Just as brute matter is effete (meaning "no longer effective") mind, so mind would be considered by Peirce to be evolved matter. — Janus

Agree up to this point. I don't think that second statement stacks up in the least against what Peirce thought. Mind being 'evolved matter' is what neo-Darwinists think, and although of course they didn't exist when he was around, it is not at all congruent with his thinking. (Have a look at his ideas on 'agapeism', which are distinctly antagonistic to many of the ideas that would become characteristic of later neo-Darwinism.) In Peirce, 'mind' was much more like Hegel's 'geist'.

Generality is not transcendent because without particularity there can be no generality; it cannot be any more transcendent that particularity. — Janus

I think the depiction of 'universals' as simply 'generalities' amounts to psychologism i.e. it equates them purely with habits of thought. The way that universals transcend particulars is more the fact that individual particulars are simply instances of a universal form. For instance, individuals are simply instances of a species, so the species in a sense 'transcends' the existence of this or that individual.

Agree up to this point. I don't think that second statement stacks up in the least against what Peirce thought. — Wayfarer

What I should have said is that consciousness is evolved matter. Matter is effete mind, ineffective mind, consciousness is thus evolved effete mind, the temporal; development of mind through the creative "taking of habits". The thing that is not in Peirce's ontology is the idea of a foundational pervasive consciousness (as opposed to ineffective mind). There is no doubt that Peirce believed in evolution. I think that his conception of matter as effete mind indicates that he thought that what we think of as mind is, in its basic brutely ineffective forms (forms that we would not normally think of as mind) inherent in nature; and that this explains its emergence in the forms that animals and humans manifest.

Take a look at this SEP entry in order to appreciate some of the subtleties of Peirce's view and its points of commonality and lack of commonality with the German Idealists: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/self-contextualization.html

I think the depiction of 'universals' as simply 'generalities' amounts to psychologism i.e. it equates them purely with habits of thought. — Wayfarer

I don't see why. Generality is as inherent in nature as particularity is; and it is not confined merely to "habits of thought". The habit of thinking generalities could never have developed if there were no generalities in nature. It's true that a species in a sense "transcends" individuals of its class, but there is no reason that I can see to believe this is evidence of a transcendent realm of universal forms. It just shows the ways in which natures "takes habits" to reproduce established patterns.

Matter is effete mind, ineffective mind, consciousness is thus evolved effete mind, — Janus

The distortion, the twisting begins. Just drop some some words, rearrange some, and presto you have something you can live with. Now let's read what he really wrote instead of what you wish he wrote specifically about the mind (probably anticipating philosophers who would try to distort his views).

Peirce took several years to write his paper. It was written in English. Peirce knows how to use the language.

"I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind.

Rarely, have I read any philosophers so perfectly succinct about his views about mind. Bergson took the exact same view as did others, Emerson being one influence.

For all those who enjoy Tychism, I hope you equally enjoy Mind which provides the creative, non-deterministic impulse as well as deadened mind/matter.

The thing that is not in Peirce's ontology is the idea of a foundational pervasive consciousness (as opposed to ineffective mind). — Janus

But that is precisely what is in Peirce. Note that bolded phrase in the passage two posts up: 'mind pervades all nature'. It is pretty close to pan-psychism, really. And from that article you just linked to:
'This single substance of Peirce's metaphysical monism, Peirce seems to associate with with objective idealists, especially with the Geist of Hegel'. This is a point that I have taken up with Apokrisis at various times - I think the notion of 'mind' in Peirce ultimately goes back to the 'nous' of the Western tradition. That is what makes him an idealist - just as the SEP article says. And the addendum on his links with German idealism say that ultimately, he identified as more or less a Kantian - with some caveats. As I said, this is partially because of when he wrote - it was before the rebellion of analytical philosophy against Continental idealism.

there is no reason that I can see to believe this is evidence of a transcendent realm of universal forms — Janus

