What do you mean by 'classic realism'? — Wayfarer
But the point of all of this is to call into question the statement that 'realism', in the sense we understand that today, is 'perfectly rational'. — Wayfarer
The philosophy with respect to which I am 'anti-' is just the bloodless stuff that wants to be a depersonalized armchair science. — ff0
There's a world outside of me that contains me and I share it with others who are also in this world. I was just at the memorial of someone I've known for twenty years. I have their dog now. The world survived their passing. — ff0
It's up there with love not as a duty but as a self-justifying higher pleasure. — ff0
I do like non-subjective actuality. — ff0
Of course we know how to do things, but there's something like a massive ignorance that (in my view) we mostly ignore. Yet this same ignorance when experienced is wonder itself. — ff0
"Unless you mean the whole default position deal," — T Clark
"Oh, those craaaazy theists," is not a rational argument. — T Clark
As to philosophic justifications, while I hold deep empathy for pathos given outlooks that provide wisdom, I’ve come to believe that only logos can convince logos. This, then, does lead toward one of those dry, analytic forms of argumentation … at least this—I guess unfortunately—is the formal approach I’m taking in putting together whatever philosophy I’ve got. — javra
Condolences, and may things work out for the best. — javra
I’d use the word “happiness” for, to me, this concept encompasses that of pleasure. All the same, I like the way you’ve stated this. Hence, then, the supposed pinnacle of love—that of absolute, selfless love—is not an issue of duty but one of attraction toward a self-justifying highest (or deepest) happiness of personal being (by which I take for granted the love of other; interpreting one’s proximity to this pinnacle to be proportional to the degree—dwelling at least within individual moments—to which distinction between self and other fizzles away … be this relation one of romance or otherwise). Anyways, nicely worded. — javra
See, it is this very aesthetic that makes philosophical skepticism so wonderful a stance for me. Somehow always feel the strain in saying this from those who are Cartesian or else interpret skepticism from a Cartesian stance of “doubt”—now common fair culturally. Nevertheless, this (occasionally felt) experience of beauty in there being unending wonder and unending discoveries is to me part and parcel of what philosophical skepticism is all about. — javra
Surely not, but if not, why should it follow, from the fact that I use the word 'laptop' to mean a being which exists unperceived, that the thing actually exists unperceived? — PossibleAaran
We can't possibly believe everything, so we must make some judgements, we don't need to make them with absolute certainty, but part of that process will be to reject some options. — Inter Alia
If, like Dawkins, you believe that religion does more harm than good, then it is morally incumbent upon you to attempt to persuade others to abandon it's practices, i.e. you must "act" on your belief, it is not possible to suspend judgement because you believe some harm might be done. — Inter Alia
The inconsistency here is that ‘the conscience’ is generally understood as an innate moral faculty, which you’re here applealing to. But it is just such innate moral faciulties which Dawkins has devoted considerable energy to de-bunking on the grounds that what really motivates human actions are the unconscious motives of the selfish gene. So there’s a kind of irony in a self-righteous call to action on the basis of the very faculty which the Dawkins of this world declare a religious delusion. — Wayfarer
So there’s a kind of irony in a self-righteous call to action on the basis of the very faculty which the Dawkins of this world declare a religious delusion. — Wayfarer
Scepticism is about not adopting ‘world views’ as a kind of global opinion. — Wayfarer
I'm demonstrating that such an argument does exist, the "default position" argument is much more subtle and well-thought out than you caricature it as being. It may be wrong, of course, but to suggest it is so absurd that even the Realists don't believe it is nonsense. — Inter Alia
And you had just done with accusing me of mis-characterising the argument and the arguers! I have never presented an argument which states or implies that because theists are crazy we should ignore them. — Inter Alia
The only use of the word crazy was to describe the way in which we would consider someone who believed in fairies, or believed they were Admiral Nelson. These people are locked up and yet we have no more reason to dismiss their belief than we have someone who believes in God. The same denial of Realism on the grounds that we cannot prove it can be applied to the insane. — Inter Alia
“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”.
So, if either of you feel like offering your opinions on this, could “nonsubjective actuality” be cogently understood to express this stated meaning? Such as in the proposition: “that the first person point of view holds presence while it is in any way aware is a nonsubjective actuality”. (this being the first example that comes to my mind) — javra
I don't remember saying that the default position is absurd, I said it is wrong. And I don't mean metaphysical wrong, I mean real in-the-world wrong. — T Clark
I was making a joke. — T Clark
People with unconventional understandings of the world are not ipso facto crazy — T Clark
It has no consequences for the real world, — T Clark
Great, that's at least tangible, so could you explain why you think the theory that children naturally, instinctively understand the data they receive from their senses in a classically realist sense (physicalist, even materialist) is wrong? — Inter Alia
Yes, so was I. We also need a symbol to indicate when we've got it. — Inter Alia
Yes but clearly we treat some of them as such, why is someone who believes they're Admiral Nelson not consulted on naval strategy but someone who believes they can speak to God (the Pope) is consulted on morality? — Inter Alia
Did you not previously describe it as a toolbox, are they now all tools which you never use because they don't actually do anything? I'm a bit lost now. — Inter Alia
In my view, we work with a persuasive speech that is both logical and feeling-tinged. For instance, I might ask you what it is for logos to convince logos. What is this being convinced? Is this not something like a feeling about the way that sentences hang together? A good feeling that approves? (I realize that this stress on feeling drags along the specter of irrationalism. ) — ff0
So, "nonsubjective reality" is your term that could include both the Tao and objective reality, as a way to avoid pointless argument about terminology. Is that correct? Off the top of my head, have no problem with that, although I'll think about it some more. Wherever I finally come down, I appreciate the effort and understand the impulse. The problem for me is that the really interesting issues are found between the two concepts. This is a fight between the Tao and OR, not one where they join together like a Power Ranger to create a mighty Nonsubjective Reality to fight for truth and justice. Wow, that's some metaphor. I'm really proud of that. — T Clark
Aw, geez, you mean you want me to get facts. I hate that. Just trust me. — T Clark
Poor analogy - the belief that the Pope has a direct relationship with God is supported and reinforced by a vast social and cultural network. He may be wrong, but he's not crazy. Do you really think he is? — T Clark
Scepticism is about not adopting ‘world views’ as a kind of global opinion.
— Wayfarer
Right, so back to my earlier question of what does skepticism look like then? You seem quite convinced that there's not enough skepticism but I'm lost as to how you reached that conclusion. If it's not the adoption of any 'world view' how does such a person act that people (including the Dawkins' and Churchland's of the world) aren't currently doing? — Inter Alia
Isn't the belief that we shouldn't adopt any particular 'world view' itself a 'world view'. If you've justified skepticism by its necessity, rather than its utility, then how come it isn't also necessary when deciding whether skepticism is the right approach? — Inter Alia
I am presently asking whether what I ordinarily think is actually true, and whether I have any reliable means of figuring it out. — PossibleAaran
A painfully simple way to see the difficulty with your argument here is as follows. Every Theist means by 'God', a being which actually exists. Does it then follow that God exists, just from the fact that the Theist uses a word a certain way? Surely not, but if not, why should it follow, from the fact that I use the word 'laptop' to mean a being which exists unperceived, that the thing actually exists unperceived? — PossibleAaran
what I'm trying to say is that the reason the Pope is consulted and our Nelson delusion is not is only because of the social network and I just don't think that's a very good reason to give any greater credit to what the Pope says than to our Nelson. — Inter Alia
Yea, you’re of course correct that there is no such thing as emotion-devoid logic. Logic is, I very strongly believe, strictly a tool via which our cherished emotions (e.g., sense of well-being) are safeguarded, embellished, and so forth. Hence, our emotive experience of being is primary and our logic (or even wisdom) secondary—thought the first is strongly dependent upon the second. Yet, even in this, merely so saying will not be enough to convince someone who deems logic to be the superlative faculty of intellect to which, ideally, all emotions (including those of desire and sense of satisfaction/comfort) then become subservient slaves of. So, while I agree with you, I still personally find the fine-tuning of logical arguments to be very worthwhile. Then again, there’s wisdom in how one best goes about conveying what one intends to convey, this again addressing the emotive aspects of what is expressed … and I’ve so far found myself direly lacking in this department. But I’m aiming to fail better next time around. :) — javra
I'd be interested to get your thoughts on what constitutes a "good reason" for believing that objects continue to exist when they are not perceived. You mention observation and inference, so let's head down that path a bit.
