t is particulars which I was talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that the general sense of this would be that the Form of the individual thing exists in God's mind prior to it's material existence, such that the ideal — Metaphysician Undercover

So are you saying that the form in God’s mind is always completely particular?

Seems that this leads to more than a few problems regarding change - Janus’s point about the fact you are materially different every day.

Or else that is one hell of a helicopter parent you are imagining there.

I wouldn't equate unity with continuity at all, they seem quite incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again as Janus reminds, continuity of function or purpose seems a trivially obvious reply.

Regarding the essay...

Self-contradiction on page 7. In defending Aristotle's definition of "man", the author says this...

...It is true that he often suggests that reason (or speech, thought, or some
other capacity he regards as characteristic of rational creatures) is unique to human beings; but that is not necessarily to claim that “rational animal” gives a sufficient account of what it is to be a human being, which is what an Aristotelian definition is supposed to do...

With this prima facie point, I agree. Since Aristotle set forth his own criterion for what counts as the 'kind' of definition in question, a charitable reading would grant that he would meet his own criterion of what it is to be a "man", and would also realize that being rational is insufficient.

However, on the same page much closer to the bottom, while attempting to justify another point, the author then states the following...

...Similarly, the concept rational animal seems to be such that other species at least
could fall under it...

Well, not according to Aristotle. If it is the case, as the author suggested, that Aristotle held that being rational was unique to man, then that alone is all the evidence we need to know that either Aristotle did not mean to include other animals, or his position contained inherent self-contradiction(incoherence).

That problem is fatal for the author's project. However, it is an interesting article and I'm going to finish reading it. It may have material worthy of a topic in it's own right, Actually, the groundwork(brief summary at the beginning) piqued my interest significantly...

Being existentially contingent upon language and being a language construct are not equivalent.
— creativesoul

The basic point is that the capability came first (i.e., animals evolved with the capability for language/rational thought). At some later point that capability was recognized and represented in language. — Andrew M

This dubiously presupposes a completeness that is later represented. I would strongly argue that being rational in the way humans are cannot be successfully argued for in such terms if we take the relevant everyday facts into consideration.

Everyday fact bears witness to quite the contrary.

Thought and belief are accrued. Human rationality, if it is to include all that the ancients wanted it to include, is very complex. Thought and belief are accrued. At conception, we are utterly, completely, and totally void of all thought and belief. That is a true conclusion that is grounded upon what everyday facts show, and thus prove to anyone willing to look. Thought and belief are accrued.

It cannot be the case that thought and belief are accrued if it is also the case that the thought and belief necessary for being rational in the way that humans are is complete in it's capability and/or potential at birth, or at conception.

Thought and belief are accrued.

For the realist about universals, that capability is real independent of whether it is represented in language. Whereas for the nominalist, that capability is real only to the extent that it is represented in language. Essentially it comes down to whether universals are considered to be discovered or created.

For me, Aristotle's definition of "man" as being a rational animal is real solely in terms of it's efficacy. A vein of thought for another time.

Quite frankly, the capability just isn't there. Being rational, in the human sense described in the links I've read, requires being able to think about one's own thought and belief. Embryos cannot. Infants cannot. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires having it, being able to identify it, then isolate it in order to then talk about it. Being rational, in the sense that humans are rational, is not the capability of an infant solely by virtue of just being human. It is not a capability of an infant at all. Being able to rationalize as humans do is the capability of being rational.

Being rational is existentially contingent upon being able to think about one's own thought and belief. Being able to think about one's own thought and belief requires written language(per argument in preceding paragraph). Humans are clearly incapable of being rational in all the ways humans are rational until we have a baseline upon which to take an account of the world and/or ourselves. That baseline is our first worldview, and it is almost entirely adopted.

We first look into and at the world, including ourselves, via adopted lens.

That bit of Aristotle doesn't warrant belief.

Well. I guess there's nothing more to say then, since I don't interpret those terms the way you apparently do.

Grant the terms. See them through. Talk about the consequences. Compare them. Further scrutinize them.

Don't be coy. What's point would you like to make about those ?

