It is impossible to justify any theory about non-physical existence without any data. — Pollywalls

So, if we were to say that there is some immaterial reality completely independent of this physical universe we would just be talking nonsense; we would not know what we are saying?

The self's being is whole, it is not divided up into physical and non-physical parts. While parts can be abstracted, studied as if they were separate, in reality, and as it is experienced, none of it is separate. — Cavacava

Yes, I agree the self is neither physical nor non-physical. And I would say the self is not independent of the physical nor the non-physical. If we say the physical is presence and the non-physical is absence; then the physical is not independent of the non-physical and nor is the non-physical independent of the physical. As you say, "in reality and as it is experienced" there is no separation at all.

I would join the convo in one of those physical vs. non-physical threads that have been going on for a few weeks, but they look so heavy such that if you join in them, you'll pretty much have no time for any other threads... >:O No wonder I haven't been hearing much from you Janus - like you live in a parallel universe now.

I'm actually most interested in why people choose to believe one or the other, and also whether religious faith of whatever stripe is necessarily (not historically) more aligned with one position than with the other. — Janus

I'm not sure how helpful the distinction is. I see the world as more hylomorphic than either physical or non-physical. The reason for that being that if you analyse physical things, you will actually end up with non-physical things, ie patterns which can often be recorded in mathematical equations. So I would agree with the Aristotelian version that matter is potency and form is act. So matter, by itself, without form, is nothing.

Well, yes, it is the experience of the world in itself; but, by mere definition it cannot be experience of the world as it is in itself. The 'for us' and the 'in itself' is a logical distinction that circumscribes our epistemic limits, according to Kant. — Janus

Can the world ever be "in itself"? I think this distinction is itself incoherent for those of us who don't buy into Kant's TI.

Generally speaking, I think non-physical things that are real are mostly patterns, relatively stable patterns of behaviour, of interaction, etc., of physical things. — gurugeorge

Exactly - so how can physical things be said to exist if they don't / can't interact at all? And the only way they can interact is precisely if they're not just physical - if they take part in a certain pattern.

OK, I certainly agree that abstract concepts do not exist extra-mentally. But the problem seems to be that, for example, numbers are independent of any particular mind. Does that mean they are independent of all minds, or independent of the totality of minds? If so, then does that "independence" constitute some kind of existence or being or reality? If we answer in the affirmative, then should we call that existence or being or reality physical or non-physical. If non-physical, then mental? But if mental, then numbers are not independent of mind, not "extra-mental". — Janus

I think that numbers (or more specifically ratios) exist both mentally and extra-mentally.

there is another order of being beyond the merely physical; an order that may be even be thought to be independent of the physical, and I can't see why this would not amount to a dualistic hypothesis. — Janus

Hmm, see, I think the "order" that you consider to be physical, is actually non-material.

Heidegger — Janus

Tell us more.

I have no aspiration for or interest in becoming an academic. — Janus

I've always been much the same. I also personally have a certain distaste (and distrust) of academics.

Yes, I agree the self is neither physical nor non-physical. — Janus

Bang goes the law of the excluded middle! Why do philosophers waste their time on these things?

I'm actually most interested in why people choose to believe one or the other, and also whether religious faith of whatever stripe is necessarily (not historically) more aligned with one position than with the other. — Janus

I'm not sure how helpful the distinction is. I see the world as more hylomorphic than either physical or non-physical. The reason for that being that if you analyse physical things, you will actually end up with non-physical things, ie patterns which can often be recorded in mathematical equations. So I would agree with the Aristotelian version that matter is potency and form is act. So matter, by itself, without form, is nothing. — Agustino

I don't have much time: (it's the Christmas rush and all my projects are expected to be complete in a few days time :-} ), but you don't seem to have answered my question here; which was really concerned with whether ontological standpoints such as idealism and materialism are necessarily implied by the various forms of religious belief. I don't think so; for example, there were apparently materialists who were Buddhists more than a thousand years ago, as there are today.

