The bird doesn't "know" that it's beautiful in the way that we "know" that (and of course, there's the problem of whether beauty can be epistemically apprehended in the first place). But putting that question aside, our unique, subjective apprehension of the bird's beauty is an experience of the bird that only occurs via our human conciousness. From our human vantage point, the bird is beautiful: not just the the colors of the plumage, but the physical way the bird flits, flies, and the songs that it sings. The bird is acting on instinct; the bird doesn't control it's physical appearance the way a beautiful man or woman does; the bird doesn't sing for the pleasure of song itself; the bird has no mirror in which to observe it's own beauty, both literally and figuratively (figuratively in the sense that conciousness is a mirror in which we reflect on ourselves). The bird has none of that. But we possess a view unique to us; The very sense-experience and abstract concepts that create our apprehension of the bird as beautiful are the things that are exclusive to our human conciousness.

Suppose that beauty is pleasurable and that both man and bird feel beauty. We the beauty that we see around us, such as in nature and in the beauty in art, the bird in the joy of its song (I am not saying this is its sole purpose). We are very different beings but our behaviors seem somewhat merged in pleasure and pain.

If so then perhaps the beauty of a song bird's song may not be entirely lost on itself due to its cognitive limitations. I am inclined to believe that Nature itself is responsible for both bird and man. A bird's instincts rule what it feels and the pleasure it experiences in its own behavior, which is as important to it as it is to us.

Man's consciousness is Nature's realization of its own existence. If there is a macro-cosmic/transcendent perhaps it is Nature itself who's imminent hierarchy might be based on each separate beings degree of participation in it.

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Clear enough, but this is just definition, and not quite accurate. And it says that red is the name of a judgment made about a feeloing. People may agree that the book is red, but what does that tell us about red in-itself? — tim wood

The quale of red is the knowledge of what it is like to experience red.

Consider a physicist and a robot, neither of which can see red, due to a genetic defect and a loose connection respectively. When the physicist (who knows of red) is repaired by a geneticist, she can not only detect red, but also gains knowledge of what it is like to see red. When the robot is fixed by an engineer it can detect red, but has no idea what it is like to see red.

A quale is "what it is like" knowledge. Birds are incapable of creating such knowledge, as are robots.

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I dunno. Crows are supposed to be pretty intelligent. Granted birds cannot create people knowledge. Can you create bird knowledge? Perhaps you claim that birds are incapable of knowing. If so, make your case. — tim wood

In what way is "bird knowledge" any different from knowledge? How do birds create this "bird knowledge"?

The point that's getting skipped, here, is How Do You Know? — tim wood

Funny!

I don't see knowledge in there at all. And even if so, your "knowledge" is just of "what it is like to experience red." That's not the same thing as the experience of red. And what does the experience of red have to do with red itself? — tim wood

Qualia and knowledge are intimately related.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/

#2 isn't quite right. What colour is the book if you turn out the lights, or if you're using a sodium lamp, and so forth? The point is that what you get from the book is reflected light, but nothing of the book itself. — tim wood

Yes, I agree. As you say, this is not a case of the actual book touching one's mental apparatus; the book is not actually touching my eye. What is touching my eye are the properties of light interacting with the both the book's properties and the properties of my mental apparatus.

People may agree that the book is red, but what does that tell us about red in-itself? — tim wood

By "red in-itself" do you mean noumena?

For example, you say, "What would existents look/be like without properties?" I know what you mean. The trouble is that the remark, which I think makes perfect sense most of the time, doesn't make sense here. — tim wood

I'm not sure whether you do know what I mean. If properties are identical to existents, then how can existents exist without properties?

This begins to look like the pre-Kant problem: if what you know is in your head, then how can you know about the world? If it's in the world (I.e., empirical/observational) then how can you know how it works? I say pre-Kant problem, because Kant resolved it. — tim wood

I think we have direct perception of observables (I'm a naive realist). In other words, we experience externals (i.e. objective/external-to-mind objects) directly. We can make inferences from that direct experience, and that's how we can know about the world.

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How about as genus and species. And I'll tackle the how when you've accounted for human knowledge. Three questions: an sit, quid sit, quale sit, Is it? What is it? What kind is it? Are you denying the third because you haven't dealt with the first two? — tim wood

I see, you claim "bird knowledge" is different from knowledge, and now demand that I defend your claim?

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As to knowledge, I certainly do distinguish between "knowledge" and "bird knowledge," as well as human knowledge, dog, cat, whale, otter, and every other kind of knowledge. Don't you? — tim wood

What is the difference between "bird knowledge" and "dog knowledge"?

What is the difference between "bird knowledge" and "dog knowledge"?