So are you saying that the form in God’s mind is always completely particular? — apokrisis

I would say that this is a conclusion which must be made, the divine Forms are particular, as property of one divine mind, and they are present to us as particular things. And this is consistent with the notion of perfection and completeness which is commonly assigned to God. Also, it is consistent with Aristotle's law of identity, that an object has a perfection which is proper to itself.

Seems that this leads to more than a few problems regarding change - Janus’s point about the fact you are materially different every day. — apokrisis

There is no problem with change, in fact this perspective makes change very intelligible. The theological conception of time is quite different from that of physics because it focuses on the importance of the present, and "what is". The will of God is necessary to support the existence of material things, at each moment of passing time.

The reality of free will, and what you call the degrees of freedom which you assign to the future, indicates that there is no necessary continuity between the observed material existence of the past (physical constraints), and what will exist in the future. In principle, any material existence can be changed at any moment in time, by an immaterial power such as the mind. This indicates that the entire material universe must be created anew at each moment of passing time. That there is consistency in this "creating anew at each moment", with the appearance of continuity, is described as inertia.

In physics, inertia is taken for granted, but this is inconsistent with your assumption of degrees of freedom. So one or the other must be dismissed as an ontological misrepresentation. Either the degrees of freedom are not real, or inertia cannot be taken for granted. Under the theological representation, inertia must be supported at each moment of passing time by the will of God.

Again as Janus reminds, continuity of function or purpose seems a trivially obvious reply. — apokrisis

I didn't understand Janus' remarks about functionality, and I still don't. You say that its trivially obvious, but I don't see how one can conclude continuity from functionality. It appears like the claim is that if there is functionality then there is continuity, but I don't see the relationship. Perhaps you can explain.

Well. I guess there's nothing more to say then, since I don't interpret those terms the way you apparently do. — Janus

I already knew that this was the case. It was evident. I took my definitions directly from the Oxford dictionary though, so you may want to consider the possibility that you misunderstand these concepts. However, I know it is very likely that you could find some definitions to support your interpretation, so the misunderstanding is on my side as well. What does this indicate about the supposed existence of these concepts?

OK, for 'multiplicity' Oxford has:A large number or variety
For ;collection': A group of things or people

I can see where you are coming from insofar as 'multiplicity' is (or at least can be) less specific than 'collection'. This is shown by the fact that we can say "There is multiplicity in nature"; we can speak of 'multiplicity' or 'a multiplicity', whereas we cannot speak of 'collection' unless it is treated as a verb. So, if I say "There is a mutliplicity of objects in my room" it doesn't seem any different in meaning or in what it implies than saying "there is a collection of objects in my room", because both are referring to a precisely specific group of objects. On the other hand, it seems more appropriate and suggestive of unity to say of the human body, as an example of organic unity, that it is a multplicity, than it does to say of it that it is a collection.

What does this indicate about the supposed existence of these concepts? — Metaphysician Undercover

Concepts are certainly not rigid in their meanings or implications. This fact seems to lead to the conclusion that Platonic Ideas, the Form of the Good, the Form of Beauty and the Forms of Tree, Horse, Man and so on, are incoherent, because they are the ideas of specific forms of the general, and this doesn't seem to make sense if generalizations cannot be rigidly defined. (Particulars cannot be rigidly defined either, but at least they can be apprehended and precisely referred to). When it comes, then, to the idea of particular forms; I can only parse that idea in terms of 'eternal counterparts to temporal forms'. And in this connection I would say that if there were such forms, then the eternal form of any individual existent would have to be the eternal form of its whole temporal history, of its entire existence through time.

Perhaps this could be related to Einstein's 'block' theory of time and other 'eternalist' views.

I would say that this is a conclusion which must be made, the divine Forms are particular, as property of one divine mind, and they are present to us as particular things. — Metaphysician Undercover

So this divine mind, is it the bit that is continuous? :-O

In physics, inertia is taken for granted, but this is inconsistent with your assumption of degrees of freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

But inertial motion is a degree of freedom. So a particle is defined by having six degrees of freedom - three of translational momentum and three of angular momentum.

