It's magic that trees aren't chairs, or that cats aren't dogs, or that brain activity isn't a fusion reactor? — Michael

Exactly, the whole theory if materialism rests on a magical Miracle of the greatest sort. In a nutshell, "it all just happens".

Meaningless philosophy with the sole goal being to claim everything is material. Totally laughable.

oh, my guess is you a agree Mind directs the whole body? Right?

If 5 pages of Michael's careful and patient explanation of the materialist position hasn't disabused you of your preconceptions, I'm not about to start another 5 pages of exposition.

Out of courtesy, I will happily answer your question. I think that the body is directed by the body.

Did you read Michael's carefully crafted messages. The Mind is the Body. They are identical. The Mind directs the body. How does that grab you?

Let me put it this way. The Mind is Life is the Body. I'm cool with this "materialistic" philosophy.

I think that the body is directed by the body. — Pseudonym

That's nice. The Mind is the Body - according the New Age Materialism. Ask Michael.

I think that were a materialist to say that then they'd be sort of skipping over the hard problem, or perhaps have written it off as a pseudo-problem. If one were to take the hard problem seriously then, to be a materialist, one would have to deny that there is such a thing as consciousness (as defined by the hard problem, at least) -- since even functionalism is adeqaute enough to account for mental processes and the effects of a nervous system on a body, but doesn't say much about consciousness.


I think the OP's article conflates consciousness with awareness as it related to perception, at least with respect to the discussion of the hard problem of consciousness. The feely-ness of the world differs from the amount of concentration a learning system needs to learn, or whether or not they are aware of a perception or if that perception is subliminal.


Sorry if that's off topic. I reflexively read "consciousness" in terms of the hard problem.

I think the hard problem is only a problem if you subscribe to substance or property dualism. If you reject the notion of there being something like qualia that is distinct from brain activity then you don't need to explain how the latter gives rises to (or otherwise interacts with) the former.

Hrmm, that's not how I understand it at all. Substance or property dualism would be an explanation for the hard problem, not a problem for the hard problem.

I'd say the hard problem is posited on the basis that consciousness exists, 1, and the standard physicalisms are unable to account for the fact. By standard I just mean the one's you list -- behavior, identity, functional, or eliminative.

There are people who lay claim to non-reductive physicalism, but I don't think the metaphysical stance is quite as clear as the other four. It's usually kind of idiosyncratic and unworked out -- sort of like saying, hey, consciousness exists, and it is physical, because. . . it's convenient that way? That is, the "because..." doesn't seem to work out what physicalism means like the other four have.

The hard problem was coined by Chalmers in Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness:

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

...

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect.

There's no problem of explaining how physical processes "give rise" to something else if you reject the premise that there is something else. There is just the information processing, and this can be explained by everyday neuroscience.

Sure. I allowed for that possibility. I didn't explicitly say that the premise had to be denied, but that's what I meant by "skipping over or written off as a pseudo-problem"

Would it be considered a panpaychism to theorize that what we consider unique about consciousness, its 'aboutness' and 'feeling of what it is like' , is not something inside a mind but the pre-condition for understanding any notion of existing things? What I'm getting at isn't the standard naturalist mode of starting from the assumption of objective matter in the one hand and inner subjectivity on the other and then explaining the latter by sprinkling it it like a spice on matter. Instead, the idea here is to suggest that what is thought of as matter and inner subjectivity are both derivative abstractions from a dynamic of meaning-making that isn't yet either objective or subjective , it rather makes it impossible to talk about an 'object' without already bringing into play notions of contextual transformation and interelationality that complicate any claim to nearly separate, at any level, first personal and third personal modes of experience.
You'll find this kind of thinking in its embryonic form in James and Dewey, and in Husserl.
It's been developed in many directions by enactive embodied cognitive scientists and philosophers who are incorporating the ideas of phenomenology. I particularly recommend the work of Shaun Gallagher. Also Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson.

There is just the information processing, and this can be explained by everyday neuroscience. — Michael

Of course not. The best explanation I ever heard by ba neuro-scientist was that "it was all very complicated". Which is a bit more than what you are saying, which is complete denial (I suggested this stance in my original reply - illusion and/or denial).