Sniffability

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Sniffability — Cavacava

Do you think it possible to transfer dog knowledge to a bird?

Don't you think you ought to try for at least a definition of knowledge before you ask people about the varieties of it? Keep in mind I did not say they were different; I did say I distinguished between them. If you locate knowledge in qualia, and qualia is an internal state of some kind, then I imagine that all knowledge is different. We both may be able to identify raspberries in a series of blind tests, but by no means does that lead to the conclusion that our mental states - our qualia - are the same. — tim wood

You claimed that dog knowledge and bird knowledge are different. Why do you not attempt to defend your claim, rather than pretending yu did not make it? If you don't know what knowledge is, how can you even make such a claim?

Granted birds cannot create people knowledge. Can you create bird knowledge? — tim wood

So, for some reason, birds cannot create "people knowledge"!

I certainly do distinguish between "knowledge" and "bird knowledge," as well as human knowledge, dog, cat, whale, otter, and every other kind of knowledge. Don't you? — tim wood

In order to distinguish between "dog, cat, whale, otter, and every other kind of knowledge", there must be a difference between them. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?

No. I think all life shares the same world, but each species confronts that world in their own way, utilizing what nature has provided to it according to its own pragmatics.

No. I think all life shares the same world, but each species confronts that world in their own way, utilizing what nature has provided to it according to its own pragmatics. — Cavacava

So, why might it not be possible to transfer dog knowledge to a bird? If a bird can know something, then what stops it knowing anything?

I don't think dogs, birds or other creatures can conceptualize. They can think, feel, sense, associate experiences and react on that basis. I think they can share these senses, these feelings at times but knowledge in my opinion requires conceptualization, determinate concepts, without which there is no understanding, no knowledge.

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I think they can share these senses, these feelings at times but knowledge in my opinion requires conceptualization, determinate concepts, without which there is no understanding, no knowledge. — Cavacava

How do birds "share these sensations, these feelings"?

You offer an account: something that was outside comes inside, as qualia (fix this if I'm wrong), and the qualia - the "what it's like to see red" - is(?) the knowledge. Is that it? — tim wood

Using "inside" and "outside" like that I think confuses things. It's rather that properties of light (that are interacting with properties of the book) are interacting with properties of one's eye/retina, which in turn cause changes in the nerves that then cause changes in the visual system, and so on. The qualia refers only to the properties of the mental apparatus processing the environment in this case. And I'd say that the sensorial, perceptual, and acquaintance knowledge experience is not identical to the propositional knowledge one can infer from the experience.

There was a time when there was a "projectionist" theory of perception. As you recognize above, people realized that we don't actually see the tree. — tim wood

That's not what I said, nor implied; at least, that's certainly not what I intended to say/imply. "Seeing" a tree is identical to properties of light interacting with properties of the tree interacting with one's eye and causing particular changes in one's mind. "Seeing" does not refer to anything else (for instance, the tree actually touching one's eye). Touching the tree with one's hand is another way of perceiving in which properties of the tree interact with the properties of one's hand which cause changes to one's skin, nervous system, etc. I wouldn't say that touching the tree with one's hand isn't touching the actual tree.

So I find two flaws in the notion of qualia as an account of knowledge. 1) That qualia is the experience of what it's like to experience something (clearly not the experience itself, or the experience of the thing itself). And 2) even if it were, then how does it become knowledge. That is, how does the qualia itself establish knowledge and understanding? — tim wood

As per your (1), the qualia is the experience of some objective/external phenomena (provided that the phenomena in question is not illusory like, say, a projection of any object in question). "Experience" is synonymous with "mental experience", in my view. (2) In a nutshell, as we develop, observe, and "absorb" external phenomena, our minds learn to organise/classify different phenomena into abstract categories of experience. "Qualia" allow us the "material" (i.e. the experiences) from which we make sense of reality.

We can't both have and not have direct experience of externals. We agree we can't (we don't see the tree itself). Because we can't, we can't know about the world. — tim wood

Again, see my comment above: we have direct experience of observables; it's just not in the way you think qualifies as direct experience. Let me put this another way by asking you a question: what would need to occur for you to believe we have direct experience of observables...of say, a tree?

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By "mental apparatus" I'm thinking you mean mind. — tim wood

Yes. Just to clarify, we also have a sensory apparatus that detects externals/light-as-external/etc. Perception involves the combination of sensory and mental apparatus. Knowledge is mental only.

By "knowledge experience" I'm thinking you mean just that which is the reflection/awareness/consciousness of the experience - or that which is added to the experience-in-itself that makes it intelligible to consciousness - or something along these lines. — tim wood

Yes, more or less.

But the perception of the touching. Therein lies the problem. In this sense touching is like seeing. — tim wood

It's just employing two different "modes" of perception simultaneously: touching and seeing.

