But recall that Aaron answered a question from you the other day about the traditional philosophical view of God as ‘being itsellf’, to which your response was:
I can't see what being could be (apart from being merely our idea) over and above the totality of beings. Being is comprised of beings I would say, just as beings are manifestations of being; I can't think of any other way to make sense of it.
The fact that ‘you can’t think of any other way to make sense of it’, is not actually an argument against this understanding. — Wayfarer
That every being participates in Being does not imply that Being is identical with the totality of beings, nor that beings are "part of" (in the compositional sense) Being. It simply implies that beings would not be without Being. In other words, God and nature can still be understand as ontologically distinct. The key difference between Aquinas (Monotheism) and Spinoza (Pantheism) is going to be found in their contrasting definitions of substance. — Aaron R
I can't see what being could be (apart from being merely our idea) over and above the totality of beings. Being is comprised of beings I would say, just as beings are manifestations of being; I can't think of any other way to make sense of it. It seems to me that God and nature cannot be understood to be ontological distinct unless God is conceived as otherwise than being; as potentiality or creative freedom, or something along those lines. But then potentiality and creative freedom would seem to be inherent in being, and so would not be "otherwise" at all.
You might say that being consists in the act of being, and so it is ontologically distinct from the totality of beings in that sense. But I think of beings as acts of being, so being would equally be the totality of acts of being, that is one great act of being, and again there would be no ontological distinction.
Whereas here I am inexpertly trying to deal with metaphysical arguments that do claim that ‘being as such’ is real, and real in a way that doesn’t require your agreement or buy-in. In other words, there might be something about this school of argument that you’re not seeing. Please don’t take that as a put-down or an ad hominem because it isn’t intended as such, although we have reached this point in previous debates. — Wayfarer
I have had a genuine moment of epiphany and that I glimpsed a reality which I have come to think is now lost and forgotten. That is why I have a sense of antagonism towards what a lot of people take for granted. I think it ‘pushes buttons’ because it questions the taken-for-granted nature of reality. — Wayfarer
Particular Imagined existences are always part of general material existence though, and the material (in the sense of 'content') of imagined existences is always the material of material existence. — Janus
This argument holds only if determinism is presumed. I don't accept determinism so the argument has no power to persuade. — Janus
So, what you think of as essence is something which changes constantly along with the conditions of your existence or is it something prior to your existence? — Janus
The issue I have with Metaphysician Undiscovered concerns his obfuscation over what it means to say 'two things are the same' or 'two representations have the same meaning'. — Wayfarer
A distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).
But as for 'blurring the difference' - I am making a very general point about the ontology of ideas. I generally assume that most readers understand ideas to be ultimately within the individual mind (as MU has stated throughout). If pressed, most will say that ideas are, therefore, the product of the brain, which in turn is the product of evolution. This is the general consensus in modern culture. Of course its true that none of the pre-modern philosophers understood evolutionary science, so none could respond to it. — Wayfarer
This doesn't make sense to me. Are you saying that matter has an imagination, and imagines what it will be prior to being that? — Metaphysician Undercover
That's not true. The argument is very consistent with free will, — "Metaphysician
I wasn't referring to determinism in that connection but to ontological determinism, where the nature of future entities is determined by their present internal conditions. even here it could not be rightly said that what entities will become is exhaustively determined by what they presently are because it is also determined by external conditions affecting them. — Janus
I am still unclear about this one. Is 'mental image' the same as 'concept', that is, the form once abstracted in the mind? Or else, if by 'mental image' you mean the physical visualization in the mind, then I agree that concepts are not that; because concepts, being universals, cannot have accidentals properties, which are necessary for any physical visualizations.And I agree, although, again, it’s important to distinguish a ‘form’ from a ‘mental image’. That is a hard distinction to draw but it’s important. — Wayfarer
I read a few comments where you discussed what sameness is and it seemed to me that MU was more or less right. — Πετροκότσυφας
My basic position is very simple: ideas are real, and they're not reducible to the physical.