I can see where you are coming from insofar as 'multiplicity' is (or at least can be) less specific than 'collection'. This is shown by the fact that we can say "There is multiplicity in nature"; we can speak of 'multiplicity' or 'a multiplicity', whereas we cannot speak of 'collection' unless it is treated as a verb. So, if I say "There is a mutliplicity of objects in my room" it doesn't seem any different in meaning or in what it implies than saying "there is a collection of objects in my room", because both are referring to a precisely specific group of objects. — Janus

As I said in my first reply on this issue, you can use "multiplicity" in a similar way as "collection", but this just means that you are using each to refer to a whole. What we are discussing is the difference between referring to a number of distinct things, as distinct things, and referring to them as one whole. So we can refer to a multiplicity of objects in your room, or a collection of objects in your room, and the meaning is very similar. We are referring to a whole, all the objects in your room. It is the clearly defined boundaries of "objects in your room", which turns this collection, or multiplicity (however you want to call it) into one single object, a unity, or whole.

What was at issue is the principle of mereology which would be utilized here. We determine a defining feature, a principle whereby we differentiate these objects to be classed together, from those objects to be left aside, and this defining feature gives us "an object" which is the collection, or unity, the whole.

On the other hand, it seems more appropriate and suggestive of unity to say of the human body, as an example of organic unity, that it is a multplicity, than it does to say of it that it is a collection. — Janus

In this case, you are speaking about the human body as a unity. The principle of mereology which would be utilized here would be quite different because the things which we sense as a distinct objects, are naturally referred to as objects, wholes, or unities because that's how we sense them. So we call an object a whole, or a unity, because we sense it that way, so that becomes our principle of mereology. But when we sense objects as distinct objects, then we need a principle by which we class them together, such as "the objects in your room", and it is by this principle that they are considered to be a whole.

So this divine mind, is it the bit that is continuous? — apokrisis

I don't know. So far the idea of continuity has not been grounded. We really haven't agreed at all on a definition. You think it's at the opposite end of the spectrum from discrete, I think it is categorically different from discrete. It appears like continuity is some sort of assumption. We can think up this idea of continuity, so we figure that there must be something which corresponds to it.

On the other hand, the divine mind is brought in out of necessity, to account for what we experience as existence at the present. If we can establish an association between this, and the idea of continuity, then we might be able to say that the divine mind is the bit that is continuous, or at least related to continuity. This would depend on whether we assume any continuity involved with the passing of time, and if so, how we would relate the passing of time to continuity. Under the assumptions of the last post, it is impossible that the temporal existence of material objects at the present is continuous. It may be the case that the passing of time itself is continuous though, but this would require a separation between the passing of time and material existence, such that the passing of time would be independent of material existence. Then the divine mind might be associated with the passing of time. The divine mind seems to be other than the passing of time though, so if one of these is "the bit that is continuous, the other is probably not.

But inertial motion is a degree of freedom. — apokrisis

Since inertial motion is completely defined by past constraints, and "degrees of freedom" is how you refer to the future, I do not see how inertial motion is at all consistent with any degree of freedom.

Being rational is existentially contingent upon being able to think about one's own thought and belief. — creativesoul

Rationality is the ability to ‘see reason’ - to make inferences, to say ‘because of this, then that must be the case’, to say that ‘this means that’, or ‘this equals that’. Being able to think about one’s own thought might require that, but I don’t believe it’s the definition of rationality. That is self-awareness, which is related, but not the same.

Reason is not contingent on language, so much as language is contingent on the ability to abstract. Apokrisis said that language might become established as ‘a habit of reference’ which might well be so - but hierarchical syntax is a step beyond pointing and making a sound about something. But then you’re into the whole discipline of evolutionary linguistics, which is a vast subject area. Here I think we’re actually talking about a very general point.

So far the idea of continuity has not been grounded. We really haven't agreed at all on a definition. You think it's at the opposite end of the spectrum from discrete, I think it is categorically different from discrete. — Metaphysician Undercover

So one of us has defined it by grounding it as the opposite of the discrete or the divided - the standard dictionary definition, as it happens.

