Moore was certain he had hands.

If what is required for him to know that he has hands is some account that uses language, then we must conclude, counterintuitively, that despite his certainty he did not know he had hands.

So why was he certain? Here, here are the hands - he showed them. — Banno

I think we agree, but I'd take it farther...

What belief grounds such a denial?

He gave the only ground necessary. He showed that he knew how to use the language.

If an account is required then knowledge of one's hands is knowledge that these are called "hands". Moore satisfied that requirement as well, because he displayed exactly that.

I can know that these things I'm shaking in front of you are called "hands". You know it too. Any competent English speaker knows it as well. Moore showed that he knew how to speak, and by virtue of knowing how to speak he knew that he had hands.

Certainty?

Sure, but what does that matter? I mean, he's not wrong. Certainty doesn't necessarily require being grounded upon some complex language construct. I see no reason to hold that certainty be denied, because I find no reason to deny that Moore has knowledge of his hands.

But an account that involves showing - is that a justification?

What do we make of someone who holds up their hands in front of their own face, and yet sincerely claims they have no hands?

What more than that theydo not understand how we use words about hands? — Banno

A justification happens when a speaker offers grounds for a belief statement. If the belief is well-grounded, it is justified.

A justification is a method of convincing another. The strongest ones have the strongest grounds. What moore convincing is required?(pun intended)

Moore's knowledge that he has hands is indubitable.

I mean, Witt was brilliant in many ways involving his approach. However, he did spend an extraordinarily long period of time mulling over the notion of a priori...

So...

His inability to grant Moore's knowledge was nothing more than his being stuck between a rock and a hard place. Cognitive dissonance.

This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions (I'll just refer to them as "some rules") ought not be doubted, because they are necessary. If these rules are "necessary" in the sense of determined, necessarily existing, such that they cannot be doubted, rather than "necessary" in the sense of needed for some purpose (in which case it could be reasonable to doubt them) then they are nothing other than platonic Forms. In other words, these rules would require the status of "eternal truth", which is equivalent with platonic Form, in order that it would be unreasonable to doubt them.

The point being that the game analogy is good, until we get to the point where the rules need to be justified. To say that you ought to follow this rule requires justification because someone might doubt the correctness of this rule. But justification heads toward an infinite regress when this rule is justified by that rue which is justified by another rule, etc. So Wittgenstein and Sam26 propose that some rules, hinge-props have a special status as "unreasonable to doubt", which makes them necessary. But unless they are claimed to be necessary in the sense of "eternally true" platonic Forms (therefore cannot be doubted), then any claim of special status and "unreasonable to doubt" is just arbitrary, as they are really no different from any other propositions. — Metaphysician Undercover

As far as I can tell, nobody here - including you - believes that the rules of language, knowledge and/or games exist as Platonic Forms. How does the analogy break down if those rules are all man-made?

Moore's knowledge that he has hands is indubitable. — creativesoul

As I understand it, If it's indubitable then it can't be knowledge. For a statement to be classified as a piece of knowledge, then it must be open to doubt.

I don't know that I am now speaking English, but only because it doesn't make any sense to doubt it. However, there might be circumstances where it would make sense for me to doubt that I was speaking English (although I can't think of any off the top of my head), and then it may be sensible to make a knowledge claim about it.

In my uni work on metaphysics of mind last year I read and thought a lot about Feigl. Contrary to what the paper you cite says, Sam, he did in his appendix to 'The Mental and the Physical' (1957/67) write something about 'brain states'. (You can read the whole paper online here) I hope it's of use to quote here extensively from his Appendix B. I think he is saying something close to what you're saying, Sam, but correct me if I'm wrong. Excuse me jumping into the debate on page 16!

Suppose that we had a complete knowledge of neurophysi-ology and that we could order all possible human brain states (if not metrically, then at least topologically) in a phase space of n dimensions. Every point in this phase space would then represent a fully specific type of brain state. And, taking isomorphism for granted, a subset of these points would also represent the total set of possible mental states.

