The analogy that I drew between non-linguistic beliefs and a dormant life force was made in response to your question/assertion that without non-linguistic beliefs, "what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically?" This appears to indicate that language could not have evolved from scratch, without some assistance from non-linguistic beliefs. I tend to agree with Banno's complaint that this smacks too much of a private language. — Luke

When I say that language evolved from scratch that doesn't mean there wasn't anything there as a basis for language. It's like saying I baked a cake from scratch, that doesn't mean there wasn't anything used to bake the cake. Yes, and I do believe there was assistance from non-linguistic beliefs. That there are non-linguistic beliefs is self-evident for me.

How can it be similar to a private language, especially if there is no language present. If we can have beliefs apart from language, and beliefs can arise apart from language, then how is this even remotely similar to having a private language?

This example relies entirely on the shared meanings/concepts of words like "snake" and "dangerous". I really don't believe that Wittgenstein had much interest in what causes our beliefs or how our language developed, which is much more theory than description. I mention this only because you claim this to be your view based on your reading of Wittgenstein. — Luke

Much of my theory relies on some of Wittgenstein's thinking, but not all of it. I'm not attributing causal beliefs to Wittgenstein.

There is clearly a distinction, at least for me and others, between causal beliefs and reasons for a belief. Roughly, a reasoned or rational explanation is something that involves a choice, in that I could have done or thought otherwise. However, a causal explanation is something that occurs apart from rationality, and many of our beliefs are like this. Also, a cause for a belief is an explanation of why an event occurred, like the turning on of a switch, which allows the electricity to flow to the light bulb, thereby, causing the light to come on. The same can happen with a belief. The cause of Mary's belief is the bite of the snake. The effect is Mary's belief that snakes are dangerous. Mary didn't reason her way to this belief.

How is it any different? Aren't the snake bite and its subsequent effects evidence that snakes can be dangerous? — Luke

A reason speaks to the truth of some conclusion, but a cause is not concerned with truth.

How can it be similar to a private language, especially if there is no language present. If we can have beliefs apart from language, and beliefs can arise apart from language, then how is this even remotely similar to having a private language? — Sam26

Non-linguistic beliefs are similar to a private language in that Wittgenstein's arguments against a private language apply equally to non-linguistic beliefs. There is "no language present" in a private language either, which Wittgenstein assumes only to demonstrate the absurdity or impossibility of the assumption. How can beliefs be held or expressed except in language? If they cannot be expressed or shared with others, because they are intelligible only to one solitary believer, then how is this any different to a private language?

Let's say that we all have a box with a thing inside which we call a "beetle". We can never see what is in another person's box, only what is in our own. Let's also assume that the thing in my box is nothing like anything else I know. Can I not coin a number of different terms to refer to the various properties of the thing in my box? I don't see why not. And given that nothing else I know of is like the thing in my box, surely it would be impossible for me to teach others what I mean by the words I use to describe the thing in my box?

Yes, it's easy to imagine. But what sort of properties are you inventing? Can't say? I guess we'll just have to disagree then.

Let's say that we all have a box with a thing inside which we call a "beetle". We can never see what is in another person's box, only what is in our own. Let's also assume that the thing in my box is nothing like anything else I know. Can I not coin a number of different terms to refer to the various properties of the thing in my box? I don't see why not. And given that nothing else I know of is like the thing in my box, surely it would be impossible for me to teach others what I mean by the words I use to describe the thing in my box? — Michael

Or let's say that I'm able to look inside another person's box, and what I see is nothing like what I see in mine. I would probably say that what's in their box isn't a beetle, but something else, because when I use the term "beetle" I'm talking about the particular kind of thing that's in my box, not about the variety of things that are in each of our boxes, whatever they are.

So even if there's a public meaning of "beetle", there's also a private meaning.

Yes, it's easy to imagine. But what sort of properties are you inventing? Can't say? I guess we'll just have to disagree then. — Luke

Let's say that the thing inside my box is blue, and nothing else in the world is blue. I coin the term "blue" to refer to the unique colour of the thing inside my box.

My understanding of the private language argument is the following: In PI 244 Wittgenstein talks about words referring to sensations, he doesn't deny the sensations, the private things that are happening to us. He wants us to consider the connection between the name, and the thing named, that is, how is it set up? How do we learn the meaning of the word pain? So a child learns for example to associate the word pain with certain behaviors. These are behaviors we can all see. Thus, the concept pain is not something private, but something we're all able to observe, it's not like the beetle in the box. You're able to see my behavior, just as I'm able to see yours, so it's not private.