You're defining seeing, and touching, as the entire process, and presupposing that what ends up in your mind is what's out there. — tim wood

"Seeing" and "touching" is just referring to the process of experiencing some object via two "modes" of perception.

And again, saying stuff like "what ends up in your mind is what's out there" confuses/gets wrong what's actually going on, in my view. None of the tree is ending up in your mind when you touch or see the tree. Your sensory apparatuses properties and your mind's properties is being affected by the tree's properties (when touching) and the light's properties interacting with the tree and your mind (when seeing).

What we have learned to call a tree is out there. All we have to work with is perception of the tree (whether by seeing or touch or any other sense) - in short, an image. — tim wood

Like a mental construct of sorts?

I suppose the image is more-or-less accurate within the limits of my perception; I do not suppose it is the thing perceived (nor do you, I gather), — tim wood

I take it you're a representative realist? As I've said, I'm a direct realist. In my view, we perceive observables directly. We do not perceive an image/mental construct of what is supposedly an observable. If that were the case, we wouldn't even begin to be able to verify whether our mental construct or "image" (if that's how you're using it) matches the "thing itself". Which means the representative realist holds a solipsistic position.

nor do I suppose my image is exactly accurate, with respect to the thing - the tree - itself. — tim wood

What would "exactly accurate" refer to? What does it mean to have an "exactly accurate" image to a thing itself?

It's that "direct experience" that's throwing me. The only way I make sense of it is if the "observables" are the raw material of the perception, before it is put into order by the mind - but in no way to be confused with the thing itself. In this sense we do have direct experience of the "observables": we create them! As to direct experience of the tree, I'm with Kant (as I understand him): as a practical matter the tree is green and leafy and rough to the touch, and if it's a pine then it has a distinctive smell, and so on. And I don't doubt that the tree really is this way. — tim wood

The observables are the facts/states of affairs that we observe/perceive. The whole act of experiencing some object/observable is "processual", so what we are perceiving is continually being processed and changing/affecting our mental experience of some object/observable, moment by moment (as long as we're observing it, of course). Processing/experiencing a fact/observable/object is just our mental apparatus/phenomena (like qualia) interacting with external phenomena (like trees). So we don't actually create the external phenomena. Rather, our minds are causally affected by and process external phenomena via our mental apparatus.

As to knowing it in scientific sense, then no. — tim wood

By "scientific" I take it you mean empirical observations in lieu of theoretical/hypothetical support?

I think we can know things empirically (in the knowledge by acquaintance sense) since I buy direct realism.

(Btw, all experience is from a perspective; there is no "view-from-nowhere" experience or knowledge of some x.)

How do birds "share these sensations, these feelings"?

As I suggested to ND I think it might be in their tweet.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/131491

I have watched a pet cat do something that, it seems to me, required a lot of all kinds of mental capacity. (It had learned how to open a door.

Pets can be quite crafty, I think they learn (mimic) this from us, but I think it is more associative reasoning then conceptualized reasoning. So a is to b as b is to c rather than a implies b and b implies. c.

As an aside. It is interesting that song birds learn their song from their parents, and if they don't learn it for some reason they can still sing but they will not attract mates. Scientist indicate that their songs change over time for an entire population as a whole based on the recording scientist have made.

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The difference between associative reasoning and conceptualization (I think) is similar to the "distinction between the substitution of the name of an attribute or adjunct for that of the thing meant, for example suit for business executive, or the track for horse racing" (the definition of metonymy), things that occur in proximity and are connect by that proximity. Conceptualization has to do with metaphor, a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable... how a can imply b.

Humans think by both association and implication, while animals thinking is in my opinion confined to the associations they have learnt which can lead to amazing results such as your cat's feat. Not all animals are created equal, some are smarter then others. Animals are intelligent in many ways, but they are not intelligent in the same way as humans.

In the case of animals I think the metonymic link has to do with feelings like pleasure and pain.

Does a human person know that it's beautiful? And secondly, could there be a higher form of being that observes and apprehends a beautiful quality in us which we are incapable of seeing? — Noble Dust

I say yes. We 'look down' on ourselves. As we age we become more sophisticated, more sensitive to all the different ways that humans can be beautiful. And we can look 'down' on our younger selves with a mixture of contempt and longing. As cultures we age too, and so we can look back/down in a similar way. Sometimes we can see the past of ourselves or our culture as a stronger, more beautiful kind of living. Then we strive to undo the false learning, etc., that cut us off from this stronger beauty.

*Feuerbach pays quite a bit of attention to this issue. The Incarnation is a symbolic confession for him that (the hu-)man is the God or supreme value for (the hu-)man.