"Ducks lay eggs" is true if and only if ducks lay eggs. Some ducks do not. — creativesoul
Here is where I think you're major problem is. The very point of a definition is that it's general. A definition doesn't have to allow for all of the variations that might be observed in particular individuals. — Wayfarer
Being A is essential to being B.
Not all B's are A. — creativesoul
If we are looking to define humans in terms of what's necessary, required, and/or essential to being a human... — creativesoul
Being A is essential to being B.
Not all B's are A.
— creativesoul
Being a bird is essential to being a duck, but not all ducks are birds? Sounds legit. — apokrisis
Agree, there are many more elements that could be required to define what 'being a human' means. Definitions are sometimes difficult, especially when it comes to matters such as this. But, as far as it goes, a 'rational animal' does say something important, I think. Especially in a culture which will readily agree with 'animal' and dispute 'rational'. — Wayfarer
...as far as it goes, a 'rational animal' does say something important, I think. Especially in a culture which will readily agree with 'animal' and dispute 'rational'. — Wayfarer
Birds would be a genus - a real distinction in nature - because there was some essential natural purpose that "a bird" expresses. And then a duck would be a bird as a particular form that in turn expresses that purpose in terms of some more specific design. — apokrisis
I draw a complete blank as to what you could possibly mean by that. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, to re-state it, I don't agree with you that reason is dependent on language. The two are obviously closely interlinked, but I'm inclined to give rationality precedence over language, because the ability to abstract and to symbolise, which is required for intentional speech acts, seems to me to be intellectual rather than simply linguistic. — Wayfarer
There's no reason to believe that he meant anything in that generic sense.... — creativesoul
Finally, to re-emphasize a point made by Goodman (1955) and more recently by Dahl (1975) (among a host of others), the truth of generics depends on a notion of non-accidental generalization for their truth. The world contains in its extension all manner of possible patterns and convergences, many of which we judge to be purely accidental, but others of which we take to be principled. Only the principled patterns are taken to support true generics. (author's emphasis) — Greg N. Carlson
Saying that "ducks lay eggs" is true because some ducks lay eggs would be equivalent to saying "humans are superstars" is true because some humans are — creativesoul
There's no reason to believe that he meant anything in that generic sense....
— creativesoul
Actually the puzzle is why you would think he didn't. Generic sentences are a feature of all natural languages, not just modern English. If instead, as you claim, Aristotle intended an "all" quantification over particulars (re rationality) then the far deeper puzzle would be why he would make such an elementary logic mistake or be curiously unaware of the cognitive differences between infants and adults. [*] — Andrew M
..."Ducks lay eggs" is true not because some ducks lay eggs, but because there is an essential connection between ducks as a species and egg-laying and only an accidental connection between humans as a species and being a superstar.
That is the nature, so to speak, of generic sentences. You can't straightjacket the wrong logical form onto those sentences (in this case, an "all" quantifier over particulars), you need to investigate and understand the logical form that is already there. This was the kind of situation that motivated the linguistic turn in the early 20th Century where philosophical problems were seen to arise from misunderstanding the logic of language. — Andrew M
I find it rather interesting that an entire school of thought and belief has arisen as a means to sophisticate what is nothing more than unsophisticated language use.
"Ducks lay eggs" is not true. That's plain and simple. — creativesoul
And so you have some notion of truth that can’t make a useful distinction between the essential and the accidental. — apokrisis
There's a marked difference between not being able to draw and maintain a dichotomy and rejecting it based upon grounds of inadequacy... — creativesoul
I find that your approach presupposes agency where none is warranted. Drop the notions of intent and purpose, then see what happens to what's left of it... — creativesoul
Click on my avatar. Click on "comments" icon. Scroll down looking for comments with this thread title. Read for yourself. Much of the discourse between Wayfarer/Andrew M and myself covers it and it's all fairly recent. All my comments in this thread would be a good place to look... I would think. — creativesoul
I find that your approach presupposes agency where none is warranted. Drop the notions of intent and purpose, then see what happens to what's left of it...
— creativesoul
Why would I arbitrarily exclude final cause from nature? — apokrisis
I think you give yourself way too much credit for clarity of writing. — apokrisis
Generality is the essence that a collection of individuals would have in common. Their particularity would then be the accidents that are the differences that don't make an (essential) difference to that. — apokrisis
↪creativesoul The usual rambling bullshit instead of any direct answer. — apokrisis
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