Note though that he's talking about the public use of the word pain, which is associated with the public expression of our sensations. What Wittgenstein seems to be saying in the private language argument, is, that a word cannot refer to something that's totally private, like the beetle in the box. The word pain has to get a foothold in something public for us to have a shared meaning.

None of this denies that there are private sensations, or that there are private beliefs. Wittgenstein is saying that for us to share in language what these are, we must be able to associate the concept with something that's not private, something that's communal. And by the way, there is language present in the private language game, but the language is meaningless in terms of what we mean by the beetle in the box. So again, I don't see how my view is anything like the private language argument.

I'm simply saying, again, that the beliefs, the private beliefs apart from language, are similar to the private sensations we have. And these private sensations are also prelinguistic. They have an existence quite apart from any statement about them. Their existence is not dependent upon language.

Note though that he's talking about the public use of the word pain, which is associated with the public expression of our sensations. — Sam26

I'm sure almost all of us will say that the word "pain" refers to the sensation, not to the public expression.

That's why we can talk about people faking pain.

I'm sure almost all of us will say that the word "pain" refers to the sensation, not to the public expression.

That's why we can talk about people faking pain. — Michael

My point is that the meaning of the word pain gets a foothold in public expressions. The meaning isn't solely tied to my private sensation, which would be the beetle in the box scenario.

My point is that the meaning of the word pain gets a foothold in public expressions. The meaning isn't solely tied to my private sensation, which would be the beetle in the box scenario. — Sam26

This seems like saying that the meaning of "Aristotle" gets a foothold in textbooks, given that none of us have ever met the man. The word refers to the philosopher, not the writings.

This seems like saying that the meaning of "Aristotle" gets a foothold in textbooks, given that none of us have ever met the man. The word refers to the philosopher, not the text. — Michael

I don't quite follow the analogy. How is what I'm saying, like saying the meaning of Aristotle gets a foothold in textbooks?

You say we learn the word "pain" by associating it with certain behaviours, and so therefore these behaviours have something to do with the meaning of the word "pain". How is that any different to learning the word "Aristotle" by associating it with certain texts?

That there are middle-men in learning a word doesn't then mean that these middle-men have anything to do with the meaning of the word.

But all this seems by-the-by. I know that what I mean by "pain" is the sensation, not the public expression. Wittegenstein can argue all he likes that I'm actually talking about the expression, but my own reflexive understanding of what I mean when I use the word is far more compelling than his arguments.

You say we learn the word "pain" by associating it with certain behaviours, and so therefore these behaviours have something to do with the meaning of the word "pain". How is that any different to learning the word "Aristotle" by associating it with certain texts? — Michael

The point is that we learn correct usage in a public forum, and that forum can take a variety of forms, including texts. There is a difference though between words that refer to things, as opposed to words that refer to an abstraction, which Aristotle is presently for us. We learn them by using them in a variety of contexts in conjunction with implicit and explicit rules, but we don't learn them in isolation. The difference then would be that pain is referring to public behavior that reflects my private sensations, but the way we learn to use Aristotle is also public, but not in the sense that there is something to point to, that is, there is no longer the thing we call Aristotle. There are just a variety of language-games that arise in various public venues.

I know that what I mean by "pain" is the sensation, not the expressions. Wittegenstein can argue all he likes that I'm actually talking about the expressions, but my own reflexive understanding of what I mean when I use the word is far more compelling than his arguments. — Michael

How did you learn to use the word pain? You didn't learn it by associating it with your sensation. You learned it by using it publicly in association with your own sensation, and the pain behavior of others. I agree that your experience of pain is much more compelling than any meaning associated with the word, but that's quite a different thing. The point, I believe, is how we learn the use of a word in a linguistic setting. What you mean by pain is quite irrelevant in terms of meaning.

I hope I answered the question, but maybe not completely.

Then let's use a different example. I've never met Trump; only ever seen him on TV and in photos. I've learned to use the term "Donald Trump" by associating it with certain digital images. But do those digital images have anything to do with the meaning of "Donald Trump". Of course not. The name refers to the man himself.

I don't see why this is any different in the case of "pain". The public expression is just a middle-man; a "hook" with which I can connect the word and the sensation.

When I talk of others being in pain, I'm not talking about them behaving as I do when I have that sensation; I'm talking about them feeling as I do when I have that sensation. The behaviour may be an inevitable consequence, but that's it.