I think the problem lies with the concept of a 'transcendent realm' because the concept 'objectifies' the idea - tries to depict it in a spatio-temporal sense. Of course, we can't imagine 'where' such a realm might be, and so, how it could actually be 'a realm'. But I think the expression is meant in the same sense as expressions such as 'the realm of natural numbers' or 'the domain of laws', which are in some sense a metaphorical use of the term 'domain' or 'realm'. However I still think that such realms and domains are perfectly real - but that they're not objectively existent, they're not 'out there somewhere'. The reality of numbers, for example, must already be assumed by thought, in order to arrive at an understanding at what is objectively the case. I mean, science does this at every instance, by calculating sameness, difference, distribution, frequency, and so on. It is only by quantification that it is able to derive such ideas as means, averages, patterns, and the like, by which an objective judgement is validated. But notice that the mathematical reasoning that science relies on to derive such facts, is not in itself part of the objective realm, mathematical truths being 'transcendent' in that sense. Scientists make quantified predictions based on hypotheses and then test them against nature, which tells them whether their hypotheses are correct. And they may get the maths wrong, but the general fact is that maths provides all the yardsticks against which such judgements are made. That is the sense in which mathematics is 'transcendent'; mathematical truths are 'always already the case'.

I think the problem is, that this notion of 'transcendental' sits uneasily with current philosophy. That is why such Platonistic intuitions are more than unfashionable, they're almost politically incorrect.

I think the problem is, that this notion of 'transcendental' sits uneasily with current philosophy. That is why such Platonistic intuitions are more than unfashionable, they're almost politically incorrect. — Wayfarer

I think the problem is really that they are unintelligible. Hegel's notion of spirit is not a transcendental notion, but a notion of immanence; for Hegel spirit just is matter looked at from a different perspective; similar to Spinoza. I agree that this is in line with what Peirce wants to say, too. Nowhere that I can remember (and I have read quite a bit of Peirce over many years) does he identify himself as a Platonist. I'll try to respond in more detail to the rest of your post later.

It's not like the simplistic picture you are wanting to paint. Take a look at this SEP entry on this Schelling: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schelling/#2 paying particular attention to'2. Transcendental Philosophy and Naturphilosophie'.

if you disagree with what he wrote, then just disagree with him. His description is pristine clear and carefully crafted. He knew that he had to deal with the question of mind and matter and he did. Good for him. And he didn't need 15000 pages to do it. When someone knows what they want to convey, it can be done very succinctly. It's when someone has no idea what they are talking about when obfuscation and long windiness becomes the tool, hoping that the mass of words will hide that there is nothing there.

In one short, succinct paragraph Peirce related what was on his on mind. A breath of fresh air.

I think the problem is really that they are unintelligible. — Janus

‘Not understood’, more likely.

The problem is that apparently no coherent account of the reality of transcendent forms can be given; if an intelligible explanation had been propounded by anyone, no doubt we would all know about it.

Oh well, I remain unconvinced that you have any idea what was on Peirce's mind.

“The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category … suffices to make the world… .” (CP, 5.436).

The "third category" is what you would call "mind".

https://screenshots.firefox.com/rxVQpiIITv13H3Vn/en.wikipedia.org

From Schelling System of Transcendental Philosophy Introduction 3. 'Preliminary Division of Transcendental Philosophy':

"Now it is certainly a productive activity that finds expression in willing; all free action is productive, albeit consciously productive. If we now suppose, since the two activities have only to be one in principle, that the same activity which is consciously productive in free action,is productive without consciousness in bringing about the world, then our predetermined harmony is real, and the contradiction resolved."

The rest of the text is here:

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/schellin.htm

Oh well, I remain unconvinced that you have any idea what was on Peirce's mind. — Janus

And you do? First you didn't even know about his own writings on the subject. Then, when presented, you completely ignore it. Then you simply rewrite it to your own taste. Then you start quotng some 5th removed text. Remarkable. It reminds me of the "academic scholars" who declare Bohmian Mechanics deterministic despite Bohm's own specific writings to the contrary.

Apparently an author's writings don't count much.

The point is that we have to know how to reach from A to B. That requires nothing between. It cannot be something, lets call it C, since we need to know how to reach from A to C.

We have of course no reason to assume that our discrete representations are literally representative of a discrete reality undergoing state transitions, for we never observe precise and static states undergoing transition, rather we just see a fuzzy dynamic procession that we carve up into neat pieces for sake of approximate analysis.

So perhaps you argument should be interpreted as a modus-tollens that leads to a rejection this assumption, rather than an argument for a separate mental substance. I'm not even sure how introducing an overseer solves the problem without introducing it at another level.

We have of course no reason to assume that our discrete representations are literally representative of a discrete reality undergoing state transitions, for we never observe precise and static states undergoing transition, rather we just see a fuzzy dynamic procession that we carve up into neat pieces for sake of approximate analysis. — sime

I don't know whether the reality is discrete or continuous. Regardless you can develop a same model for continuous case.

