Metaphysical realism means the the world we perceive as external consisting of objects, events, space and time exists in some form regardless of whether anyone is perceiving or thinking about it. Some form means it need not be exactly as we experience it. — Marchesk

Is this is a stipulative or a lexical definition? If the latter then I think it fails (or at least isn't exact enough). Putnam's internal realism is opposed to metaphysical realism, but accepts the existence of a causally independent world. Kant's transcendental idealism also seems opposed to metaphysical realism, but accepts the existence of independent noumena. Enactivism is another example that accepts the existence of an independent environment, but wouldn't count as metaphysical realism.

Metaphysical realism, at least as traditionally understood, requires more than just the independent existence of things which are causally covariant with human experience, which is where I think your argument falls apart. At best the occurrence of consistent shared experience is evidence that something other than experience exists, but that alone isn't sufficient to jump to a conclusion of metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism also seems to require that the kinds and categories that the things in experience belong to are also the kinds and categories that those mind-independent things belong to, but I think there's a case to argue that this isn't the case.

I might agree that the particles of the Standard Model have an independent existence, but not agree that things like chairs and trees are reducible to them. The causes of perception and the objects of perception are not identical. But neither would I then say that chairs and trees are simply experiences in my head. I think that's a false dichotomy that paints a far too simplistic picture.

Is metaphysical realism equivalent to belief in objective reality, or is there something more to it?

The other thing an external world does is it makes everything hang together. Consider perception being brute. Do you still need air when you're not aware of breathing? Is your heart still beating? Does the floor under your feet still hold you up? Is the back of your head or your brain still there? How about the eyes you see with? Do they only exist in the mirror? Does your food digest or do you just have the experience of it coming out? Why would there even be an inside full of organs when we cut them open? It's not like brute experience requires a body to breathe or digest food. It's odd that we would perceive a brain if brains aren't needed. — Marchesk

Perception is a part of our experience.
I'd define conscious perception as conscious awareness of sensory stimulation.
What we 'unconsciously perceive' is therefore sensory stimulation without conscious awareness.
Awareness appears to be the source of perception, whether we experience it consciously or not.
Let's say our 'conscious mental awareness' stimulates responses, for instance, feeling hungry; our sub-conscious mental awareness also stimulates responses in instances such as the arc reflex, maintaining our heartbeat, controlling digestion, homeostasis etc etc.
We have different levels of conscious awareness that govern our neurophysiological processes.
It is a result of such processes that we consciously and 'unconsciously' perceive our reality, and our awareness makes use of such perceptions and determines our responses.

Would a falling tree still make a noise if no one was around to hear it?
Yes.

Would anyone hear it?
No.

Would the tree be aware of it's demise?
Debatable.

I guess the question I'm asking is - what is existence without awareness of it?

Metaphysical realism means the the world we perceive as external consisting of objects, events, space and time exists in some form regardless of whether anyone is perceiving or thinking about it. — Marchesk

Kant would have agreed that it exists ‘in some form’, but he would have said that we couldn’t possibly know in what kind of way it existed, insofar as we only ever know how it appears to us.

What you’re advocating is close to what Kant refers to as ‘transcendental realism’. He spells it out here

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensiblity). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. (CPR, A369)

However, Kant does NOT say that ‘the world exists only in perception’ as did Berkeley. This was addressed in an addition to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, under the title, ‘Critique of Material Idealism’ ( here).

The key point that I take from all this is that the idea that the world exists in a state of perfect objectivity, independently of any perceptual or cognitive act on our part, is a kind of conceit. It of course routinely assumed by many moderns, which is exactly why Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is so important (as per this brief essay).

However, Kant does NOT say that ‘the world exists only in perception’ as did Berkeley. — Wayfarer

How does Kant say the world exists apart from perceptions then?

The summary given in that reference goes like this:

1. I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and can be aware, that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise)
2. I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise)
3. No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
4. Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
5. If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
6. Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1–5)

I've read that quite a few times, and I think I get it. As mentioned, it is included in the second edition to differentiate his work from Berkeley's esse est percipe.

So Kant is not saying that 'the world only exists in the mind'. What I think he saying, is that we can't see it apart from how it occurs to us, as perceiving subjects - that we are an ineliminable aspect of reality. We can 'bracket ourselves out' by concentrating on only those elements which are amenable to precise quantification, thereby arriving at the proverbial 'view from nowhere'. Except that it's not really a 'view from nowhere' because, again, the mind is foundational to even that view - even though the observing mind is nowhere among the objects of perception or analysis! (This is arguably what is at the source of the so-called 'observer problem'.)

There's a passage from Schopenhauer that puts it very succinctly:

All that is objective, extended, active - that is to say, all that is material - is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction). But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufacture of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time. From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given: the idea, in which alone the object that materialism starts with, exists. 1

Is metaphysical realism equivalent to belief in objective reality, or is there something more to it? — T Clark

I would have said that, but then skeptical scenarios like the Matrix would qualify. I think Michael put it better:

Metaphysical realism also seems to require that the kinds and categories that the things in experience belong to are also the kinds and categories that those mind-independent things belong to, but I think there's a case to argue that this isn't the case. — Michael

How similar does reality need to be for metaphysical realism to be true? Does the fact that tables are mostly empty space mean that solid tables don't exist? Or can we just say that within the light we see, and given that our bodies and ordinary objects are held together molecular in a similar fashion, tables are solid?

Or what if we take Banno's approach to objects, and say that there are different ways to carve up the world? Can there be a multiplicity of conceptual schemas about the world, but the world is still real?

Would a falling tree still make a noise if no one was around to hear it?
Yes. — Qurious

It would make sound waves, but if there are no ears around, then there would be no sound as a phenomena. This is where it gets tricky. Does the tree look brown and green? Well, it does given the sort of eyes we have. But what about when nobody's looking? Well then it's reflecting light with wavelengths that correspond to brown and green perceptions, in addition to any light humans can't see that would be reflected by a tree. There's also all the light that passes through objects like trees, such as radio waves.

It makes you wonder what the sky would look like if our eyes could take in the entire EM spectrum.

Neither that summary nor your remarks say anything whatsoever about how the world exists apart from perceptions.

The passage quoted from Schopenhauer is quite incoherent for he says that what the materialist posits is "indirectly given" since it has "passed through the machinery of the brain", but he seems to have forgotten that the fact that it has passed through the machinery of the brain is also indirectly given because it has also passed through the machinery of the brain. His argument fails to achieve coherence because it leads to an infinite regress.

But we only want to say that something is brute when we have no further explanation. Quantum Mechanics can be said to be brute because physicists lack a means of explaining further, at least so far. — Marchesk

I guess this depends on what you take for an explanation. If I can take some concepts and numbers and build a reliable prediction machine, that's great. Is this an explanation? Obviously we want reliable prediction. No complaint there. But why is this explanation?

The same problem haunts theology, too, though. A certain system of concepts is used to predict the afterlife as a function of behavior and belief now, for instance, in the cruder cases. But that God is there in the first place is just as strange as the presence of quarks. Brute fact is arguably the result of examining the concept of explanation --and seeing its limits if not its nullity when it comes to our situation as a whole.

We perceive an external world because there is one. — Marchesk

I agree. But I think everyone agrees. To deny such a world in conversation is nevertheless to try to say something true about a shared situation. This dimly understood but well and often employed sense of the shared situation is (in my view) the world behind the (more theoretical concepts of the ) world.

I guess this depends on what you take for an explanation. If I can take some concepts and numbers and build a reliable prediction machine, that's great. Is this an explanation? Obviously we want reliable prediction. No complaint there. But why is this explanation? — ff0

Why does it rain? Because heat from the sun evaporates the water which eventually turns into rain clouds. Sounds like an explanation to me.

Science is both prediction and explanation. The explanation gives rise to prediction, which allows for the explanation to be tested.

Why does the sun evaporate the water? You can invoke still other entities, still other projected necessities. Maybe we can go all the way back to the theorized big bang. At some point, however, these objects and their apparently necessary relationships are just here. They just happen to be the case. To be clear, 'God' explanations run into the same problem.

This isn't meant to be anti-science or anti-theology. I'm just trying to point at the limits of explanation. As I see it, it tends to be pragmatic and emotional. Certain ways of thinking about things make them easier to predict and control. Along the same lines, we like to tame the unfamiliar for emotional reasons by relating it to the familiar. On the other hand, we sometimes like to strip the familiar of its familiarity, for stimulation and the pleasure of wonder which we largely lose as we age.

Let's say, for instance, that you have a theory of everything that fits on a T-shirt. Unless that theory explains why it has the shape it has (which sounds absurd to me, like God not needing a creator), it's a mysterious brute fact. It's the mathematical structure that the quantifiable aspect of shared reality just happens to have. We are no less thrown into the world, having merely found some patterns in the way stuff moves.

Maybe we can go all the way back to the theorized big bang. — ff0

I don't think we need to go all the way back to the big bang to explain the rain satisfactorily. In my OP, I admitted that at some point, we run out of the ability to explain, and then we're left with brute existence. But we don't need to do that with experience.

Anyway, even if the universe is brute, that still explains our experiences of it. We experience a world, because it's there to be experienced (or better yet, we're animals living inside that world whose survival is dependent on perceiving the world to a certain degree of fidelity).

I don't think we need to go all the way back to the big bang to explain the rain satisfactorily. In my OP, I admitted that at some point, we run out of the ability to explain, and then we're left with brute existence. But we don't need to do that with experience. — Marchesk

Well, I can relate. But this satisfaction is pragmatic/emotional, as I see it. For the most part we react to threats and chase promises in nature. We want some things and avoid others. So prediction and control gets the job done.

So we at least agree on some kind of brute existence. So you think experience isn't a brute fact? I don't see how it isn't as a whole finally inexplicable.

How similar does reality need to be for metaphysical realism to be true? Does the fact that tables are mostly empty space mean that solid tables don't exist? Or can we just say that within the light we see, and given that our bodies and ordinary objects are held together molecular in a similar fashion, tables are solid? — Marchesk

The issue is whether or not tables are reducible to those molecules; whether or not "table" is a mind-independent kind. If not then the above is a category error. It's not that the table is mostly empty space; it's just that there's a lot of empty space between the particles that are causally responsible for our experience of a table.

the Earth appears to be motionless with a rising and setting sun. Our language reflects that appearance. But we know the Earth rotates around its axis every 24 hours, creating the appearance.

Don't we already have built in answers, contained in our history, which we learn and we can't unlearn or suspend in our interactions with others or with what is in the world it self. We can only find meaning through communication with others. The world, the 'real world' we know is the same one others know because we all communicate. It works, we get along very well in the world.

I think the dualism of man--world is misleadingly driven by a desire for ideal certainty in knowledge, our natural inclination towards a correspondence theory of truth.

The issue is whether or not tables are reducible to those molecules; whether or not "table" is a mind-independent kind. If not then the above is a category error. It's not that the table is mostly empty space; it's just that there's a lot of empty space between the particles that are causally responsible for our experience of a table. — Michael

I like this explanation.
The issue is whether or not anything we perceive can be reduced to it's component parts i.e. molecules/atoms/subatomic particles in actuality, since in order for us to conceive a table, for example, the mind must process a perception of the above in varying quantities.

Are the fundamental particles causally responsible for our experience of a table, or is it our mind which causes us to perceive such a thing?
To me it seems like we could only ascribe names/labels and therefore any human understanding to a given thing in actuality because of our minds ability to do so, paired with the limits of our sensory capacity.
This isn't to say that the 'given thing' doesn't exist independent of mind, but it is to say that any label/understanding for this thing could not exist independent of mind.

It seems that only upon observation (perception/mind), or lack of observation in some cases, can one ascribe a thing as this or that.
Therefore, I would say that a 'table' doesn't exist as such without a human's awareness of it being a table, and even though that thing might potentially exist independent of mind, it could never be conceived as such, since all that we conceive is mind-dependent.

This, I believe, is the distinction that is missing.

Since this is metaphysics, there isn't a foolproof argument that will convince everyone.

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There are uncontroversial metaphysical statements and arguments. I propose a metaphysics based on those. …an uncontroversial metaphysics.
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But someone could ask what the explanation for a mind-independent world is.

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If it just consists of abstract facts, then it doesn’t need an explanation. There inevitably are infinitely-many abstract facts, and infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract facts. They don’t need explanation.
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Could there have not been abstract facts? We’ve discussed that. We’ve discussed why there couldn’t have not been abstract facts. So I think we agree on that, and so I needn’t go into it here.
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We do have cosmology to help with that\

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No, cosmology is part of physics. Physics describes how the physical world works, and what it’s like, but it doesn’t say anything about why there’s a physical world.
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, but maybe we do end up a brute fact of existence eventually (the quantum vacuum perhaps).

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That would be positing (some theory of) the physical world as a brute-fact. For one thing, any particular physics theory will most likely be replaced, updated, expanded and improved-on by a more comprehensive theory.
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For another thing, the Materialist’s brute-fact physical world is an unnecessary brute-fact.
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It's just that we don't have to invoke bruteness until there is no explanation available. And we do have that for the world we perceive.

