I may have missed it, but I don't see how you deal with the argument I quoted, which seems to show that hinge statements cannot be propositional because they cannot be either confirmed or disconfirmed.

Or is it that you are rejecting the idea that beliefs are propositional?

Again, I take the common view that a belief sets out a relation between a proposition and the attitude of an agent.

I disagree that these "non-propositional commitments" are necessarily certainties. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are not necessary certainties. Just certainties. They do not hav to apply in every possible world.

I am saying that such commitments may not be certainties at all. In fact I think it's a mistake to refer to them as certainties.

And I am saying that they are simply a given.

A given is something taken for granted. But it's not necessary to take it for granted, one may decline it, just like a proposition may be declined, and that is doubt.

A commitment is an obligation. But just as much as one person may feel obliged to take what is given, for granted, another person might feel obliged to request justification for it (doubt it).

And both can provide good examples of hinge propositions.

So why would anyone insist that hinge propositions are indubitable? They are not certainties, and they are only accepted if one feels obliged to do so. The "indubitable' characteristic is dependent on the obligation, but since they are not certainties the obligation has no efficacy to prevent doubt.

There's nothing new here, is there? And again, for the purposes of this thread we are assuming there are such things and delving into their nature.

One of your previous questions has led me to look to examining the different sorts of indubitable statements. But the present line of thought is one we have been over innumerable times.

Your explanation of my belief...
— creativesoul

It's "your explanation of my behaviour". — Banno

So be it. Your explanation of my behaviour is equivalent to neither my belief, nor my behaviour.

...example of contrary? — Banno

I do not follow you here.

What are you asking me for an example to the contrary of?

We can keep it interesting, despite my absences...

Your explanation of my behaviour is equivalent to neither my belief, — creativesoul

Ha. If I am right in my explanation of your behaviour, then I have set out your belief.

Behavior shows belief, sometimes... — creativesoul

I'm asking, why the sometimes? Can you give an example of a belief not shown by behaviour?

And again, for the purposes of this thread we are assuming there are such things and delving into their nature. — Banno

Yes, we assume that there are "hinge-propositions". The point I am making, is that as we are "delving into their nature", it becomes more and more evident that "indubitable" in relation to "hinge-propositions" is a false predication.

But the present line of thought is one we have been over innumerable times. — Banno

That's very true, but Sam26 is providing us with more and more information, such that the true nature of the "hinge propositions" is becoming more and more evident. Once we expose exactly what they are, and how they exist, it will be easier to see whether they are indubitable or not.

If it is revealed that "indubitable" is a false predication, then what becomes of Wittgenstein's response to the skeptic?

OK.

Let's look a the bishop example one more time.

Can we agree that it would not be viable to play chess against someone who doubted the movement of the pieces?

Ha. If I am right in my explanation of your behaviour, then I have set out your belief. — Banno

I don't know about that Banno. At least I do not think that that is always the case. While I do hold that one can correctly report upon both, another's belief and behaviour.

I'm asking, why the sometimes? Can you give an example of a belief not shown by behaviour? — Banno

Any and all cases of deliberately misleading behaviour.

Any and all cases of deliberately misleading behaviour. — creativesoul

Wouldn't such behaviour be evidence of another, overriding belief? Not telling the axe-weilding thug at your door where someone is, is evidence of a certain belief, no?

↪Sam26 An excellent post.

From your source:
Crucially, our basic certainties are not subject to rational evaluation; for instance, they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence and thus they would be non-propositional in character (that is to say, they can be neither true nor false). Accordingly, they are not beliefs at all; rather, they are the expression of arational, non-propositional commitments.

So if you are to maintain that hinge propositions are beliefs, you must maintain that they are propositional.

That's close to my criticism; that pre-linguistic beliefs are statable, even if unstated. — Banno

I'd like to remark upon this. It goes back to what I was setting out earlier...

I agree with Banno here in a very specific way. If it is the case that hinge propositions are beliefs, then it must be the case that they are propositional. Hence, the name. I do not even think for a second that that went unnoticed by Witty. He is working from the framework of his contemporaries...

It was wrong.

Once again, it's all about the content of belief.

There's an interesting thing happening with the claim that all belief are stateable. While I agree with that, it quite simply does not follow that all beliefs are propositional, nor linguistic. That is because of the content of belief. It is correlational. Thus, if we correctly set out the connections drawn by the agent, we've stated their belief in a sense, despite the agent's having no language.

