Yes, I am saying that it might actually be a person who is doing these things, for example, rather than hands which are doing these things, and the person is just using the hands to do these things. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not to the point. If the person is using hands then the person has hands, no?

What I tried to say is that when we speak of knowledge, we've, at the same time, legitimized the skeptic's doubt. We're playing his game. He says we can't know (i.e. we can't provide grounds for our belief), we buy this and go on to show him that we can know by providing evidence that we know. But, we can provide such evidence, only if his doubt makes sense to us, only if we treat it as legitimate. Otherwise, what are we providing evidence for? If that's the case though, that "there can be no coherent skepticism" is excluded.

What Moore seems to be doing is accepting the skeptic's challenge for the existence of the external world. By accepting the challenge, he legitimises it. He implicitly acknowledges that we could be wrong in thinking that the external world exists and proceeds to show that, after all, we are not wrong. The skeptic is. Not incoherent, just wrong. You say that he demonstrates our knowledge of the external world on perceptual grounds, but that's merely begging the question, that's what the skeptic challenges; he says you could be fooled, you might be dreaming or be a BIV or whatever. When reminded of this scenario, you speak as if such doubt or challenge is illegitimate and incoherent; as you did in your answer to MU, who made that point. But, earlier, by accepting the challenge, the doubt was legitimised. So, in trying to demonstrate our knowledge, there's this back and forth. The clue is, I think, that our certainty regarding the external world is of a different kind than the certainty of our demonstrable knowledge. The former does not involve doubt nor demonstration, it's taken for granted and this is why we can have any knowledge at all. — Πετροκότσυφας

I can't see why you think that we must be playing the skeptic's game If we think someone is playing at doubting rather than really doubting. Why can we not simply, without buying into the idea of the coherence of the kind of doubt the skeptic is playing at entertaining, demonstratively show, as Moore does, how this so-called doubt is without substance, is not genuine?

There is a distinction between knowing and believing. You know something if there is no reason to doubt it. Does anyone really believe there is reason to doubt they have hands? They have been with you your whole life, and within this shared reality that we refer to as "the external world", which has also been with you your whole life there can be no reason to doubt that you have hands. Sure, we can imagine absurd logically possible scenarios such as that we might be in the matrix or whatever; but they don't change the fact that we have hands and share an external world. We are not talking about the conditions that give rise to this shared external world; those conditions could be God, the matrix, the quantum foam, the noumenal world, or whatever, and of course in relation to those conditions, whatever they might be, we might not *really* have hands, because the very idea might be a nonsense. We know that as well as we know that in the reality we share day to day we do have hands (well not all of us do).

So, in short, the skeptic is incoherent because his doubt jumps illegitimately across different worlds of discourse.

See my response to Πετροκότσυφας.

Sam, just to mention that although I'm not participating in this thread, I'm finding your contributions really interesting and useful to my own thinking. I wouldn't want you to feel you were just whistling into the wind :) — mcdoodle

Thanks Mcdoodle.

I'll wait for Πετροκότσυφας to respond. He's done a pretty good job of answering.

Replacing my comments with things like:

If you want to belief that knowledge is solely involved with following the principles which work to get the job done, and not at all involved in the seeking of better ways of doing things, then I think that's your problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

is hardly a mark of good will.

This is not to the point. If the person is using hands then the person has hands, no? — Janus

Actually this is the point. Existence is given to the object, it is what we assume individual, particular objects have, existence. We describe objects by naming the object (subject) and assigning properties to the objects (predication). The attributes, properties, are universal, such that we predicate the same properties to numerous individuals. Since numerous individuals are said to have the very same property, then the property cannot actually be a part of the individual itself. That is why we have a categorical difference between particulars and universals, such that if universals have existence, it is a completely different type of existence from the existence of particulars, individuals.

When you say that a person has hands, then "person" is the subject, and "hands" is predicated of the subject. We could assume that the "person" as an object may have existence. But "hands" referring to the property being predicated, signifies a universal. Unless we assign independent existence to universals, then "hands" cannot refer to anything with independent existence. And if "hands" has existence as a universal, this is a concept, not the active part of the person doing the work. So the identified object is assumed to have existence, but there is no principle whereby "what the object has" might have a similar type of existence.