Suppose further that we could teach children the vocabulary of the language of brain states. If this requires n-tuples of numbers, then simple expressions like "17-9-6-53-12" (or even abbreviatory symbols for these) might be inculcated in the child's language. If we took care that these expressions take the place of all introspective labels for mental states, the child would immediately learn to speak about his own mental states in the language of neurophysiology. Of course, the child would not know this at first, because it would use the expression, e.g., "17-9-6-53-12" as we would "tense-impatient-apprehensive-yet hopefully-expectant." But having acquired this vocabulary, the child, when growing up and becoming a scientist, would later have no trouble in making this terminology coherent with, and part of, the conceptual system of neurophysiology, and ultimately perhaps with that of theoretical physics. Of course, I not only admit, but I would stress, that in this transformation there is a considerable change in the meaning of the original terms. But this change may be regarded essentially as an enormous enrichment, rather than as a radical shift or a "crossing of ontological barriers." In other words, introspection may be regarded as an approach to neurophysiological knowledge, although by itself it yields only extremely crude and sketchy information about cerebral processes. This sort of information may concern certain Gestalt patterns, certain qualitative and semiquantitative distinctions and gradations; but it would not, by itself, contain any indication of the cerebral connections, let alone localizations. — Feigl

Interesting. I think I have a sense of it that's somewhat similar to your own. I don't think "hinge propositions" are quite the same as the pre-verbal mental "set" that the animal part of us has, but there's undoubtedly some relationship between them.

Schopenhauer (who the early Wittgenstein at least, admired) put it in a really neat way. There's understanding and reason. Understanding, which we share with animals, is the inbuilt expectations we have about how the world is that we bring to our experience as a result of us being evolved creatures. So that's roughly the general idea of the world as 3-dimensional, comprised of "middle sized furniture," and things like solidity, figure, texture, colour, etc. But it needn't be consciously represented (though it would probably have to be "represented" in some sense in the brain's machinery) - it's just how we proceed, it's pre-verbal, unconscious expectation taking-for-granted about how the world is. We proceed as if the world is a certain way.

And this pre-verbal expectation or mindset is usually correct because whatever may exist beyond these features, these features at least exist and are the kinds of features that our ancestors (going right back to primitive life forms) evolved to cope with.

Reason, on the other hand, is our own neat trick that other animals don't have (or have only to a much more primitive degree) - it's the ability to have either mental contents or items in the world symbolize other things. This probably evolved out of the capacity mammals (and some other social animals, like corvids, etc.) have, to represent inner states to their conspecifics (e.g. "I'm hurting"), which facilitates social co-ordination. As soon as the possibility of symbolizing inner states "honestly" arises, though, the possibility of lying about inner states for advantage also arises, and that opens up the possibility of counterfactuality, the possibility of imagining and symbolizing alternative possibilities, etc. And then we're off to the races, because we can then explain the known by means of the unknown (i.e. we can project possible causal explanations, that go beyond present experience, for what we presently experience).

I think "hinge propositions" and the like are elements (words, concepts, sentences, propositions) from reason that are tied closely to elements of understanding (pre-verbal expectations). The former express in symbolism what we take for granted at the level of pre-verbally just going about our business in the world.

Being stateable doesn't require that the believer do the stating. If the content of belief is propositional, then it only follows that it can be stated. Earlier I address the linguistic aspect when talking about the coherency aspect of JTB(epistemologists). If propositions are not existentially contingent upon language, then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic. — creativesoul

I understand that "being stateable" doesn't imply that someone actually state the belief. Yes, it seems quite obvious that if a belief is in the form of a proposition, then necessarily it can be stated.

Contingency, being a subset of possibility, implies that things could happen differently, but how is it that propositions are only contingent upon language? Can propositions arise apart from language? I think not, unless you can provide an example. I would say that propositions are necessarily a feature of language. Thus, propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language.

