1. Event B occurs.
2. When event A occurs event B follows.
3. Therefore, event A occured before B. — Magnus Anderson
If we are going to use B to justify A, then we ought be more confident in B than in A. It would be odd to attempt a justification with evidence that was weaker than what is being justified. — Banno
So the surprise - the disproof of an inductive metaphysics - would be if your pissed-away bottle of red magically reconstituted again itself each night, like a Magic Pudding. — apokrisis
...the first question, which is "how can we hope to have certain knowledge?", will remain unanswered. I think the first question makes no sense at all. — Magnus Anderson
So abduction, if I understand you correctly, is a pattern of no-pattern of thinking. You say that it is the least formalisable pattern of thinking which suggests to me that it lacks pattern to a considerable degree. Or it could be that the pattern is complex and thus difficult to understand and formalise? Which one of the two is the case? I am inclined to think the former but I like to keep my options open. — Magnus Anderson
So if abduction is a process of thinking that has very little pattern within itself, this means that abduction is mostly a random process. It's basically random guessing. — Magnus Anderson
If you see a disembodied head lying on the floor you are not going to assume "someone clapped his heads and this head popped out of nowhere" you are going to assume something like "someone's head has been cut off". That betrays order. Not necessarily in reality but in thought. — Magnus Anderson
Abduction has the following form:
1. Event B occurs.
2. When event A occurs event B follows.
3. Therefore, event A occured before B. — Magnus Anderson
It seems odd, then, to back up one's belief that the chooks will lay eggs tomorrow with a vast, profound theory of pragmatism. — Banno
And yet it is true that this sentence is in English. We can be certain of it. — Banno
I don't really know what justification is. Everyone is talking about, and everyone is asking how, to justify this belief or to justify that belief; everyone has certain kinds of philosophical problems that they want others to solve for them or that they themselves want to solve or have solved. But most of these philosophical problems are alien to me. I do not understand what exactly is problematic. So I have to ask, unfortunately, and I believe that by doing so I will remain within the boundaries of the topic, what exactly is justification? — Magnus Anderson
some guy named Plato comes along and says that knowledge is "justified true belief" without ever explaining to whom a belief should be justified. To ourselves? But what does it mean to justify our beliefs to ourselves? — Magnus Anderson
Giving them a name does not alter their invalidity. — Banno
But the future is not like the past.
Yesterday I had a full bottle of red. Now it is only half full.
Supposing that the future is like the past requires quite a selective view. — Banno
Deduction is basically playing with definitions; nothing more. — charleton
Don't buy into this free will clap trap, as this flies in the face of the massive advances in science of the last 250 years which assert determinism. — charleton
Reductive explanation is a reason to believe. It is the standard reason we believe in everything else, that we have a reductive explanation for its being the case.
The comment I was disputing was "he is simply saying that the reasoning of science cannot justify them, [the passions]".
My argument was, in what way can the reasoning of science "justify" anything other than by explaining the causal chain of its existence back a few steps? — Pseudonym
I have a passion 'hunger', science can explain exactly what that passion is in physical terms (brain states), why it is there causally (DNA - protein synthesis - neurons development - interaction with the environment), and also why it is there teleologically (evolutionary function of hunger). What additional thing can science provide with regards to the proposition "the sky is blue" that is missing from what science can tell us about passions such as to warrant the distinction made? — Pseudonym
Neat diagram.
Notice that the syllogisms under Inductive and Abductive are invalid?
Giving them a name does not alter their invalidity. — Banno
I believe this would depend on your metaphysical assumptions. It sounds like you are taking a nominalist position which would reduce deduction to the abstract rules of description. — Perplexed
Only if you accept that free will is defined as not compelled to act from external forces.Does this mean that you believe free will to be incompatible with determinism? — Perplexed
Does this mean that you believe free will to be incompatible with determinism? Would you then say that our sense of free will is an illusion? — Perplexed
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