Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Edward Feser

Some Brief Arguments for Dualism

Some Brief Arguments for Dualism — Wayfarer

Rather that's a brief argument for semiotics and the epistemic cut.

Yes, it shows that there is a separation of our "minds" from "the world". The interpretation of marks is separate from the physics of the marks. And in turn, that informational separation is how interpretance can arise to regulate the actual physics of the world with some purpose in mind.

But actual dualism is avoided by there being that living connection - the feedback loop which connects the two sides of the modelling relation. The habits of interpretance can only survive to the degree they do useful material work.

So the mind is actually free or transcendent. It is embodied and rooted in an ultimately physicalist purpose.

Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. — Edward Feser

This just begs the question. They don't seem devoid of meaning to someone who thinks that 'meaning' is a particular brain sate. Then they have 'meaning', in that they cause this particular brain state. Obviously if you've decided that 'meaning' is a thing other than a brain state then you're going to prove that 'meaning' must be separate from physical processes, but that requires that you already believe 'meaning' is a thing, so you've already committed to dualism anyway. It's not an 'argument' for dualism, it's just a statement of the author's belief in it.

Some Brief Arguments for Dualism — Wayfarer

What are the physical processes in the brain for?

What are the physical processes in the brain for? — bahman

If you are asking what they are doing, they are the transmission/receiving mechanism for the mind(s) that permeate the body. The nervous system is the mind's communication network. It too is living.

It seems to me that it is hard to apply determinism to mental states for various reasons.The main reason for this is the conceptual or representational content of mental states.

Facts or propositions that the mind deals with depend either on the nature of the external the word or logical relations. So for example Paris is the capital of France and 2 + 2 = 4 are facts regardless of which state the brain is in.

A brain state could be something like "neuron A and B caused Neuron C to fire"

Now if Neuron "A" represented "Paris" and Neuron "B" represented "Capital" and Neuron "C" represented "England" you can see how the firing of neurons here would not preserve a factual state of affairs.
So the one issue is that facts of the world are independent of brain states. The other issue is that it is hard to imagine how neuronal firings could preserve conceptual relationships.

Another issue concerns how we could challenge our beliefs if neuronal firings just forced us into particular mental states.

Also there is the problem of how beliefs cause other beliefs. Believing that Paris the Capital of France doesn't cause any other beliefs. I can't immediately see what would conceptually link mental states or brain states and beliefs together or to make one cause another. — Andrew4Handel

Ideas trigger similar, or related, ideas in my head. So my ideas are causally influenced by some other idea, and it's not the same for everyone, as it is based on experience.

Real world events, not just ideas, can trigger other ideas. I don't see how causation isn't involved in both mental states interacting with each other and mental states interacting with states of affairs in the world.

Natural selection is the process by which mental states came to represent external states more and more accurately.

If you are asking what they are doing, they are the transmission/receiving mechanism for the mind(s) that permeate the body. The nervous system is the mind's communication network. It too is living. — Rich

So that is mind which experience, decide and act? Which does thinking?

The mind is seeking to create. It uses its memory to direct actions in order to help achieve some future possibility. To understand the nature of the mind is only as easy or as difficult as understanding oneself, one's own mind. It is right there experiencing and creating.

Ideas trigger similar, or related, ideas in my head. So my ideas are causally influenced by some other idea, and it's not the same for everyone, as it is based on experience. — Harry Hindu

I don't see how semantic content is causal like say neuronal firings. Ideas are conceptually related but that does not equal causal relations. Thinking "Paris is the Capital of France" doesn't cause any more behaviour or thought in me or any determined next content (such as I rush to the shop to by garlic bread).

I am also concerned with a proposed linkage of mental states to brain states and how mental content could be determined this way and preserve coherence.

The behaviourist model is that idea that constant co-firing of neurons makes one idea trigger another through constant conjunction like Pavlov's dog's saliva and bells. However salivation was an inappropriate response to a bell because bells do not always signal food (nor do they "mean" food) and that type of learning makes lots of errors that we don't.

The main problem I was highlighting though is that if thoughts are determined then we can't evaluate them for truth. Like the dogs couldn't control salivating.

What are the physical processes in the brain for? — bahman

Sir Charles Sherrington (physiologist) once claimed that most brain activity was related to action.

"The brain seems a thoroughfare for nerve-action passing its way to the motor animal. It has been remarked that Life's aim is an act not a thought."

Life's aim is an act not a thought." — Andrew4Handel

Yes.

So thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Edward Fese
And yet we never see human thoughts or consciousness separated from brain processes or brain activity?