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Yes, but it can’t be a physical explanation. Physics can’t explain why there’s a physical world.
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Now, about Realism vs Anti-Realism:
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How we talk about that depends on what the Realist is saying there is. So, when I speak of that matter, of course it’s necessary for me to do so in terms of what I claim there is.
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There are abstract facts. There couldn’t have not been abstract facts. Shall I go into the discussion that we had about why there couldn’t have not been abstract facts?
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If there were no facts, then the fact that there are no facts would be a fact.
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But could there have obtained a fact that there are no facts other than that one fact that there are no other facts?
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For one thing, that would be a special brute-fact, calling for an explanation, but not having one (How could it, if there are no other facts?)
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For another thing, as I mentioned above, an abstract fact, or a system of inter-referring abstract facts is completely isolated and independent of any context outside itself, or any global permission, or any medium in which to be.
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…so a global fact that there are no other facts would be meaningless.
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I usually give several examples of inevitable abstract facts:
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A proposition can’t be true and false.
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If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.
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If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4.
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(…with an obvious reasonable definition of 1, 2, 3, & 4, based on the multiplicative identity and addition.)
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As described above, those things are just true, with or without minds, and without existence or realness in some larger context, or any global permission, or any medium in which to be.
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…and not subject to some global negating-fact.
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Sure, only sentient beings can discuss those logical facts. But we can also discuss them with regard to a hypothetical universe in which there's no life. We can say "If, in that world, there were Slithytoves, Jabberwockeys, and the quality of being 'brillig'..." or "If, in that world, there were four objects to count in various ways, and someone to do the counting..."

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A proposition can’t be true and false, and so we don't live in a willy-nilly-self-inconsistent impossibility-world. That's why I say that logic has authority over experience,
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The metaphysics that I propose is an Anti-Realism, about an experience-based possibility-story, for each of us.
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For each of us, that life-experience possibility-story is a complex system of inter-referring if-then facts about hypotheticals. It’s valid in the sense that it's as valid as any other abstract fact, or system of them. It's one of infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract-facts.
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But its abstract facts aren't really different from all the other abstract facts, which, likewise, each have their own local validity, quite independent of anything else.
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So that's why I claim that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question.
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Michael Ossipoff

To be clear, 'God' explanations run into the same problem. — ff0

Maybe, but explanations of God are a largely Atheist topic.

Many Theists don't regard God as an element of metaphysics. Metaphysics is about explanations, and things discussable and describable.Many Theists don't assert to you about God.

Assertion and proof are meaningful only in logic, mathematics, physics and (limitedly) in metaphysics..

Let's say, for instance, that you have a theory of everything that fits on a T-shirt. Unless that theory explains why it has the shape it has (which sounds absurd to me, like God not needing a creator)

Speaking of "Creation", in regards to religion, is anthropomorphic.

And, in any case, it would be absurd to speak of a "creator",of what isn't an element of metaphysics. ..or a need for a creator for what isn't an element of metaphysics.

I'm not trying to start a religious debate. I don't debate religion. I'm just clarifying that many Theists don't believe in a God that is an element of metaphysics or needs a creator.

We needn't debate it. (..and let's not). But do you think that the discussable, describable subject called metaphysics describes all of Reality, or that you could understand or know all of Reality? Maybe it would be more modest to not make such an assumption.

, it's a mysterious brute fact. It's the mathematical structure that the quantifiable aspect of shared reality just happens to have. We are no less thrown into the world, having merely found some patterns in the way stuff moves.

Yes, the fundamental existence of the Materialist's objectively-existent physical universe is a brute-fact.

But no, we don't need that brute-fact. There's no particular reason to believe in it. There's no particualr reason to believe that our physical universe is other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypothetics. ...one of infinitely many such complex abstract logical systems.

Michael Ossipoff

Maybe, but explanations of God are a largely Atheist topic. — Michael Ossipoff

In my experience, there is here and there a metaphysical theist on philosophy forums. I was trying to make clear that my mention of the limits of scientific explanation wasn't some covert introduction of some other kind of explanation. Indeed, both kinds of explanation have the same shape in my view. Objects are understood within a nexus of necessary relationships. The 'supernatural' is just a different understanding of the natural insofar as one does a kind of science.

I don't take sides really on the theist versus atheist debate. I can find interesting uses for the word 'God.' Still, I don't believe in an afterlife. So that gives my perspective an atheistic feel. That is arguably the real issue: is this all there is? A brief embodiment? I think yes. But I don't claim to have some 'proof.' I can emit 'reasons' for this belief. I can cough up words.

Many Theists don't regard God as an element of metaphysics. Metaphysics is about explanations, and things discussable and describable.Many Theists don't assert to you about God. — Michael Ossipoff

Those are probably the kind I'd get along with best. I do live the old King James. I vote for whoever has the best English poetry.

Assertion and proof are meaningful only in logic, mathematics, physics and (limitedly) in metaphysics.. — Michael Ossipoff

You're preaching to the choir. Life is bigger than that which permits of some tidy, settled method. We might even drag the word 'God' in for this largeness of life that dwarfs our systems. But I'm not attached to this or that word. Life is bigger than our words.

Speaking of "Creation", in regards to religion, is anthropomorphic. — Michael Ossipoff

In my view, it's all anthropomorphic. We only really give a damn about the human-like. We can do without the human body (sort of) in a Deity. But take away human virtues and we have only a machine, a pathetic patch over our ignorance.

I'm not trying to start a religious debate. I don't debate religion. I'm just clarifying that many Theists don't believe in a God that is an element of metaphysics or needs a creator. — Michael Ossipoff

You aren't hurting my feelings, and we don't have to debate religion if you don't want to. But I don't see why debating religion should be a bad thing. For me philosophy is something like the religion of those who like to think of themselves as 'rational,' a word with a rich and slippery meaning. We are invested in our highest ideas. They are sacred, etc. Call it philosophy or religion or whatever. We have words that sustain our sense of sanity and worth.

We needn't debate it. (..and let's not). But do you think that the discussable, describable subject called metaphysics describes all of Reality, or that you could understand or know all of Reality? Maybe it would be more modest to not make such an assumption. — Michael Ossipoff

Hell no. I'm an anti-metaphysician. Perhaps my fundamental theme at the moment is the gap between life as it is lived and the small 'piece' of it that we can make explicit and rational. As far as modesty goes, that's a tricky issue. One can be immodestly 'modest.' The real conversation is going to happen or not according to whether we have the guts to say something stirring, even if we might change our minds about it. We've got to take risks, clash, be distinct personalities.

Some might imagine themselves as doing a kind of science here. I don't see it that way. But I recognize their right to project any kind of minimally civil personality they wish. That keeps things fresh. To me this is a place of wild and often impressively articulate conversation.

Yes, the fundamental existence of the Materialist's objectively-existent physical universe is a brute-fact.

But no, we don't need that brute-fact. There's no particular reason to believe in it. There's no particualr reason to believe that our physical universe is other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypothetics. ...one of infinitely many such complex abstract logical systems. — Michael Ossipoff

Let's say our physical universe is such a system. Why is it specifically the way that it is? Why is it here in the first place?