The other of us says it is "categorically different", but can offer no good reason for that claim.

I say let's call this an honourable draw. >:O

Since inertial motion is completely defined by past constraints, and "degrees of freedom" is how you refer to the future, I do not see how inertial motion is at all consistent with any degree of freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you might not see it, but it's a definitional position in mechanics.

So one of us has defined it by grounding it as the opposite of the discrete or the divided - the standard dictionary definition, as it happens. — apokrisis

As I explained, defining a thing with its opposite doesn't ground it. We need to refer to something outside the category to give it meaning. That's the point I was bringing to your attention when I first engaged you in this thread. Defining cold as the opposite of hot, and hot as the opposite of cold, does not tell us what it means to be either hot or cold.

So, we've looked at all sorts of things which all seem to have discrete existence. In fact, as I was explaining to Janus, to be a thing is to be discrete. So, are you arguing that to be continuous is to be nothing, or that there is nothing which is continuous?

The other of us says it is "categorically different", but can offer no good reason for that claim. — apokrisis

Damn! I was under the false impression that you were reading my posts.

Reason is not contingent on language, so much as language is contingent on the ability to abstract. Apokrisis said that language might become established as ‘a habit of reference’ which might well be so - but hierarchical syntax is a step beyond pointing and making a sound about something. — Wayfarer

My position is that reason comes in grades of semiosis. So animals are reasoning creatures because the brain is organised by the kind of dichotomous principles that break the world down "intelligibly". The neurology of animals with brains exhibits a basic kind of reasonableness just in things like the opponent channel processing of the visual pathways. In Gestalt fashion, brains are designed to break the experience of the world into events vs contexts - create a rational view that sees the world as a collection of definite objects or entities.

The evolution of language then provided humans with another level of semiosis. A structure of grammar and cultural habit could be imposed on the neurology of the animal brain. We could start to see "a world of objects" through the lens of a collective social history. But traditional cultures aren't "rational" in the sense we mean by the kind of rationality which gets positively taught in modern literate society. The reasoning of the peasant can seem curious to a person educated in "the proper way to think".

And so rationality - in it most modern exalted sense - is the product of still higher grades of semiosis.

First the transition from oral to textual culture is a big step up. Writing forces a much greater rigour on speech acts in terms of tight and complete grammatical structure. Writing has to be able to bring to mind everything that is not actually present for the reader. So literacy has a big impact on "the habit of rationality".

Then after that comes the invention of logical and mathematical levels of semiosis. A new completely symbolic or abstract kind of language with a grammar to match. To be rational now means to think mechanically, in utterly constrained fashion - no room for vagueness or allusion. Ideas are constructed from arrangements of elements. Each step in an argument is as absolute as a computation.

So the definition of humans as reasoning animals does get at a major fork in the road - the huge departure that was the human evolution of articulate speech.

But because semiosis is always "reasonable", neuro-semiosis is a recognisably rational process. It is fundamentally dialectic. It is fundamentally "scientific" in being the production of beliefs which are held because they are measurably useful in achieving an organism's purposes.

So animals are rational in their simpler way too.

But then for the majority of their existence, humans weren't rational in the literate and logic-grammar sense. That is yet a further level of reasoning that only began to emerge 3000 years ago.

So if we want to define Homo sapiens in terms of a distinctive evolutionary break, it would be animal+language rather than animal+reason.

Once humans started painting pictures on walls, wearing bear claw necklaces and daubing themselves in ochre, then they had become symbolically organised social creatures. They were reasonable at a collective socio-cultural level of semiosis. They were using signs to take a shareable view of a "world of objects".

I was under the false impression that you were reading my posts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your false impression would be that you made sense.

As I explained, defining a thing with its opposite doesn't ground it. We need to refer to something outside the category to give it meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are just trying to say that categories are monistic. I am pointing out that categories arise via triadic development.

And yes, mine is an internalist or immanent approach. That is the whole bleeding point.

