Okay, then I'm confused by you making a distinction between the existence of rules as man-made vs the existence of rules as Platonic Forms. Why make this distinction when games, language and knowledge all have man-made rules? — Luke
So I set up that game again, in which we do make up the rules as we go. — Banno
Now Meta can't mean this as it stands; because obviously if we are making our language up as we go along, and there are no rules, then language would be unlearnable. — Banno
Now, we could name these bits; let's see, they have simple rules to hold them together, like games, so let's call them language games...
Now, in such games, we can hold some bits constant while we are playing; but outside of such games, we could muck around with words as much as we like.
What would then be important would be working out which games we re playing, and which rules we ought be following. Because when we mix the rules of different games, all sorts of weird things might happen. We could invent a sort of therapy that looked carefully at the game we were playing and sorted out what rule goes were, so that we don't get confused... Let's call it "Analytic Philosophy". — Banno
This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions (I'll just refer to them as "some rules") ought not be doubted, because they are necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
To which I replied that to avoid Platonic Realism you would have to be using "necessarily" in the sense of "needed for some purpose". And if you are using necessary in the sense of needed for some purpose, then the statement is doubtable depending on whether or not the purpose of the person considering the statement is consistent with the purpose for which the statement is needed.There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. — Sam26
I never said those propositions were examples of hinge-propositions. We've been talking about this stuff for years. You'd think by now you will know my position.This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is, as I stated earlier, that we in general, do not have a good clear idea of what it means to exist. Therefore doubt concerning claims of existence is warranted. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is not necessarily true, because the learning of language could be grounded in something other than rules. It could be grounded in the desire to learn, and the desire to learn could inspire one to create rules which enable learning. Just because you are unable to conceive of learning language in any way other than learning rules, doesn't mean that this is the case. It may just be that your model of learning is inaccurate. — Metaphysician Undercover
When a person follows a rule, that person establishes a principle within the mind, and adheres to that principle. This is what following a rule is, like a New Year's resolution, you adopt a principle, hold it in your mind, and adhere to it in your actions. — Metaphysician Undercover
You appear to be suggesting that we could take a language, and use that language to get outside of language. — Metaphysician Undercover
never said those propositions were examples of hinge-propositions. We've been talking about this stuff for years. You'd think by now you will know my position. — Sam26
I'm suggesting based on my understanding of Wittgenstein, that it's senseless for anyone to doubt Moore's proposition, and that it's not an arbitrary decision, but one that's rooted in the nature of Moore's proposition. What is this nature? Certain propositions have at their core something basic, foundational, or bedrock, which makes doubting them nonsensical. This is rooted in the language-game of doubting.
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Correct usage can be seen in particular contexts, but it's not the context itself driving correct usage.
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So is there a general principle that dictates whether some statement is doubtable?
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There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. There are also statements that are contingently correct, for example, the Earth has one moon. — Sam26
However, the claim is that this is generally the case, because as Wittgenstein points out, there are cases where it would makes sense to doubt that this is my hand. Thus not every statement of the form "I know this is a hand," would fall into the category of being outside of our epistemological conversations. — Sam26
I think I know what I'm saying, but he wants to tell me what I'm saying, as though I don't know my own thoughts. — Sam26
A language learner combines a large but limited vocabulary to develop novel utterances using a large but limited grammar. If the language had an unlimited vocabulary, a new word for each situation, it wold be unlearnable. If it had an unlimited grammar, such that words could be arranged in any way, it would be unusable. — Banno
It's not bout the desire to learn, but the capacity to learn. — Banno
This is exactly the account that Wittgenstein shows to be faulty; here you do no more than blandly assert its truth. — Banno
We can't step outside of language as a whole, but we might be able to step outside any part of it. — Banno
I think I know what I'm saying, but he wants to tell me what I'm saying, as though I don't know my own thoughts. It's just crazy. — Sam26
But Wittgenstein doesn't show my account as faulty or inept, he just proposes his as more simple, easier, less complex. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you think that you can step outside of any part of the language that you're already using, then you are delusional. — Metaphysician Undercover
What exactly is your background in philosophy MU? — Sam26
The reason I ask is that you talk using philosophical jargon, but it's as though it's generally not connected with what I would call good philosophy. And this has nothing to do with agreeing with me, because there are members that I don't agree with, but I respect their arguments. You can tell by the way they write that they aren't just blowing smoke. — Sam26
Rubbish. The first 250 paragraphs in PI are a series of arguments against your position.
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Here again is that odd refusal you have to read what was actually written. — Banno
I've read all PI. most of it numerous times. Remember when we did that debate, all the direct references I made. There is no coherent argument against my position, just a demonstration that the true reality concerning this issue is within the mind, and because of that it is veiled, inaccessible to observation. So an alternative was proposed, that we ignore all of this in the mind stuff and focus on what is accessible to observation. As I said, it's just a proposal for an easier way. But of course, it skirts the real issue. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ever consider that your capacity to distinguish between "good philosophy" and "blowing smoke" isn't as objective as you think? Perhaps you are swayed more by what "agrees" with you, than you think you are. Consider your reference to LR Hubbard. Clearly what he has written is not as you say, gibberish, because he has millions of followers. I suggest that you simply do not agree with him, like you do not agree with me. And, since I need to repeatedly point to the same weakness in your belief, over and over again, because you refuse to acknowledge this weakness, this irritates you. — Metaphysician Undercover
None of us are probably as objective as we think; and we are all probably swayed more by arguments we tend to agree with, so nothing new there. Now just consider the statement you just made, viz., "Clearly what he has written is not as you say, gibberish, because he has millions of followers." I would not associate good thinking or good arguments in terms of having millions of followers. There are millions of followers of astrology, but I surely don't think there is any logic to astrology, or any way one can coherently justify such a belief. So having millions of followers doesn't do anything to lend support to your criticism of my remark. This is an example of the kind of basic mistake that a beginner would make. — Sam26
What irritates me is not that you supposedly point out some weakness in my argument. It's your constant misunderstanding of basic things; and it's not just what your saying to me, but this is a hallmark of many of your posts with others. Your remarks with Michael in another thread show an inability to understand basic things. People have to continuously correct what your saying, and you seem to change the meanings of words based on private interpretations. — Sam26
You said that a belief must be stateable. However, OC 284 and 285 implies that beliefs can simply be shown in the actions of people. Why does a belief have to be stateable? It's true that within language beliefs do get stated, but that doesn't mean they have to be stateable or stated, which seems to further imply that beliefs aren't beliefs unless they're linguistic. — Sam26
Also, does this mean that if the actions of "rooting around," as W. puts it, never get stated, that it doesn't imply a belief. It doesn't seem to me that W. held that beliefs (necessarily (my words))have propositional content, some do, but others do not. — Sam26
Anyway Creative, that's my take on it. I understand though that you seemed to leave open the possibility that beliefs are not necessarily propositional.
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