It became apparent - after a long discussion - that if one accepts the Aristotelean view of the world, in which notions like 'potential, 'essence' and 'directed' are believed to have meanings beyond their everyday pragmatic meanings, then the OP argument has some bite, and if one doesn't, then it has none. — andrewk

I don't think you're correct in this analysis. The Aristotelian notions are signposts which signal to some relevant aspects of reality. Do those aspects of reality exist? If they do, then the notions are valid. I haven't seen a relevant argument from the non-Aristotelians which show that those aspects of reality don't exist - maybe I've missed it cause I haven't read all posts here, so I'd appreciate if you could point me to it.

The Aristotelian notions are signposts which signal to some relevant aspects of reality. — Agustino

It goes straight back to the A vs non-A divide. The As believe that reality has those aspects and that they have objective meanings, and the non-As do not. The As have no proof of their view, and the non-As have no proof of theirs. It comes down to core beliefs. They seem to be what Alvin Plantinga calls 'properly basic beliefs'. One either believes them or one doesn't. There are no arguments for or against them.

The As believe that reality has those aspects and that they have objective meanings, and the non-As do not. — andrewk

Even though the referenced aspects are open to observation? Take the case of the match. We observe that it consistently produces fire when we strike it in the right place on the matchbox in favourable conditions. Why is that? Is that even a valid question?

If it is, then what is the answer? If your kid asked you "Daddy why does the match always light up when you strike it on the right side of the match box?", what would you answer?

If it's not a valid question, why isn't it?

I don't understand the relevance to A vs non-A. An explanation for the match lighting up is that heat arises from friction between the match and the match box. The friction is particularly high because of the roughened match tip and matchbox side. The match is coated with material that has a combustion point lower than the temp generated by the friction, so the material ignites. None of this requires adopting an A worldview.

Plus, being a pedant (sorry) I'd probably correct the child's use of 'always' and point out that sometimes it doesn't catch fire, and there can be various reasons why that happens (e.g. strike speed too slow, combustible material layer too thin, matchbox side worn smooth).

The explanation for the match lighting up is that heat arises from friction between the match and the match box. The friction is particularly high because of the roughened match tip and matchbox side. The match is coated with material that has a combustion point lower than the temp generated by the friction, so the material ignites. — andrewk

Right, but that's not the question I was asking. I wasn't asking why it catches fire in this or that particular instance. Clearly, it does because of the friction which produces heat. I was asking why does it always and consistently catch fire in that particular set of circumstances?

The question can be moved further too - why does friction always produce heat?

Plus, being a pedant (sorry) I'd probably correct the child's use of 'always' and point out that sometimes it doesn't catch fire, and there can be various reasons why that happens. — andrewk

Sure, I preempted you being a pedant, that's why I said:

Take the case of the match. We observe that it consistently produces fire when we strike it in the right place on the matchbox in favourable conditions. — Agustino

I was asking why does it always and consistently catch fire in that particular set of circumstances? — Agustino

Every particular set of circumstances happens only once. Each match strike is different. There is no 'always and consistently' to explain. For a particular strike, current scientific theories predict that, If certain conditions are met, ignition will almost certainly occur.

I'm still not seeing the A-connection.

For a particular strike, current scientific theories predict that, If certain conditions are met, ignition will almost certainly occur. — andrewk

Why will it occur if certain conditions are met?

why does friction always produce heat? — Agustino

I'm still not seeing the A-connection. — andrewk

Friction always produces heat because it is directed towards the production of heat. That's part of its nature, what being friction is in the first place.

Why will it occur if certain conditions are met? — Agustino

There will be a straightforward explanation involving physics and chemistry and the interactions of particles of certain types. I'm afraid this is getting beyond my area of expertise. I haven't done any Chemistry since high school.

What I do know is that, if one is not an A, there is no need to use the concept of being 'directed towards' in the explanation, which is just as well, because I don't know what that concept means.

What I do know is that, if one is not an A, there is no need to use the concept of being 'directed towards' in the explanation, which is just as well, because I don't know what that concept means. — andrewk

It means, for example, that friction always produces heat. It doesn't one time produce heat, and the next time produce butterflies. It always produces heat, and only heat. That's what the concept of "being directed towards" means.