Defining cold as the opposite of hot, and hot as the opposite of cold, does not tell us what it means to be either hot or cold. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already said hot and cold are pretty weak as a "dichotomy". They are too symmetric and don't speak to some deeper asymmetry.

A strong definition of temperature is one that is concretely bounded. So a kinetic theory of temperature defines heat in terms of motion. From quantum theory, we can then see that motion is bounded by its contrary extremes of the Planck temperature or energy density, and the absolute zero which is the Heat Death or the "empty as possible" vacuum.

So physics understands temperature as a bounded spectrum. Opposing the hot and the cold is at least a start on getting to the root of the story. And now physics can define reality in terms of being bounded by the asymptotic limits of the absolutely hot and the absolutely cold.

So, are you arguing that to be continuous is to be nothing, or that there is nothing which is continuous? — Metaphysician Undercover

Damn! I was under the false impression that you were reading my posts.

Check back and you will see that a proper notion of "an object" is that it is continuous with itself and discrete from the world. So the absolute separation from the world is the logical source of being able to claim the matching fact that the object is absolutely continuous with itself.

This was illustrated by the duality of cardinality and ordinality. The one act secures both aspects. To the degree that an object is discrete from the world, it is continuous with itself and thus obeys your precious law of identity.

And then Janus pointed out how the category of the discrete~continuous connects to the category of the material~formal.

In the four causes Aristotelian view, formal cause is about constraint - the regulating presence of some enduring tendency, function or purpose. So organisms are defined as wholes rather than mere sets of parts because they are glued together by a common purpose. They have a generality or continuity that is real in being actually causal. That is why Aristotle could claim his hylomorphic substantialism. Form wasn't all accident. The glue of a purpose is what is essential to the continuity that makes anything an actual substance.

It boggles that you claim to be any kind of Aristotelian. You seem to have gone way past even Medievalist revisionism in your theistic wildness.

Don't be coy. What's point would you like to make about those ? — Janus

The point was that what you said was not true. There were other things to do, despite the fact that you and Meta work from different senses of key terms. I mentioned them.

Rationality is the ability to ‘see reason’ - to make inferences, to say ‘because of this, then that must be the case’, to say that ‘this means that’, or ‘this equals that’. Being able to think about one’s own thought might require that, but I don’t believe it’s the definition of rationality. That is self-awareness, which is related, but not the same.

Reason is not contingent on language, so much as language is contingent on the ability to abstract. Apokrisis said that language might become established as ‘a habit of reference’ which might well be so - but hierarchical syntax is a step beyond pointing and making a sound about something. But then you’re into the whole discipline of evolutionary linguistics, which is a vast subject area. Here I think we’re actually talking about a very general point. — Wayfarer

Note, that I was working from Aristotle's notion of being rational, which stresses that humans are the only rational beings. That would mean that being rational in the way that humans are requires the ability to rationalize in all the various ways that humans do.

I reject Aristotle's ill-conceived notion of being rational - in addition to the earlier objections - for it doesn't draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. It is grounded by an inadequate understanding of what thought and belief consist of... their 'ontology', if you like. Looks like most of Western philosophy followed...

Reason is not contingent on language... — Wayfarer

Reason - as and/or on a whole - most certainly is. However, the attribution/recognition of causality is not.

...Janus pointed out how the category of the discrete~continuous connects to the category of the material~formal...

A dichotomy is not a category.

A dichotomy is not a category. — creativesoul

Can you please supply the argument and all the working out that supports your conclusion. :-}

Meanwhile, just consider that there has to be some good reason why the philosophy of maths has settled on category theory - the dichotomy of structures and morphisms - as the fundamental basis of mathematical thinking.

I can see that you, like MU, are exercised about identifying the oneness, the inherent continuity, that permits one to speak of "a category" in the monistic singular.

Well stretch your grey matter a bit and you will understand the triadic story I've been providing.

What a dichotomy does is provide a singular definition of some spectrum of possibility, or a metaphysical-strength degree of freedom - that is, some axis or dimension along which reality could be measured.