So perhaps you argument should be interpreted as a modus-tollens that leads to a rejection this assumption, rather than an argument for a separate mental substance. — sime

You are left with mere experience, if we accept that experience is by product of physical activity, which does not have any causal power. To be honest I believe on mind but I don't understand what is the use of brain when it comes to experience and act.

I'm not even sure how introducing an overseer solves the problem without introducing it at another level. — sime

What is another problem?

And you do? First you didn't even know about his own writings on the subject. Then, when presented, you completely ignore it. — Rich

Your assumption that I was unaware of Peirce's The Law of Mind is incorrect. I asked you to cite passages and provide arguments for your particular interpretation of those passages; which you have failed to do. You interpret tendentiously and then protest that your interpretation must be correct because Peirce is so transparent that no interpretation is required. I am reasonably familiar with a good portion of Peirce's writings, the ones contained in two collections that I have owned for about fifteen years: Charles S Peirce: Selected Writings and Philosophical writings of Peirce edited by Philip P Wiener and Justus Buchler respectively. I know that Peirce is a complex and subtle thinker, and I also know that the philosophical questions concerning idealism and realism are nuanced and complicated in general.

So, when I see someone like you who reads superficially and interprets in order to satisfy their pet agenda, an agenda that they never cease to go on about, I can only laugh and shrug my shoulders. If you want to develop philosophically you need to learn that the writings of complex thinkers require considerable effort to understand and interpret and that the meaning of the content in individual essays always needs to be interpreted against their whole body of work.

Continuing your example, say there is a determinable state A followed by a determinable state B, and we call the transition from the first to the second states 'C'. You claim that C must be "nothing". I say that it must be an indeterminable state because "nothing" is impossible. C is something but it is not a determinable something.

I asked you to cite passages and provide arguments for your particular interpretation o — Janus

There is no need to interpret. This is not ancient Greek. It is plain English and unusually succinct and pristine for philosophical writings which usually meander into total obfuscation and meaningless rambling. I'll leave the distortions, or what you call sophisticated intepretation, to you.

"Plain English! LOL, it seems you are a lost cause, then. You should be posting on some New Age forums instead of here if you think sophisticated interpretation of philosophical writing is not required.

Mind is a result of the growth of tychism. Matter is deadened mind.

Very, very straightforward.

The Law of the Mind.

What, in your own words, is "the growth of tychism"? What is mind? What is matter? Explain you interpretation of Peirce.

No need for me to "interpret". I have my own views of Mind. Peirce has his views.

"I argued further in favor of that way of thinking, which it will be convenient to christen tychism (from τύχη, chance)."

" I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth,"

and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind..

It's straight forward. I don't agree entirely, but that is my view. I don't layer my views on Peirce.

If you're not prepared or able to say in your own words what you think Peirce means, and how you think that what you think he means entails that consciousness is fundamental to reality, then that surely signals the end of this discussion.

he means entails that consciousness is fundamental to reality — Janus

Actually he wrote Tychism and Mind are fundamental. That is why he titled his paper Law if the Mind.

Continuing your example, say there is a determinable state A followed by a determinable state B, and we call the transition from the first to the second states 'C'. You claim that C must be "nothing". I say that it must be an indeterminable state because "nothing" is impossible. C is something but it is not a determinable something. — Janus

C cannot be an indeterminate state. How could you get something determinate, B, from something indeterminate, C? You need nothing to allow changes and mind to know, and perform changes.

Yes, but that goes back to my original point that I believe that Peirce is not referring to consciousness or perception as being fundamental, but to the tendency of matter, as "effete mind", to take habits, which leads to the possibility of sign relations and evolved states such as consciousness.

Do you have an argument for why something determinate cannot proceed from something indeterminate?

Nope. You left out Mind and jumped right too "effete mind" or matter, because this better dovetails with your biased interpretation. He clearly indicates Mind (not matter) is fundamental. He even described matter as deadened Mind. He didn't title his paper the Law of Matter.

Do you have an argument for why something determinate cannot proceed from something indeterminate? — Janus

Yes, an indeterminate state could lead into many determinate things since it is indifferent.

Outline your argument for the distinctions you claim he is making then. Of course my interpretation is biased; all interpretations, including yours, are biased. No one knows for sure what Peirce really had in mind; that's why there are scholars who spend lifetimes studying the great philosophers and disagreeing over how to interpret them.