Besides, given that we have these terms "sensation" and "private experience" that refer to something other than behaviour and public expression should be evidence enough.

What you say doesn't make sense. You are claiming that the mere possibility of mistake is grounds for questioning a belief--and therefore that we have grounds for questioning all of our beliefs, which is absurd. — aletheist

You just keep asserting, but I have justification. The possibility of mistake indicates that the belief may be wrong, and if the belief may be wrong, we are justified in doubting it. You simply assert that's absurd, but clearly it's not.

Belief is a constraint on doubt. — apokrisis

I don't agree that belief is a constraint on doubt. Doubt, like its opposite, certitude, is an attitude which we have toward beliefs. Having beliefs does not free up one's certitude, nor does it constrain one's doubts.

The point isn't that I know and doubt at the same time, but that one's knowledge is always questionable, up to a point. If I say I know X, you might naturally want to know how it is that I know. You want to see for yourself that I'm not mistaken, so your questioning my knowledge. — Sam26

An important aspect, not to lose sight of, is the difference between "I know" and "you know". Usually, our attitude toward what another claims to know, is of less certitude than what oneself claims to know. So if someone else claims to know something, I might doubt this, but if I claim to know something, I wouldn't be doubting it, or else I wouldn't be claiming to know it.

In general then, certitude relates directly to "I know", and doubt relates directly to "you know". When you justify to me, what you claim to know, then I can claim that I know it as well, therefore the doubt which was related to what you know has been replaced with certitude relating to what I know. I now know what I previously doubted that you knew. The certitude is always related to what I know, and the doubt is always related to what you know.

If it's something we both know, then there is no need for me to say to you that I know, especially if we both know that we know. A doubt just wouldn't arise, at least until there is good reason to doubt that we know. — Sam26

The problem with this is that there may be nothing which we both know, until we discuss it and rule out the inconsistencies. Even if we both observe the very same event, we know it in our different ways, with our different words, and discussing it produces consistency. So we probablycannot say that there is anything which we both know, unless we've discussed with each other, and confirmed, that this is what we both know.

As soon as you speak of these foundational or basic beliefs in reference to being justified, or as being true, or as something known, then you are bringing them into the domain of epistemology. Of course the classic example's used in this thread are Moore's proposition's that he claims to know, e.g., - "This is a hand," or "I live on the Earth." — Sam26

To assume these foundational beliefs, hinge-propositions, is to assume that there are certain things which we both know, without having discussed them. If we discuss them to confirm that we both know them, we bring them into the realm of epistemology. To assume that we both know them, without having discussed them is a faulty assumption.

The only thing that I would question is this statement. Why can't my belief be private? The language which states a belief is not private, but my belief, it would seem to me, starts out at being private before there is any showing or stating. — Sam26

See, this is the point Sam26. As soon as you recognize that "my belief" starts out as private, and not public, then every belief must be justified. There can be no such thing as hinge-propositions, because "hinge-propositions" implies that there are beliefs which start out as public beliefs, beliefs which we all have in common, which need not be justified. If you allow that beliefs start out as "my beliefs", i.e. as private, then this is inconsistent with "hinge-propositions".

If you deny private beliefs, as Banno does, then hinge-propositions make sense. Beliefs start out as public. We all start out with the very same fundamental beliefs, hinge-propositions, which do not need to be justified because they are the very same, in agreement, right from the start. Consider that these are beliefs given to us by instinct, or something like that. They just come to us naturally, and they come to us all the same, common, shared, so they are public. However, if these instinctual beliefs come to us as something private, uniquely individual to each of us, then there can be no hinge-propositions, as each one of these needs to be justified.

The possibility of mistake indicates that the belief may be wrong, and if the belief may be wrong, we are justified in doubting it. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's possible that I will win the lottery tomorrow, but I'm not justified in doubting that I won't. Doubt requires more than just possibility.

The possibility of mistake indicates that the belief may be wrong, and if the belief may be wrong, we are justified in doubting it. — Metaphysician Undercover

The possibility of mistake pertains to all of our beliefs; does this mean that we are justified in doubting all of our beliefs? In any case, what you state here is a belief, and it may be wrong; therefore, by its own criterion, I am justified in doubting it.

The possibility of mistake pertains to all of our beliefs; does this mean that we are justified in doubting all of our beliefs? In any case, what you state here is a belief, and it may be wrong; therefore, by its own criterion, I am justified in doubting it. — aletheist

1) this is a hand
2) it is possible that 1) is false

Is it possible that 2) is false? If not then we can doubt 1) but not 2) (according to MU).

