The analogy that I drew between non-linguistic beliefs and a dormant life force was made in response to your question/assertion that without non-linguistic beliefs, "what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically?" This appears to indicate that language could not have evolved from scratch, without some assistance from non-linguistic beliefs. I tend to agree with Banno's complaint that this smacks too much of a private language. — Luke
This example relies entirely on the shared meanings/concepts of words like "snake" and "dangerous". I really don't believe that Wittgenstein had much interest in what causes our beliefs or how our language developed, which is much more theory than description. I mention this only because you claim this to be your view based on your reading of Wittgenstein. — Luke
How is it any different? Aren't the snake bite and its subsequent effects evidence that snakes can be dangerous? — Luke
How can it be similar to a private language, especially if there is no language present. If we can have beliefs apart from language, and beliefs can arise apart from language, then how is this even remotely similar to having a private language? — Sam26
Let's say that we all have a box with a thing inside which we call a "beetle". We can never see what is in another person's box, only what is in our own. Let's also assume that the thing in my box is nothing like anything else I know. Can I not coin a number of different terms to refer to the various properties of the thing in my box? I don't see why not. And given that nothing else I know of is like the thing in my box, surely it would be impossible for me to teach others what I mean by the words I use to describe the thing in my box? — Michael
Yes, it's easy to imagine. But what sort of properties are you inventing? Can't say? I guess we'll just have to disagree then. — Luke
Note though that he's talking about the public use of the word pain, which is associated with the public expression of our sensations. — Sam26
I'm sure almost all of us will say that the word "pain" refers to the sensation, not to the public expression.
That's why we can talk about people faking pain. — Michael
My point is that the meaning of the word pain gets a foothold in public expressions. The meaning isn't solely tied to my private sensation, which would be the beetle in the box scenario. — Sam26
This seems like saying that the meaning of "Aristotle" gets a foothold in textbooks, given that none of us have ever met the man. The word refers to the philosopher, not the text. — Michael
You say we learn the word "pain" by associating it with certain behaviours, and so therefore these behaviours have something to do with the meaning of the word "pain". How is that any different to learning the word "Aristotle" by associating it with certain texts? — Michael
I know that what I mean by "pain" is the sensation, not the expressions. Wittegenstein can argue all he likes that I'm actually talking about the expressions, but my own reflexive understanding of what I mean when I use the word is far more compelling than his arguments. — Michael
What you say doesn't make sense. You are claiming that the mere possibility of mistake is grounds for questioning a belief--and therefore that we have grounds for questioning all of our beliefs, which is absurd. — aletheist
Belief is a constraint on doubt. — apokrisis
The point isn't that I know and doubt at the same time, but that one's knowledge is always questionable, up to a point. If I say I know X, you might naturally want to know how it is that I know. You want to see for yourself that I'm not mistaken, so your questioning my knowledge. — Sam26
If it's something we both know, then there is no need for me to say to you that I know, especially if we both know that we know. A doubt just wouldn't arise, at least until there is good reason to doubt that we know. — Sam26
As soon as you speak of these foundational or basic beliefs in reference to being justified, or as being true, or as something known, then you are bringing them into the domain of epistemology. Of course the classic example's used in this thread are Moore's proposition's that he claims to know, e.g., - "This is a hand," or "I live on the Earth." — Sam26
The only thing that I would question is this statement. Why can't my belief be private? The language which states a belief is not private, but my belief, it would seem to me, starts out at being private before there is any showing or stating. — Sam26
The possibility of mistake indicates that the belief may be wrong, and if the belief may be wrong, we are justified in doubting it. — Metaphysician Undercover
The possibility of mistake indicates that the belief may be wrong, and if the belief may be wrong, we are justified in doubting it. — Metaphysician Undercover
The possibility of mistake pertains to all of our beliefs; does this mean that we are justified in doubting all of our beliefs? In any case, what you state here is a belief, and it may be wrong; therefore, by its own criterion, I am justified in doubting it. — aletheist
It's possible that I will win the lottery tomorrow, but I'm not justified in doubting that I won't. — Michael
The possibility of mistake pertains to all of our beliefs; does this mean that we are justified in doubting all of our beliefs? — aletheist
In any case, what you state here is a belief, and it may be wrong; therefore, by its own criterion, I am justified in doubting it. — aletheist
As I said, if you cannot demonstrate certainty, then doubt is justified. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then let's use a different example. I've never met Trump; only ever seen him on TV and in photos. I've learned to use the term "Donald Trump" by associating it with certain digital images. But do those digital images have anything to do with the meaning of "Donald Trump". Of course not. The name refers to the man himself. — Michael
I don't see why this is any different in the case of "pain". The public expression is just a middle-man; a "hook" with which I can connect the word and the sensation.
When I talk of others being in pain, I'm not talking about them behaving as I do when I have that sensation; I'm talking about them feeling as I do when I have that sensation. The behaviour may be an inevitable consequence, but that's it. — Michael
Note though that he's talking about the public use of the word pain, which is associated with the public expression of our sensations. — Sam26
None of this denies that there are private sensations, or that there are private beliefs. — Sam26
A belief is about something: "I believe that..." What follows the ellipsis can only be a linguistic statement. Unless by "private" you mean something like "unformulated", where the person is unaware that they hold a particular belief. If that's the case, then I don't think they should be called "private", given the Wittgensteinian connotations (i.e. that they are unable to be made public). — Luke
I need only ask, in the specific case in which you are saying "this is a sheep", why you believe there is anything there at all. — PossibleAaran
The analogy that I drew between non-linguistic beliefs and a dormant life force was made in response to your question/assertion that without non-linguistic beliefs, "what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically?" This appears to indicate that language could not have evolved from scratch, without some assistance from non-linguistic beliefs. I tend to agree with Banno's complaint that this smacks too much of a private language. — Luke
If by doubt you just mean "not certain". But it can also mean "not likely". — Michael
because I can see it. — Janus
Yeah, that's how we've been discussing doubt, in relation to certainty, in the sense of "it is certain". "It is likely" has a different meaning from "it is certain". If we can exclude doubt with "it is likely", then "it is certain" and "it is likely" end up meaning the same thing, as without a doubt. Wittgenstein's proposal was to base certainty in something which is unreasonable to doubt, but then "it is certain" is reduced to "it is likely", i.e. that which it is unreasonable to doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
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