"Everything is in continuous flux." and "We are all involved in sharing experiences." are both statements that you believe are true of ALL minds, which makes it a statement about some state-of-affairs that includes ALL minds, which makes it an objective statement about minds.There is no objective state of affairs. Everything is in continuous flux. We are all involved and sharing experiences.
And when the heck did I ever use the concept of Laws? Everything is constantly changing. However, habits are formed which appear to be repetitive but are always different.
The fundamental error in all academic and scientific analysis of the universe is replacing symbols (which are static) for flow, which is what we are all experiencing. This is where philosophy can step in and say "what the heck"?. Instead philosophy plays along, even substituting some measurement which science calls time for the real thing. — Rich
We are all involved in sharing experiences." are both statements that you believe are true of ALL minds, — Harry Hindu
Consider three movements:
1) S is hypothesized — Cavacava
2) S becomes destabilized as it it is negated (-S) — Cavacava
3) S' the synthesis of S & -S
Determinate negation. — Cavacava
How about it is no longer there, when experienced? Given the time involved in perceptual processing
or It is not as experienced? Given the limitations of perception and the filtering and organization of the perceptual process. — prothero
Does mind create and destroy "Reality"? — prothero
Does mind exist outside of "Reality"? — prothero
Not as I understand the meaning of the terms but we likely have a language problem as well as a philosophical one. — prothero
Well actually there are lots of problems with the assumptions underlying that statement. One is the assumption that the precise state (location in space and time) of anything can be determined to the degree of precision required when talking about infinite divisions of space and time.There are many discernible states of change within the "one BIG STATE" of change that we call the universe. That is what science studies states of change, rates of change and regularities of change. Do you find a problem with that? — Janus
"scholastic realist", and this is not compatible with the idea that he was simply an idealist or a panpsychist; or that he shared their ways of understanding the notion of mind or considering it to be fundamental. — Janus
Maybe what you might consider is rethinking your own views? — Rich
If you don't believe that what philosophers write requires deciphering then that explains your tendency towards simplistic interpretations. — Janus
Peirce is not compatible with what he himself has stated; — Janus
Peirce refers to himself as being something like a "scholastic realist", — Janus
Peirce understood nominalism in the broad anti-realist sense usually attributed to William of Ockham, as the view that reality consists exclusively of concrete particulars and that universality and generality have to do only with names and their significations. This view relegates properties, abstract entities, kinds, relations, laws of nature, and so on, to a conceptual existence at most. Peirce believed nominalism (including what he referred to as "the daughters of nominalism": sensationalism, phenomenalism, individualism, and materialism) to be seriously flawed and a great threat to the advancement of science and civilization. His alternative was a nuanced realism that distinguished reality from existence and that could admit general and abstract entities as reals without attributing to them direct (efficient) causal powers. Peirce held that these non-existent reals could influence the course of events by means of final causation (conceived somewhat after Aristotle's conception), and that to banish them from ontology, as nominalists require, is virtually to eliminate the ground for scientific prediction as well as to underwrite a skeptical ethos unsupportive of moral agency.
I don't believe Peirce intends anything which would suggest panpsychism or idealism as they are usually understood. — Janus
This notion of all things as being evolved psycho-physical unities of some sort places Peirce well within the sphere of what might be called “the grand old-fashioned metaphysicians,” along with such thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Whitehead, et al. Some contemporary philosophers might be inclined to reject Peirce out of hand upon discovering this fact. Others might find his notion of psycho-physical unities not so very off-putting or indeed even attractive. What is crucial is that Peirce argued that mind pervades all of nature in varying degrees: it is not found merely in the most advanced animal species.
That makes him a 'medieval' realist, i.e. accepts the reality of universals - so not a 'realist' in the modern sense. — Wayfarer
He most certainly was a self-described idealist. — Wayfarer
Therefore, even though during the transformation from A to B, neither A or B exist, by B being the only outcome of A's transformation, the transformation will take place by passing through a series of events whose sum will result in the formation of B. — Daniel
I don’t see anything there in which Peirce is said not to be idealist. — Wayfarer
Universals have to be ‘transcendent’ insofar as not being characteristic only of particulars. — Wayfarer
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