So if you have the discrete~continuous as a dichotomy, that narrows down the messiness of existence to a fairly singular spectrum of "the possible". Possibility is now measured in terms of what lies in between these two bounding extremes. Possibility is in fact particularised in being made describable according to a particular view of one of actuality's definite categories of variety.

So discrete~continuous is a reduction of vague potential to some singular definite dimension of categorical generality. It is a particular slice across existence that encompasses then a spectrum of possible particulars.

Other metaphysical-strength dichotomies look to do the same thing from some different angle. Different categories of possibilities are revealed. Like the spectrum or measurable dimension that could exist between absolute chance and absolute necessity, or absolute one-ness and absolute multiplicity.

So in fact a dichotomy IS how metaphysical categories get defined. A category is a generality that speaks to single dimension of "acceptable" variety. It is a dimension along which open particularity gets suitably constrained.

A strong definition of temperature is one that is concretely bounded. So a kinetic theory of temperature defines heat in terms of motion. — apokrisis

OK, so lets take this as an example then. Heat is defined in terms of motion, so to be hot is like having lots of motion, and having less motion is to be less hot, or colder. Now hot and cold refer to the different degrees of motion.

Now, I want a real dichotomy, not just opposing terms referring to different degrees (hot and cold) within the same category (motion), but a real dichotomy. So I have to oppose heat, which is motion, to what is other from it, and this is rest. Now I have a real dichotomy, motion and rest. All the degrees of heat, which are described by hot and cold are placed in the category of motion. Do you see the need for the category of rest, in order that we can account for the reality of things that stay the same through time? Isn't this what continuous means, staying the same through time, not changing?

So physics understands temperature as a bounded spectrum. Opposing the hot and the cold is at least a start on getting to the root of the story. And now physics can define reality in terms of being bounded by the asymptotic limits of the absolutely hot and the absolutely cold. — apokrisis

I know that this is how "physics" understands these things, but we're discussing philosophy here, specifically ontology. Physics only deals with the physical, and this is why we need to go beyond physics, to metaphysics, in order to relate this category of things which physics deals with (motion), to reality as a whole. You seem to want to pigeonhole all of reality into this one category "what physics understands", with total disregard for the obvious fact that physics is a very limited field of study in relation to the vast whole of reality.

Check back and you will see that a proper notion of "an object" is that it is continuous with itself and discrete from the world. So the absolute separation from the world is the logical source of being able to claim the matching fact that the object is absolutely continuous with itself. — apokrisis

Janus already suggested this, that an object is continuous within itself, but it is obvious that an object is made of discrete parts, and the parts even overlap each other, and with other objects, so it is clear that an object is not continuous within itself. And, it is quite obvious that there can be no absolute separation of an object from the world, so I don't know how you could even suggest such a thing. If you are suggesting a temporal continuity, then we have the issues of my last couple of posts to deal with.

In the four causes Aristotelian view, formal cause is about constraint - the regulating presence of some enduring tendency, function or purpose. So organisms are defined as wholes rather than mere sets of parts because they are glued together by a common purpose. They have a generality or continuity that is real in being actually causal. That is why Aristotle could claim his hylomorphic substantialism. Form wasn't all accident. The glue of a purpose is what is essential to the continuity that makes anything an actual substance. — apokrisis

I've read most of Aristotle's material, and I never saw anything about an object being glued together by a common purpose. I think maybe that's something you are just making up. And you need to make this up because you refuse to respect the difference between formal cause and final cause. Are you saying that all the components of my computer are glued to together by the common purpose of being a computer? Sure, my computer was built with intent, or purpose, but it is not the intent, which holds the parts together. Intent, or purpose, may be influential in inspiring a person to put parts together into a unity, but it is clearly not the glue which holds the parts together.

It boggles that you claim to be any kind of Aristotelian. — apokrisis

I really don't claim to be Aristotelian, though I am very familiar with his work, as well as the work of others.

So I have to oppose heat, which is motion, to what is other from it, and this is rest. Now I have a real dichotomy, motion and rest. All the degrees of heat, which are described by hot and cold are placed in the category of motion. Do you see the need for the category of rest, in order that we can account for the reality of things that stay the same through time? Isn't this what continuous means, staying the same through time, not changing? — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks for explaining back to me my own argument. But why did you then tack on your wrong conclusion.