Your final statement "...then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic," seems strange, since if it is linguistic (definition - relating to language), then a proposition is necessarily linguistic. To say that a proposition is stateable, is also to say that a proposition is linguistic. Stating something is a linguistic endeavor, is it not? It seems to me that being stateable is a subset of linguistics.

I do not hold such a view. However, it is consistent with the notion that belief content is propositional. I say that Witt worked from that tenet because ihe talked about hinge "propositions" as beliefs that need no justification. I've read nothing of his, early or late, that would suggest that he did not hold that the content of belief is propositional. The limits of my language is the limit of my world. Whereof one cannot speak. All doubt is belief based. When one doubts a proposition, let's call it 'X', upon what grounds does the doubter of 'X' rest their disbelief upon? Doubting 'X' is to doubt that 'X' is true; is the case; is the way things are/were, etc. — creativesoul

For me it's quite clear that beliefs can be shown in what we do apart from what is sayable. I can't make any sense out of the idea that pre-linguistic man did not have beliefs apart from language. If pre-linguistic man was observed building something, then necessarily his actions of gathering material shows his belief that the materials are in a certain spot, and that the materials are used for a specific purpose. Thus, he shows his beliefs quite apart from any statements or propositions. Moreover, it seems to me that one of the functions of language is to convey my thoughts and/or beliefs to someone else.

I also can't make sense of animals having beliefs, if beliefs are necessary to language. Animals also show what they believe apart from saying something. For example, a dog may express its belief that its master is home by jumping up and down and barking - thus, the dog also shows what it believes based on its actions.

Thoughts/beliefs are pre-existent necessarily, if not then language would develop in a vacuum.

"William James, in order to show that thought is possible without speech, quotes the reminiscences of a deaf-mute, Mr Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had had thoughts about God and the world. -What could that mean!- Ballard writes: 'It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: how came the world into being?" - Are you sure - one would like to ask - that this is the correct translation of your wordless thoughts into words?...... (PI 342)."

Also you can't just dismiss OC 284 and 285 by saying that Wittgenstein just didn't have time to edit his remarks, as though he would have edited this out of the final draft. If this is your position, then any of Wittgenstein's remarks could be dismissed based on this criteria.

Yes, I think what you're expressing is close to what I'm saying.

Thanks for the information Mcdoodle, I appreciate it.

Suppose that we had a complete knowledge of neurophysi-ology and that we could order all possible human brain states (if not metrically, then at least topologically) in a phase space of n dimensions. Every point in this phase space would then represent a fully specific type of brain state. And, taking isomorphism for granted, a subset of these points would also represent the total set of possible mental states. — Feigl

I'm not sure this could even work for a computer, let alone a human brain. We can, as a matter of fact, identify all possible states of a computer, yet dong so helps us in no way to understand what it is computing. In fact the same computer-states will be used in different computations for different purposes.

Assuming isomorphism is a mistake.

At some point, there isn't any reason to keep arguing, and I think we have reached that point. — Sam26

I don't think so, I think that this is how we resolve issues, by going over them again and again and again. Most of the things you have said make sense to me, but then you stick in this hinge-proposition notion, and it doesn't make sense to me, it's out of place. You seem to whole-heartedly believe this idea, but you are unable to explain it to me, or give examples, in a way which I can understand. I am very interested to understand why this is. So I see this as an instance where I am unable to understand what someone else strongly believes, and I'm not so quick to give up on it.

I think we agree that in instances of justification we reach bottom, or fundamental statements, which we agree are unreasonable to doubt in those instances. These could be self-evident truths, axioms, premises for deductive arguments, etc.. You seem to proceed from this fact to make some sort of inductive conclusion, a generalization about statements themselves, which says that there are propositions (hinge-propositions) which are unreasonable to doubt. I apprehend this as faulty logic.

