Are you claiming that ducks do not have anything in common with each other that they do not have wit[h] other kinds of birds? Or that they do not have anything in common with other kinds of birds that they do not have with mammals, reptiles or insects. — Janus

No. I am not claiming that.

Certainly sounds like it! So, what are you claiming then?

Creative: "I refer you to my entire post history. Any astute reader perusing that will surely uncover the nature of my heretofore mentioned claim. (Peel me another grape, darling.)"

What's more puzzling; attributing meaning that is possible, or attributing meaning that is not? The notion of "generic" is 17th century. Aristotle lived two thousand years prior. — creativesoul

You seem to be confusing a formal analysis of generics with their use. From the SEP article on generics, "By 30 months, children understand that generics tolerate exceptions (Gelman and Raman 2003)". Is it your claim that people couldn't understand this in Aristotle's day? Or that generics have only featured in language since the 17th century?

"Ducks lay eggs" is not true. That's plain and simple.

It is called "true" as a result of our leniency towards such ambiguity. Most folk know that only female ducks lay eggs and that not all female ducks do. — creativesoul

There's nothing ambiguous about it. It is called true because most folk think it is true. If you disagree, then why not test your hypothesis and ask a few people whether they think it is true and why.

As far as I can tell, you're just denying that generics are a real feature of natural languages.

What's more puzzling; attributing meaning that is possible, or attributing meaning that is not? The notion of "generic" is 17th century. Aristotle lived two thousand years prior.
— creativesoul

You seem to be confusing a formal analysis of generics with their use. From the SEP article on generics, "By 30 months, children understand that generics tolerate exceptions (Gelman and Raman 2003)". Is it your claim that people couldn't understand this in Aristotle's day? Or that generics have only featured in language since the 17th century? — Andrew M

When there is no conception of "generics", and in Aristotle's time there was not, then people could not understand that generics tolerate exceptions. Strictly speaking, statements aren't the sort of things that tolerate. People are. So, surely people tolerated exceptions in Aristotle's time and before, assuming they had the ability to take note of them.

Aristotle clearly held that man was the only rational creature, and that being rational was an essential part of being human(man). I suspect that Aristotle recognized that being rational included a wide range of differing abilities. I also suspect that he attempted to bridge this divide with the idea that being rational was inherent to being human and that that much is 'proven' by virtue of it's later representation. In this way, Aristotle glossed over the differences.

My issue here is that Aristotle's own words do not support the ad hoc explanations which aim to minimize the clear contradiction that his words have with everyday facts.

"Ducks lay eggs" is not true. That's plain and simple.

It is called "true" as a result of our leniency towards such ambiguity. Most folk know that only female ducks lay eggs and that not all female ducks do.
— creativesoul

There's nothing ambiguous about it. It is called true because most folk think it is true. If you disagree, then why not test your hypothesis and ask a few people whether they think it is true and why.

As far as I can tell, you're just denying that generics are a real feature of natural languages. — Andrew M

The term "ducks" includes all things that we call "duck". Not all things that we call "duck" lay eggs.

I agree that "Ducks lay eggs" is called true, because most people think(believe) it is true. However, thinking(believing) it is true does not make it so, nor does calling it "true".

Certainly sounds like it! So, what are you claiming then? — Janus

This is a nuanced discussion. I am always happy to bear the burden of my claims. Asking me what I am claiming without further qualification leaves me wondering what you're talking about. I mean, the discussion has taken many turns. See if this helps...

Not all ducks lay eggs.

That seems like a pedantic quibble, though. You are interpreting 'Ducks lay eggs' as "All ducks lay eggs" rather than interpreting it as "it is normal for(female) ducks to lay eggs". One might even say, if the correct term for a male of the species is taken to be 'drake' that we could simply say 'it us normal for ducks to lay eggs'. Likewise the statement that man is a rational animal, should be taken to mean that it is normal for humans to be rational in a way that animals never are. There doesn't seem to be any substantive point to your supposed critique of Aristotle; its relevance, if it could be thought to possess any, is merely of a trivial order.

I find it rather troubling for you to argue over interpretation in this case.

Interpretation is nothing more than the attribution of meaning to something that is already meaningful.

I am taking Aristotle at his word. You are adding to it.

Not all ducks lay eggs.

Do you agree or not?

Nonsense, all meaning consists in interpretation, and it seems to me that it is your interpretation which is inapt to Aristotle's intention, and the scholastically normative interpretation of the meaning of his formulation. It's obvious that only approximately half the population of ducks lay eggs, and that not all humans are highly rational; but that seems not to the point. Certainly any human capable of language and hence of conceiving of the distinction between past, present and future could be counted as rational compared to animals.

I agree that "Ducks lay eggs" is called true, because most people think(believe) it is true. — creativesoul

So note that most people are aware of the individual exceptions yet continue to assert that "ducks lay eggs" is true. That is because they are asserting something about the category (species, genus, kind, etc.), not the individuals.

Which just is realism about universals as against nominalism, which rejects that categorical usage.

Nonsense, all meaning consists in interpretation... — Janus

Nonsense?

:-}

Explain to me exactly what's being interpreted again? How about Anscombe??? When she translates Witt, she is interpreting what was already meaningful. All meaning involves that which is or will become a sign/symbol, that which is or will become that which is significant/symbolized, and an agent capable of drawing a correlation between them.

That's how it works... necessarily so... without exception.

I've nothing further here Janus. I've already adequately argued my case without subsequent relevant and/or valid objections.

I've already adequately argued my case without subsequent relevant and/or valid objections. — creativesoul

Shall we take a collective vote on that?

Explain to me exactly what's being interpreted again? — creativesoul

What is being interpreted is a text. Of course texts are meaningful, but that doesn't entail that any text must have just one literal meaning. So, of course interpretation will inevitably come into play. it surprises me that you apparently don't understand that rudimentary fact.

Explain to me exactly what's being interpreted again?
— creativesoul

What is being interpreted is a text. Of course texts are meaningful, but that doesn't entail that any text must have just one literal meaning. So, of course interpretation will inevitably come into play. it surprises me that you apparently don't understand that rudimentary fact. — Janus

One author, one meaning... or else equivocation. What is a literal meaning? Typical rhetorical drivel.

One author, one meaning... or else equivocation — creativesoul

Rubbish. Speech acts are intrinsically creative. No words ever exactly capture the meaning I had in mind, despite even the opportunity for rewriting. But then the forced concreteness of having to have found some formula of words paves the way for further departures in thought. More refined interpretations arise.

One author, one meaning... or else equivocation. What is a literal meaning? Typical rhetorical drivel. — creativesoul

Problem is you cannot ever know exactly what the author means; you obviously don't know what Aristotle meant.

Obviously so-called literal interpretations of texts are possible, but I haven't claimed that the idea of a literal meaning is coherent; in fact that it is not is what I was suggesting. So, accusing me of "rhetorical drivel" is a laughable deflection, an attempt to disguise the fact that you have no coherent argument to offer to support your ridiculous position.