Neat. The very idea of doubting everything is absurd, since it involves doubting the very language needed to frame the doubt.

Doubt is overrated. We need not doubt without some reason to doubt.

Could you doubt that this post is in English? What would that entail?

Doubt needs grounds for justification, just like making confident claims. Just the fact that we probably got many things wrong from a position of epistemic humility doesn't justify a switch in behavior, which we can never succeed in doing so anyways so no point pretending.

[Delete] @Baden

I'm not an expert but was it Decartes who approached philosophy, life, with complete doubt? — TheMadFool

No. Descartes was a methodological skeptic, not a philosophical skeptic. His approach was to scrutinize all claims to knowledge, not to argue that knowledge is impossible. In fact he was quite certain that we can and do have knowledge, given that we can trust God to not allow for global deception.

I am thinking, therefore I am. — René Descartes

There"truth" goes even deeper than that. With a careful reading of this statement one might observe that, I think therefore I am. Quite interesting but also probably a ticket to the burning at the stake in Decartes' time.

m not an expert but was it Decartes who approached philosophy, life, with complete doubt? — TheMadFool

No, that was Pyrrho of Elis. He's considered the first Greek sceptic. He met several wise men (gymnosophists, magi) in the east during his travels with Alexander the Great which inspired him to live a life free from doxa. As such, scepticism has connections with eastern philosophy. Ataraxia, the mental state advocated by sceptics, should be regarded in that way imho, as a meditative attitude. That ataraxia is central to scepticism is further outlined in book 1 of the "Outines of Pyrrhonism" by Sextus Empiricus:

"Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or "judgements." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgements"; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways – appearances to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or alternando appearances to judgements, -- in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever" to "appearances and judgements" in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgements" we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to "conflicting judgements." "Equipollence" we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgement we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) "Concerning the End.""
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch.4

"Our next subject will be the end of the Sceptic system. Now an "end" is "that for which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists for the sake of none"; or, otherwise, "the ultimate object of appentency." We assert still that the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the skeptic, having set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgment on the sense impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgment; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavor to avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.
The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are afflicted by two circumstances, -- namely, by the affections themselves and, in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions are evil by nature, --the Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort. Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion the Sceptic's End is quietude, in regard to things unavoidable it is "moderate affection." But some notable Sceptics have added the further definition "suspension of judgment in investigations.""
-Ibid. ch.12

Skepticism is a problem for philosophy because there is no absolute certainty in it. How does one overcome it? Do we fall back on pragmatism or do we just ignore it?

As for myself, I just keep it real by observing patterns, understanding human nature, always working on sharpening my skills via "cross-training", and like any good detective, making sure all the pieces in the puzzle are fitting together. Philosophy is all about being a good detective whose working to solve the case. I like challenges that thoroughly test my capabilities and creative thinking possibilities. It takes time to develop the skills but it is never too early or late to start.

[Delete] @Baden

I share the opinion that Descartes had - that if you doubt whatever cannot be justified non-circularly, you will see that you can use those doubts to discover new truths, or to understand old truths more clearly and distinctly.

I think this view was also held by Bertrand Russell and was the starting point for his logical construction of the world.

It is not so popular in philosophy today, and not on these forums either. Many people here prefer some dosage of "common sense" and Wittgenstein's view that legitimately doubting P requires some evidence against P or, alternatively, that our ordinary methods of verification are somehow exempt from criticism. I am not sure that I really understand these ideas.

PA

Skepticism is a problem for philosophy because there is no absolute certainty in it. — TheMadFool

Maybe the problem is the notion of "absolute certainty", not scepticism.

How does one overcome it?

I don't. I retooled to scepticism years ago.

Do we fall back on pragmatism or do we just ignore it?

We become sceptics and attain ataraxia. It's not particularly hard.

Suppose D is true.

That means there are NO truths but...

that means D too is a falsehood.

A contradiction D & ~D — TheMadFool

Evidence that the law of non-contradiction is dubious.

that if you doubt whatever cannot be justified non-circularly — PossibleAaran

The problem with this method is when do you stop doubting? When is there enough certainty for something to be justified?

If I see a flower outside my window, then do I have enough justification to believe there is a flower there just by seeing it? Or do I need to perhaps approach it and touch it? Smell it too? Move it, and interact with it in different ways?

In other words, with the method of doubt, how do we decide when to stop doubting?

doubting P requires some evidence against P — PossibleAaran

I tend to agree with the statement. If I doubt something, I must have grounds for doubting it. Though I have to admit, that if I am honest, I don't often behave that way in practice. The reason why I adopted belief in the proposition quoted is because I was suffering from generalised anxiety disorder, OCD and hypochondria back then - so I determined to establish a philosophical method for when to worry and when not to worry (worry being somewhat similar to doubt). So then I learned, using that, not to worry (or doubt) in the absence of evidence, but only in the series of worries/doubts that were troubling me.

If I am honest, I continued to doubt other things even in the absence of evidence. It has been quite a methodological means for me to determine what can go wrong, and what can be done if it does go wrong. For example, I typically and often do this in my work and business. I doubt whether the work is good enough, or I doubt whether X or Y will do the right thing with the paperwork I need them to do for me, etc. So there is a certain degree of hypocrisy for me in holding to that belief. On the one hand, it did help me overcome an anxiety condition, on the other, I still practice it in many aspects of my life, where it yields results. But on a theoretical level, I cannot distinguish between when it's right to practice doubting and when it's not.

Of course there are truths.

Facts are true, or they wouldn't be facts. What is a truth, if not something that's true?

There are lots of facts. Here's one:

If all dogs are mammals, and all mammals are animals, then all dogs are animals.

Of course there are lots of other facts too.

Michael Ossipoff

If all dogs are mammals, and all mammals are animals, then all dogs are animals. — Michael Ossipoff

Where is the fact? It is simply a proposal (hence the proposition). You said "If". Suppose someone doesn't buy into your 'If".

You are confusing consensus on a proposal with some sort of an idea that you call a fact or truth.

"If all dogs are mammals, and all mammals are animals, then all dogs are animals. "— Michael Ossipoff

Where is the fact? It is simply a proposal (hence the proposition). — Rich

It's more than a proposition. It's a true proposition. That makes it a fact.

You said "If". Suppose someone doesn't buy into your 'If".

The proposition says nothing about a case in which its premise isn't true. The proposition only says something about the case in which all dogs are mammals and all mammals are animals.

If you doubt that premise, that doesn't mean that you disagree with or challenge the if-then proposition.

You are confusing consensus on a proposal with some sort of an idea that you call a fact or truth.

Since the premise is the part that you challenged, I must assume that the consensus that you're referring to is consensus about the premise. See above.

Having said what I said above, I should quality that statement a bit, by quoting a standard definition:

As "implication" is standardly, 2-valued truth-functionally, defined, an implication proposition is true unless its premise is true and its conclusion is false. And so the mere falsity of its premise would be enough to make an implication proposition true, by the standard 2-valued truth-functional definition of implication.

I tell a story based on that definition, at the Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics sub-forum at this website, in a thread entitled, "A guy goes into a jewel-store owned by a logician who never lies."

My metaphysics is about abstract facts, which could very well contain a lot of false premises. (I don't claim that anything exists). But I claim that, for those if-then propositions, the premise, if true, would always make the conclusion true. Therefore, those if-then propositions that I refer to can't not be true, even by the standard 2-valued truth-functional definition that I quoted above.

...so they're if-then facts.

Michael Ossipoff

Where is the fact? It is simply a proposal (hence the proposition). — Rich

Because you say so? Suppose sometime disagrees?

If you doubt that premise, that doesn't mean that you disagree with or challenge the if-then proposition. — Michael Ossipoff

I just did.

Finding "facts" outside of philosophy class is actually quite difficult.

[Delete] @Baden

Yeah, recently, there is a lot of competition over Descartes here it seems. You, @PossibleAaran and @Hanover all like Descartes :P

Personally, as I said in my previous reply in this thread, I find the method of doubt problematic.

[Delete] @Baden

Where is the fact? It is simply a proposal (hence the proposition). — Rich


Rich added:
— Rich

Because you say so? Suppose sometime disagrees?

I replied:

If you doubt that premise, that doesn't mean that you disagree with or challenge the if-then proposition.

Rich answered:

I just did.

I didn't mean you couldn't disagree. Obviously you can disagree with anything that you want to. I merely meant that you can't validly, justifiably disagree with an if-then proposition based on a belief that its premise is false.

To get an idea regarding what you're talking about, i recommend that you re-read the post that you're "replying" to.

The falsity of an implication proposition's premise doesn't make the impiication-proposition false. In fact, by the standard 2-valued truth-functional definition of an implication, the falsity of an implication's premise makes the premise true.

But, even if you don't like that standard definition, the falsity of an implication's premise certainly doesn't make the implication false.

You're repeating your previous comments, without paying attention to the answer that was given.

Finding "facts" outside of philosophy class is actually quite difficult.

Facts aren't at all difficult to find.

You call yourself "Rich". That's a fact. Maybe "Rich" is really your first name. That, too, is a fact.

Those are just 2 examples. There are many other uncontroversial facts.

Establishing the premises of implications might be difficult. For example, regarding the if-then facts on which my metaphysics is based, many or most of their premises may very well be false, because I don't make any claims about anything being real or existent.

(In fact, because "real" and "existent" are metaphysically undefined, any claim that something is or isn't "real" or "existent" is a claim using meaningless words.)

That in no way invalidates the if-then facts.

But your statement quoted above seems based on a misunderstanding of what "fact" means. You're probably just expressing, in another way, your suspicion about the truth of the premises of some if-then facts. I've answered that.

Michael Ossipoff

I merely meant that you can't validly, justifiably disagree with an if-then proposition based on a belief that its premise is false. — Michael Ossipoff

Of course I can.

The falsity of an implication's premise doesn't make the proposition false. — Michael Ossipoff

IF there is disagreement with the premise THEN there will be disagreement with the conclusion (as there always is). One might as well forget about everything until there is concensus with the premise/stated belief. I would think this is pretty obvious.

But, even if you don't like that standard definition, the falsity of an implication's premise certainly doesn't make the implication false. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes, when people agree, they will agree. It is not true or false, it is the nature of human beings. Agreement (consensus) is often restated as facts. Despite this, it remains a belief.

You call yourself "Rich". That's a fact. Maybe "Rich" is really your first name. That, too, is a fact. — Michael Ossipoff

No one knows what Rich is. You can say something about it and I might agree, but suppose I'm a hacker and have nothing to do with the name Rich? All information is subject to ambiguity some more so than others. You form beliefs but it doesn't make it a fact.

The problem with most analysis of the nature of things is that people are in need such a hurry to reach conclusions that they don't even pause for a second to consider alternatives that would undermined their conclusions. This is no doubt a product of an educational system that encourages the idea of "pat answers". That is why I stopped going to college courses. It trains students that there are facts that can be spoon fed by higher authorities. Actually those are the worst sources for information.

You need to do more (or at least some) listening, and less expounding.
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I’d said:
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I merely meant that you can't validly, justifiably disagree with an if-then proposition based on a belief that its premise is false.

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You replied:
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Of course I can.

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I didn’t say you couldn’t disagree. I merely said that you couldn’t validly and justifiably disagree.
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…because the truth of an if-then proposition doesn’t at all depend on the truth of its premise.
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(…except that, by the 2-valued truth-functional definition of implication, the falsity of an implication’s premise makes that implication true by definition.)
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Here’s a tip: Find out something about a subject before you expound on it.
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Yes, saying that to you is a waste of time.
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I’d said:
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The falsity of an implication's premise doesn't make the proposition false.

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You reply:
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IF there is disagreement with the premise THEN there will be disagreement with the conclusion

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First you confuse the implication with its premise. Now you confuse it with its conclusion
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So yes, if you disagree with an implication-proposition’ s premise then you can (but needn’t) also disagree with its conclusion.
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The falsity of both the premise and conclusion of an implication-proposition doesn’t imply the falsity of the implication-premise.
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In fact, by the standard 2-valued truth-functional definition of an implication-proposition, if is premise is false, and its conclusion is false, then the implication-proposition is (by definition) true.
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But, even if you don’t like that definition, the falsity of both the premise and the conclusion of an implication-proposition certainly doesn’t contradict that implication-proposition.
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As I said before, if an implication’s premise is false, then the implication is saying nothing whatsoever about the truth of its conclusion.
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Your belief in the falsity of an implication-proposition’s premise and/or conclusion in no way implies a belief in the falsity of the implication-proposition itself.
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You need to get it straight, regarding the difference between an implication-proposition, its premise and its conclusion.
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…or at least you need to get that straight before expounding about the subject.
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IF there is disagreement with the premise THEN there will be disagreement with the conclusion (as there always is)

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Actually no. If I believe that an implication’s premise is true, and you believe that its premise is false, then we could both agree that its conclusion is true. …even if we both believe that the implication itself is true (…and even if we both agree that the implication itself is false…and even if we disagree on whether the implication is true or false.).
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Remember that an implication whose premise is false says nothing whatsoever about the truth of its conclusion.
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. One might as well forget about everything until there is concensus with the premise/stated belief. I would think this is pretty obvious.

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…pretty obvious to you, and entirely wrong.
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Yes, if we don’t know if an implication’s premise is true, then (even if we assume that the implication itself is true), we don’t know if its conclusion is true.
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But not knowing if an implication’s premise is true doesn’t mean that we don’t know if the implication-proposition itself is true.
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Some implication-propositions can be shown to be timelessly true, without testing them by looking at their conclusion in every instance. Some would just be agreed by all to be true, without argument.
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For example, my metaphysics is about abstract if-then facts, and I don’t claim that all of their premises are true, or claim anything about the “reality” or “existence” (whatever that would mean) of the abstract facts or what they refer to.
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What if it can be shown by argument, or it’s otherwise agreed, that an implication-proposition is intrinsically, inevitably, timelessly true?
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Unless someone shows an instance of its premise being true and its conclusion being false, there’s no reason to doubt that demonstration or agreement. (…unless someone shows an error in the demonstration.)
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I’d said:
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But, even if you don't like that standard definition, the falsity of an implication's premise certainly doesn't make the implication false.

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You replied:
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Yes, when people agree, they will agree. It is not true or false, it is the nature of human beings. Agreement (consensus) is often restated as facts. Despite this, it remains a belief.

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…none of which has any bearing on this topic.
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And, contrary to what you seem to mean, there really are facts. But we’ve been over that.
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I’d said:
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You call yourself "Rich". That's a fact. Maybe "Rich" is really your first name. That, too, is a fact.

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You answered:
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No one knows what Rich is. You can say something about it and I might agree, but suppose I'm a hacker and have nothing to do with the name Rich?

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Irrelevant. You call yourself “Rich”. As I said, that’s a fact.
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All information is subject to ambiguity some more so than others.

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No, you call yourself “Rich”, by using it as your login-name, and signing your posts with “Rich”. That isn’t subject to ambiguity.
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Maybe each “Rich” post is really from a different person. Fine. Right now you’re signing your post “Rich”. Thereby, you un-ambiguously calling yourself “Rich”.
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If all dogs are mammals, and all mammals are animals, then all dogs are animals.
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That’s another fact that isn’t subject to ambiguity.
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You form beliefs but it doesn't make it a fact.

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I never said that all of your beliefs are facts.
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The problem with most analysis of the nature of things is that people are in need such a hurry to reach conclusions that they don't even pause for a second to consider alternatives that would undermined their conclusions.

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Exactly! That’s why you’ve got to check your conclusions before you post.
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Michael Ossipoff

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I didn’t say you couldn’t disagree. I merely said that you couldn’t validly and justifiably disagree. — Michael Ossipoff

What makes you think you didn't understand your declaration of final arbiter? I did. I fully understand that you believe you are in the position of greater understanding. Fine. I disagree.

If you want to argue about what is valid and what is true and all of those other arbitrary terms, there is a thread thrashing that out right now. Suffice to say, I don't recognize you as the final arbiter. That belief is your own.

You called me Rich. I never called myself anything. Check your facts.

What makes you think you didn't understand your declaration of final arbiter? I did. I fully understand that you believe you are in the position of greater understanding. Fine. I disagree. — Rich

And that's what your problem is: Your delusional belief in your understanding of a topic on which you're quite clueless.

Is this about fuzzy relativism?

You're so innocent of any exposure to the subject, that you think that the things I've told you are just one person's personal opinion.

