Seems to me the physical vs non physical question is a product of the philosophical heritage of object-subject dualism, a world 'out there' split off from and making contact with a subject. — Joshs
What the above definitions attempt to do is, more or less, assume dualism by giving a deflationary, dictionarial definition, where we are left with the "physical", which is what physics studies and the "mental" which, by definition, isn't studied by physics. — Πετροκότσυφας
Descartes had argued that there were two basic yet separate substances in the universe: Extension (the material world of things in space) and Thought (the world of mind and ideas). Subsequently opposing camps took one or the other substance as their metaphysical foundation, treating it as the primary substance while reducing the remaining substance to derivative status. Materialists argued that only matter was ultimately real, so that thought and consciousness derived from physical entities (chemistry, brain states, etc.). Idealists countered that the mind and its ideas were ultimately real, and that the physical world derived from mind (e.g., the mind of God, Berkeley's esse est percipi, or from ideal prototypes, etc.).
Materialists gravitated toward mechanical, physical explanations for why and how things existed, while Idealists tended to look for purposes - moral as well as rational - to explain existence. Idealism meant "idea-ism," frequently in the sense Plato's notion of "ideas" (eidos) was understood at the time, namely ideal types that transcended the physical, sensory world and provided the form (eidos) that gave matter meaning and purpose. As materialism, buttressed by advances in materialistic science, gained wider acceptance, those inclined toward spiritual and theological aims turned increasingly toward idealism as a countermeasure. Before long there were many types of materialism and idealism. — Dan Lusthaus
Sorry, my question wasn't worded well. What I meant to ask is; what does it mean for a thing to be a law of physics? Is a law of physics just whatever all things are subject to? That's the second horn of Hempel's dilemma, and makes for physicalism to be circular. Is a law of physics just whatever is part of current physical theories? That's the first horn of Hempel's dilemma, and makes for physicalism to be known to be false as it is known that current physical theories are not a Theory of Everything. — Michael
Physics being the science of the physical.
Physical is what physics studies. — Πετροκότσυφας
How about:
Physics is the science of the fundamental constituents of reality and their interactions.
Physical is everything that is subject to the laws of and principles that physics discovers.
Physicalism is the metaphysical claim that only physical entities exist.
Could be better worded of course, but is it circular? — tom
I think so:
1. only physical things exist
2. only [things subject to the laws of and principles that physics discovers] exist
3. only [things subject to the laws of and principles that [the science of the fundamental constituents of reality and their interactions] discovers] exist
It's also vacuous. It just amounts to the claim that only the things that exist exist.
Although it seems to me that this doesn't really explain the issue. Surely people make such claims as "the fundamental constituents of reality are immaterial"? And so using the above definition(s), physics is the science of the immaterial, and so physicalism and immaterialism are identical? — Michael
OK, I certainly agree that abstract concepts do not exist extra-mentally. But the problem seems to be that, for example, numbers are independent of any particular mind. — Janus
I tend to think the whole distinction between mental and physical ( beyond its ordinary commonsense applications) is fatally flawed — Janus
What are "numbers" ontologically in your view? — numberjohnny5
Strictly (and ontologically) speaking, I don't make a distinction between "mental" and "physical", so there is no problem or flaw. — numberjohnny5
Precisely. That's the problem. That does not mean you can't discard the framework. — Πετροκότσυφας
didn’t say you should, I’m simply trying to articulate it. — Wayfarer
I'm not saying that Dennett has completely succeeded — Joshs
I think number is inherent in nature; so number is not merely the product of minds.That much seems obvious to me. — Janus
think you read "that does not mean you can discard the framework" — Janus
When you say numbers are 'inherent in nature', what does it mean? You won't literally find anything like 'a number' in nature. — Wayfarer
It is said that crows and monkeys are able to differentiate between groups of 2 and 3 people, but I don't think that qualifies as counting. — Wayfarer
I think number is inherent in nature; so number is not merely the product of minds.That much seems obvious to me. — Janus
And yet you say you are a "physicalist" not a "mentalist". Seems like an ontological distinction to me. — Janus
But if the infolding of the universe is a process in which each present moment of time is not exhaustively predictable in a linearly causal fashion from the previous moment, then time becomes something more than an empty construct. Or one could say, the nature of objective reality itself presupposes novelty. — Joshs
Physics is the science of the fundamental constituents of reality and their interactions. — tom
Could you specify some examples of number being inherent in nature? — numberjohnny5
I'm perfectly fine with a position stating there is nothing outside of this universe — Joshs
The issue for me is what sort of materialism is up to the job of taking into account phenomena relating to the subjective, the mental, consciosness etc.
If you are against all materialisms, what sort of philosophical account do you think deals with reality better?
What we don't take into account is that mathematical operations are inventions. They are social constructions that evolve along with the rest of culture. Since our physics is also a construction that guides our interactions in the world rather than a correspondence or mirror of it, we've rigged the game beforehand without realizing it. — Joshs
Number is inherent in nature if there are multiple things. — Janus
So I really don't buy this 'deflationary' account of mathematical ability, nor do I think it is something that can be profitably analysed through the lense of evolutionary biology or cultural history. — Wayfarer
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