Existence is given to the object, it is what we assume individual, particular objects have, existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Particular objects are existents; if we can reliably identify something then it exists. We say it exists in virtue of the fact that we can identify it. That is what 'existence' means.

This is exactly what I pointed out to you, that if you insist that we must follow the rules, in the case of language and knowledge, instead of freely doubting the rules, you apprehend knowledge as "following the principles which work to get the job done". Only if you respect the need to doubt the rules will you apprehend the aspect of knowledge which is "the seeking of better ways of doing things"

To which you replied "I feel quite disrespected by such a trivial response."

So I'll just repeat myself. If you want to keep on representing knowledge and language as a set of rules which must be followed, as if we were playing a game of chess, then I think you're wrong, for the reason stated. And if you think that it's trivial that I think you're wrong, then no one cares. But if you would like to demonstrate why you think I am wrong, then that's your problem so get on with solving it.

Particular objects are existents; if we can reliably identify something then it exists. We say it exists in virtue of the fact that we can identify it. That is what 'existence' means. — Janus

Yes, now the identified object is the person, the person exists. The hands are not identifiable as distinct particular objects, they are identified as property of the person, so why do you think that they exist?

The hands are identifiable objects, though. If you are worried about the fact that they attached to a body, then you can cut them off. Of course, they will no longer function, but they will remain as hands.
Will you say there are no leaves because they attached to trees? Do they only come into existence when they fall?

Either language absolutely captures the truth of the world, or the truth of the world absolutely escapes capture by language.

Or in fact neither, but - pragmatically - somewhere in between. ;)

These thread never get anywhere because they leave out the further issue of optimisation. If it is any kind of "self" that is being defined in contrast to "the world", this very separation itself has to develop and be reinforced by the "truth telling".

So there is a further optimality constraint on the whole business. Truth has to be effective at driving a wedge between self and the world, between the phenomenal and the noumenal. This is the epistemic cut argument. You don't want the truth dissolving the very division on which a self~world relationship is formed.

That is why semioticians stress the fact that minds are focused on understanding the world in terms of signs. The fact that we don't have transcendent access to the thing-in-itself is the feature, not the bug, of truth-telling. It wouldn't work if we didn't see the world through an utterly self-interested lens - as it is "seeing" in this fashion that does give rise to "the self". There would be no witness to "the truth" if truth-telling did not play the part of creating this witness.

So - because these threads always get stuck on idealism vs realism, the absoluteness of solipsistic isolation vs direct access - they don't really get into the meat of the issue.

Pragmatism picks up the story where it is accepted that truth-telling is a practice with a purpose. And then we can start to appreciate how a somewhat counter-intuitive optimisation principle must apply.

To form "a self" requires not directly "knowing the world".

If the body just responded directly to the "sensory facts" of world, that would be useless. Light, soundwaves, physical knocks and scrapes, would just register as energetic deformations. Some kind of heating or damage.

The nervous system exists to transcribe physics into information. The energy that composes the world becomes an interpreted set of symbols - an umwelt. As much as possible, the reality is made something simple and imagined. Organised in terms of the image of "a self" in its "world".

So pragmatism is better epistemology as it is a theory that accounts for observers along with the observables. They are two sides of the one (semiotic) coin.

If your epistemology fails to speak about what constitutes the observer, and just argues about what is observable, then of course it won't get anywhere. Frustrated with itself, it can only wind up in the angry silence of quietism. One liners that say nothing in their ambiguity.

There's a tendency on my part to skip over posts I agree with; sometimes it is worth coming back to acknowledge excellence. RockThrush, this is as neat a summation of On Certainty as I have read anywhere, with the additional merit of brevity.

Either language absolutely captures the truth of the world, or the truth of the world absolutely escapes capture by language. — apokrisis

We know that language captures the truth of the world as we experience it or all our discourse would simply be nonsense. The notion that language could, or could fail to, absolutely capture the truth of the world is itself nonsense, if the 'absolutely' signals an intention to indicate something beyond simply capturing the truth of the world as we experience it.

Actually, I thought the thread was going quite well. Sam has a way of keeping things on the path that I admire.

That notion of the absolute bother me as well. Assuming an "absolute cut" between "self and the world, between the phenomenal and the noumenal", perhaps leads directly to "idealism vs realism, the absoluteness of solipsistic isolation vs direct access".

Assuming dualism from the start does not seem a good way to explain the relation between word and world.

Actually, I thought the thread was going quite well. — Banno

So when "you" believe something, is it true in some self-transcending sense, or just true for you?

Answers on a postcard as usual.

Either language absolutely captures the truth of the world, or the truth of the world absolutely escapes capture by language. — apokrisis

No, it's somewhere in between.

We know that language captures the truth of the world as we experience it or all our discourse would simply be nonsense. — Janus

Again, what I was pointing out is that of course it will do this. Language, being semiotic, is producing the very self for whom such an experienced world would be the true one.

This seems straightforward. Is something getting lost in translation?

I'm not denying there is "a world". We couldn't form a notion of self-hood unless there was a physical reality to kick against. Moore's hands speak to the discovery of that fundamental counterfactuality.

But to be a self requires that we form a "selfish" image of the world. And that changes the game so far as theories of truth are concerned.

As I argued earlier, a big part of the epistemic tension arises because humans operate both as biological animals and social creatures. We are "grounded" in the truth of the biological animal claim Sam and perhaps Banno. But even that grounding is a self-interested umwelt. It is the self-interested view that a living organism needs to form to be a self with useful levels of autonomy.

Yep. As I've said.

That's just not what I have been saying.

Bah. I guess I was a bit tired and grumpy last night, and my back has the gip; perhaps we can reach some basic agreement using this:

Sure, but the introduction of this hinge-proposition required doubting the prior hinge proposition, that the planets and sun orbited the earth. Introduction of a new hinge proposition, to describe a specific phenomenon, can only follow after doubting the hinge proposition which presently describes that phenomenon. Proceeding with the attitude that our eyes see the sun rise up in the east and go down in the west, and therefore this must be what is the case, because we ought not doubt what our senses show us, is not conducive to progress. — Metaphysician Undercover

So in one situation I tell little Jimmie to be home before the sun goes down.

Should I instead tell little Jimmie to be home before the earth rotates to such a point that the sun appears to be below the horizon?

I suggest that in the circumstances we can take it for granted that the sun will go down, and also ignore all the physical errors in that presumption.

It's different when we are teaching little Jimmie some basic astronomy.

And that's rather the point' what we take for granted depends on the situation. I gather @Metaphysician Undercover will agree, since he has talked about situations before; perhaps even @apokrisis will see something in this about accepting such stuff for practical purposes. @Sam26 might not think of "The sun goes down each day" as a hinge proposition, but he might bear with me for a bit. @Πετροκότσυφας might encourage us not to accept Jimmie's challenge.

We can either say to Jimmie that it is certain that the sun will go down; or we can change the conversation from when he should be home to one of astronomy or induction. The spade is turned when we hit the bedrock that the sun goes down each day.

which bedrock will turn the spade depends on where you dig; which propositions are to go unchallenged depends on the language game, depends on the conversation, depends on situation, depends on the practicalities.

Are we so far apart in our ideas?

If we look to use rather than meaning, then since use involves the world, then a statement's being true involves the world.

If we look to use rather than meaning, then since use involves the world, then a statement's being true involves the world. — Banno

Did I say something different? I just continued on to point out that that involvement in turn involves "a self".

Which is where things get slippery again. Who does language speak for? The communal self? The biological individual?

That is the further issue I am interested in clarifying. If you want to leave it unsaid, that's a cop-out.

I just continued on to point out that that involvement in turn involves "a self". — apokrisis

Why?

You've had my explanation. What did you disagree with?

Don't start trolling if you don't want to be "disrespected". :)

Language, being semiotic, is producing the very self for whom such an experienced world would be the true one. — apokrisis

It seems to me that language use involves a world that includes a community of some sort for the language to be used by; but a self - that's potentially a whole other thing.

Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and if you don't care to help me understand, that's fine. I meant no offence.

Language, being semiotic, is producing the very self for whom such an experienced world would be the true one. — apokrisis

Is that your explanation? So because language involves signs and symbols, it must involve a self?

I don't follow that. But it is off the topic of this thread anyway.