You seem to proceed from a description of how people behave, that they accept certain propositions as beyond a doubt, to make a general conclusion about propositions themselves, that some of them are beyond a doubt. I think that this is a faulty procedure. Consider this analogy. We state as a fact, that all people find that some foods taste good. Then we proceed to the conclusion that therefore some foods taste good. That is the type of faulty logical procedure I believe is supporting your belief in hinge-propositions.

How does the analogy break down if those rules are all man-made? — Luke

The game analogy breaks down at the point where we have to account for the creation of the rules. If we allow that the rules are man-made, then we ought to also allow that they change and evolve according to how human beings decide they should be. This is contrary to the principal point of the game analogy, which implies that we must follow the rules in order to play the game. We as human beings do not only follow the rules of the game, we create the rules as much as we follow them. Therefore if a "game" consists of a stated set of rules which must be followed, there is no game because there is no such set of rules.

As I explained to Banno, the game analogy assumes a faulty description of what it means for a human being to follow a rule. It assumes that there is a set of rules, which are part of an external object, a game, which the human being follows. In reality, when a human being follows a rule, that individual holds within one's mind, a principle which is adhered to. The principle, or "rule" which is followed, is within the individual's mind. It is not part of an external object such as a game.

If you apprehend the rule, or principle, which the individual adheres to when following a rule, as existing within the individual's mind, then you may understand that the process of learning is a process whereby such rules are created within one's mind. This perspective allows us to understand the fact that rules are created by human beings, because it respects the fact that each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning.

I've been using the term "brain states" to generally talk about brain/mind phenomena, because there seems to be some correlation between beliefs and brain states. I'm not sure that one can associate a brain state with, say, belief in God, because there are probably overlapping frequencies and chemical reaction taking place in the brain. So in my limited understanding of brain physiology, I'm simply saying that brain states happen or take place within a physically (this assumes of course that consciousness is limited to the brain, which I don't believe) defined area. I'm not sure if we can assume that if someone has belief X, that that belief is associated with some function Y, i.e., that there is a one-to-one correspondence. It's most definitely more complicated.

I'm not sure this could even work for a computer, let alone a human brain. We can, as a matter of fact, identify all possible states of a computer, yet dong so helps us in no way to understand what it is computing. In fact the same computer-states will be used in different computations for different purposes.

Assuming isomorphism is a mistake. — tom

It's a mid-20th century scientistic fantasy. I do think it's an interesting way of putting it, in that it spells out some of the ground that a lot of people evade: just what sort of factors would need to be aligned to make an ultra-physicalist view work.

One problem anyway is 'state' versus ' process'. A still picture, if that is the equivalent of 'state', can be very deceptive about what 'process' is going on in the course of movement, taken in isolation.

People get bogged down in terminological problems: 'mental' and 'physical', 'monist' and 'dualist' for instance. Feigl identifies that there would need to be some common language, and he can only imagine a scientific one replacing a 'natural' one, a bit like the Churchlands. It's interesting then how hard it is to imagine 'I believe' being represented by 'I am in state 44: 34: 22: 67 :98'. I suggest that one issue is that 'belief' has an emotional, or at the very least a commitment component to it that natural language gives us.

(Personally I think 'belief' is overdone and 'thought' is a good old-fashioned Fregean word that might be better. When I think of a musical note, as I often do, in relation to musical notes before and after, for instance, I feel the vocabulary needs to encompass that)

As I understand it, If it's indubitable then it can't be knowledge. For a statement to be classified as a piece of knowledge, then it must be open to doubt. — Luke

Indeed. I'm not denying that that is what Witt held. I'm denying that it should, and I've offered more than one reason for that.

It's a mid-20th century scientistic fantasy. I do think it's an interesting way of putting it, in that it spells out some of the ground that a lot of people evade: just what sort of factors would need to be aligned to make an ultra-physicalist view work. — mcdoodle

Physicalist or not, you can't tell what a computer is doing from its state.