"But no, we don't need that brute-fact. There's no particular reason to believe in it. There's no particualr reason to believe that our physical universe is other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypothetics. ...one of infinitely many such complex abstract logical systems". — Michael Ossipoff


Let's say our physical universe is such a system. Why is it specifically the way that it is? — ff0

There are infinitely many abstract if-then facts. There are infinitely-many inter-referring systems of if-then facts. There are infinitely-many of those that are complex enough to be what we'd call a "physical universe".

Because there are infinitely-many such systems, it's hardly surprising that there's this one. ...one that is the way this one is. There are also infinitely-many other ones, which are infinitely-many different ways.

Why is it here in the first place?

In my post that you're replying to, I discussed why there couldn't have not been abstract facts.

...and, therefore, systems of inter-referring abstract facts. ...such as the complex abstract logical systems that is our universe.

As I emphasized in my post that you're replying to, I feel that it's more meaningful to speak of individual life-experience possibility-stories, instead of objective 3rd-person whole possibility-worlds. Those individual life-experience possibility-stories, likewise, are inevitable systems of inter-referring abstract facts about hypotheticals.

In reference to your question, I emphasize the word "inevitable".

Michael Ossipoff

Because there are infinitely-many such systems, it's hardly surprising that there's this one. ...one that is the way this one is. There are also infinitely-many other ones, which are infinitely-many different ways. — Michael Ossipoff

But why isn't all the more surprising that there are infinitely many? One of the anti-metaphysical axes I like to grind is a sort of smugness that I feel in the 'nothing here to see, folks' approach. I don't mean to accuse you personally of smugness. I'm just talking about a kind of stubborn resistance to confessing any sort of experience of wonder (or terror) at finding oneself alive and mortal. It's fine of course if others disagree. They can think me irrational and I can think that they are in the same kind of smug, complacent mode that I am often in myself.

From my point of view, there's a kind of pasting over of this wonder-terror by very plausible sciency sounding phrases. But I personally can't buy it. I do believe, of course, that humans can (for a long time even) remain un-freaked-out. It's not exactly convenient or practical to be freaked-out by existence all the time. But I suspect that most of us experience moments from time to time when all of the impressive words fall away and we stand before the roaring of the there that we are and the there that we are surrounded by. We are thrown into a drama that we don't remember choosing. Thrown into a face and language. Thrown into relationships with particular human beings, each of them also thrown. All of us mortal. All of us improvising, keeping the ship afloat or occasionally scuttling it to do away with the drama.

This is where religion/philosophy as the non-cute stuff really kicks in. Your theoretical vision of the world is interesting enough, but surely you live in a world of people and objects. By no means am I trying to censor you. I'm just pointing at the gap between our creative theoretical fictions and the vivid world of people and objects we actually live in, work in, suffer in, enjoy ourselves in.

(Sometimes nested quotes don’t seem to work. In this reply I sometimes use them, but sometimes just write the inner quote in ordinary quotation-marks. ..just experimentally.)
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“Maybe, but explanations of God are a largely Atheist topic.” — Michael Ossipoff
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In my experience, there is here and there a metaphysical theist on philosophy forums.

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Sure, there are Theists who like metaphysics, and there are Theists who regard religion as metaphysical. Of course those categories overlap. I think most Atheists, here and elsewhere, regard religion as a metaphysical belief, though they don’t express it that way.
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I just meant that, at philosophical forums, not all Atheists are Materialists. Elsewhere they pretty-much are (I’ll address your disagreement about that when I get to that other posting).
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I’m only here to discuss metaphysics, and I don’t consider Theism to be within metaphysics. But I answer about Theism when Theists or Atheists bring it up—and Atheists always bring it up a lot more often & more assertively than Theists do.
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My criticism is that Atheists seem to believe that the beliefs of Biblical-Literalists are the beliefs of all Theists, and that the God believed in by Biblical-Literalists is the One True God for Atheists to believe in assertively disbelieving in.
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It’s as if I commented about Vedanta as if all Vedantists were Advaitists. …or if I commented about Buddhism as if all Buddhists were Theravada.
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Of course it could be asked why I always feel obligated to butt in to correct Atheists about those misconceptions about Theists. Good question! I’ve got to quit that habit. I don’t do that in politics. I have nothing to do with political debates.
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I was trying to make clear that my mention of the limits of scientific explanation wasn't some covert introduction of some other kind of explanation. Indeed, both kinds of explanation [physics and metaphysics] have the same shape in my view.

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Sure, in a way.
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Objects are understood within a nexus of necessary relationships.

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That’s a reasonable comparison.
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The 'supernatural' is just a different understanding of the natural insofar as one does a kind of science.

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I don’t believe in the Supernatural. I don’t believe in Werewolves, Vampires, or animated mummies or skeletons that chase people. …but it makes for some good movies.
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The Supernatural, in general, means contravention of established physical laws, especially in scary movies or other works of fiction.
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Yes, I realize that “Supernatural” is defined more broadly in dictionaries. But my definition, above, is what that word means to pretty much everyone.
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Materialists, especially the ones who call themselves “Naturalists”, use “Supernatural” to refer to everything not part of their Materialism metaphysics.
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So, the fundamentally, objectively existent physical world believed in by Materialists as a brute-fact--an unverifiable and unfalsifiable proposition--is “Nature”, or “The Natural”, and so anything else is “The Supernatural” :D
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Still, I don't believe in an afterlife. So that gives my perspective an atheistic feel. That is arguably the real issue: is this all there is? A brief embodiment? I think yes. But I don't claim to have some 'proof.' I can emit 'reasons' for this belief. I can cough up words.

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I don’t think any position can be proved, regarding what comes after this life.
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But there are a few things that can be said about that matter.
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One thing for sure is that you’ll never experience a time when you don’t experience. Only your survivors will experience that time.
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Oblivion never arrives. Sure, you arrive at sleep, but you never experience complete unconsciousness.
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“Assertion and proof are meaningful only in logic, mathematics, physics and (limitedly) in metaphysics..” — Michael Ossipoff

We might even drag the word 'God' in for this largeness of life that dwarfs our systems. But I'm not attached to this or that word. Life is bigger than our words.

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Words don’t describe Reality. At these forums, it’s nearly always Atheists who talk about God. Even elsewhere, it may well be that, on the average, a typical avowed Atheist talks about God a lot more than does a typical Theist.
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I only speak of God when replying to someone else who has. And my use of that word doesn’t imply an anthropomorphic belief, or all the beliefs of the Biblical-Literalists.
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But at least many Biblical-Literalists believe or feel more than the allegories that they take literally…the only thing that Atheists see about Biblical-Literalists. …and attribute to all Theists too.
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“Speaking of "Creation", in regards to religion, is anthropomorphic.]
— Michael Ossipoff

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In my view, it's all anthropomorphic.

