Only beliefs that do not consist of linguistic content can be held by a non-linguistic agent. — creativesoul
Only beliefs that do not consist of linguistic content can be held by a non-linguistic agent.
— creativesoul
Where to go.
This is the sort of error that creeps in when beliefs are treated as mental furniture. Beliefs are explanations for actions; they are all statements. They are all of them linguistic. — Banno
I also note that you never answered my question about whether it is possible to break a rule, which I consider to be a related problem for your position. — Luke
If the words in your mind are identical to the words you speak, then I have no problem calling them both words, but I do think you are equivocating when you refer to both the written rules of a game, and everybody's alleged differing mental interpretation of those rules, as "the rules". — Luke
Your attempt to call them "private rules" just adds to the confusion and equivocation. — Luke
Hi Luke,
Can you just confirm for me that I properly understand what you arguing with respect to the "actual rules". Let's start with the assumption that there are symbols on the paper. I would say that the symbols must be interpreted, and it is the particular interpretation which each of us makes which constitutes the "actual rules". Some would argue that there is a real, objective, or true interpretation of the symbols, independent of how any individual would interpret the symbols, and this constitutes the "actual rules", which would be Platonic Realism. Since I know you reject Platonic Realism, are you arguing that the symbols on the paper are themselves the "actual rules", and that calling them symbols is a false description? — Metaphysician Undercover
Contingent means that something could be otherwise, correct? But propositions cannot not be part of language, they're a necessary feature of language. — Sam26
While it might be true that a language might not contain any statements, it would not be possible to have a statement without a language. — Banno
Indeed. — creativesoul
Third, it's the contention of this theory that not only are actions reflections of a thought life, but that language is also a reflection of a thought life.
...
It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. — Sam26
If all of the above is true, then Jack has no belief and you've arrived at self-contradiction. — creativesoul
Only if you continue to believe that a belief is a think inside Jack's head.
You can lead a horse to water... — creativesoul
Janus doesn't hold water either, and you know it. It dubiously presupposes an untenable and purely imaginary distinction between abstraction and being real. Chock full of irony as well... — creativesoul
You can lead a horse to water...
— creativesoul
...but you can't make him think.
Jack's beliefs are not something that is inside his head.
Jack's beliefs are ascribed to him by language users in order to explain his behaviour.
Jack does not, so far as I can tell, ascribe beliefs to himself. — Banno
Are you, or are you not, imputing a mental state of 'having a belief' to the animal?
The only coherent way that it could be said that I am having a belief is if I am internally reciting a statement or proposition that expresses the belief, and even that does not consist in a state but in an activity. — Janus
Jack cat is behaving as if there is a mouse under the bed.
Jack thinks there is a mouse under the bed.
For Jack, there is a mouse under the bed.
For Jack, it is true that there is a mouse under the bed.
Jack believes there is a mouse under the bed. — Banno
Here we need to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between our talking about Jack's belief and Jack's belief. The two are not one in the same thing. So...
Agree? — creativesoul
No, actually. — Banno
Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? — Banno
Jack's beliefs are ascribed to him by language users in order to explain his behaviour. — Banno
I think the issue here is whether the belief is the behaviour itself, or the description of the behaviour. — Metaphysician Undercover
Tomatoes make good food.
SO I seek out and buy tomatoes, I store them in a certain way, I plant seeds or buy seedlings and water them and pick off the bugs and watch for the reddening fruit. I say things like "We need some tomatoes" and I write "Tomatoes" on the shopping list and say "this tomato is not ripe" and so on.
Sometimes folk might say that Banno believes tomatoes are good food.
Is that any more than shorthand for the set of behaviours described above? — Banno
In particular, does it follow from the use of this shorthand that there must be a brain state that corresponds to Banno's belief that tomatoes are good; and further that this brain sate is distinct from and yet somehow responsible for all of those behaviours?
Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? Including that internal soliloquy that just came up with this post...
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