One problem anyway is 'state' versus ' process'. A still picture, if that is the equivalent of 'state', can be very deceptive about what 'process' is going on in the course of movement, taken in isolation. — mcdoodle

I'm not sure "process" helps you either. Why would a sequence of states tell you what is going on? The only way to tell what's going on, is to run the program.

It's interesting then how hard it is to imagine 'I believe' being represented by 'I am in state 44: 34: 22: 67 :98'. I suggest that one issue is that 'belief' has an emotional, or at the very least a commitment component to it that natural language gives us. — mcdoodle

What makes anyone think brain and mental states are correlated, when computer and computational states aren't?

One problem anyway is 'state' versus ' process'. A still picture, if that is the equivalent of 'state', can be very deceptive about what 'process' is going on in the course of movement, taken in isolation. — mcdoodle

I agree that this is a problem. A brain is always active. To say that there is such a thing as a "brain state" is a misleading claim because "state" implies a condition of inactivity. So to say that a belief is a "brain state" is only to give an unrealistic description of the brain which is understood as active.

I'm not sure "process" helps you either. Why would a sequence of states tell you what is going on? The only way to tell what's going on, is to run the program. — tom

Aristotle demonstrated an inherent incompatibility between "being" (state) and 'becoming" (process). He claimed one could not be resolved, or reduced to a form of the other, such that the two must be considered as distinct categories. He proposed exceptions to the law of excluded middle to account for the reality of "becoming" with the concepts of "potential", and "matter".

Hegel in his dialectics of being implies that being is subsumed within the category of becoming, through a process of negation; being, negated by not-being, then the negation of the negation, etc.. That is how becoming is explained, such that becoming is a sort of synthesis of being and not being. This is fundamental to dialectical materialism, many of whom call for exceptions to the law of non-contradiction, which is called dialetheism.

@mcdoodle

we could order all possible human brain states (if not metrically, then at least topologically) in a phase space of n dimensions. — Feigl

I like this too, but only as an object of criticism.

So that we can be scientific, let's apply falsification to the situation we describe.

The child grows up and becomes a neuroscientists. One day, she is in state "17-9-6-53-12"; but just to be sure, she checks on her Neuroscope.

She finds she is in state "84-9-6-53-12".

Was she wrong about the state of her own mind? How could that make sense?

So would this count as a falsification of the theory?

It occurs to me that I may have imported too much of Searle into my understanding of Wittgenstein. Searle said in the introduction to one of his books "anything that can be meant can be said". When he appeared briefly in the previous incarnation of this forum, I asked him about this and his reply was that he meant it in a straight forward way that had been taken too far, and to an extent he regretted it.

Yet if "The world is everything that is the case" then it must be statable.

But this gives primacy to statements over other meanings.

When one shows something that cannot be said, is one breaking Searle's rule? Or is what is shown not meant?

Critiquing my own thinking.

Therefore if a "game" consists of a stated set of rules which must be followed, there is no game because there is no such set of rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is patently false. Board games don't exist?

As I explained to Banno, the game analogy assumes a faulty description of what it means for a human being to follow a rule. It assumes that there is a set of rules, which are part of an external object, a game, which the human being follows. In reality, when a human being follows a rule, that individual holds within one's mind, a principle which is adhered to. The principle, or "rule" which is followed, is within the individual's mind. It is not part of an external object such as a game. — Metaphysician Undercover

You speak about an individual person but games are more often played with/against other people, who teach us the rules of (i.e. how to play) the game and who ensure that we don't break the agreed upon rules of the game (i.e. cheat).

If you apprehend the rule, or principle, which the individual adheres to when following a rule, as existing within the individual's mind, then you may understand that the process of learning is a process whereby such rules are created within one's mind. This perspective allows us to understand the fact that rules are created by human beings, because it respects the fact that each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do we have written rules, sports referees, teachers, driving instructors, ombudsmen, judges, police, etc. if "each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning"? And what does it mean to break a rule in that case?