But it is off the topic of this thread anyway. — Banno

So you've prepared your excuses already? Coitus interruptus signalled in advance?

It seems to me that language use involves a world that includes a community of some sort for the language to be used by; but a self - that's potentially a whole other thing. — Banno

The usual vague response from you.

I made a specific argument. There is a community level self that is instantiated through "being linguistic". And semiotics makes the case that this kind of self-making is also taking place at the level of individual felt experience. So we are dealing with social and biological levels of the same general process.

This is a problem when folk like yourself go on about epistemology without speaking to this distinction. The "self" is critical to there being "a world". And to pass over the nature of this self in silence, not offering a full account, is a cop-out.

Is that your explanation? So because language involves signs and symbols, it must involve a self? — Banno

Is that really the best summary you can make? Try again.

No, Apo; I'm not playing. You win.

No, Apo; I'm not playing. You win. — Banno

Ever the sulky child, hey? Beats me what you think you have to lose.

I think there is a sense where one can be grounded in one's belief apart from epistemological ideas. One's experience as one acts in the world provides a kind of grounding. Jack's belief has a grounding to it, but it's not an epistemological grounding, i.e., the epistemological grounding that occurs within the language-game of knowing. So knowledge, in terms of how I'm using it (JTB), is something that necessarily occurs within language. Justification is something we do with others, i.e., it gets it's meaning within a rule-based language. If it's something one can simply do on one's own, then whatever seems justified to you, is justified. It would seem to lose it's meaning if we separate the idea of justification from a linguistic format. Not only can't Jack justify his belief to us, but he can't justify it period. He just HAS the belief - the state of mind reflected in his actions. — Sam26

When I use the term justification it has a specific application, and in particular to the uses of JTB across a wide spectrum of language-games. It means being justified not only in terms of arguments, but also in terms of the other uses that I mentioned early on in this thread.

The term well-grounded can also be used as a synonym for justification in the JTB sense, but it also has an application quite apart from epistemological applications. Thus, well-grounded also applies to those applications that are not epistemological, like Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions. So Jack's belief is grounded, but not justified in the JTB sense (language-games of epistemology). Jack's beliefs are grounded in reality, but not linguistically grounded, i.e., they're not dependent on a statements.

Of course someone could ask what it means for a belief to be grounded in reality. — Sam26

Epistemology is a language-game. It arose via the need to establish what counts as knowledge(what it takes for S to know P). Folk made and still make knowledge claims all the time. Some of these claims contradict one another, and always have. Epistemology aims to sort these out. Justification is part of the standard for JTB. S knows that P if, and only iff, iS believes P, iiS is justified in believing P, and iiiP is true.

I understand, and grant that words like justified have more than one accepted usage. I don't find that flippantly denying/dismissing another's usage is acceptable, although many hereabouts do exactly that. There are many discussions on this forum and elsewhere that are based solely upon one participant using A to mean X and another using A to mean Y. Sometimes the two people do not, or perhaps cannot, recognize that this is happening. Other times it is taken note of, but neither participant is willing to budge. Situations like these do not have to end in impasse. Rather, much can be gleaned by virtue of granting anothers terms as the first step in seeing them through. Moreover, one cannot possibly understand another in the best way possible unless the key terms are granted. So, with all this in mind, I'm granting your terms and in doing so I'm fairly certain that I'm also granting Witt's, Banno's, and many others hereabouts.

I'm attempting to point out that the only ground I see for holding that Jack cannot know that touching fire caused his pain is maintaining coherency. Admitting that Jack's belief is justified is to admit of self-contradiction. So, that's an ass-backwards way I suppose, for me to grant the consistency of what you've been reporting heretofore. I want to take it quite a bit further, though...

Witt held that belief has propositional content. Thus, he insisted that a belief must be stateable.

Now, when we think about the consequences that the above has regarding non-linguistic and/or pre-linguistic belief, we find ourselves at a crossroads of mutually exclusive beliefs.

If belief has propositional content, then there can be no such thing as pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic belief, unless it is also the case that propositions are not existentially contingent upon language.

Do you believe that propositions are not existentially contingent upon language?

Witt held that belief has propositional content. Thus, he insisted that a belief must be stateable. — creativesoul

Just curious, where did W. say this? And how do you reconcile this with OC 284?