Sir Charles Sherrington (physiologist) once claimed that most brain activity was related to action.
"The brain seems a thoroughfare for nerve-action passing its way to the motor animal. It has been remarked that Life's aim is an act not a thought."
I am sure that is true just as I am sure most functions of mind (movement of the body and the organization and presentation of sensory data) is done by the sub or unconscious “brain”. Most of the mental activity (mind) in nature is unconscious. Consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg of mental processing in the brain. Consciousness is just a very special and rare form of mind. Consciousness gets all our attention but if one wishes to pursue the relationship between brain, mind and consciousness one needs to look deeper.

So the one issue is that facts of the world are independent of brain states. The other issue is that it is hard to imagine how neuronal firings could preserve conceptual relationships. — Andrew4Handel

It is of course not the firing of an individual neuron but the firing of patterns of neurons. It can shown with active brain scans (PET and the like) that fear or other emotions consistently cause activation of the same regions of the brain. So there is consistent relationship between certain patterns of neuronal activation and emotional states. Language or speech activates certain brain regions as does music. We are yet down to the point of resolution of individual neurons within these patterns but one should not bet against that level of detail in the future. How these patterns give rise to “feeling” is another subject. A clue as to my preference is the notion that the physical is always accompanied by some degree of the psychic (mind). Unconscious experience (affect or feeling if you prefer) is a universal feature of nature although such experience is mostly, weak, unconscious and habitual.

Hence Pierce’s notion of matter as effete mind and Whiteheads notion of reality as events and process.

And yet we never see human thoughts or consciousness separated from brain processes or brain activity? — prothero

What you’re not seeing here is that the argument is that the nature of meaning, and the nature of physical processes, are two entirely different and even incommensurable things. Say for example, you are a neuroscientist, and you have some idea about how the brain goes go about interpreting meaning. What data are you working from when you want to explain that? You might get an fMRI scan or a set of them, and say ‘look here, this is the language-processing area of the brain’. And so on. But even then, you don’t actually see anything like ‘language’ when you’re looking at that data. What you see is an illustration which is derived from the electro-chemical activity of the brain cells. You have to infer that ‘this means so and so’. And that act of inference is internal to the process of thought itself, it is not something you can see in the data; or rather, to see it in the data, requires that you utilise the very faculty which you’re trying to identify, so is circular, or question-begging. (Also, see this.)

Whenever you say that some piece of information means something, you’re utilising a non-physical capability, as logical inference is based on the relationship of ideas and nothing else. And ideas can be expressed in many different media, and assume the same general shape in all kinds of minds, because they’re not tied to any particular form.

You are moving either towards "information" theory or Piercian signs and semiosis. Either that or you prefer dualism which I do not. I prefer various forms of monism particularly Whitehead and process theory. In any event as Russell would say " ‘Physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little."

In other words matter is considerably more complex than we give it credit for in our physical descriptions and measurements. In fact as Pierce would say "matter is effete mind" where habit dominates and thus there appear to be laws of behavior. Or as Whitehead would say reality is a process a becoming, not a thing or a being and the fundamental unit of reality is experiential events which monisitically fuses mind and matter at the very core of nature.

The initial quote I provided was indeed from an article called ‘Brief arguments for dualism’, but Edward Feser’s dualism is not Cartesian, but ‘hylomorphic’. See this blog post for what I consider an excellent summary.

I am fascinated with the notion of Platonic forms (or in Whitehead eternal objects) and Aristotle's final causes as possessing some explanatory (metaphysical) power for the patterns, regularities and self organizing capabilities of nature. I still find the usual dualistic split of mind and matter to be much less desirable in approaching the problem of phenomenological experience and the power of science than that of the neutral monists or dual aspect approach to nature leaving spiritual realms out of the discussion. If one is discussing mental states and physical states with respect to our "experience" I think some form of monism is the way to go. If one is discussing spirituality or God perhaps talk of final causes or forms is useful or insightful.

I don't see how semantic content is causal like say neuronal firings. Ideas are conceptually related but that does not equal causal relations. Thinking "Paris is the Capital of France" doesn't cause any more behaviour or thought in me or any determined next content (such as I rush to the shop to by garlic bread). — Andrew4Handel

It caused you to type those words on your keyboard and click send so that we could read it. Speaking and writing are both physical behaviors triggered by thought. You could say that speaking and writing involve semantics as you convert your thoughts into sounds and scribbles to communicate your thoughts to others. Every post on this forum is a physical effect, and therefore a representation, of mental causes.

I am also concerned with a proposed linkage of mental states to brain states and how mental content could be determined this way and preserve coherence.