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Wait a minute. Isn’t there anything that isn’t anthropomorphic? Surely that’s over-broad.
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If you mean that Theism in general is anthropomorphic, then that’s what I mean by assumptions about other people’s beliefs.
…by what I’d consider a meaningful definition of “anthropomorphism”.
Merriam-Webster says that it’s about attributing human characteristics or attributes. (plural). So, attributing as many as two attributes (but not just one) in common with humans is anthropomorphic?
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To me, Merriam-Webster’s definition of “anthropomorphize” is better: To attribute human form or personality.
…or, I’d also say, inaccurate attribution of one or more human attributes. (where of course anyone can judge for themself what’s inaccurate, meaning that anthropomorphism is just a matter of opinion.)
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So I prefer those last two definitions, enclosed by asterisks.
But, admittedly, yes there are some definitions of “anthropomorphism” that describe all Theisms. Houghton-Mifflin, for instance, doesn’t always have the plural-attributes requirement.
I disagree with that definition, because I feel that “anthropomorphism” should (and usually does) only imply incorrect or inappropriate humanization.
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We only really give a damn about the human-like.

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We at these philosophical forums discuss much that isn’t human-like.
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We can do without the human body (sort of) in a Deity.

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“Sort of “? I’d bet that only a small percentage of Theists believe that God has or needs a body. Many don’t believe that God is a being.
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But take away human virtues...

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Though most Theists don’t believe that God is a person, and many don’t believe that God is a being, is there a Theist sect that believes in a God that has no namable attribute in common with some humans?
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The attribute-less God is more the invention/theory of the theologically-inclined Atheist. (…and yes there contradictorily are those at these forums.)
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and we have only a machine, a pathetic patch over our ignorance.

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That may very well be the theory or position of Atheist theologians.
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I'm not trying to start a religious debate. I don't debate religion. I'm just clarifying that many Theists don't believe in a God that is an element of metaphysics or needs a creator. — Michael Ossipoff

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You aren't hurting my feelings, and we don't have to debate religion if you don't want to. But I don't see why debating religion should be a bad thing.

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It isn’t a bad thing. It just isn’t meaningful or conceivable (to me), because (to me anyway) religion, and Theism in particular, isn’t about assertion, debate or proof at all. It’s like speaking of electroplating and polishing an adverb.
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To me it’s about impressions, feelings.
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Impressions and feelings aren’t debatable, provable, or assertable.
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But I invite people to debate metaphysics. If anyone disagrees with my metaphysics, then I ask them which part of it they disagree with. I claim that it doesn’t say anything that anyone would disagree with. I claim that it’s completely uncontroversial.
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For me philosophy is something like the religion of those who like to think of themselves as 'rational,'

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Of course it isn’t for me to say what is or isn’t a religion to someone else. I know, for instance, that the worship of Science is a religion to many, including many here.
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I also call that religion “Scientificism”, Some prefer “Scientism”. But, the trouble with “Scientism” is, what do you call an adherent of Scientism? A Scientist? No, that word already means a practitioner of science (not a believer in Scientism). Hence my preference for “Scientificism”.
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Every religion has a metaphysics. The metaphysics of Scientificism is Materialism. I think that it can be convincingly argued that Scientificists and Materialists are the same set of people.
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Atheism is a belief of Scientificists/Materialists. But, as I mentioned, not all Atheists are Scientificists/Materialists. (I’ll just say “Materialists” for short.)
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a word [“rational”] with a rich and slippery meaning.

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Amen!
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We needn't debate it. (..and let's not). But do you think that the discussable, describable subject called metaphysics describes all of Reality, or that you could understand or know all of Reality? Maybe it would be more modest to not make such an assumption.

—Michael Ossipoff

Hell no. I'm an anti-metaphysician.


Is that the position 1)that metaphysics is entirely unknowable, or just 2)that it doesn’t affect our practical day-to-day decisions, or 3) that its statements are meaningless, or 3) that, though not meaningless, it’s all untrue?
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I claim that most who denounce metaphysics are believers in the metaphysics of Materialism. For example, in the radio show Philosophy-Talk, I’ve heard espousal of both anti-metaphysics and ”Naturalism”.
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Perhaps my fundamental theme at the moment is the gap between life as it is lived and the small 'piece' of it that we can make explicit and rational.

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Yes, what can be explicitly and rationally discussed certainly isn’t all of Reality. …and of course isn’t even everyday experienced Reality. Description or evaluation has nothing to do with experience or Reality.
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As far as modesty goes, that's a tricky issue. One can be immodestly 'modest.' The real conversation is going to happen or not according to whether we have the guts to say something stirring, even if we might change our minds about it. We've got to take risks, clash, be distinct personalities.

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Sure, not many differences can be discussed or (maybe) resolved without risking starting an argument, making someone angry, getting criticized, etc.
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Some might imagine themselves as doing a kind of science here. I don't see it that way.

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Though metaphysics isn’t the same as science, it’s like science in some ways. Definitions should be explicit and consistently-used. Statements should be supported. Metaphysics, like physics, doesn’t describe all of Reality, but definite uncontroversial things can still be said about both.
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But I recognize their right to project any kind of minimally civil personality they wish. That keeps things fresh. To me this is a place of wild and often impressively articulate conversation.

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Quite so.
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Let's say our physical universe is such a system [as I described]. Why is it specifically the way that it is? Why is it here in the first place?

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There are abstract facts, and there couldn’t have not been abstract facts, for reasons that I’ve discussed in previous replies. …and infinitely-many inter-referring systems of them. Those things are inevitable.
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The specific way that our physical universe is, is one of the infinitely-many ways that systems of inter-referring abstract facts are. Inevitably, there is each one of those systems or ways. …including this one that is the context and setting for our lives.
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Michael Ossipoff

Wait a minute. Isn’t there anything that isn’t anthropomorphic? Surely that’s over-broad. — Michael Ossipoff

When it comes to what we care about, no. In my opinion. It may be an exaggeration to get the point across. Accusations of anthropomorphism don't ring true for me. What's the 'sin' here? I think the sin is supposed to be that we are less accurate about reality because of a bias toward human-likeness. Sure. QM violates ordinary experience. But it works. So we endure it. On the other hand, it makes no sense to worship or revere anything unrelated to the human. Not to me. 'God' or X has to be 'good' in some way, good-for-humans, good-for-me.

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Though metaphysics isn’t the same as science, it’s like science in some ways. Definitions should be explicit and consistently-used. Statements should be supported. Metaphysics, like physics, doesn’t describe all of Reality, but definite uncontroversial things can still be said about both. — Michael Ossipoff

Perhaps. But this is your assumption. This is the loaded 'how' that you bring to the situation. But my 'how' is the tendency to think this 'how' and get behind this 'how,' to open up the situation.