So yes, a more fundamental and well formed dichotomy is that of stasis~flux. Or absolute rest vs absolute motion.

Thus if we are talking about kinetics, temperature has this asymmetric direction. There is the spectrum of possible states that are anchored at the two ends of maximum physical action (the Planck heat) and minimum physical action (absolute zero).

The Cosmos then has a dimension of time as there is an irreversible directionality that points from one end of the spectrum - the creation that is the Big Bang - towards its eternal other, the matching timelessness that is the finality of the Heat Death. The Cosmos is a story of absolute change being constrained so as to become absolute unchanging rest by the end of time, thus expressing the Comos's continuity of purpose.

Physics only deals with the physical, and this is why we need to go beyond physics, to metaphysics, in order to relate this category of things which physics deals with (motion), to reality as a whole. You seem to want to pigeonhole all of reality into this one category "what physics understands", with total disregard for the obvious fact that physics is a very limited field of study in relation to the vast whole of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps you ought to brush up on Cosmology 101. You will see that metaphysics is seen as foundational to the physics.

(This really is an excellent introductory site).... http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/ast123/

Since Aristotle set forth his own criterion for what counts as the 'kind' of definition in question, a charitable reading would grant that he would meet his own criterion of what it is to be a "man", and would also realize that being rational is insufficient. — creativesoul

It's a sufficient criterion if humans are the only rational animals. If it were recognized in other animals (say, as a consequence of future evolution), then it would then become necessary to differentiate those rational animals from our own species.

This dubiously presupposes a completeness that is later represented — creativesoul

Exercised rationality is how we come to recognize it. But the definition describes the kind of animal a human is, and is not negated by the developmental stage any particular human is at or whether their capabilities are currently being exercised.

As a similar case, consider the uncontroversial claim that humans are bipeds. Yet initial human embryos don't have two legs and neither does an adult that has had their legs amputated.

There are two points for you to consider. First, in saying that there was nothing further to be said it's possible that I was simply expressing my feeling, rather than presenting a propositional claim. Even if it were a propositional claim it's truth would be contingent upon whether or not the differences between our interpretations were ineradicable or could be modified such as to produce reconciliation sufficient to allow for engaged dialogue. Meta's subsequent reply convinced me that there was enough flexibilty in his interpretations to make it worthwhile engaging in further conversation.

So yes, a more fundamental and well formed dichotomy is that of stasis~flux. Or absolute rest vs absolute motion.

Thus if we are talking about kinetics, temperature has this asymmetric direction. There is the spectrum of possible states that are anchored at the two ends of maximum physical action (the Planck heat) and minimum physical action (absolute zero). — apokrisis

I see you just want to repeat the same mistake with different terms. We seem to agree on this dichotomy of motion and rest. Now you want to refer to these as "the two ends of maximum physical action". But all "physical action", including what you call the two maximums, are by definition, within the category of motion. No type of action qualifies as rest. Are you prepared to recognize that rest is completely different from "physical action", and discuss what type of things might be in the category of rest, or are you satisfied with your category error, and contradictory claim that rest is an extreme type of motion?

but it is obvious that an object is made of discrete parts, and the parts even overlap each other, — Metaphysician Undercover

So if discrete parts can overlap each other, then you have an interesting definition of "discrete" - one that seems to mean "continuous" as well.

But anyway, the reason mereology fails is that - as a hierarchical account - it is merely taxonomic and doesn't speak to an Aristotelian systems causality.

So in hierarchy theory proper, parts are shaped by wholes. Parts are formed by a functional constraints. Complexity develops by actually producing the simpler parts from which it can be constructed.

An example is bricks. To make construction simple, we shape sloppy and shapeless mud into dry and regular units. The functional constraint of desiring to build a house as easily as possible leads towards the shaping of the most suitable possible part - the repeating unit of a rectangular brick.

So a proper understanding of hierarchical causality sees parts as being emergent along with wholes. The functional desire expressed by the whole is what selects for the right kind of parts to construct that whole.