— Wayfarer
But that's empty — Πετροκότσυφας
Your confusion comes from your refusal to acknowledge the two distinct ways in which "same" is used. Not recognizing ambiguity and equivocation in your own use of the term causes you to be confused when someone attempts to point it out to you. My actions of attempting to explain to you these two distinct ways in which "same" is used does not constitute obfuscation. Your attempts to disguise this difference is obfuscation. — Metaphysician Undercover
You claim that there is "something about this school of argument that you're not seeing" and yet you are unable to tell me what it is. I don't take this personally "as an ad hominem or put-down", but it is either condescending (and all the more unjustifiably so if you cannot back it up with an explanation) or it is an evasive tactic; neither of which belong to philosophical discussion as I see it. — Janus
then all you have to do is give an account of the alternative understanding. — Janus
But I draw no conclusions from those moments; and I don't think the ineffable understanding one feels there has any bearing on metaphysical arguments one way or the other. — Janus
In particular, whether ideas have a reality apart from the natural world or whether they are grounded in the natural world. In general terms, this is the problem of universals. — Andrew M
I am still unclear about this one. Is 'mental image' the same as 'concept', that is, the form once abstracted in the mind? Or else, if by 'mental image' you mean the physical visualization in the mind, then I agree that concepts are not that; because concepts, being universals, cannot have accidentals properties, which are necessary for any physical visualizations. — Samuel Lacrampe
a mental image of a chiliagon (a 1,000-sided figure) cannot be clearly distinguished from a mental image of a 1,002-sided figure, or even from a mental image of a circle. But the concept of a chiliagon is clearly distinct from the concept of a 1,002-sided figure or the concept of a circle. I cannot clearly differentiate a mental image of a crowd of one million people from a mental image of a crowd of 900,000 people. But the intellect easily understands the difference between the concept of a crowd of one million people and the concept of a crowd of 900,000 people. And so on.
We don't need to rely on the ancients to do philosophy all that is required is imagination and logic. — Janus
your remarks seem to be all over the place. — Πετροκότσυφας
You say you're arguing for a form of hylomorphism, yet it seems closer to some form of cartesian dualism and when you're asked to provide details (for example, what counts as a substance in your version of hylomorphism, what is form, what is matter, what are particulars, what are universals etc), you just don't. — Πετροκότσυφας
if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.
The theory of natural selection, which Aristotle and Plato didn't know about when making their explanations, brings human beings and their ideas fully into the natural world. It seems quite obvious that, if humans are products of the natural world and their ideas are influenced by and in turn influence the natural world, then they are part of the natural world.Obviously knowledge has progressed immensely since the time of the ancient Greeks. Yet philosophical disputes remain. Those disputes often find their origin in the fundamental differences between the views of Plato and Aristotle. In particular, whether ideas have a reality apart from the natural world or whether they are grounded in the natural world. In general terms, this is the problem of universals. — Andrew M
I’m perfectly aware of the distinction between ‘the same’ in a numerical sense, i.e. ‘the same object’, and ‘the same’ as in ‘the same kind’. That has never been at issue. You’re changing the subject again. — Wayfarer
This argument is very problematic as well. The word "same" here is used in a very unphilosophical way. — Metaphysician Undercover
Not at all. When Metaphysician Undercover came into this thread, it was to say that two sentences which say the same thing, don’t really say the same thing, but similar things, which devolved into a pointless argument about the difference between ‘similar’ and ‘same’. — Wayfarer
when you say that two distinct sentences say "the same" thing which way is "same" used? — Metaphysician Undercover
The meaning can't be identified as the very same (numerically) because there are slight differences which we ignore as accidental, in order to claim that the meaning is the same — Metaphysician Undercover