As I recall reading, and this was actually mentioned in Edward Feser's Scholastic Metaphysics, powers are just formal-final causes under a different name. — Marty

I don't know, I am not a fan of powers and propensities on the one hand, and I don't know what Feser's argument is. Maybe he proposes a reduction to final causes, but that wouldn't mean that the two accounts are actually one and the same.

As for counterfactual dependence, I'm not sure what it means to say “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred” without wondering why that claim is the case. In virute of what? — Marty

Well, you could pose the same question in response to any account of anything whatsoever, couldn't you? But to address your question more directly, counterfactual accounts of causation are more conceptual analysis than metaphysics. "What we talk about when we talk about causation."

From a quantum mechanical viewpoint, nothing always happens. The most we can say is that the probability of it not happening is negligible. But we can still work with that.

Is the following a fair rendition of your concept of 'is directed towards'.

We say that an object of category C1 (e.g. a match) is 'directed towards' phenomena of category C2 (e.g. ignition) if there exists a set of conditions S that include at least one condition relating to an object of class C1, such that our current scientific theories predict that, whenever conditions S are satisfied, an event of class C2 will occur with probability p, where p is very close to 1 [we would need to specify an exact value to complete the definition. Let's say 0.99999].

I like to learn wherever I can from discussions, and the lesson from this one has been that the gulf between Aristoteleans and non-Aristoteleans is immense. I am starting to think that it is bigger than that between theists and anti-theists. — andrewk

We agree. Fancy that. The Aristotelean / non-Areistotelean division is deeper than the theist /atheist division. I see the theist /atheist division as a manifestation of the other, like a symptom of the illness.

The As have no proof of their view, and the non-As have no proof of theirs. It comes down to core beliefs. — andrewk

Actually, as I demonstrated in this thread, this is not the case. You simply redefine "proof" in such a way that the A's proof does not qualify as proof under you restrictive definition of proof. That's the problem with your mode of argumentation, which is to make definitions and produce "proofs' as logical conclusions from these definitions. You can "prove" whatever you like, by tailoring your definitions.

You simply redefine "proof" in such a way that the A's proof does not qualify as proof under you restrictive definition of proof. — Metaphysician Undercover

That difference in standard of proof is part of the divide. It appears that the As and non-As differ in that respect. There's no point in arguing over definitions. I expect we can at least agree on the following statements.

1. The OP would be considered by an A to be a proof.
2. The OP would not be considered by a non-A to be a proof.

So... if someone genetically engineered a horse to become a unicorn, then the unicorn would be fictional? :s — Agustino

No, see again what I said about real lions and fictional lions.

Engineering a horse to become a unicorn would involve natural processes. It doesn't assume that fictional unicorns have essences, let alone an immaterial essence that just lacks the property of existence.

What makes them different, apart from existence? If existence is what makes them different, then you're granting Feser's point that existence is a property, and denying Kant's. — Agustino

One can eat you, the other can't. You find one in a jungle and the other on a bookshelf. One has an evolutionary history, the other is a product of humans.

Lions have an essential nature, as do books, which is what it means to exist. Unicorns and fictional lions do not.

There's no point in arguing over definitions. — andrewk

This has been our difference of opinion from the beginning. I believe that it is very important to argue over definitions. This process is sometimes called platonic dialectics, and it is through this process that we determine correct definitions. You seem to think that all reasoning and proofs, begin with definitions and proceed to conclusions, but I think you are completely excluding the ostensive proofs, and reasoning which are necessary for giving us correct definitions.

I expect we can at least agree on the following statements.

1. The OP would be considered by an A to be a proof.
2. The OP would not be considered by a non-A to be a proof. — andrewk

Actually I can't offer an opinion on this. I find the OP to be a very long argument, and at the same time overly condensed, summarized. I am simple minded and need things to be well spelled out in order to understand them, and I cannot judge something as a proof or not without adequately understanding it.

I believe that it is very important to argue over definitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe that's another key A vs non-A difference. My non-A position is that there's no such thing as a correct or incorrect definition. For a non-A the worth of a definition is determined solely by its usefulness and clarity.

I'd be interested to hear what other Aristotelians think about the importance of arguing over definitions.

I have been reading this thread with interest, and also downloaded the PDF and read the original.