What you seem to want to say is that 'each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning the rules', but 'one's own rules' is redundant here. Following rules is a normative practice, rather than something mentally private.

This is patently false. Board games don't exist? — Luke

I think you misunderstood what I said. I didn't mean to say that board games do not exist. I meant, that if "game" refers to something which consists of a set of rules which must be followed, then in the case of language, there is no game.

Why do we have written rules, sports referees, teachers, driving instructors, ombudsmen, judges, police, etc. if "each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning"? And what does it mean to break a rule in that case? — Luke

What is the case, is that written rules are physical symbols on paper, or whatever medium, which must be interpreted. When the symbols are perceived (read), they are interpreted. If the individual desires to play the game, then the person will create principles within one's mind, and adhere to these principles in the act of playing the game.

If you and I are playing a game, and you carry out an action which is discordant with my interpretation, I will claim that you have not followed the rules. If you insist that you have, we may have to consult the written symbols, and each of our own interpretations, to try and decide who is right.

In the case of the various authorities which you have named, we trust them as authorities due to their training, such that we grant to them different degrees of power, to provide an official interpretation in the relevant situations. The statement "break the rule" is based on the authoritative interpretation. So for instance, we assign to the police the power to make arrests based on their interpretations. But what the police do is charge the person, whom according to their interpretation has broken the law. This still does not mean that the person has necessarily "broken the law" though, because the person has the right to go in front of a judge, or jury, to provide a more authoritative interpretation. So in the case of "law", in which breaking the rule is taken very seriously, we employ multiple levels of interpretation to ensure fairness.

What you seem to want to say is that 'each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning the rules', but 'one's own rules' is redundant here. Following rules is a normative practice, rather than something mentally private. — Luke

Yes, each one creates one's own principles within one's mind, and adheres to these principles. It is something mentally private. This is very evident, all you need to do is take at look at how you personally follow a rule. You have your own interpretation of what you ought to do to follow that rule, you hold some principles within your mind, and you adhere to them. Consider Banno's chess example, the bishop must move diagonally. You hold this interpretation within your mind, and adhere to it when you play chess. That is how you follow a rule, you hold a principle within your mind, and adhere to it in your actions, you do not consult some externally existing rules each time you are going to act. The actual rules, or principles, which one follows when playing chess go far beyond one's interpretation of the written rules, to include principles of strategy. They must be mentally private or else one could not proceed with a strategy.

When you say that "following rules is a normative practise", what you refer to is a judgement as to whether or not a specified set of rules has been followed. That specified set of rules constitutes "the norm". This is determined by some authorities. Falling outside the norm does not mean that one has not followed rules, it means that one has not followed that specific set of rules which are designated by the authorities as the norm. So I may have principles within my mind, which I adhere to, and I firmly follow those rules, but if my actions are eccentric, or in some other way odd, I may be judged as being outside the norm. We might commonly say that I do not follow "the rules". But "the rules" here refers to that specific set of rules which is determined as constituting the norm, it in no way means that I do not follow any rules in the general sense. So "normative" refers to a judgement as to whether specific rules have been followed, not a judgement as to whether rules have been followed in general.

I'm not a fan of Searle, so I don't know what to tell you.

I've been busy with other things lately, so I haven't had much time to respond. Hopefully I'll get back to this soon.

What makes anyone think brain and mental states are correlated, when computer and computational states aren't? — tom

Well, I said, this is a mid-20th century fantasy, and at that time it was the view of a group of people including Feigl, named in the paper Sam referenced. For a time it was the leading 'physicalist' view. Then the notion of the mental supervening on the physical gradually superseded it. I don't really understand the accusatory tone of 'What makes anyone think...?' It's not something I think. But I'm exploring that some other intelligent people have thought that, and that it's got affinities with what Sam is arguing for. One obvious rejoinder to your analogy is that it's a poor one: 'computer and computational' don't easily map on to 'brain and mental' without remainder.