Consider classical physics. It is it reasonable to claim that classical physics is the best available model for understanding the motion of inanimate, macroscopic objects? Classical theories assume continuous trajectories and temporally persistent masses. They predict that if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences that we simply do not experience. A reasonable explanation, given the assumptions built into our best model, is that those objects don't disappear when unobserved, but continue to exist much as they were when last observed.
Is this philosophically air-tight? No. Is it reasonable and responsible for the purposes of belief? No question — Aaron R
I already told you: do something like take a picture while you have your eyes closed, and you will be able to verify that the object of your experience exists unperceived. Or just ask someone else. It's not that complicated or difficult, and there's no great mystery about it. — gurugeorge
As I said, you're only making it seem difficult and mysterious because you're mixing up the abstraction of the experience of the object with the object. This is also the reason why you think I'm begging the question, or defining things into existence.
Your experience of the laptop, certainly, cannot possibly exist unperceived. In the case of experiences as such, abstracted away from what they're experiences of, esse most certainly is percipi. — gurugeorge
I completely agree with you that our language itself isn't metaphysically loaded. I think ordinary language is far less precise than most philosophers suppose that it is and doesn't have 'build in' views on philosophical issues. I think Bertrand Russell saw this clearly. I do think, though, that most non-philosophers believe that Realism is true, at least implicitly. — PossibleAaran
We take our most fundamental criterion in a blindly passionate sort of way. Because what's so great about being logical? We can't use logic to justify this, since the authority of logic as a criterion is what's at stake. On the other hand, something like being logical is experienced as a self-justifying value. It's 'aesthetic' in some sense.
[...]
I understand the charm of fine-tuning arguments. Still, I think the most revolutionizing speech often involves a strong new metaphor --an analogically shifted paradigm, etc. — ff0
Still, relying on the Ancient Greek concept of Logos: logic, reasoning, ratios and rationing (or, partitioning this from that; appropriating relations between; proportionality; etc.), rationalizing, and language itself—among other concepts—were all interlinked in the concept of Logos. Are all interlinked, I’d say. Our inability to get behind language—which you’ve previously mentioned—is then, from certain vantages, one and the same with our inability to get behind the logos within which we dwell and of which we are in large part composed … and—like the fish’s lack of awareness of the water within which it swims, which you’ve addressed—quite often of which we can’t help but be utterly unaware of. IMO, due to our inability to get behind all the logos that is, we in some ways then cannot ever get to the pure, non-linguistic, being that is—for which we as beings use logos to address. — javra
That perspective briefly mentioned, logic then—in the form of the principles of thought being consistently applied—then serves as our common, human, universal language—or common meta-language if one prefers. (For my part, the particulars of formal logic then follow suit, but are not as universal as the principles of thought themselves.) — javra
To cut to the chase, what I’m here trying to make the case for is this: imo, the optimal metaphor would be one that consists of a logical expression readily accessible to all—such that the meaning holds the potential to become commonly understood by (as extremely overreaching an ideal as this is) all people. Since all people share the aesthetic for consistency in what is and what is deemed to be—otherwise said, all are subjects to the principle of noncontradiction—all could then in principle come to understand such logos-bound expressions.
… or so I’m currently thinking. And waxing a bit too poetic at that, I imagine. (Heck, not all poetic verse is good even from the vantage of its author.) But I trust that some of this can come across in a comprehensible manner—though maybe not to everyone. — javra
The materialism of those types of thinking is an ideology, a constellation of ideas, which form the basis for judgements about what is and isn't true. For that reason, they are examples of 'unbelief as a belief'. Your own appeal to Dawkins illustrates a similar tendency: the view that science is (pardon the irony) the 'path of righteousness' while religion is a pernicious error; it puts science in the place of a religion, not in its methods, but in the sense of being the source of normative judgement. — Wayfarer
I think the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism. — Wayfarer
This is true of all of us. My place in the world on a day to day basis comes from my social network. — T Clark
At T1 I perceive something. It is something which I would ordinarily call a 'laptop', but since you insist that if it is a laptop then it must exist unperceived, I do not call it a 'laptop'. Instead I try to characterize the perception in a way that doesn't presuppose Realism, by saying merely 'I perceive something'. — PossibleAaran
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