As I said earlier, a semiotic/process perspective on Being sees it as being about formal certainty regulating material instability. Global information causes local possibility to hang together as enduring structure.

This is the deal that hierarchy theory - based on Aristotelian four causes - recognises.

Mereology is a compositional hierarchy - the view from logical atomism. It's not a metaphysically interesting model.

I've read most of Aristotle's material, and I never saw anything about an object being glued together by a common purpose. I think maybe that's something you are just making up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Err...a house made of bricks?

Are you saying that all the components of my computer are glued to together by the common purpose of being a computer? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, when you go to the shop and buy one, isn't that rather your hope? Do you instead go to the counter and ask for various quantities of transistors and wires and LEDs? You carry home a bucket of parts and then proudly tell everyone you have a new computer?

Sure, my computer was built with intent, or purpose, but it is not the intent, which holds the parts together. Intent, or purpose, may be influential in inspiring a person to put parts together into a unity, but it is clearly not the glue which holds the parts together. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. You want to be so literal about "glue" that you mean actual glue - the material/efficient cause for how to discrete things became one continuous thing?

Have fun with your careful misunderstandings!

So if we want to define Homo sapiens in terms of a distinctive evolutionary break, it would be animal+language rather than animal+reason.

Once humans started painting pictures on walls, wearing bear claw necklaces and daubing themselves in ochre, then they had become symbolically organised social creatures. They were reasonable at a collective socio-cultural level of semiosis. They were using signs to take a shareable view of a "world of objects". — apokrisis

At which point, they began to wonder.

So if discrete parts can overlap each other, then you have an interesting definition of "discrete" - one that seems to mean "continuous" as well. — apokrisis

Discrete things overlap each other all the time, but that doesn't make them continuous.

I see. You want to be so literal about "glue" that you mean actual glue - the material/efficient cause for how to discrete things became one continuous thing?

Have fun with your careful misunderstandings! — apokrisis

You said that purpose is the glue which holds the parts together to make the unity of a whole. If you didn't mean by "glue", the substance by which the parts are untied and held together, then what did you mean? The parts must be united by something, if it's not a substance like glue, and it's simply "purpose", then why didn't you simply say that purpose holds the parts together? You didn't say that because you know that it's nonsense. So you had to add that purpose is a "glue", because "glue" implies substance, and you know that there must be something substantial which holds parts together. Are you saying that purpose is a substance, like a glue, which unites parts to make a whole?

But all "physical action", including what you call the two maximums, are by definition, within the category of motion. No type of action qualifies as rest. — Metaphysician Undercover

Err, inaction?

Remember inertia? The first derivative of motion? The big deal is that "rest" isn't actually not going anywhere. It is simply a relative lack of motion. A mass can spin or move in a straightline inertially. And it can appear to lack any action if pinned down by an inertial frame. But relativity means that there is no absolute frame which can underwrite a state of absolute rest. If you are moving inertially along with the object you mean to measure, you will both seem at rest. But even Galilean relativity says "seems" is the operative word. Rest is an idea that can be approached, but never absolutely, only relatively, achieved.

Quantum mechanics then tells us that every "resting object" has an uncertainty in terms of its position and momentum (that good old basic dichotomy!). QM tells us that even the empty vacuum has a zero point energetic jitter.

So in the actual physics of action, your presumptions about "rest" being anything else than an asymptotic limit on action is archaic metaphysics.

Then the other side of the coin is that absolute action - the opposite of rest - is bounded too. Nothing goes faster than c. Nothing can be hotter or more energy dense than the Planck-scale limit. The Planck constant, h, defines the fundamental quantum of action.

So post-classical physics is based on the discovery that existence sits suspended between two extremes - absolute action and absolute rest. Together, these are the limits of reality and so can themselves never be achieved.

If you want to keep playing word games, go ahead. But physics confirms my metaphysics in this discussion.

Well stretch your grey matter a bit and you will understand the triadic story I've been providing. — apokrisis

In some ways I understand it better than you...

Study a bit of Davidson.