So my description of free will holds then. The nature of future entities is not necessarily determined by their present internal conditions, nor by their external conditions, it may be determined by an act of free will. And so you have no argument against the principle that the form of a thing is prior to the material existence of that thing. You reject this principle based on your claim that it is determinist, but it is not. In the case of free will the future of the object is determined neither by the object's internal conditions nor by the object's external conditions, it is determined by an act of free will which is an immaterial cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
But then I try to explain, and from my perspective, you don’t understand the explanation, and instead say that I’m evading your questions. So there’s a gap here and I don’t think I can close it. — Wayfarer
The ‘alternative understanding’ in this case, is the traditional philosophical form of theism that you were discussing at the time. — Wayfarer
Whereas I think that this is where metaphysics has to come from. — Wayfarer
Andrew M understands the problem! — Wayfarer
It seems quite obvious that, if humans are products of the natural world and their ideas are influenced by and in turn influence the natural world, then they are part of the natural world. — Harry Hindu
And value! Where in that, is the domain of value, some way of anchoring qualitative judgement? Or is it entirely subjective, ‘beyond words’, can’t be spoken about: in which case what role does it play in philosophy? — Wayfarer
So, not the numerically the same, but the meaning remains the same. — Wayfarer
The whole point of the idea is that the obvious differences in the way the information is represented, don’t effect the message which is being transmitted. The argument is that the information content must be separable from the representation in order for this to be the case. — Wayfarer
It is ‘the same information’ because no matter how it is represented, it always means the same thing. — Wayfarer
So you impute free will to all entities then? — Janus
In any case, I would say that even in a case where free will is operating there could be no prior form (independent of the constraining present internal and external existential conditions which you have said constitute an entity's essence) which determines what an entity will become: because if there were then that so-called freedom would be determined by that prior form and not by itself; freedom cannot be freedom if it is determined by something apart from, and prior to, itself; it must be thought as causa sui. — Janus
Or are you claiming that this form is free will? If so, the ideas of something formed and something free do not seem to mesh together very well. So, it remains entirely unclear to me as to exactly what you are trying to say here. — Janus
Also, why must an act of free will be "an immaterial cause" if the the physical is not deterministic? — Janus
So, what does Aristotle mean when he says: "For if attributes, such as "moving" or "white," do not exist apart from their substances"? — Πετροκότσυφας
For if besides sensible solids there are to be other solids which are separate from them and prior to sensible solids, clearly besides sensible planes there must be other separate planes, and so too with points and lines; for the same argument applies.
Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds, because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, the individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Furthermore the mind discovers them rather than forming them or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate...
...certain intelligible objects - for example, the indivisible mathematical unit [i.e. prime numbers] - clearly cannot be found in the corporeal world (since all bodies are extended, and hence divisible.) These intelligible objects cannot therefore be perceived by means of the senses; they must be incorporeal and perceptible by reason alone.
...We refer to mathematical objects and truths to judge whether or not, and to what extent, our minds understand mathematics. We consult the rules of wisdom to judge whether or not, and to what extent, a person is wise. In light of these standards, we can judge whether our minds are as they should be. It makes no sense, however, to ask whether these normative intelligible objects as they should be; they simply are and are normative for other things.
In virtue of their normative relation to reason, Augustine argues that these intelligible objects must be higher than it, as a judge is higher than what it judges. Moreover, he believes that apart from the special sort of relation they bear to reason, the intrinsic nature of these objects shows them to be higher than it. These sorts of intelligible objects are eternal and immutable; by contrast, the human mind is clearly mutable. Augustine holds that since it is evident to all who consider it that the immutable is clearly superior to the mutable (it is among the rules of wisdom he identifies), it follows that these objects are higher than reason.