Obviously when I say "physical" or "non-physical" I am referring to these as categories as we conceive them. In fact I would say our conceptions are not all that clear; yet clearly the conception of "physical" is clearer than that of " non-physical" (which is really on an apophatic conception based on "physical" and is thus even less clear than its contrary).

So I don't see it as a contravention of the LEM to say that the self is neither physical nor non-physical; it is just to say that the self cannot be coherently thought in either of those ill-formed categories.

So I don't see it as a contravention of the LEM to say that the self is neither physical nor non-physical; it is just to say that the self cannot be coherently thought in either of those ill-formed categories. — Janus

Is a computer program physical or non-physical?

A computer program occupies the logical space created by the hardware of a computer. So, it exists as an epiphenomenon if that makes any sense.

Is a computer program physical or non-physical? — tom

Like the tree that falls unheard in the woods, is what a computer program computes meaningful without an act of interpretance?

Observables demand observers. Von Neumann spelt out the logical problem that creates for naked physicalism.

The most convincing general argument for this irreducible complementarity of dynamical laws and measurement function comes again from von Neumann (1955, p. 352). He calls the system being measured, S, and the measuring device, M, that must provide the initial conditions for the dynamic laws of S. Since the non-integrable constraint, M, is also a physical system obeying the same laws as S, we may try a unified description by considering the combined physical system (S + M). But then we will need a new measuring device, M', to provide the initial conditions for the larger system (S + M). This leads to an infinite regress; but the main point is that even though any constraint like a measuring device, M, can in principle be described by more detailed universal laws, the fact is that if you choose to do so you will lose the function of M as a measuring device. This demonstrates that laws cannot describe the pragmatic function of measurement even if they can correctly and completely describe the detailed dynamics of the measuring constraints.

This same argument holds also for control functions which includes the genetic control of protein construction. If we call the controlled system, S, and the control constraints, C, then we can also look at the combined system (S + C) in which case the control function simply disappears into the dynamics. This epistemic irreducibility does not imply any ontological dualism. It arises whenever a distinction must be made between a subject and an object, or in semiotic terms, when a distinction must be made between a symbol and its referent or between syntax and pragmatics. Without this epistemic cut any use of the concepts of measurement of initial conditions and symbolic control of construction would be gratuitous.

"That is, we must always divide the world into two parts, the one being the observed system, the other the observer. In the former, we can follow up all physical processes (in principle at least) arbitrarily precisely. In the latter, this is meaningless. The boundary between the two is arbitrary to a very large extent. . . but this does not change the fact that in each method of description the boundary must be placed somewhere, if the method is not to proceed vacuously, i.e., if a comparison with experiment is to be possible." (von Neumann, 1955, p.419)

https://www.informatics.indiana.edu/rocha/publications/pattee/pattee.html

A computer program occupies the logical space created by the hardware of a computer. So, it exists as an epiphenomenon if that makes any sense. — Posty McPostface

So, entropy is an epiphenomenon? The 2nd Law of Thermodynamics is an epiphenomenal law?

So, entropy is an epiphenomenon? The 2nd Law of Thermodynamics is an epiphenomenal law? — tom

I don't understand how computer programs are related to entropy or the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics.

I suppose the issue is understanding how emergent properties can emerge from basic systems.

I'd agree quantum theory is not simple to me and I don't like it much. But while we have no strong weapons against it and its conclusions, there are ones we need to perceive that quantum collapse is one. Ignoring other interpretations, I like the idea that the world without you and the world having you in are much different. "You" stand in here as the observer. It appears you have quite an impact to the world not in anyway small.
Further, it hints me that if you have such a great impact then probably the word is your own, akin to but not identified with the others' worlds.

(it's the Christmas rush and all my projects are expected to be complete in a few days time :-} ) — Janus

Haha, I've closed the biggest part of my work already this week, but past 2 weeks were very busy for me as well. It's not only about Christmas, but end of the year stuff - have to deal with bureaucracy X-)

but you don't seem to have answered my question here; which was really concerned with whether ontological standpoints such as idealism and materialism are necessarily implied by the various forms of religious belief. I don't think so; — Janus

Ahh okay, I must have missed that. If that's the case, then I agree with you. I think obviously that ontological standpoints aren't necessarily implied by forms of religious beliefs. But I do think that idealism will generally tend to lean towards being adopted by the religious, while materialism will tend to be adopted more frequently by atheists and non-believers. But I think this is really a false dichotomy, since idealism is really opposed to realism (not just materialism). I'm a realist for the most part, but not a materialist.