Two observations: in Feser's original text, I think the move from how 'the table supports the coffee cup' to 'how things are supported in being' is pretty weak. It seems obviously an analogy, based on the way that one thing is supported by another - coffee cup>table>floor>building>earth - but I find the move from that analogy, to the description of what 'holds things in being' pretty hard to fathom, on the basis of this text alone - for instance, the description of why hydrogen and oxygen are bonded in the particular way to form water, when they could be bonded in some other way.

I'm sure that most modern naturalists would say that the casual sequence that enables the coffee cup to sit on the table can easily be explained in terms of a sequence of material causation; I can't quite see how this argument counters that. But I will read it again, there might be something I am missing.

The second observation is that in Feser's other book, on Aquinas, he starts the text with a reference to the Parmenides, and how the 'problem of becoming' was given in that seminal text of Western metaphysics. Then he starts on elaborating how the Parmenidean 'problem of becoming' was addressed by the subsequent development of the Greek tradition. But, the point of all this is that it frames such concepts as 'potential' and 'actualisation' in a way which is no longer at all familiar in our culture. Whereas for those who were schooled in the Greek tradition, those concepts would naturally be considered in those terms, as they presented a solution to a particular metaphysical conception.

I think that is the source of the disconnect that AndrewK is referring to. When viewed from outside the cultural form of classical metaphysics, the terms themselves don't have any traction, for the modern point of view (something that Feser comments on). So in some ways, you have to learn to think in their terms, in order to understand the cogency of the argumentation - and I don't know how many people will want to do that.

For a non-A the worth of a definition is determined solely by its usefulness and clarity. — andrewk

I think that in metaphysics your principles would take us around in a circle. You say, that to prove something requires clearly defined terms. And, the worth of the definitions is determined by their usefulness. So it appears to be as I stated, you would produce your definitions according to what is useful to prove your point. And your point would be well proven because you would have produced the definitions which are useful to prove that point. So we would never make any progress toward actually understanding reality, we'd just be making up various different definitions to prove various different points

1- deductive fallacy. Other possibilities have been overlooked.
2-Begging the question- given the idea of 'god' is acquired knowledge, built on ideas of acquired knowledge which are assumed as true.
3. By definition God can not be known, so any argument build on the premise of "things known about God" are by nature, false because the premise for the argument is false.
4. If God is "Good" then God cannot be evil as perfection does not exist in a state of contradiction.
5. If something is omnipotent then it embodies that which is evil and by relation is evil.
6. Perfection is a state of existence without flaw.
7. Fallacy is flaw.
8. To be omnipotent is to be flawed and be flawed as part of the definition
9.If God is not perfect, the idea of God is flawed.
10. God is omnipotent God cannot be Perfect.
11. If God is perfect, God can not be omnipotent.
I could go on but why beat a dead horse.

based on your argument, God cannot exist and the idea itself is flawed being a contradiction of its iwn terms of existence even by its own definition ergo your argument in invalid.

Side note:
Just for a fun thought experiment redefine "God" as the creator of a virtual reality that we are in.


"For those who believe, no proof is required. For those who don't, none will suffice."
- I forget

Just for a fun thought experiment redefine "God" as the creator of a virtual reality that we are in. — Myttenar

Who creates the "we" who are in this virtual reality?

So it appears to be as I stated, you would produce your definitions according to what is useful to prove your point. — Metaphysician Undercover

A definition can't enable or disable the proof of a point of any interest, as any proof that uses the defined term can be converted to one that doesn't by simply replacing every instance of the defined term by that which it is defined to mean.

For instance, if I have a proof about bachelors, and I have defined bachelor to mean 'Live, adult, male human that has never married', I can change the proof to one that does not use the defined term, simply by replacing the term by those italicised words, wherever it occurs.

The purpose of a definition is to enable one to write shorter, more intuitive proofs. Semantically, introducing or removing a definition cannot change the provability of anything.

A useful definition is one that shortens a proof or attempted proof in a way that makes it easier to find a way through the logical maze.

You tell me, i dont presume to know in reality let alone in a hypothetical. Besides that's why it's an interesting proposition some entity created a virtual reality that we are in and that is the only stipulation, so if that is the question then follow the logical process. There are a finite number of considerations to take.