The behaviourist model is that idea that constant co-firing of neurons makes one idea trigger another through constant conjunction like Pavlov's dog's saliva and bells. However salivation was an inappropriate response to a bell because bells do not always signal food (nor do they "mean" food) and that type of learning makes lots of errors that we don't.

The main problem I was highlighting though is that if thoughts are determined then we can't evaluate them for truth. Like the dogs couldn't control salivating. — Andrew4Handel

I don't understand your problem. What truth?

Are you taking into account some form of indirect realism where the brains (and the neurons they are made of) that we see are just mental models of what is in the real world?

As @Pseudonym said, the OP just begs the question.

It caused you to type those words on your keyboard and click send so that we could read it. Speaking and writing are both physical behaviors triggered by thought. You could say that speaking and writing involve semantics as you convert your thoughts into sounds and scribbles to communicate your thoughts to others. Every post on this forum is a physical effect, and therefore a representation, of mental causes. — Harry Hindu

This is a misrepresentation. I selected the example here "Paris is the capital of France" as opposed to those words causing me to type anything. Usually the vast majority of my thought don't cause me to type anything. I don't think you could give a convincing causal explanation as to which thoughts specifically causally determined me to type something. The main thing that is making me type here is the necessity to do so in order to have a discussion.

The same exact thought can have different causal relationships on different days. There is no causal law or regularity that entails that if I think "Paris is the capital of France" then I am compelled to exhibit behaviour X. And it is hard to imagine what that causal law would be. It would be inconvenient if every time I thought X it determined the same behaviour. the value of thought is that you can reflect without action. Physical causes don't have this luxury.

By the way this thread is about determinism and not the nature of thoughts.

I don't understand your problem. What truth?

Are you taking into account some form of indirect realism where the brains (and the neurons they are made of) that we see are just mental models of what is in the real world? — Harry Hindu

The issue for me is that facts are more important than the patterns of neurons firing.
As I said in the opening post 2+2=4 is true regardless of which neuronal firing patterns correlated with having that thought.

To me it is not determinism if the truth of a proposition determines the neuronal activity because that is top down causation. For example if I write Hello" in some sand. My intent to write hello determines the physical movement of the sand. If thoughts determine brain states then that is the definition of free will.

However if thoughts were created by brain states that would main the brain state would determine thought regardless of the validity of the content. The Pavlov Dog's paradigm showed how two conceptually unrelated can be come triggered due to constant conjunction. It is not clear how being repeatedly exposed to stimuli would crate valid concepts about them. There is an extra step from having vivid perceptions to creating a semantic concept. Once again top down influence is posited in perception which is not compatible with strong determinism really.

This is a misrepresentation. I selected the example here "Paris is the capital of France" as opposed to those words causing me to type anything. Usually the vast majority of my thought don't cause me to type anything. I don't think you could give a convincing causal explanation as to which thoughts specifically causally determined me to type something. The main thing that is making me type here is the necessity to do so in order to have a discussion. — Andrew4Handel

Your not thinking honestly about your own mental processes. Think about thinking. What is the causal sequence in your mind that made you read this post and respond to it? You have a goal, which isn't "physical", and your goal guides your behavior. Your goal, you say, is to have a discussion, and that is why you are typing on a keyboard - "physical" behavior.

The same exact thought can have different causal relationships on different days. There is no causal law or regularity that entails that if I think "Paris is the capital of France" then I am compelled to exhibit behavior X. And it is hard to imagine what that causal law would be. It would be inconvenient if every time I thought X it determined the same behavior. the value of thought is that you can reflect without action. Physical causes don't have this luxury. — Andrew4Handel

That's because the same thought in different circumstances can have different results. Your thought isn't the only cause. If anything, this shows the causal relationship between mind and the world even more. When both causes work together to produce results that one alone couldn't achieve. Think of it as a feedback loop between world and mind. This is how we learn as well. We take input, process it, produce output, and then use our own output as the new input to observe how close we get to the perfect result.

By the way this thread is about determinism and not the nature of thoughts. — Andrew4Handel

Correction. Mental States and Determinism.

The issue for me is that facts are more important than the patterns of neurons firing.
As I said in the opening post 2+2=4 is true regardless of which neuronal firing patterns correlated with having that thought. — Andrew4Handel

I'm not quite sure that is true. Mathematics is a model of the world. Distinctions could be illusory. When looking closer at the world, everything seems to be interconnected - causally - deterministic. 2+2=4 could only be true for minds that have a perspective of space and time like we do.

To me it is not determinism if the truth of a proposition determines the neuronal activity because that is top down causation. For example if I write Hello" in some sand. My intent to write hello determines the physical movement of the sand. If thoughts determine brain states then that is the definition of free will.