I suppose it's similar in kind to Socrates' "I know that I know nothing". It's not really supposed to be taken as self-defeating.

It's possible that I will win the lottery tomorrow, but I'm not justified in doubting that I won't. — Michael

This would exclude anyone from buying a lottery ticket. And that's why Wittgenstein's argument, that doubt can be excluded if it is unreasonable, is itself an unreasonable argument. Many would agree that it is unreasonable to buy a lottery ticket, yet they still do it.

As I said, if you cannot demonstrate certainty, then doubt is justified. If you cannot demonstrate with certainty, that I will not win the lottery, then my buying a ticket is justified.

The possibility of mistake pertains to all of our beliefs; does this mean that we are justified in doubting all of our beliefs? — aletheist

Yes, it extends to all beliefs. But it is personal, private, as an attitude. You decide which beliefs you will and will not doubt, and I decide which beliefs I will and will not doubt.

In any case, what you state here is a belief, and it may be wrong; therefore, by its own criterion, I am justified in doubting it. — aletheist

Right, that's exactly what I am trying to demonstrate. I don't doubt this, because I have an attitude of certitude toward it. But my attitude of certitude does not make it a certainty. I haven't been able to demonstrate to you that it ought to be accepted, therefore you have an attitude of doubt toward it. So it is clearly not a certainty. However, unless you demonstrate to me that I ought to release my attitude of certitude, I will not doubt it.

Each person has certitude toward some beliefs which are held by that person. Each person has doubt toward some beliefs held by others. The beliefs which one has certitude toward, and doubt toward vary from one person to another. Therefore, when I take into account the attitudes of all human beings, I cannot say with certitude that there is any belief which will not be doubted by someone. So I cannot accept the claim that there are some beliefs which it is unreasonable for anyone to doubt.

As I said, if you cannot demonstrate certainty, then doubt is justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

If by doubt you just mean "not certain". But it can also mean "not likely".

Will I have a job tomorrow? I'm not certain, but I'm not doubtful either. I'm pretty sure I will.

Then let's use a different example. I've never met Trump; only ever seen him on TV and in photos. I've learned to use the term "Donald Trump" by associating it with certain digital images. But do those digital images have anything to do with the meaning of "Donald Trump". Of course not. The name refers to the man himself. — Michael

Are you saying that we learn meaning only by understanding that there is "the real Donald Trump?" (as opposed to the digital image) - or that there is some referent X that is required? It would seem that we can not only use the word correctly by referring to his image, but that we understand the meaning by using the word to refer to the image. What more do we need? What more would we understand if we saw the real referent as opposed to the image of the referent? We understand that it's not the real thing when looking at the image, but how does that take away from the meaning of the word? The important thing is that we use the word correctly, and in doing so we show that we understand what the word means.

Yes, the name does refer to the man himself, but can we derive correct usage, and as such, meaning, by only referring to the digital image? Yes. The "middle-man" works just as well for the term Donald Trump. The digital images themselves, or the text on a page, are not what gives meaning to the word, but how we use the word in reference to those images, or for that matter how we use the word to refer to the actual person. The object conveys no meaning in itself. It's only as we use concepts within a language that meaning is conferred. If the object conveyed the meaning, then how is it that we understand the meaning of Aristotle? The referent is gone, it no longer exists, so how is it that we understand what the word means?

I don't see why this is any different in the case of "pain". The public expression is just a middle-man; a "hook" with which I can connect the word and the sensation.

When I talk of others being in pain, I'm not talking about them behaving as I do when I have that sensation; I'm talking about them feeling as I do when I have that sensation. The behaviour may be an inevitable consequence, but that's it. — Michael

Yes, again I agree, that in the case of the concept pain, it is just a middle-man, the "hook" as you put it, but it is very important in this case, more so than in the other example. More so because of the beetle-in-the box example, that is, without the pain behavior we wouldn't know if we were referring to the same sensation (the same referent). The pain behavior is essential to understanding correct usage and meaning. My private experience, although important, is not what gives meaning to the words we use, that is, meaning happens as we use words in a rule governed activity (language).

There is another aspect to this that's important, and I think it goes along with what your saying, if I understand you correctly. Without the existence of the pain (the private sensation) there would be no pain behavior, and thus no meaning to convey. This is true, but the existence of the private sensation although necessary for pain behavior, is not necessary for the correct use (meaning) of the word in a language setting. It is a kind of backdrop, a necessary backdrop, as in the case of my prelinguistic beliefs, to the development of language.