If the geometrician can consider man qua solid, why can't the biologist consider man qua evolved animal? — Πετροκότσυφας
Then the theory of natural selection proves that Aristotle was right as opposed to Plato?Yes, which was Aristotle's naturalist view as opposed to Plato's dualist view (realm of matter plus realm of forms). — Andrew M
What are "particulars"? Would that be similar to saying that nature is made up of "information"?But it is also important to note that Aristotle's position was not that nature is equivalent to matter (which is just to reject one horn of Plato's dualism) but, instead, that nature is hylomorphic. That is, what exists are particulars and they are an inseparable unity of matter and form. — Andrew M
To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that fashions things on the model of the Ideas? Besides, anything may both be and come to be without being imitated from something else; thus a man may become like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not,and even if Socrates were eternal, clearly the case would be the same. Also there will be several "patterns" (and therefore Forms) of the same thing; e.g., "animal" and "two-footed" will be patterns of "man," and so too will the Idea of man.Further, the Forms will be patterns not only of sensible things but of Ideas; e.g. the genus will be the pattern of its species; hence the same thing will be pattern and copy. Further, it would seem impossible for the substance and that of which it is the substance to exist in separation; — Πετροκότσυφας
Then the theory of natural selection proves that Aristotle was right as opposed to Plato? — Harry Hindu
What are "particulars"? Would that be similar to saying that nature is made up of "information"? — Harry Hindu
Part of Wayfarer's argument, I think, is that information isn't the sort of thing you can bump into or detect with your senses. Therefore it shouldn't be considered to be part of the material world. Since information is not an illusion and also not reducible to material, it would seem to imply there is an immaterial (Platonic) realm of ideas or forms. — Andrew M
It is simple enough to demonstrate that information is not physical (at least certain types). We can use the Test of Imagination, as Chesterton calls it: If a thing x is imaginable without the property y, then y is not essential to x. Thus if a certain type of info is imaginable without any physical properties, then physical properties are not essential to this type of info. And this is precisely what we do when we imagine universal forms such as triangle-ness, whiteness, justice, etc. As universals have no particulars by definition, and all physical properties are particulars, then universal forms are imagined without physical properties. Therefore information regarding universal forms is not physical.For Aristotle nature is an inseparable unity of matter and form. Whereas for Plato, matter and form (or ideas) constitute separate and distinct natures. — Andrew M
Your logic is correct; however, we can take a shortcut when it comes to physical things, because of the law of physics that no two physical things can occupy the same space at the same time. As such, the properties of place and time are sufficient to determine if two physical objects observed are the same. And... it is also possible for universal concepts, because they have a limited quantity of essential primary properties (they may have an infinite quantity of essential secondary properties, but these are not critical in defining the concept, as previously explained).You need to respect the fact that the properties which a thing actually has, and the properties which a thing is said to have are not necessarily the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are missing my point, as I was using my statement above merely as an analogy. My point was that we are certain of the truth of particular examples that contain the concept, such as "this is not a triangle". My hypothesis that "we already have implicit knowledge of the concept from observation" explains this phenomenon, and has not yet been refuted.It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around.
— Samuel Lacrampe
There are two sides to this procedure, and you are completely neglecting one side. The perception of the object is one factor which allows us to describe it, but knowing the words, and their meanings is another factor. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that we can learn some concepts in school, but it does not follow that concepts are subjective. We are taught some math concepts, and yet it is clear that these concepts are objective. Besides, what about the fact that people born blind cannot apprehend the concept of redness, despite having gone to school? Remember that the essential property of redness is not "this light frequency range", which is merely its cause (and good luck explaining light), but purely this.Did you not ever go to school in your life? It is quite clear, that in school we learn the concepts, they are taught to us by our teachers. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is your definition of ideal? Mine is "perfection; as good as a thing can possibly be". Note that I don't mean Perfection in everything (this could only be God); only in the thing discussed. Under that definition, it is definitely possible to reach ideals. The ideal answer to 2+2 is 4, because it is as good as it can possibly be. And a 100% score on an exam is the ideal score, because there is nothing to add to reach a better score. I don't understand your example of "40% score on an exam"; what is this ideal of? Not score, because it is possible to obtain a better score.I simply explained that you were working off an incorrect definition of "ideal", which made the ideal into a particular instance of occurrence. If "ideal" is made into a particular instance of occurrence, then any occurrence is the ideal of that particular occurrence, and "ideal" looses all meaningfulness. So I could define the "ideal" as obtaining 40% on my math exam, then if I get 40% on my math exam I have obtained the ideal. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle would instead say that information is in the particulars — Andrew M
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