No' that's not what I said, nor implied. I was talking about considering statements. In the consideration of statements it is incumbent on me to decide whether or not I ought to doubt the statement. If I were playing chess, I would be considering which moves to make, not considering statements, so the example is not relevant. Though there would still be doubt involved as to which move I ought to make, there would be no doubt in my mind concerning the rules. Any such doubt would have been dealt with when I first encountered, and learned the rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to be refusing my distinction between "may be doubted", and "ought to be doubted". — Metaphysician Undercover
Does knowing the bowl is empty require being able to think about one's own belief? — creativesoul
Does Jack know his bowl is empty?
— creativesoul
Does it make sense to say Jack thought he knew the bowl was empty?
— Banno
No. That would be to say that Jack thought about his own belief. That requires written language. Jack has no such thing.
Does knowing the bowl is empty require being able to think about one's own belief? — creativesoul
Where are we going here? What was the question? — Banno
If every statement may be doubted, then every justification may be doubted. You have no grounds for certainty. — Banno
However, reality doesn't seem to be the same sort of thing with regard to epistemology. When I attempt to make good sense of this parallel between the rules of chess and reality, I can only surmise the following... — creativesoul
Contrary to the game of chess, it is fundamental and essential to knowledge that the rules change. This means that doubting the rules is a very important aspect of knowledge. It is evidenced by things such as the Copernican revolution, and Einstein's revolution. Einstein for instance doubted the idea that "time" is absolute, and replaced it with the notion that "time" is relative. That's an obvious instance of doubting a "hinge-proposition". — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem with this is that we perceive objects as particular things, and we are sometimes wrong in our perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is why I turn instead toward "certitude" as the grounds for certainty. Certitude is an attitude of confidence which instills the feeling of being certain. Certitude, as the grounds for certainty, is often rejected for being subjective (of the subject), because many have the attitude that certainty must be objective (of the object, i.e. "it is certain that..."), but it really doesn't make sense to say that anything other than a subject is certain. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if there can be no coherent skepticism about our hands existence, then to say that we know that they exist is incoherent as well. If Moore gives perceptual evidence for the existence of hands, then he accepts skepticism as coherent. — Πετροκότσυφας
So it seems that the content of such a creature's belief is not linguistic, nor could it be.
— creativesoul
That a prelinguistic belief is stateable is not that the prelinguistic believer can state it, When you say the cat believes X you are stating her prelinguistic belief for her. — Janus
However, reality doesn't seem to be the same sort of thing with regard to epistemology. When I attempt to make good sense of this parallel between the rules of chess and reality, I can only surmise the following...
— creativesoul
Hi creativesoul! It's been a while, I missed you. It appears like we may be on the same side of the coin (so far) this time around. — Metaphysician Undercover
The justified true belief notion comes from Theaetetus, of course. Two things are well worth understanding about that dialogue.
The first is that Plato does not use the idea of justification. Towards the conclusion, he starts, but does not finish, a conversation about the relation between objects and words, and the analysis of complex statements into their components. SEP translates the result as "True Judgement with an Account". Judgement is in many ways a better word than belief here, since it brings in the volition of the believer. This is perhaps were I differ from Sam26, who I think has a notion of beliefs being caused. — Banno
But, it is the account that concerns us here. Jack cannot give an account, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty.
The second is that Theaetetus ends inconclusively. The argument itself is described by Socrates as a long painful labour giving birth to wind. Socrates does not pretend to give a final account of knowledge. Nor, I think, should we. As we analyse and cajole our words into order we lose some of their flexibility. There is a sense in which Jack demonstrates his belief that the bowl is empty by herding me into the laundry. He is sharing his knowledge, perhaps in the only way available to him, even giving an account of the situation.
And so I, too, have brought forth nothing but wind. — Banno
That's the longest reply I've seen you write in quite some time. ;) — creativesoul
If the criterion for JTB includes that the believer offer an account... — creativesoul
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