It is true that when we talk about the pain of others, we are talking about how they feel. However, how is it that we learn how someone feels? How is it that we learn how to associate the word pain with that feeling? Is it not by observing pain behavior? If there were no pain behavior what feeling would we be referring to (again the beetle-in-the-box)? What would it mean to say that I am in pain without pain behavior in a linguistic context? The pain behavior, although an outgrowth of our private sensations, is a necessary outgrowth in terms of our understanding of the concept. In some cases the middle-man is necessary for meaning and understanding to take place (within language). It is not necessary for my private understanding, but it is necessary for a public understanding.

Note though that he's talking about the public use of the word pain, which is associated with the public expression of our sensations. — Sam26

Right, that's what sensation terms refer to and how we learn their meanings.

None of this denies that there are private sensations, or that there are private beliefs. — Sam26

A belief is about something: "I believe that..." What follows the ellipsis can only be a linguistic statement. Unless by "private" you mean something like "unformulated", where the person is unaware that they hold a particular belief. If that's the case, then I don't think they should be called "private", given the Wittgensteinian connotations (i.e. that they are unable to be made public).

A belief is about something: "I believe that..." What follows the ellipsis can only be a linguistic statement. Unless by "private" you mean something like "unformulated", where the person is unaware that they hold a particular belief. If that's the case, then I don't think they should be called "private", given the Wittgensteinian connotations (i.e. that they are unable to be made public). — Luke

A belief is about something, true, but it doesn't necessarily have to take the form "I believe that..." one's actions can express one's beliefs. And yes the belief is unformulated in terms of language, but as I pointed out in earlier posts which people seem to skip over, is the fact that we know that people who have had no language think in terms of beliefs. People who have been deaf and blind can have quite a sophisticated belief system, quite apart from language.

I need only ask, in the specific case in which you are saying "this is a sheep", why you believe there is anything there at all. — PossibleAaran

Obviously I would believe something is there because I can see it. If I had reason to doubt one specific case it would only be on the unlikely basis that I might be hallucinating, but this doubt would soon be cleared up by corroboration with others, or by feeling the object, checking that it persists, and so on.

The analogy that I drew between non-linguistic beliefs and a dormant life force was made in response to your question/assertion that without non-linguistic beliefs, "what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically?" This appears to indicate that language could not have evolved from scratch, without some assistance from non-linguistic beliefs. I tend to agree with Banno's complaint that this smacks too much of a private language. — Luke

The sharing of a "public" world does not require linguistic ability. Look at the higher social animals for example.

If by doubt you just mean "not certain". But it can also mean "not likely". — Michael

Yeah, that's how we've been discussing doubt, in relation to certainty, in the sense of "it is certain". "It is likely" has a different meaning from "it is certain". If we can exclude doubt with "it is likely", then "it is certain" and "it is likely" end up meaning the same thing, as without a doubt. Wittgenstein's proposal was to base certainty in something which is unreasonable to doubt, but then "it is certain" is reduced to "it is likely", i.e. that which it is unreasonable to doubt.

because I can see it. — Janus

And this means that constitutive rules don't stop the regress. Sense perception does.

Yeah, that's how we've been discussing doubt, in relation to certainty, in the sense of "it is certain". "It is likely" has a different meaning from "it is certain". If we can exclude doubt with "it is likely", then "it is certain" and "it is likely" end up meaning the same thing, as without a doubt. Wittgenstein's proposal was to base certainty in something which is unreasonable to doubt, but then "it is certain" is reduced to "it is likely", i.e. that which it is unreasonable to doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not right at all. To put in some semi-arbitrary percentages, it's certain if the probability is 100%, likely if the probability is >=75%, unlikely if the probability is <= 25%, and impossible if the probability is 0%.

We often use the term "doubt" to refer to something with a low probability, not just to anything that isn't certain. If the likelihood that I will win the game is 95%, then I'm not certain that I will win, but neither am I doubtful. I'm pretty sure that I will win.

"Pretty sure" isn't "certain", but neither is it "doubtful". You're setting up a false dichotomy.

For example, in physics the standard for "proof" is a confidence of 5 sigma. That doesn't mean certainty, but it doesn't mean that it's reasonable to doubt, either. "Doubt" doesn't just mean "not certain".