What if language isn't what you need it to be here? What if strict definitions force you to abandon the fluidity of language in ordinary life? Your system seems well thought out, better than average. But from my point of view it's still a kind of theoretical construction that a philosopher comes up with at his desk, alone in his study. Then he goes outside and immerses himself in the usual inexplicit knowhow of moving among objects and interacting with other human beings. His conceptual art falls away. It doesn't describe the way he actually lives. It's a sort of model airplane building, fun for a certain kind of conversation. I'm not saying there's anything wrong with that. I'm just pursuing my own notion of 'objectivity' that does justice to non-theoretical life. I want to open the window of the study and let the storm of life in. We are mortal, loving, fearing, lusting, etc., human beings first and system-builders second. In my view, the system builders (cosy in their study) forget the storm. So they bring their systems to those immersed in life and meet with bewilderment.

I suppose for 'spiritual' or 'esthetic' reasons I want my words to have a kind of legitimacy or weight-- or awareness of the passing storm of life. I make my living at a technical job. All hail science. But I don't live for it. It's a small piece of life. Or maybe even a medium sized piece. But what of love and relationships? And how do these fit in to our theologies?

When it comes to what we care about, no. In my opinion. It may be an exaggeration to get the point across. Accusations of anthropomorphism don't ring true for me. What's the 'sin' here? I think the sin is supposed to be that we are less accurate about reality because of a bias toward human-likeness. Sure. QM violates ordinary experience. But it works. So we endure it. On the other hand, it makes no sense to worship or revere anything unrelated to the human. Not to me. 'God' or X has to be 'good' in some way, good-for-humans, good-for-me.

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Of course, I agree with all of that. The Atheist philosopher’s attribute-less god doesn’t make sense to me either.
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Let me just clarify about my Theism:
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It seems to me that metaphysics leads to the conclusion that what there metaphysically (describably, discussably) is, is insubstantial and ethereal. …implying an openness, looseness and lightness, …and something really good about what is, in a way that’s difficult to describe, explain or specify.
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…a feeling or impression that there’s good intention behind what is.
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That’s it. That’s my Theism. It’s an impression and a feeling. I don’t ordinarily call it Theism, because, as you suggested, “-ism”s are more for arguing…compartmentalizing and dividing people.
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But, it seems to me that what I’m talking about is something also evidently felt by many Theists, including those who believe in Literalist allegories. …but more significant than the Literalist allegories. So even though I don’t share all the beliefs of the Biblical Literalists and the more progressive selective Literalists, many of them are still onto something, …what they likely emotionally mean when they speak of God. Of course some Theists, maybe usually the more progressive ones, are more consciously aware of that than others.
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As I said, it’s an impression or feeling. It isn’t something to assert, and can’t be proven to someone else, but I don’t doubt it either. Sureness without proof isn’t scientific? Fine. As I said, proof and assertion are only for logic, mathematics, physics and (to some extent) metaphysics. It would be meaningless to speak of proof, or need for doubt without proof, for a meta-metaphysical impression. As I said, it would be like speaking of electroplating an adverb.
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I’d said:
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Though metaphysics isn’t the same as science, it’s like science in some ways. Definitions should be explicit and consistently-used. Statements should be supported. Metaphysics, like physics, doesn’t describe all of Reality, but definite uncontroversial things can still be said about both

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— Michael Ossipoff
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You replied:
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Perhaps. But this is your assumption. This is the loaded 'how' that you bring to the situation. But my 'how' is the tendency to think this 'how' and get behind this 'how,' to open up the situation.

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But I only apply that “how” where it’s called-for and appropriate. I don’t mean it or offer it outside its range of applicability. I often criticize Scientificists for wanting to apply science outside it legitimate range of applicability. You’re, quite rightly, saying that too, about the “how” of metaphysics, logic, and mathematics. Yes, I’m always criticizing that over-application of science’s approach. And yes, of course that goes for metaphysics too, which has a similar approach.
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What if language isn't what you need it to be here? What if strict definitions force you to abandon the fluidity of language in ordinary life?

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But I only talk that way in metaphysics and when I talk about logic, mathematics or science. I agree that the language of metaphysics isn’t for everyday life, and is only verbal argument. And, in fact of course, verbal description or explanation doesn’t, at all, ever even come close to experience or Reality. …and of course I realize that the metaphysics that I talk is entirely verbal and conceptual. …and couldn’t describe or substitute for experience, or describe or explain Reality.
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I often use the analogy that the difference between metaphysics and Reality, experience, is a bit like the difference between a book all about how a car-engine works, vs actually going for a ride in the countryside.
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Your system seems well thought out, better than average. But from my point of view it's still a kind of theoretical construction that a philosopher comes up with at his desk, alone in his study. Then he goes outside and immerses himself in the usual inexplicit knowhow of moving among objects and interacting with other human beings. His conceptual art falls away. It doesn't describe the way he actually lives. It's a sort of model airplane building, fun for a certain kind of conversation.

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Of course. Agreed. I like metaphysics.
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But you aren’t saying, are you, that the matter of what metaphysically is, doesn’t meaningfully and relevantly relate to our larger lives?
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For me, the metaphysical medium and basis in which this life is, and has been, happening is worth finding out about.
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No, metaphysics doesn’t describe or explain experience or Reality.
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But that metaphysical medium and basis is still part of the life story. That story has a physical aspect, basis and medium, and unsurprisingly it has a metaphysical aspect, basis and medium too.
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The fact that metaphysics isn’t everything doesn’t mean that it isn’t part of the story.
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I'm not saying there's anything wrong with that. I'm just pursuing my own notion of 'objectivity' that does justice to non-theoretical life. I want to open the window of the study and let the storm of life in. We are mortal, loving, fearing, lusting, etc., human beings first and system-builders second. In my view, the system builders (cosy in their study) forget the storm.

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Not necessarily always. For example, I realize that physics or metaphysics aren’t, and can’t describe or substitute for, experience. And life is experience in the present, without regard to maps or formulas, teachings, or anything written. As you said, life and experience are something else from logical study.
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So they bring their systems to those immersed in life and meet with bewilderment.

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I know that most people aren’t interested in philosophy. There was even a thread here about that, a few months ago.
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But let’s not imply that the study of metaphysics (or physics, mathematics or logic) prevents someone from being immersed in life.

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But what of love and relationships? And how do these fit in to our theologies?