I don't understand how computer programs are related to entropy or the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics.

I suppose the issue is understanding how emergent properties can emerge from basic systems. — Posty McPostface

Your claim that computation is an epiphenomenon struck me as rather strange because I had thought that such effects were strictly non-causal, and it seems that the computation itself must be causal. But, perhaps it isn't, perhaps we just line up all the marbles in the right way, and let them roll down the hill.

Maybe tigers are just an epiphenomenon as well, but if computation is an epiphenomenon, then entropy creation certainly is. Entropy and computation are related by information theory, and you can't do a computation without the production of entropy. It seems strange that we have a physical law about an epiphenomenon.

I've not come across a convincing account of emergence. However, as I've understood it, we know it has happened when explanations must take account of the emergent entity. So, our best theory of biodiversity is couched in terms of replicators, selection, variation. None of these emergent properties is even necessarily biological.

I would like to clear up the issue of whether computation is emergent or epiphenominal.

the simplest answer I have found is quantum mechanics and the physical world. — Pollywalls

In what way is quantum mechanics simpler than the alternatives?

But I do think that idealism will generally tend to lean towards being adopted by the religious, while materialism will tend to be adopted more frequently by atheists and non-believers. But I think this is really a false dichotomy, since idealism is really opposed to realism (not just materialism). I'm a realist for the most part, but not a materialist. — Agustino

I agree, idealism seems to be the favored metaphysics for most of the religious.

Whether idealism is the other pole of materialism or of realism is a complicated question, though. I guess it depends on what form of idealism and what form of realism. Thinking in terms of substance; there are idealists who say there is one substance and it is consciousness and materialists who say there is one substance and it is physical.

Then in terms of realism, there are conceptual idealists (like Kant) who say that universals are only in the mind, and there are conceptual realists who say that they are mind-independent (such as Plato).

Or take Spinoza, who some say is a neutral monist. He says there is one substance and it appears as both extensa (material form) and cogitans (idea). Yet if you take his philosophy to its logical conclusion the world does appear to be an idea in the mind of God, and this does seem to lead to the metaphysical primacy of mind. Spinoza can say that God (substance) is extensa (material), though, insofar as He is infinite extension, but it seems more difficult to claim that God is also form, because 'form' implies 'boundary'.

Then in terms of realism, there are conceptual idealists (like Kant) who say that universals are only in the mind, and there are conceptual realists who say that they are mind-independent (such as Plato). — Janus

There's also the neo-Platonist or Aristotelian notion that the forms are both in the mind AND mind-independent. And I think the Kantian transcendental idealism does necessarily slide into a more thorough-going idealism. Because the phenomenal world is necessarily ideal, and the thing-in-itself probably isn't spatial or temporal at all. Space and time are mere forms through which our mind organises sensation. So that means that it's like the computer's desktop. It's an interface that allows us to survive, but not also access truth. Maybe the whole world, if we follow Kant, is formed of pathé as TGW would say - and the phenomenon is just a useful interface for navigating our own pathé. So hunger is primary, and then it gets projected through the forms of space and time into a pain in the stomach associated with food, or whatever.

So materialism is incoherent for a Kantian. Idealism is the only possibility. The sensations, the content of experience, is indeed real - but this just means that it doesn't depend on our own mind, there is no solipsism involved. So we're back to a kind of Berkeley, where the question is where are the sensations (as ideas) coming from?

Yet if you take his philosophy to its logical conclusion the world does appear to be an idea in the mind of God, and this does seem to lead to the metaphysical primacy of mind. — Janus

Why do you think so? I see this as one possible interpretation, but why do you think it's the right one?