A definition can't enable or disable the proof of a point of any interest, as any proof that uses the defined term can be converted to one that doesn't by simply replacing every instance of the defined term by that which it is defined to mean. For instance, if I have a proof about bachelors, and I have defined bachelor to mean 'Live, adult, male human that has never married', I can change the proof to one that does not use the defined term, simply by replacing the term by those italicised words, wherever it occurs. — andrewk

That's irrelevant, because all those other words would need to be defined as well, according to your stated principles of reasoning, which requires definitions. So these words could just be defined in a way which suited the purpose as well.

The purpose of a definition is to enable one to write shorter, more intuitive proofs. Semantically, introducing or removing a definition cannot change the provability of anything.

A useful definition is one that shortens a proof or attempted proof in a way that makes it easier to find a way through the logical maze. — andrewk

This seems to contradict what you were saying earlier, that reasoning requires exact, objective definitions. Your objection against Aristotelianism was that it didn't provide clear definitions which are required for proof. Now it appears like you are saying that definitions are not required for proof, they just make the proof easier.

Myself, I would rather read hundreds of pages of examples of usage of the terminology to make sure that I grasp a firm understanding of the meaning, rather than a few words of definition. The former ensures that I have a clear understanding of the things being proven, the latter only ensures that I can associate some words with some other words.

I am wondering, are we part of the virtual reality, or are we real? If we are real, then I am real, and you are real, so you cannot be part of my virtual reality, you are real. If we are not real, then what difference does it make, even to ask your question?

The point is the logical process one can attend.
Questioning reality is the foundation of philosophy...

I'd be interested to hear what other Aristotelians think about the importance of arguing over definitions. — andrewk

If substantive, yes, if merely about word symbols, no.

For an Aristotelian, a definition signifies what it is to be something. For example (per the Oxford dictionary), an apple is a round fruit of a tree of the rose family, which typically has thin green or red skin and crisp flesh.

Note that this is not merely defining the word "apple". It is describing something in the world, namely, those objects we call "apples". The definition serves to distinguish those objects from other objects, such as pears (a different kind of fruit) and rocks (not a kind of fruit at all), and so can be considered a valid definition.

well I can't speak for you but since I am conscious of myself I can deduce that I exist at very least.

This seems to contradict what you were saying earlier, that reasoning requires exact, objective definitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is required is that any defined terms used in the proof have exact, objective definitions. However it is not mandatory to use any defined terms. One can write a proof without any defined terms, in which case no definitions are needed.

There can be a grey area in that axioms that refer to a particular item in the Domain of Discourse may in some circumstances be considered as in a sense constituting a 'definition' of that item. For instance, the axioms that refer to the item '0' in Peano Arithmetic might be interpreted as constituting a definition of '0'. But there are various complexities about that, which I think it would not be fruitful to delve into now, as I don't think they relate to the topic under discussion.

@andrewk
@Metaphysician Undercover

On one hand it is reasonalbe to expect a "proof" to be logical, which requires complex concepts to be well-defined. On the other hand one can argue that metaphysics is more general than logic because it adresses everything while logic investigates only a fraction of reality. (Concepts like "everything" have different meaning in logic and in meaphysics.)

I think your debate clearly shows the continental-analytic disagreement and won't be resolved anytime soon.

From a quantum mechanical viewpoint, nothing always happens. The most we can say is that the probability of it not happening is negligible. But we can still work with that.

Is the following a fair rendition of your concept of 'is directed towards'.

We say that an object of category C1 (e.g. a match) is 'directed towards' phenomena of category C2 (e.g. ignition) if there exists a set of conditions S that include at least one condition relating to an object of class C1, such that our current scientific theories predict that, whenever conditions S are satisfied, an event of class C2 will occur with probability p, where p is very close to 1 [we would need to specify an exact value to complete the definition. Let's say 0.99999]. — andrewk

It doesn't matter. This doesn't save you in any way. We're still back to the same square. Take radioactive decay which is probabilistic by nature.

Is an atom of whatever - say Uranium - going to decay with a specific probability of x%? Sure. This means that that specific atom (or type of atom) is directed towards decaying into the following components (X, Y, Z) with this, and only this probability.

Whatever causes there are out there, they have to be directed towards producing whatever their range of effects happen to be (even if those effects are probabilistic), otherwise, why is it that they always produce only that range of effects and not just any effect imaginable?