I'm asking, why the sometimes? Can you give an example of a belief not shown by behaviour?
— Banno

Any and all cases of deliberately misleading behaviour. — creativesoul

Any and all cases of deliberately misleading behaviour.
— creativesoul

Wouldn't such behaviour be evidence of another, overriding belief? Not telling the axe-weilding thug at your door where someone is, is evidence of a certain belief, no? — Banno

I offered an example of belief not shown by behaviour. It's quite nuanced, as you are aware, in all of the ways that insincerity is...

There's an interesting thing happening with the claim that all belief are stateable. While I agree with that, it quite simply does not follow that all beliefs are propositional, nor linguistic. That is because of the content of belief. It is correlational. Thus, if we correctly set out the connections drawn by the agent, we've stated their belief in a sense, despite the agent's having no language. — creativesoul

I don't follow this paragraph at all. It seems to contradict itself. Can you clarify?

The belief is shown by the deception.

OK, I'll take your point and adjust the definition to belief being the best explanation for some coherent set of behaviours...

(adjusts weight to back foot...)

There's an interesting thing happening with the claim that all belief are stateable. While I agree with that, it quite simply does not follow that all beliefs are propositional, nor linguistic. That is because of the content of belief. It is correlational. Thus, if we correctly set out the connections drawn by the agent, we've stated their belief in a sense, despite the agent's having no language.
— creativesoul

I don't follow this paragraph at all. It seems to contradict itself. Can you clarify? — Banno

Yeah, that's unusual enough to be difficult to wrap one's head around.

What do you find self-contradictory? Precisely as possible, I mean...

Can we agree that it would not be viable to play chess against someone who doubted the movement of the pieces? — Banno

Right, I wouldn't play if I thought the person might cheat. How would I know whether the person was a cheater or not?

You appear to agree that all beliefs are statable, then deny that they are propositional.

It might be my confusion of statement and proposition, but doesn't that imply that there are beliefs that do not admit to being either confirmed or disconfirmed?

Sam seems to think something like this, that there are beliefs that are neither confirmable nor disconfirmable, adding that such beliefs are true, and indubitable, and hence not propositional.

Suppose you are white and move the queen's pawn, aiming at a Queen's gambit. Your opponent says "you can't do that!"

How do you proceed?

I don't know, I really don't play chess and I'm only vaguely familiar with it. I'm not really into games. I had bad experiences as a child, finding out halfway through, that the others were playing by different rules than I. And even after consulting the printed rules, they'd insist that these are the rules they play by regardless of what it says on the box.

So because of your uncertainty we cannot begin the discussion.

That is, we need some sort of certainty in order to get started.

You appear to agree that all beliefs are statable, then deny that they are propositional.

It might be my confusion of statement and proposition, but doesn't that imply that there are beliefs that do not admit to being either confirmed or disconfirmed?

Sam seems to think something like this, that there are beliefs that are neither confirmable nor disconfirmable, adding that such beliefs are true, and indubitable, and hence not propositional. — Banno

I do agree that all beliefs are stateable. The overwhelming majority of beliefs are propositional(take the form thereof... belief statements). Where you and I differ, as well as Sam and I(I think), regards the content of belief. Sam notices and attempts to make sense of how language gets off the ground without belief. If all belief has only propositional content, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language(which they are on my view), then so too are all beliefs(which they aren't on my view). I think you agree here.

I suspect that you don't worry about such things as how language gets off the ground. I mean, there is an overriding notion of not being able to get 'beneath' language. That would be true if the content of all belief were propositional. If some belief consists entirely of correlations drawn by a prelinguistic agent, then we can, because there's nothing stopping us from using language to acquire knowledge of that which exists - in and of itself - prior to...

So...

All correlation is thought and/or belief.
All predication is correlation.
Not all correlation is predication.

I think we're having a fine discussion. Why do you think we need to be certain of anything in order to have a discussion? Usually in discussion I find many mistakes in interpretation, so I think it's better to approach discussion without an attitude of certitude.

I think we're having a fine discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure we are. But then, we are both confident that we are talking epistemology on a web site in English.

If that were not the case, how would our discussion proceed?

If he's not knowing, then I think he's doubting. Agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope.