But there is no need to reason to the conclusion that the sun will come up tomorrow. What would need reason is if the sun were not to come up tomorrow.

I always quote Wiki. Wisdom of the crowds. Meta-induction works.

Explicitly wrong.

Inductive logic: Every crow ever seen is black. Joe has a crow. Joe's crow is probably black.
Deductive logic: Every crow is black. Joe has a crow. Joe's crow is black.

It's set out now.

Statistical analysis is validated empirically and is therefore rooted in inductive logic. Primacy rests with inductive logic, not deductive. Deduction doesn't even tell us what crows are, black is, or who Joe is. — Hanover

Interesting that Banno pretended not to hear this.

Why is it wrong? Because one of its premises is "every swan in the future must be of the same color every swan in the past was"? That's based on the fundamental premise of all reasoning (which is that the future will mimic the past.)

As you know, though, false premises do not entail that deductive arguments are invalid, just that are unsound. — Janus

Apparently reason don’t care about semantic truth. Only syntactical correctness matters.

All you need to know is the bishop moves on the diagonal. The reason why it moved to that particular square is of no interest.

Sound move, unsound move? Banno no bothered.

But even there some folk are asserting that stats is based on induction. — Banno

The validity of statistics is ultimately proved by the occurrence of the empirical event it references. Certain empirical events occur with apparent mathematical precision and are thus predictable deductively, but the gold standard proof is the observation. The odds of 100 heads in a row is easily proved with a calculator, but best proved by flipping coins. Only if the coin tosses match the calculator will the deduction be inductively proved true.

You have reason to believe the Sun will rise tomorrow because you have reasons to believe in the existence of gravity and the more or less invariant motions of the planets, reasons to believe in nuclear fission and electromagnetic radiation and so on. All of these are inductive, not deductive, reasons.

That raises an interesting question I hadn't considered: is validity merely a matter of syntax, or must it also involve semantics? I'll have to think on that one...

That's what I suggested happens in statistical inference. But even there some folk are asserting that stats is based on induction. — Banno

Hmm. You mean like ...

In rejecting Bayesianism and the method of inverse probabilities, Peirce argued that in fact no probability at all can be assigned to inductive arguments. Instead of probability, a different measure of imperfection of certitude must be assigned to inductive arguments: verisimilitude or likelihood. In explaining this notion Peirce offered an account of hypothesis-testing that is equivalent to standard statistical hypothesis-testing. In effect we get an account of confidence intervals and choices of statistical significance for rejecting null hypotheses. Such ideas became standard only in the twentieth century as a result of the work of R. A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, and others. But already by 1878, in his paper “The Probabilitiy of Induction,” Peirce had worked out the whole matter.

Corresponding to AAA-1 (deduction) we have the following argument: X% of Ms are Ps (Rule); all Ss are Ms (Case); therefore, X% of Ss are Ps (Result). Construing this argument, as we did before, as applying to drawing balls from urns, the argument becomes: X% of the balls in this urn are red; all the balls in this random sample are taken from this urn; therefore, X% of the balls in this random sample are red. Peirce still regards this argument as being a deduction, even though it is not—as the argument AAA-1 is—a necesary inference. He calls such an argument a “statistical deduction” or a “probabilistic deduction proper.”

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#logic

One could imagine any number of self contained systems that can articulate itself without the need for external verification but sooner or later its relationship to other fields of endeavour must come into question. — Perplexed

You are talking about metaphysical systems, surely? Because scientific systems (with the possible exception of some highly theoretical fields) are the opposite of self-contained: they are directly engaged with our senses. They may not pass Hume's very strict and literal understanding of empiricism, but they are a helluva lot better in that regard than metaphysics.

Can you give any further details of such a conceptual analysis? Perhaps this would extend beyond the boundaries of science. — Perplexed

Well, my question was open-ended: I do not insist that all metaphysical questions are pseudo-questions. But take a look at the literature on just about any contentious metaphysical question, such as determinism, and you will find conceptual challenges.

Note that this explanation that you are taking to undermine induction is itself inductively derived. It relies on that which it purports to undermine. — Janus

But it is not self-undermining. It is entirely compatible with the situation where the world ceases to be orderly some time in the future (Goodman's grue scenario).

To understand how"knowledge" is acquired, one can analyze the bird which we call crow. Enough birds with similar visible attributes, such as the color black, are witnessed by multiple observers so that a species classification is formed. It is totally arbitrary.

In time exceptions can be found, and depending upon certain arbitrary rules, a sub-species may be created or a whole new species within an arbitrary created genus may be created. And in time more exceptions will be observed and the process continued. The whole scientific process is arbitrary and approximations subject but to constant modifications depending upon the similarities and differences being observed.

As one may expect, these observations, classifications, overall observations (can animals communicate in ways more "intelligent" than humans?) and conclusions, are highly susceptible to all kinds of biases.

And from this rather eclectic accumulation of knowledge are we to find "truths" in logic, both deductive and inductive? In my observations, such a case is highly improbable. Logic, of any sort, is more or less a game for academia, most especially to imply am aura of superiority to certain disciplines, where none really exists. An average person is not only able to derive similar knowledge without resorting to logic, but in all probably will make more sense because it admits to the approximations and changeability associated with the world (universe) we live in. The better the observer the more like likely the approximation will be admitted to (there are no Laws).