However if thoughts were created by brain states that would main the brain state would determine thought regardless of the validity of the content. The Pavlov Dog's paradigm showed how two conceptually unrelated can be come triggered due to constant conjunction. It is not clear how being repeatedly exposed to stimuli would crate valid concepts about them. There is an extra step from having vivid perceptions to creating a semantic concept. Once again top down influence is posited in perception which is not compatible with strong determinism really. — Andrew4Handel

And the word, "Hello" in the sand can cause other minds that read it to think about who wrote that and why. My point is that what if it isn't top-down, or bottom-up, at all? Everything is interconnected in time - causally. "Top-down" and "bottom-up" are illusory concepts stemming from the false dichotomy of dualism.

That's because the same thought in different circumstances can have different results. — Harry Hindu

But are you arguing that all mental activity causes some physical behaviour?

I think to make a strictly determinism account of a thought you would have to isolate a causal bridge concerning what caused I thought and what it caused and then a mechanism.

It is not clear to me what spatial-temporal-material features semantics could have to create a causal narrative with.

Facts or propositions that the mind deals with depend either on the nature of the external the word or logical relations. So for example Paris is the capital of France and 2 + 2 = 4 are facts regardless of which state the brain is in. — Andrew4Handel

I'm puzzled by this. Do you think these are facts if there were no human brains at all?
~If so how?

I'm puzzled by this. Do you think these are facts if there were no human brains at all?
~If so how? — charleton

Either they would be facts or brain dependent entities.

If somethings existence doesn't rely on the brain then I would describe them as mind independent facts.

But are you arguing that all mental activity causes some physical behaviour? — Andrew4Handel

No. I'm arguing that mental activity is part of many causal relationships. Calling it "physical" doesn't help and isn't what I'm saying.

I think to make a strictly determinism account of a thought you would have to isolate a causal bridge concerning what caused I thought and what it caused and then a mechanism. — Andrew4Handel

Why? Do you need to isolate a causal bridge between a ball striking a window and the window breaking? Isn't that just a transfer of energy? Doesn't it take willpower/energy to move your body?

It is not clear to me what spatial-temporal-material features semantics could have to create a causal narrative with. — Andrew4Handel

Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect - ALL cause and effect relationships.

Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect - ALL cause and effect relationships. — Harry Hindu

I am not sure what this means.
A meaningful thought might be "President Trump might cause World War 3"

I suppose the name Trump is caused by the person Trump.

The title of President is an invented status I am not sure what caused the origin of that word.

World War 3 is a hypothetical future event so the term can't be cause by something that hasn't happened.

The overall sentence is speculative. I think most thought is speculative and a dead end where you ruminate and then don't act. I am looking for a causal mechanism that would make a thought in some circumstance be part of a well delineated causal network.

People have a lot of false beliefs and wrong impressions. For example the famous Muller-Lyer illusion where the lines look different lengths but aren't. This misperception means that we don't always represent the world veridically/truthfully.

The issue with determinism and preserving the truth value of mental states concerns the ability to evaluate and reject false perceptions.So that we are not compelled to just have beliefs forced in us by brain states.

The other issue is that if brain states are identical to mental states or tied very closely it is not clear how brain states could communicate there mental content accurately.
Imagine if you wrote lots of words on some balls and then you randomly picked the balls out of the bag, Then you would be very unlikely to pick out a coherent sentence.
So you need to know what one brain state means to link it coherently to another one but also you need flexibility to create new meanings and evaluate old ones.

As I mentioned there was the behaviourist conditioning model of constant conjunction the problem with that as I mentioned was it set up meaningless connections because neurons cannot reflect on the nature of two or more stimuli coming into conjunction.

I am not sure how a determinist could claim that we were free to believe what we believe and free to reach the conclusions we reached.

I am not sure how a determinist could claim that we were free to believe what we believe and free to reach the conclusions we reached. — Andrew4Handel

A bigger problem for determinists would be, why would such a question would be asked in the first place. Do we have a Law of Nature that explains why quantum waves create self-reflection and philosophical musings in a continuous, meaningful, and persistent manner? Or better yet, what gives quantum waves in the brain the urge to have a Big Mac?

Beyond a grand pronouncement that everything in the Universe is determined by some undefined set of Laws, determinism has an infinite number of questions that need to be answered. Why do quantum waves of the brain sort fall in love and why is it they use Facebook to break of relationships instead of a phone? Is there a Law of Nature regarding Facebook behavior?

Mental states has n`t even got anything to do with determinism. Such ridiculous threads attract intellects, sure, but they are also surely all fools. I guess me included?