It's alright do disagree. But it would be better to disagree after educating yourself on the subject a bit.

If you want to argue about what is valid and what is true and all of those other arbitrary terms, there is a thread thrashing that out right now.

Actually, there's much in logic about which there's widespread and firm consensus.

Sorry, but it's not a subject for Rich to make up.

My message to you is just that you should educate yourself, at least a little, before you post.

Suffice to say, I don't recognize you as the final arbiter. That belief is your own.

As I said, I'm not the final arbiter. But you're befuddled, all confused about the differences between an implication, its premise, and its conclusion.

Though I'm not the final arbiter, you need to educate yourself, at least a little, before you expound.

You called me Rich. I never called myself anything. Check your facts.

You're using "Rich" as your log-in name.

I've wasted enough time replying to vain, delusional ignorance.

My participation in this conversation is concluded.

Michael Ossipoff

Your delusional belief — Michael Ossipoff

May I return the favor, which was my original point, but I believe I said it far more eloquently.

As for myself, I just keep it real by observing patterns, understanding human nature, always working on sharpening my skills via "cross-training", and like any good detective, making sure all the pieces in the puzzle are fitting together. Philosophy is all about being a good detective whose working to solve the case. I like challenges that thoroughly test my capabilities and creative thinking possibilities. It takes time to develop the skills but it is never too early or late to start — Rich

But doubt casts a shadow over everything - your assumptions AND your methods. It's great to think of philosophy as an investigation but what if our technique is wrong or our clues are faulty? What then?

Of course I may be charged of asking for a ridiculous amount of certainty. However, who decides on what degree of certainty is acceptable?

Let's first look at method viz. Logic/rationality. To evaluate rationality we use rationality itself. In other words we already assume rationality is the correct method when we put rationality under the lens. It's a vicious circle.

I've had discussions with others and some have said that to examine rationality with rationality isn't a vicious circle as it appears. Rationality vindicates itself through ways other than itself. For instance it makes predictions which are accurate. It works over a wide range of fields from children's lego blocks to advanced chemistry and physics. Therefore, one can say that rationality has universal application over space and time - rationality has proven itself.

That's why I've used logic to make the argument in my OP.

Come to assumptions and we don't have that degree of certainty as we had for rationality. We can't be sure of our assumptions. In fact philosophical arguments seem to be exactly about differing assumptions. The method - rationality - is universal but the premises/assumptions are not.

So, given the situation it seems we can't be sure of finding truths in the sense of indubitable ones that withstand any and all rational assaults. This is the problem I'm talking about. We can doubt ALL truths and still be completely rational.

Being a good detective requires one to continually assess our own assumptions and methods, right?

But doubt casts a shadow over everything - your assumptions AND your methods. It's great to think of philosophy as an investigation but what if our technique is wrong or our clues are faulty? What then? — TheMadFool

I change direction. I'm only interested in understanding nature. The more I look the better my skills.

The problem with logic is that you never go beyond where you are and the only skill that you are honing is restatement of what you already know. If you want to enhance your skills in life you have to go out there and experiment and do it. I don't look for certainty. I look for knowledge that allows me to grow.

Of course there are truths. — Michael Ossipoff

I just proved it. Can you name one truth that you're 100% sure of?

Maybe the problem is the notion of "absolute certainty", not scepticism — Ying

But then this solution leads to arbitrariness - something that isn't rational, right? We come to a consensus on what degree of certainty is acceptable but that decision is arbitrary. Anyway, I'm with you on this one. I think radical doubt should be used instead of solved. Every time we think we've found something we should doubt its veracity.

We become sceptics and attain ataraxia. It's not particularly hard. — Ying

Skeptical ataraxia. Ok

I change direction. I'm only interested in understanding nature. The more I look the better my skills.

The problem with logic is that you never go beyond where you are and the only skill that you are honing is restatement if what you already know. If you want to enhance your skills in life you have to go out there and experiment and do it. I don't look for certainty. I look for knowledge that allows me to grow. — Rich

That's a very pragmatic and beautiful.

As I said in my reply to Ying, radical doubt should be used rather than solved because as a tool it serves to remind ourselves to check and recheck our beliefs and as a problem it's unsolvable.