I disagree that these "non-propositional commitments" are necessarily certainties. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your explanation of my belief...
— creativesoul
It's "your explanation of my behaviour". — Banno
...example of contrary? — Banno
Your explanation of my behaviour is equivalent to neither my belief, — creativesoul
I'm asking, why the sometimes? Can you give an example of a belief not shown by behaviour?Behavior shows belief, sometimes... — creativesoul
And again, for the purposes of this thread we are assuming there are such things and delving into their nature. — Banno
But the present line of thought is one we have been over innumerable times. — Banno
Ha. If I am right in my explanation of your behaviour, then I have set out your belief. — Banno
I'm asking, why the sometimes? Can you give an example of a belief not shown by behaviour? — Banno
Any and all cases of deliberately misleading behaviour. — creativesoul
↪Sam26 An excellent post.
From your source:
Crucially, our basic certainties are not subject to rational evaluation; for instance, they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence and thus they would be non-propositional in character (that is to say, they can be neither true nor false). Accordingly, they are not beliefs at all; rather, they are the expression of arational, non-propositional commitments.
So if you are to maintain that hinge propositions are beliefs, you must maintain that they are propositional.
That's close to my criticism; that pre-linguistic beliefs are statable, even if unstated. — Banno
I'm asking, why the sometimes? Can you give an example of a belief not shown by behaviour?
— Banno
Any and all cases of deliberately misleading behaviour. — creativesoul
Any and all cases of deliberately misleading behaviour.
— creativesoul
Wouldn't such behaviour be evidence of another, overriding belief? Not telling the axe-weilding thug at your door where someone is, is evidence of a certain belief, no? — Banno
There's an interesting thing happening with the claim that all belief are stateable. While I agree with that, it quite simply does not follow that all beliefs are propositional, nor linguistic. That is because of the content of belief. It is correlational. Thus, if we correctly set out the connections drawn by the agent, we've stated their belief in a sense, despite the agent's having no language. — creativesoul
There's an interesting thing happening with the claim that all belief are stateable. While I agree with that, it quite simply does not follow that all beliefs are propositional, nor linguistic. That is because of the content of belief. It is correlational. Thus, if we correctly set out the connections drawn by the agent, we've stated their belief in a sense, despite the agent's having no language.
— creativesoul
I don't follow this paragraph at all. It seems to contradict itself. Can you clarify? — Banno
Can we agree that it would not be viable to play chess against someone who doubted the movement of the pieces? — Banno
You appear to agree that all beliefs are statable, then deny that they are propositional.
It might be my confusion of statement and proposition, but doesn't that imply that there are beliefs that do not admit to being either confirmed or disconfirmed?
Sam seems to think something like this, that there are beliefs that are neither confirmable nor disconfirmable, adding that such beliefs are true, and indubitable, and hence not propositional. — Banno
I think we're having a fine discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover
If he's not knowing, then I think he's doubting. Agree? — Metaphysician Undercover
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