But we drift. I thought you presented materialism as representing Mind and Brain (undefined) Matter as identical. What happened to that?

Would it be considered a panpaychism to theorize that what we consider unique about consciousness, its 'aboutness' and 'feeling of what it is like' , is not something inside a mind but the pre-condition for understanding any notion of existing things? — Joshs

I don't believe in materialism. In fact I used exclamation to show the irony in the statement. How consciousness which arises from material process can possibly affect the material process which created the consciousness. I don't believe in panpaychism too. I don't think a collective experience can have causal effect. There should be at least a mind.

You'll find this kind of thinking in its embryonic form in James and Dewey, and in Husserl.
It's been developed in many directions by enactive embodied cognitive scientists and philosophers who are incorporating the ideas of phenomenology. I particularly recommend the work of Shaun Gallagher. Also Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson. — Joshs

Thanks for the references.

Yes, cause exists. It explains how a piece of matter affects another piece. — bahman

A journal article I once read concerning the same topics as this thread--physicalism and epiphenomenalism--pointed out that we do not observe causation, we only observe relationships.

I have brought up before here the strong case made by even other sources against the existence of causes, causation, etc.

We separate two events in our minds and we use induction to conclude that one caused the other. But, it is my understanding, nobody has ever observed any such "causing" happening.

Again, if causes, causation do not exist, why does materialism matter?

We separate two events in our minds and we use induction to conclude that one caused the other. But, it is my understanding, nobody has ever observed any such "causing" happening. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

During my everyday experience, I find myself feeling that I want to move my hand in a particular manner and then feeling my hand move in that manner. My mind is causing my hand to move.

But, it is my understanding, nobody has ever observed any such "causing" happening. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Seems awful like experience things causing other things all the time. Sometimes I'm wrong about what's causing what, and confuse correlation for causation.

I don't know anything like non-physical process. — bahman

Me either. The same goes for "physical" processes. I asked what does it mean to be physical or non-physical.

Me either. The same goes for "physical" processes. I asked what does it mean to be physical or non-physical. — Harry Hindu

To me physical is made of stuff and has form, such as chair. I cannot comprehend non-physical thing such as mind.

To me physical is made of stuff and has form — bahman

It is perceived and sensed as such. Under analysis, as we peer deeper, it gradually becomes more-and more non-physical, quantitized. There is no separation or solidity.

I cannot comprehend non-physical thing such as mind. — bahman

Your mind may be different from mine, but I have dreams all the time as well as other images.

There is really no difference between the two. They are ultimately all wave forms. It is what we feel that is different. Our minds (consciousness) feel.

A journal article I once read concerning the same topics as this thread--physicalism and epiphenomenalism--pointed out that we do not observe causation, we only observe relationships. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Could you please provide the reference?

I have brought up before here the strong case made by even other sources against the existence of causes, causation, etc.

We separate two events in our minds and we use induction to conclude that one caused the other. But, it is my understanding, nobody has ever observed any such "causing" happening.

Again, if causes, causation do not exist, why does materialism matter? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Yes, that is true. We can never observe causation. The only thing that we can observe is correlation between events. I am however not sure that we can prove that causation does not exist therefore materialism might be relevant.

It is perceived and sensed as such. Under analysis, as well peer deeper, it gradually becomes more-and more non-physical, quantitized. — Rich

Quantized things are physical and have forms.

There is no separation our solidity. — Rich

What do you mean?

At the deepest level there is no solidity anywhere in nature. We feel "forces". That is all. The mind it's fundamentally all about feeling.

To me physical is made of stuff and has form, such as chair. I cannot comprehend non-physical thing such as mind. — bahman

What do you mean by "stuff"? The mind is made of stuff too and has form. How else can you even talk about it and how it changes?

How do you even know that a chair is made up of different "stuff" than the mind? Is it the fact that you can touch the chair and feel it's solidity? "Feeling the chair" is one of the forms the mind takes, as well as "sitting in the chair". Asking if you can feel a mind is like asking if the chair can sit on itself.