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Physics and metaphysics are each about an aspect of substrate, medium or basis, on which we live. As relevant as they are, in that regard, of course they don’t tell us how to live.
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Hinduism, particularly in its Vedanta versions, says something about metaphysics. I don’t entirely agree with any of its metaphysics versions (unless maybe part of what they’re saying is intended as meta-metaphysical, in which case the metaphysical part might not really differ.) But what I’m getting to is that Hinduism also has a lot to say about the purposes in life (Purusharthas).
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The ancient Indian writers seem competent, qualified and informed about the various things they wrote about, and they wrote about a number of aspects of life.
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The gist of the summaries that I’ve read referred to four Purusharthas: 1) Kama: What we like; 2) Artha: Getting by; 3)Dharma: Right living (ethical, considerate, caring, moderate, responsible to ourself and others); and 4) Moksha: Eventual life-completion, after a life (or sequence of lives) with the preceding three purusharthas.
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#2 is just practical necessity. #4 is just a culmination after having lived a complete life for a long time.
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So #1 and #3 seem to be the requirements. The Hindus say that a life deficient in one of those is an inadequate, incomplete, insufficient life. And, when your life has been inadequate, incomplete and insufficient, then you aren’t done, and there isn’t resolution or completion.
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Of course these verbal overviews/suggestions aren’t the same as life or experience, any more than metaphysics is. I mention them to answer what you said about life purposes.
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As for the relation between Theism and love and relationships: Well, I spoke of the good intent behind what is. Gratitude for that is a reason to try to embody it, repay/share some of it, at least within our limited human ability, in our own lives, actions and relations. As Theists often say it (and as you suggested), God is Love.
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Michael Ossipoff

Of course, I agree with all of that. The Atheist philosopher’s attribute-less god doesn’t make sense to me either.
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Let me just clarify about my Theism:
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It seems to me that metaphysics leads to the conclusion that what there metaphysically (describably, discussably) is, is insubstantial and ethereal. …implying an openness, looseness and lightness, …and something really good about what is, in a way that’s difficult to describe, explain or specify.
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…a feeling or impression that there’s good intention behind what is.
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That’s it. That’s my Theism. It’s an impression and a feeling. I don’t ordinarily call it Theism, because, as you suggested, “-ism”s are more for arguing…compartmentalizing and dividing people. — Michael Ossipoff

For what it's worth, I like this theism. I find it honest to speak of impressions and feelings. I also like the humility about the difficulty of expressing the higher things. If the higher things were neat little systems, they would almost have to be mechanical trivialities.

But, it seems to me that what I’m talking about is something also evidently felt by many Theists, including those who believe in Literalist allegories. …but more significant than the Literalist allegories. So even though I don’t share all the beliefs of the Biblical Literalists and the more progressive selective Literalists, many of them are still onto something, …what they likely emotionally mean when they speak of God. Of course some Theists, maybe usually the more progressive ones, are more consciously aware of that than others.
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As I said, it’s an impression or feeling. It isn’t something to assert, and can’t be proven to someone else, but I don’t doubt it either. Sureness without proof isn’t scientific? Fine. As I said, proof and assertion are only for logic, mathematics, physics and (to some extent) metaphysics. It would be meaningless to speak of proof, or need for doubt without proof, for a meta-metaphysical impression. As I said, it would be like speaking of electroplating an adverb. — Michael Ossipoff

Well said. I agree. The word 'God' and other spiritual words can play all kinds of roles. Those who can only think in terms of proving mechanical certainties often project this purpose on others. So they think religion is stupid only because they are trapped in a scientistic conception of it --and (to be fair) because many religious people themselves are trapped in such a conception.

I like 'electroplating an adverb.' That's good.

But I only apply that “how” where it’s called-for and appropriate. I don’t mean it or offer it outside its range of applicability. I often criticize Scientificists for wanting to apply science outside it legitimate range of applicability. You’re, quite rightly, saying that too, about the “how” of metaphysics, logic, and mathematics. Yes, I’m always criticizing that over-application of science’s approach. And yes, of course that goes for metaphysics too, which has a similar approach.
. — Michael Ossipoff

I'm seeing that we probably have more in common than otherwise. Would you agree that metaphysics is something like a 'logical' world-revealing or existence-revealing poetry? We want it to cohere, to be plausible. We don't want fiction. It functions as the higher truth. But since it establishes the criteria by which all statements are judged, it's also not objective.

But I only talk that way in metaphysics and when I talk about logic, mathematics or science. I agree that the language of metaphysics isn’t for everyday life, and is only verbal argument. And, in fact of course, verbal description or explanation doesn’t, at all, ever even come close to experience or Reality. …and of course I realize that the metaphysics that I talk is entirely verbal and conceptual. …and couldn’t describe or substitute for experience, or describe or explain Reality.
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I often use the analogy that the difference between metaphysics and Reality, experience, is a bit like the difference between a book all about how a car-engine works, vs actually going for a ride in the countryside. — Michael Ossipoff

Since we both seem to see things this way, I guess it's just a matter of taste or current interests that has me harping on the gap and you doing metaphysics with an awareness of its limitations. On the other hand, my thinking on the 'how' and the 'what' (inherited from influences) is a kind of metaphysics.

But you aren’t saying, are you, that the matter of what metaphysically is, doesn’t meaningfully and relevantly relate to our larger lives? — Michael Ossipoff

I do find it relevant, just as I find diet and exercise relevant, or style relevant. We humans (especially thinkers) love our words. So for me it's largely a matter of self-creation or self-editing in terms of the words we use for what is highest and truest. As a matter of taste, I like the idea of being a thinker of the storm and the blood --more of a poet than a theologian. But I used to be more of a theologian, so this is something like changing the way one dresses or deciding that X is cooler than Y. I put that in blunt terms (terms that might embarrass not you but more rigidly solemn thinkers) strategically. Slang is sometimes closer (in my view) to the way we really think and feel. A stiffer more respectable language is perhaps a mask we wear not only for others but for the mirror.

But let’s not imply that the study of metaphysics (or physics, mathematics or logic) prevents someone from being immersed in life. — Michael Ossipoff

I agree. I don't want to imply that. But I can imagine someone being word-drunk and thereby being a bad friend or lover. I'm sure I've been guilty of that. It's the love and respect I have for certain less theoretical people that wakes me up from this. Sure, I could point them to some fascinating thinkers. But are they lacking something essential? I don't think so, even if that would suit my vanity.

As for the relation between Theism and love and relationships: Well, I spoke of the good intent behind what is. Gratitude for that is a reason to try to embody it, repay/share some of it, at least within our limited human ability, in our own lives, actions and relations. As Theists often say it (and as you suggested), God is Love. — Michael Ossipoff

Well said. I like 'God is love.' I find other interesting uses for 'God' too --the idea that God is a personification of reality, or that God is the obscure object of spiritual desire. In my view, humans naturally seek virtue, but our conception of virtue is malleable. This allows for terrible cruelty sometimes. In King Lear, Edmund decides that Nature is his Goddess. He practices his religion by throwing those who trust him most under the bus to be a king. I suggest that this often vague concept of what is noble, good, virtuous, etc., is or tends to be the hub of a worldview.

I’d said:
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Because there are infinitely-many such systems, it's hardly surprising that there's this one. ...one that is the way this one is. There are also infinitely-many other ones, which are infinitely-many different ways. — Michael Ossipoff

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You replied:
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But why isn't all the more surprising that there are infinitely many?

