Seems to me the physical vs non physical question is a product of the philosophical heritage of object-subject dualism, a world 'out there' split off from and making contact with a subject. — Joshs
Sometimes I think we cannot help doing theology. What seems to distinguish one person from another most of all is what they worship (and why they worship it; so maybe it's mostly all theology and psychology). — Janus
In my view, we operate with a kind of basic know-how that we cannot make explicit. I'm not saying it's bad to try. I've tried myself, and that's how the darkness of this know-how became darkness visible. — ff0
"everything is true as we experience it, "— Michael Ossipoff
Where does 'being wrong about something' fit into that?
That's right, that's Heidegger's and the late Wittgenstein's point, or really context, of departure. — Janus
I have been looking into a little known American philosopher named Buchler a bit lately, and I find his ideas very congenial with in line with what the way I have been thinking for some time: that knowing is not merely knowing that, but also knowing how and, further still, the wordless knowing of familiarity as well. He says that all our forms of activity involve judgement and he identifies three kinds of judgement: assertive judgement, active judgement and exhibitive judgement.
I can map these to knowing that, knowing how, and the knowing of familiarity; or even more clearly, judging that, judging how and the judging of familiarity. So when we do something that we know how to the doing of that involves that we continually make judgements (In an implicit or unconscious way) what to do. This kind of know-how can be explicated, though, if we want to. Exhibitive judgement involves the familiarity that cannot be made explicit like how to paint, or play music or make love (over and above the technical "know-how" dimensions of those activities). — Janus
But I read Heidegger, coming out of Husserl's phenomenological project and transforming it into existential phenomenology, as doing something distinctly different than the later Wittgenstein, — Joshs
One might say that the goal is to get behind the past --as much as possible. We can't get completely behind the past. The past makes our questioning possible. But we open up our future (as I see it) by getting behind the past, since the past constrains the question that opens the future. — ff0
Can you explain what you mean by "get behind the past"? Do you simply mean to think about or understand it or are you referring to something else? — Janus
I don't agree, though, that we live wholly in language if that is just taken to mean verbal or written speech. We live in languages. We live in visual language, musical language, mathematical language, and of course body language, as well as 'linguistic' language. — Janus
That's the ground of being you're talking about,i presume, our situatedness or thrownness. And the most rigorous form of awareness for Heidegger, what he calls authenticity, is a not being caught up in the particulars of what comes into our horizon of concern, the this and the that of experience, but rather experiencing as a whole in its always being oriented ahead of itself.I suppose this could be understood as a getting behind the past. — Joshs
Derrida said there is nothing outside the text.By text he didnt mean literally written language. He meant context. There is no meaning that escapes its being framed via a context, and in fact isn't simply framed or oriented by a context, but in fact exists as what it is by being already split with itself. Very complex stuff. — Joshs
The complaints against major philosophers from Leibnitz and Spinoza through Kant, Hegel and Heidegger are legion. — Joshs
Do you think most have a chance to choose what to believe in? I know you didn't intend to say so.I'm actually most interested in why people choose to believe one or the other, — Janus
I think this has roots in an open question: what is matter? hasn't been resolved completely because Quantum and string theories and so on ...have not merged.So, it may be that we often say things are not physical ( when we really mean 'material') simply because they are not immediate objects of the senses. — Janus
Many people seem to be very concerned about the ontological status of things which we ordinarily think of as 'mental'. I sometimes wonder whether that is because it is (perhaps even unconsciously?) felt that their ontological status has some implications for religious belief, and most especially belief in an afterlife. — Janus
the universe does not depend on our simulations — Pollywalls
What does it mean to say that something is physical or not?
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