I like this too (Feigl's account of imaginary future language), but only as an object of criticism. — Banno

Me too. But I think Feigl could answer your question. If beliefs based on the evidence of personal experience are primitive science - which I think he's saying - then one could certainly discover that in adulthood one's coordinates for what one's child-self used to call 'belief in God' are not about 'belief in God' at all, they're about the mathematical equivalent of 'loving father-figure'.

Hm. Now I've written it down, not clear how that can be right although it seemed right when I thought it. Perhaps she could discover it's associated with delusional state 45-36-23-90-10, which she wasn't even monitoring.

I think you misunderstood what I said. I didn't mean to say that board games do not exist. I meant, that if "game" refers to something which consists of a set of rules which must be followed, then in the case of language, there is no game. — Metaphysician Undercover

You were talking about where the game analogy breaks down, but I still don't see how language is any different. The rules of both games and language are man-made and we can make up new rules for both.

If you and I are playing a game, and you carry out an action which is discordant with my interpretation, I will claim that you have not followed the rules. If you insist that you have, we may have to consult the written symbols, and each of our own interpretations, to try and decide who is right. — Metaphysician Undercover

You stated in your previous post:

"The principle, or "rule" which is followed, is within the individual's mind. It is not part of an external object such as a game."

Why would you consult the written rules of the game when you claim that the rules are not external to you?

In the case of the various authorities which you have named, we trust them as authorities due to their training, such that we grant to them different degrees of power, to provide an official interpretation in the relevant situations. The statement "break the rule" is based on the authoritative interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, why defer to these external authorities if the rules are not external to you?

The statement "break the rule" is based on the authoritative interpretation. So for instance, we assign to the police the power to make arrests based on their interpretations. But what the police do is charge the person, whom according to their interpretation has broken the law. This still does not mean that the person has necessarily "broken the law" though, because the person has the right to go in front of a judge, or jury, to provide a more authoritative interpretation. So in the case of "law", in which breaking the rule is taken very seriously, we employ multiple levels of interpretation to ensure fairness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Has a person "necessarily" broken the law if a judge and jury then decide it? Or can people never actually break the law?

Yes, each one creates one's own principles within one's mind, and adheres to these principles. It is something mentally private. This is very evident, all you need to do is take at look at how you personally follow a rule. You have your own interpretation of what you ought to do to follow that rule, you hold some principles within your mind, and you adhere to them. Consider Banno's chess example, the bishop must move diagonally. You hold this interpretation within your mind, and adhere to it when you play chess. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe I interpret the rule differently because I've always viewed the chess board at the wrong angle, so I believe that the bishop can only move vertically or horizontally. However, in practice, this is not how we learn or teach the game. This shows that our normative behaviours inform our uses of language, rather than the kind of interpretations in the abstract that you are advocating.

.

That is how you follow a rule, you hold a principle within your mind, and adhere to it in your actions, you do not consult some externally existing rules each time you are going to act. The actual rules, or principles, which one follows when playing chess go far beyond one's interpretation of the written rules, to include principles of strategy. They must be mentally private or else one could not proceed with a strategy. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is confused. The strategy you employ in any given game is not a part of the rules of the game. Otherwise, where can I find this in the rules?

That specified set of rules constitutes "the norm". This is determined by some authorities. Falling outside the norm does not mean that one has not followed rules, it means that one has not followed that specific set of rules which are designated by the authorities as the norm. — Metaphysician Undercover

Uhh, those are the rules, as you say.

We might commonly say that I do not follow "the rules". But "the rules" here refers to that specific set of rules which is determined as constituting the norm, it in no way means that I do not follow any rules in the general sense. So "normative" refers to a judgement as to whether specific rules have been followed, not a judgement as to whether rules have been followed in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are these other ("in general") rules, besides the rules, that you are attempting to make an allowance for here? You mean thinking, or something? What rules does thinking follow? And what relevance does it have to the rules of games and language that we are discussing here?