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Yes, I see what you mean. I just meant that it’s metaphysically unsurprising. But yes, it’s fantastic. But the fact that this life started at all is just as fantastic. So, as Jack Nicholson’s character said, in Wolf, “I’m hard to surprise today.”
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And just because there’s a metaphysical explanation for why and how it happened doesn’t make it any less amazing.
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The metaphysical explanation is good, as far as it goes, but this life can only remain surprising.
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And, as I mention below in this post, maybe, even though we’ve been in this life so long that it’s what we’re used to, maybe this life in time and events isn’t the usual or most “natural” state of affairs.

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One of the anti-metaphysical axes I like to grind is a sort of smugness that I feel in the 'nothing here to see, folks' approach.

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Of course that’s standard, from Scientificists, “Ignore that man behind the curtain, and his blatant brute-fact.”
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I don't mean to accuse you personally of smugness. I'm just talking about a kind of stubborn resistance to confessing any sort of experience of wonder (or terror) at finding oneself alive and mortal.

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Metaphysical explanation doesn’t diminish the wonder and amazingness of the fact that this life started.
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From my point of view, there's a kind of pasting over of this wonder-terror by very plausible sciency sounding phrases.

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Academic philosophers use a lot of what seems to me to be pseudoscientific, pseudomathematical jargon, inventing and debating fine-points not of interest to anyone else.
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There’s a lot of philosophical Greek used here, but I realize that it makes for concise, precise expression.
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I mostly use ordinary English, but metaphysics has to be discussed in a science-like way, because it’s a conceptual logical subject, and uncontroversial statements can be made, and conclusions arrived at.
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But that certainly doesn’t lessen the wonder.
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But I personally can't buy it. I do believe, of course, that humans can (for a long time even) remain un-freaked-out. It's not exactly convenient or practical to be freaked-out by existence all the time. But I suspect that most of us experience moments from time to time when all of the impressive words fall away and we stand before the roaring of the there that we are and the there that we are surrounded by. We are thrown into a drama that we don't remember choosing.

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Certainly. It’s remarkable and unbelievable that this life started. No doubt it was incomprehensible on the first day too, and remains no less amazing or surprising now.
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We’re just used to it, because we’ve been in this life for so long. But metaphysical explanation doesn’t make it less amazing.
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Whether someone believes in reincarnation or not, our time in life is finite. But the sleep at the end of lives (or of this life if you don’t believe in reincarnation) is timeless. This life has been going on for so long that we’re used to it, but, being finite, in comparison to something else that’s timeless, this life that we’re so used to is just a finite blip in timelessness. Sleep at the end of lives is timeless. Time is short. It isn’t the usual state of affairs. One dictionary definition of “natural” is “usual”, and, by that definition, the Timelessness at the end of lives is what’s natural.
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So shall we call our material world of time and events the Supernatural? :D
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Thrown into a face and language. Thrown into relationships with particular human beings, each of them also thrown. All of us mortal. All of us improvising, keeping the ship afloat or occasionally scuttling it to do away with the drama.

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Of course suicide greatly increases and worsens the drama, and puts a persistent strongly negative cast on it, a dive into longterm unhappiness.
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This is where religion/philosophy as the non-cute stuff really kicks in. Your theoretical vision of the world is interesting enough, but surely you live in a world of people and objects.

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Sure, but the larger metaphysical basis, substrate, environment of a person’s life is of interest in that life. The overall nature and character of what metaphysically is, has a lot to do with how we interpret and feel about this life. As I mention below, what is there when we look up from our day-to-day business?
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Sure we’re involved in day-to-day details, but the overall picture is relevant to how we interpret, perceive and feel about it. As you mentioned, there are times when we aren’t really busy with details, and that wonder comes to us.
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By no means am I trying to censor you. I'm just pointing at the gap between our creative theoretical fictions and the vivid world of people and objects we actually live in, work in, suffer in, enjoy ourselves in.

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But maybe we don’t suffer as much, or more than necessary, depending on our perspective on what there is, and what’s going on.
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But you acknowledged the wonder that this life started at all. We aren’t always preoccupied with the details. What’s there when we look up from the details? The overall matter of what is, what’s going on, the bigger metaphysical picture, is the background, setting and environment of our day-to-day lives.
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Michael Ossipoff

And just because there’s a metaphysical explanation for why and how it happened doesn’t make it any less amazing. — Michael Ossipoff

This is a good issue. For the most part we are immersed in life. We don't have time for wonder. We desire or fear certain situations and work to attain or dodge them. We grind away in the familiar. I remember a few incidents when I was younger when I was suddenly shocked that there was anything at all. I was also shocked by the specificity of what was. 'It is exactly this way and no other. There are three weeds at this Northeast leg of the park bench. That particular plane with its particular passengers flies overhead.' These days I have a better argument for brute facticity, and yet it's rare to feel wonder as I did once.

I'm biased towards brute facticity because it makes the world new. But I also think it's logically necessary, since nature is a system of necessity, as I see it, and the whole of nature (all that is insofar as we can explain things) can be put in relation to nothing. To put it in relation would only to be expand it, to include yet another entity in the nexus of necessary relationships.

Time is short. It isn’t the usual state of affairs. — Michael Ossipoff

I know what you mean, but in a way it is the only state of affairs. Against the background of physics time it is indeed a blip. But it's all we know. Time-for-us is being late for an appointment and hating every red light. Or dreading what morning brings. Or opportunity fading away. It is death quietly and steadily approaching us, maybe tomorrow or maybe twenty years from now. It is an uncertain resource and/or the possibility of suffering.

Sure, but the larger metaphysical basis, substrate, environment of a person’s life is of interest in that life. The overall nature and character of what metaphysically is, has a lot to do with how we interpret and feel about this life. As I mention below, what is there when we look up from our day-to-day business? — Michael Ossipoff

I very much agree. Really I'm doing my own kind of metaphysics. I enact a notion of the noble. I too am a sort of scientist, albeit one who theorizes about the limits of theory and theory's tendency to flee from the ambiguity and complexity of experience. The 'total vision' of what life is and means is indeed quite important.

But maybe we don’t suffer as much, or more than necessary, depending on our perspective on what there is, and what’s going on. — Michael Ossipoff

I agree here, too. And metaphysics or basic world views are poetic acts, too. We enjoy finding the words.

First, some definitions. Metaphysical realism means the the world we perceive as external consisting of objects, events, space and time exists in some form regardless of whether anyone is perceiving or thinking about it. — Marchesk

Here’s an interesting take...

Everything we see and experience is transposed. We don’t see a color. We perceive it as such, but really it’s the absence of the color in the spectrum.

Cold is the absence of heat. Dark is the absence of light. Substance is perceived by the space around it’s form. These things function through laws of entropy.

If you assume metaphysics is true and expand from there, you’ll stumble on odd laws of our world. Be willing to kill it if it no longer serves purpose or starts driving you over the edge crazy.

Real or not, it’s a waste of brain space if it doesn’t serve a purpose.