Okay. I think this is deeply, deeply confused. But we can leave it there.

I don't know, maybe we need a third party. @csalisbury, do you think what I'm saying make sense?

Compassion can be conventional, though. I do believe in compassion, but I doubt it's the watery-eyed universal force that a kind of Christian sentimentalism would have us believe.

Well, sure, I agree. True compassion can only occur through letting your guard down. The christian sentimental stuff keeps everyone at arms length - people are all opportunities for a compassion that's the same every time, that has nothing to do with other people.

Yeah, I think I see where you're coming from. I just don't where to go from there, while hewing to Schopenhauer.

Yeah, I think I see where you're coming from. I just don't where to go from there, while hewing to Schopenhauer. — csalisbury

I think @The Great Whatever thinks I am badly missing the point though. Do you think that is the case? If so, where? If not, where might he be missing the point?

Yeah, what I don't get is the idea of atemporal change, how the will changes, and evolves, into this or that, before representation, eventually coming to representation, as a kind of refined way to will more efficiently. This idea is certainly present in Schopenhauer and it doesn't make that much sense to me. I don't understand how change (& change in a certain direction!) occurs without time.

Yeah, what I don't get is the idea of atemporal change, how the will changes, and evolves, into this or that, before representation, eventually coming to representation, as a kind of refined way to will more efficiently. This idea is certainly present in Schopenhauer and it doesn't make that much sense to me. I don't understand how change (& change in a certain direction!) occurs without time. — csalisbury

Yeah, that was basically my question, especially how Will changes and evolves into this or that before representation. Do you think his illusion response answers the question or do you think my objections to that response makes sense?

Well, I've already spoken my part about the illusion question, recently, and a while back. But I'm still not sure what you're looking for. For TGW to admit there are limitations to Schopenhauer? For an answer, in-and-of Schopenhauer, which would resolve these supposed limitations? For different clues and avenues to follow, outside of Schop?

Well, I've already spoken my part about the illusion question, recently, and a while back. But I'm still not sure what you're looking for. For TGW to admit there are limitations to Schopenhauer? For an answer, in-and-of Schopenhauer, which would resolve these supposed limitations? For different clues and avenues to follow, outside of Schop? — csalisbury

All of the above.

Well, I'm down to help with the third option. Regarding the first option, I don't think an endorsement from me is going to affect TGW all that much tho tbh.

Well, I'm down to help with the third option. Regarding the first option, I don't think an endorsement from me is going to affect TGW all that much tho tbh. — csalisbury

Well, we can say the double aspect of Will and representation goes all the way down. Will is never without representation, which are both atemporal.. How to get passed the ever present organism then? I guess, one can bite the bullet and go the panpsychist route- even forces have a "what it's like to be" aspect, which has the oddity of giving non-organisms experiential qualities. Schopenhauer seemed to endorse this ideas. However, I still don't see it as really solving the problem, because you still have the combination problem of how little experiential qualities bring about full blown representational creating organisms.

Is that any more of a problem than how little single-cell organisms evolve into complex ones?

Is that any more of a problem than how little single-cell organisms evolve into complex ones? — csalisbury

Yeah, I thought of the same response after I wrote that. We just have to posit that subjectivity is a brute aspect of matter/energy in pansychism. At least you are not getting something from nothing here since it was there from the beginning.

I rather like the blending of Schopenhauer and panpsychism because it makes more sense. The Will is the flip side of matter/energy. You would still have to account for time and space being in the picture though. At what point is the demarcation between pre-representational and post-representational objects/organisms and when does this demarcation take place? If we say "point x" then that point x has to be accounted for as to why it's different than the point right before x.

I don't know that there would be a distinct point x. I guess it's something of a sorites paradox. What's a heap? What's 'representation'? When do creatures see? Is it when they first develop photoreceptive cells?

I do want to qualify my position a little, though. I'm a reluctant panpsychist, and not even really that. I'm as drawn to the idea of a Great Mystery, unintelligible to human reason, as I am to panpsychism (& even panpsychism would have to be a bit mysterious since, as TGW points out, there's a danger of reducing everything to your own experience). What I will say, with conviction, is that neither materialism nor idealism really adds up, if you push them far enough.

I don't know that there would be a distinct point x. I guess it's something of a sorites paradox. What's a heap? What's 'representation'? When do creatures see? Is it when they first develop photoreceptive cells? — csalisbury

Yes I agree. We cannot even say "develop photoreceptive cells" as we'd have to qualify when "develop" happens and what that is even like before "develop". There is always that odd jump to before consciousness to consciousness that does not add up.

representation, which are both atemporal — schopenhauer1

Representation is not atemporal, though.

what I don't get is the idea of atemporal change, how the will changes, and evolves, into this or that, before representation, eventually coming to representation, as a kind of refined way to will more efficiently — csalisbury

A simple answer: it doesn't (change, evolve, etc)

Strikes me as a cheap answer, tbh. Yeah, maybe the will in its essence doesn't change, but the way in which that essence manifests changes and evolves a whole bunch - and that before the purported birth of world-as-idea. I can cite some WWR passages?

Representation is not atemporal, though. — Thorongil

Yes, I wasn't saying in Schopenhauer's conception, this was in my own conception. I was trying to solve a conundrum that I see in Schopenhauer as far as I interpret it. How can representation "arise" when there is no causality in Will? That is to say it doesn't "arise" (at least not in the common sense notion). Rather, it is always there "with" will in that there was not point "x" when representation started.

It sounds like you've now answered your own query to me.

v gnomic, but I have no idea what you're talking about. What query? I don't think I've asked you anything on this thread

The one to which I originally responded. :|

I guess I'm just spacing it today. Would you mind requoting the 'query', to help me out?

what I don't get is the idea of atemporal change, how the will changes, and evolves, into this or that, before representation, eventually coming to representation, as a kind of refined way to will more efficiently — csalisbury

Oh, ok, I didn't think of that as a query but I can see how that's one way to look at it - a request for clarification. I guess I'd just I'd rephrase it like so: 'What I don't get is this idea of atemporal change, how the will (but not its essence) changes, and evolves, into this or that, before representation, eventually coming to representation, as a kind of refined way to will more efficiently."

That seems to capture the spirit. I hope you don't mean to suggest that something can't change if its essence remains the same. That seems like a very confusing path to go down. Maybe it is what you mean though.

Yes, representations are not caused by the will, since causality obtains only within the world as representation, even while they are simultaneously identical to the will as the objectification thereof. Did you wish to elevate this beyond a conundrum towards a contradiction? I don't quite see the latter if that's what you're suggesting.

how the will (but not its essence) changes — csalisbury

A strange distinction. There is no essence of the will.

Ok. What did you mean when you said I'd answered my own query? I'm lost. What was my answer?

The will in its essence (the phrase you used) I took to mean the will in and of itself, which you said doesn't change. I agree that it doesn't change (which I pointed out in my first post), so you have answered your original query about how it could change (as have I, from the beginning).

The strange distinction I perceived you to make above was that the will has an essence. It doesn't.