One obvious rejoinder to your analogy is that it's a poor one: 'computer and computational' don't easily map on to 'brain and mental' without remainder. — mcdoodle

We've known that all Turing machines are equivalent since 1930s and that all physical universal computers are equivalent since 1980s and that they are capable of emulating any physical system.

It's not an analogy, it's known physics. Once you have achieved computational universality, there is nowhere else to go.

We've known that all Turing machines are equivalent since 1930s and that all physical universal computers are equivalent since 1980s and that they are capable of emulating any physical system. — tom

What sort of mind-bendingly ridiculous statement is this?
Computers shall never fully emulate any physical system. It is logically impossible.
But since you think its already been done; please give us an example of such a machine from the 1930s??
LOL

What sort of mind-bendingly ridiculous statement is this?
Computers shall never fully emulate any physical system. It is logically impossible.
But since you think its already been done; please give us an example of such a machine from the 1930s??
LOL — charleton

Maybe you should re-read my post.

I explicitly made the distinction between Turing machines and physical universal computers; one being a mathematical abstraction, the other a real physical system. There were no universal computers in the 1930s.

The paper that proves that any finite physical system may be emulated on a universal computer by finite means is this one:

http://www.daviddeutsch.org.uk/wp-content/deutsch85.pdf

It also happens to be the paper in which the quantum computer was invented. Don't let that worry you because the brain does not rely on quantum coherence, so a classical computer will suffice for a perfect emulation.

Now, you mentioned something about logical impossibility. Would you care to explain? LOLS

I explicitly made the distinction between Turing machines and physical universal computers; one being a mathematical abstraction, the other a real physical system. There were no universal computers in the 1930s.

The paper that proves that any finite physical system may be emulated on a universal computer by finite means is this one: — tom

Then what did you mean by this?
"We've known that all Turing machines are equivalent since 1930s"

You were talking about where the game analogy breaks down, but I still don't see how language is any different. The rules of both games and language are man-made and we can make up new rules for both. — Luke

The last time I tried to make up my own rules in a game I got kicked out of the game. No one yet has denied me the right to use language, though Sam26 might like to kick me out of the thread. Games have explicitly defined parameters, boundaries of in and out, and this makes the game a definite object. Language is not like that, it is a method of communication with no definite boundaries. Banno seems to believe that specific bounded language-games may be identified within language as a whole, such that one might step outside of a particular language-game, but all the overlap and vagueness of any proposed boundaries make this assumption unrealistic. Therefore we ought to just face the fact that the game analogy, while it may give us an approach, can only take us so far in any understanding of language.

Why would you consult the written rules of the game when you claim that the rules are not external to you? — Luke

I went through this, I interpret the symbols.

The strategy you employ in any given game is not a part of the rules of the game. Otherwise, where can I find this in the rules? — Luke

Right, that's another reason why the game analogy fails. Not only do we follow "the rules of the game", we make up our own strategies, private rules, which are part of the play, but not part of "the game" itself. So the rule-following employed in actually playing the game goes far beyond the actual rules of "the game". We could not even understand playing a game, by studying the game itself, because how one plays a game goes far beyond the game itself. To understand how different people play a particular game, we must refer to something other than "the game". If studying a game cannot even provide us with an understanding of how different people play that game, and we must turn to something else to obtain that understanding, then clearly the game analogy can only go so far, and it must be dropped at this point. If we cling to it, it will mislead us.

What are these other ("in general") rules, besides the rules, that you are attempting to make an allowance for here? You mean thinking, or something? — Luke

I told you, the principles we hold in our minds, which we adhere to in activity. When I get up in the morning I put the coffee pot on, that's a rule I follow.

And what relevance does it have to the rules of games and language that we are discussing here? — Luke

It's clearly relevant to the principles or "rules" of language use, because I choose my words in a similar habitual way. It's not very relevant to "rules" of games though, and that's the point. We use "rules" in numerous ways and we ought not to equivocate when doing philosophy.