Spinoza can say that God (substance) is extensa (material), though, insofar as He is infinite extension, but it seems more difficult to claim that God is also form, because 'form' implies 'boundary'. — Janus

Well, in Spinoza's system, any given extension has a corresponding idea/thought - that's the parallelism of the attributes. So, technically, infinite extension would necessitate the infinitude of the other attribute as well.

Also in Aristotle, form doesn't imply boundary, and God is form - form being equivalent to act as opposed to potency.

The thing with Spinoza's system is that it allows for other possible parallel attributes. So we experience things as thought and extension, but maybe there are other attributes that are parallel to those that we don't have access to. That's one interpretation of the "infinite attributes" of the one substance.

Why do you think so? I see this as one possible interpretation, but why do you think it's the right one? — Agustino

Well, in Spinoza's system, any given extension has a corresponding idea/thought - that's the parallelism of the attributes. So, technically, infinite extension would necessitate the infinitude of the other attribute as well. — Agustino

I don't have much time this morning, so this'll have to be quick. I agree that for Spinoza every extension has a corresponding idea. This, it seems to me must precisely be both the connection and the distinction between the eternal and the temporal. So, for every temporal extension there is an encompassing eternal idea in God. So, it seems that the eternal is the ideal parallel of the material. This seems to mean that the eternal is mind and the temporal is body; and the dependency logically seems to go one way; that's why I say mind (the eternal) is logically primary. There are probably holes in what I have said here; and I can see that much more thought needs to be given to it; but there it is.

"I would like to clear up the issue of whether computation is emergent or epiphenominal."
Maybe its neither, once one jettisons the representationalist view of the world in favor of a pragmatist one. Maybe computation is one of a potentially limitless way of describing things, used for a particular purpose, So whether it is seen as a a macro product of a micro process or vice versa is a function of our purposes of description.

I've not come across a convincing account of emergence. However, as I've understood it, we know it has happened when explanations must take account of the emergent entity. So, our best theory of biodiversity is couched in terms of replicators, selection, variation. None of these emergent properties is even necessarily biological. — tom

My understanding is that the incompleteness theorems that Godel postulated can be seen as emergent phenomena from underlying axioms, although unprovable from those very axioms, which would seem like a contradiction of face value. I might be of course wrong about this.

My understanding is that the incompleteness theorems that Godel postulated can be seen as emergent phenomena from underlying axioms, although unprovable from those very axioms, which would seem like a contradiction of face value. I might be of course wrong about this. — Posty McPostface

Well, Godel's theorems are deductions from a set of axioms. With a different set of axioms, you are likely to get a different set of deductions. Nothing has emerged or epiphenomenalised.

If you are looking for an emergent phenomenon, then why not Life?

Not if the set of axioms is entailed by another one which is also consistent with the lower domain set?

I don't have much time this morning, so this'll have to be quick. I agree that for Spinoza every extension has a corresponding idea. This, it seems to me must precisely be both the connection and the distinction between the eternal and the temporal. So, for every temporal extension there is an encompassing eternal idea in God. So, it seems that the eternal is the ideal parallel of the material. This seems to mean that the eternal is mind and the temporal is body; and the dependency logically seems to go one way; that's why I say mind (the eternal) is logically primary. There are probably holes in what I have said here; and I can see that much more thought needs to be given to it; but there it is. — Janus

Interesting. I have been pondering this. It is one of the less discussed issues of Spinoza since it impinges on Part V which is often ignored. For example V. XXII. & XXIII. open up the issue that there must exist within God the eternal idea of this particular body - so there is some notion of personhood lingering there. And it is quite evident that ideas can be eternal, while motions (& bodies) not so much.

This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.

There is in Spinoza this Gurdjieff-like notion that it is of crucial importance (& urgency) in this life to develop those adequate ideas which are actually what our mind's immortality consists in.

I would also add that there is a certain other difficulty here. The empirical self (for lack of better words) exists only in-so-far as the body exists (V.P21), since memory and imagination are both necessary for the continued existence of this empirical self:

The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues. — E.IV.P39S

So the self sub specie durationis is different from the self sub specie aeternitatis. And indeed, it is this latter self which Spinoza claims is (or can be) eternal. What sort of existence does this latter self have?

PROP. 8. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Demonstration.—This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood more clearly from the preceding note.

Corollary.—Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they are said to continue [ sub specie durationis ], their ideas will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.

Scholium.—If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles. — Part II

PROP. 23. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

Demonstration.—There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of the human mind (II. 13.). But we have not assigned to the human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained through duration, and may be defined by time-that is (II. 8. Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

Scholium.—This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and conceiving them under the category of duration. — Part V

So there is a sense in which this eternal self goes on existing since God goes on existing - although this existence is not of a temporal nature.

This leads me to the conclusion that the ideas we have sub specie durationis cannot be the kind of ideas that exist in the infinite mind of God, but rather only copies of them as it were - and the copies are necessarily parallel to their representations as physically extended natures. If this wasn't the case, and the ideas that existed in God's mind were the same ideas we empirically had, then it would follow via the parallelism of the attributes that for our mind to be eternal, our body would have to be eternal - or in other words that there would be no ideas which don't have a current physical instantiation. And that would ultimately be an anti-Spinozist anthropocentrism since it would lead us to claiming that only our reality - that which we see and perceive empirically now, natura naturata - is real.

In the end we're dealing with a gradation of existence from the very subtle God, to God's infinite ideas, to temporal existence (the parallelism of thought and extension). So we ascend from matter and extension to thought. But thought remains in the realm of the temporal, it is of the mind. Beyond thought is that which gives birth to thought itself (and accessed via the third kind of knowledge directly, or indirectly as a copy via reason), that's the infinite ideas of God. And beyond that it is the abyss of God Himself. And of course all this is also coupled with Spinoza's acosmism, that only God really exists, and the temporal nature is (ultimately) illusory.

And so, to put it in more concrete terms, an extended thing is a less subtle form of a thought, and a thought is a less subtle form of God's infinite idea, and God's infinite idea is a less subtle form of God. In this regard, the distinction between materialism and idealism breaks, since we're just sliding across the same continuum. The difference between eternity and temporality being that in the latter only a limitation of God is given - a shadow as it were. Since God in-Himself contains both A and ~A, temporally only one at a time can be given - indeed obedience to the principle of non-contradiction is the hallmark of being in time as well observed by Schopenhauer. Eternally, mutually contradictory ideas can exist side by side.

So the self sub specie durationis is different from the self sub specie aeternitatis. And indeed, it is this latter self which Spinoza claims is (or can be) eternal. What sort of existence does this latter self have? — Agustino

It would seem that if there is a "self sub specie aeternitatis" then it must be eternal. On thinking more about this, I think I have reverted to a common mistake in speaking about the primacy of mind. This seems to be an easy intellectual trap to fall into since we commonly don't think of matter as being eternal. For example, the Buddhists although they speak of interdependent co-arising or dependent origination (ideas which I think would be better combined as interdependent co-origination) seem to often devolve into the 'mind only' mode of thought. But if God has attributes of both infinite thought and infinite extension, then the eternal existence of his modes would be as both. This would mean that the eternal life of the self would be both material and mental (and perhaps infinitely more besides if God has infinite (in the sense of 'infinitely many') attributes. This may be hinted at in the Christian idea of resurrection of the body.

This leads me to the conclusion that the ideas we have sub specie durationis cannot be the kind of ideas that exist in the infinite mind of God, but rather only copies of them as it were - and the copies are necessarily parallel to their representations as physically extended natures. — Agustino

This sounds about right. Ideas are real spatio-temporal complexes just as bodies are, although in a different way. So our ideas are the temporal face of our (God's) eternal ideas, just as our minds are the temporal expression of our (God's) eternal minds and our bodies are the temporal counterparts of our (God's) eternal bodies. In eternity ideas must be idea, minds must be mind and bodies must be body.The temporal mind cannot understand this fully. We cannot fathom how there could be any diversity, or the possibility of any diversity 'coming out of', eternity.

