key A vs non-A difference. My non-A position is that there's no such thing as a correct or incorrect definition. For a non-A the worth of a definition is determined solely by its usefulness and clarity.I believe that it is very important to argue over definitions. — Metaphysician Undercover
For a non-A the worth of a definition is determined solely by its usefulness and clarity. — andrewk
Just for a fun thought experiment redefine "God" as the creator of a virtual reality that we are in. — Myttenar
A definition can't enable or disable the proof of a point of any interest, as any proof that uses the defined term can be converted to one that doesn't by simply replacing every instance of the defined term by that which it is defined to mean.So it appears to be as I stated, you would produce your definitions according to what is useful to prove your point. — Metaphysician Undercover
A definition can't enable or disable the proof of a point of any interest, as any proof that uses the defined term can be converted to one that doesn't by simply replacing every instance of the defined term by that which it is defined to mean. For instance, if I have a proof about bachelors, and I have defined bachelor to mean 'Live, adult, male human that has never married', I can change the proof to one that does not use the defined term, simply by replacing the term by those italicised words, wherever it occurs. — andrewk
The purpose of a definition is to enable one to write shorter, more intuitive proofs. Semantically, introducing or removing a definition cannot change the provability of anything.
A useful definition is one that shortens a proof or attempted proof in a way that makes it easier to find a way through the logical maze. — andrewk
I'd be interested to hear what other Aristotelians think about the importance of arguing over definitions. — andrewk
What is required is that any defined terms used in the proof have exact, objective definitions. However it is not mandatory to use any defined terms. One can write a proof without any defined terms, in which case no definitions are needed.This seems to contradict what you were saying earlier, that reasoning requires exact, objective definitions. — Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't matter. This doesn't save you in any way. We're still back to the same square. Take radioactive decay which is probabilistic by nature.From a quantum mechanical viewpoint, nothing always happens. The most we can say is that the probability of it not happening is negligible. But we can still work with that.
Is the following a fair rendition of your concept of 'is directed towards'.
We say that an object of category C1 (e.g. a match) is 'directed towards' phenomena of category C2 (e.g. ignition) if there exists a set of conditions S that include at least one condition relating to an object of class C1, such that our current scientific theories predict that, whenever conditions S are satisfied, an event of class C2 will occur with probability p, where p is very close to 1 [we would need to specify an exact value to complete the definition. Let's say 0.99999]. — andrewk
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