Hence, the answer to any syllogism it's always maybe - with a different feeling of likelihood depending upon experiences (memory). Memory (the observer) is always a participant in judgement - science or otherwise.

Actually, all swans are still white; its just that Down Under, everything is upside-down and back to front and black is white and white is black.

I wasn't trying to pit science against metaphysics, I was making the point that its a worthwhile endeavour to asses the foundations of any system as well as its connection to other fields, rather than just saying shut up and calculate. Why engage in philosophy at all if science seems to work and one can just get busy with that?

I think I will take your advice and look at the literature since I am rather new to all this. However, if you can elaborate some of the conceptual issues with regard to determinism that might be helpful.

So do you say that to be free is to act only from internal forces? How does one begin the process of disassociating from external forces in order to follow internal ones? Would this change not violate determinism? — Perplexed

The compatibilist position finds that all acts are determined. "Free" acts are determined by the self, which is itself determined.
So - no.

If the self is determined, from where does the power of choice arise?

If the self is determined, from where does the power of choice arise? — Perplexed

The determinist position is that there is no choice. Everything is determined. (If you are not a determinist, just go on believing otherwise, because that too is determined).

Thus, anything that a determinist says can be ignored (if you believe that you have the choice to ignore). Whatever a determinist tells you is meaningless, unless one believes that the Laws of Nature and the wave-particles that they govern have some kind of built-in mandate to reveal something about themselves.

Maybe there is a God that forces the Laws of Nature to provide insight to those who aren't determinists - as a matter of playing fair?

The self is not static. Like all things it changes and evolves. The physical world is matter in motion; action and reaction.

The determinist position is that there is no choice. — Rich

This is not the case. Determinism is an explanation of choice which is completely lacking from those who propose free-will.

Actually, all swans are still white; its just that Down Under, everything is upside-down and back to front and black is white and white is black. — unenlightened

'tis not. When you bring your white swans down here they stay white. I saw one in a zoo.

how does matter in motion reach the point at which it can exhibit choice?

I'm not familiar with Goodman's grue scenario. In any case I was referring to the past, not the future. I don't see why, if it is based on an understanding of evolution, it would not rely on the assumption that the invariances of nature were in the past as they are today. And that assumption is as much irrationally inductive as the assumption that the invariances of nature will be in the future as they appear to be today.

The validity of statistics is ultimately proved by the occurrence of the empirical event it references. — Hanover

That hows its applicability. Its validity is in the mathematics underpinning it, which is deductive.

I can't see how this addresses any point relevant to the discussion. You ask what reason we could have for thinking the sun will not rise tomorrow. Well, if induction is totally irrational then we have no reason for thinking the sun will or will not rise tomorrow, there would just be the normal human tendency to expect the same; to expect that it will rise (although even the belief that there is such a human tendency is itself an inductive one).

All our experience shows us that there are regularities in nature, and cumulative human experience and thought has come to weave a remarkably coherent and consistent picture of nature's invariances understood in terms of laws. All of that came about because of inductive and abductive thinking which hypothesizes that there are laws of nature. The idea that there are laws of nature cannot be derived deductively. Nothing at all that says anything about the actual world can be derived by pure deduction.

Inductive and abductive reasoning is analogical. I offered the example of gravitational lensing earlier, but it seems as though you chose to ignore it.

This is not the case. Determinism is an explanation of choice which is completely lacking from those who propose free-will. — charleton

Are you suggesting that the Laws of Nature work in such a manner that they give the real scoop about the nature of choice is to only certain people (determinists) while the rest of us are given some delusional ideas of Choice? In other words, are the Laws of Nature playing favorites in revealing the truth?

Anyway, I wasn't speaking of the nature of choice as revealed to determinists, I was speaking of REAL choice. The one that non-believers are forced to believe in by the Laws of Nature.

Single celled organisms probably.
What's the "free will" guys answer?

Are you suggesting that the Laws of Nature work in such a manner that they give the real scoop about the nature of choice — Rich

Are you suggesting that humans are able to act against the laws of cause and effect when the rest of the universe has to comply with it?

You ask what reason we could have for thinking the sun will not rise tomorrow — Janus

As you know full well the sun does not rise, has never risen and never shall. Inductive knowledge has furnished us with the truth that the appearance of the sun rising is the result of the earth's rotation.
And it is that persistence, not only of the patterns of nature but the persistence of human observation and recording of those observations that has painted or knowledge with what we like to call laws.

Are you suggesting that humans are able to act against the laws of cause and effect when the rest of the universe has to comply with it? — charleton

There is no such thing as the laws of cause and effect for the rest of the universe. I guess it is something determinists just make up for the heck of it. And why not?

But then again, if there was this mystical Law that governed the universe (sounds remarkably similar to God), it would be kind of strange that they reveal the Truth about themselves to only a chosen few. Is there a special prayer that the Laws of Nature are particularly fond of that non-determinists can abide themselves of in order for the Truth to be revealed to them also?