In the end we're dealing with a gradation of existence from the very subtle God, to God's infinite ideas, to temporal existence (the parallelism of thought and extension). So we ascend from matter and extension to thought. But thought remains in the realm of the temporal, it is of the mind. — Agustino

This sounds very much like Kabbalism and also Gurdjieff's teaching about finer and courser 'energies'. The latter is comprehensively set forth in Ouspensky's A New Model of the Universe: Principles of the Psychological Method In Its Application to Problems of Science, Religion, and Art. It must be nearly thirty years since I read that book!

This sounds very much like Kabbalism and also Gurdjieff's teaching about finer and courser 'energies'. The latter is comprehensively set forth in Ouspensky's A New Model of the Universe: Principles of the Psychological Method In Its Application to Problems of Science, Religion, and Art. It must be nearly thirty years since I read that book! — Janus

It is also very much found in Eastern Orthodox Christianity, where the distinction is between God's energies and God's essence (refer to energy-essence distinction). As such, at the stage of theosis (or union with God), we achieve union by grace with God's energies, but not with God's essence which necessarily remains incomprehensible & hidden. So in Eastern Orthodox spirituality, spiritual development is also viewed as going from coarser aspects of reality to ever-more subtle ones.

From the link I gave above:

In Eastern Orthodox theology God's essence is called ousia, "all that subsists by itself and which has not its being in another"[ my addition: incidentally ousia is the Greek for substance ;) ], and is distinct from his energies (energeia in Greek, actus in Latin) or activities as actualized in the world.

The ousia of God is God as God is. The essence, being, nature and substance of God as taught in Eastern Christianity is uncreated, and cannot be comprehended in words. According to Lossky, God's ousia is "that which finds no existence or subsistence in another or any other thing".[9] God's ousia has no necessity or subsistence that needs or is dependent on anything other than itself.[9]

It is the energies of God that enable us to experience something of the Divine, at first through sensory perception and then later intuitively or noetically. As St John Damascene states, "all that we say positively of God manifests not his nature but the things about his nature."[10]

All this, as you see, does bear on my reading of Spinoza, as I think Spinoza landed very close to this understanding even though it was likely not available to him by direct sources.

So there is a sense in which this eternal self goes on existing since God goes on existing — Agustino

Surely Spinoza here is referring to the immortality of the soul?

The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist... — Part II

Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God... — Part II

I think this is the distinction between appearance and reality, common to many a metaphysic, whereby 'individual particulars' are not real in their own right - that is the meaning of saying 'they do not exist'. If that was translated from Latin, it would be interesting to see what Latin phrase was translated as 'do not exist'. Because here I think the meaning is that they don't truly exist, but are only real by virtue of them being 'comprehended in the attributes of God'.

if God has attributes of both infinite thought and infinite extension, then the eternal existence of his modes would be as both. — Janus

God cannot be 'extended' because anything 'extended' is 'divisible'.

God cannot be 'extended' because anything 'extended' is 'divisible'. — Wayfarer

This is not correct. Bodies, as finite modes of infinite extension, have boundaries, and are hence divisible. You are conflating the idea of infinite extension with the idea of a body.

Interesting; I must do more reading into Eastern Orthodoxy. :)

You are conflating the idea of infinite extension with the idea of a body. — Janus

Yes, infinite extension is by default unbounded.

I think this is the distinction between appearance and reality, common to many a metaphysic, whereby 'individual particulars' are not real in their own right - that is the meaning of saying 'they do not exist'. If that was translated from Latin, it would be interesting to see what Latin phrase was translated as 'do not exist'. Because here I think the meaning is that they don't truly exist, but are only real by virtue of them being 'comprehended in the attributes of God'. — Wayfarer

With regards to the quoted bits from Part II of the Ethics, I doubt Spinoza was referring to the distinction between appearance and reality. Rather he was just referring to particular modes which don't empirically exist right now. For example, your ancestors from 5 generations ago, they don't exist right now, they are inexistent finite modes. And yet, since God exists, and their existence is a mode of God (the one Substance) it follows that in a sense they exist - in the same sense that the infinitude of possible intersecting straight lines exist given a circle:

The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. — Part II

So even if a particular set of lines are not actually drawn right now, they still exist given the nature of the circle from which they emerge in the first place.