I don't think it makes sense to look at ancient theories in light of foundationalism. The search for foundations, I don't believe, is what drives very much ancient philosophy but modern philosophy. — Moliere

There are two objections I have to this. First, it's an odd thing to say, and I don't know if it has any truth to it. Second, I'm not sure how it ties into this:

But I can say that the physics ties into the ethics because it gives a pseudo-justification to the ethics. — Moliere

Clearly the Epicureans think that physics founds ethics in some way -- they, like the Stoics, were after what is the natural end of human beings, which requires knowledge of the natural world. However you want to put this, as providing a 'justification,' or 'foundation' or whatever, it doesn't matter. The point is that they see physics as somehow integral to ethics, which I'm skeptical of. As to the reference to Lucretius, the question is not whether the Ecpicureans think there is some such tie or attempt to provide one, but whether there is one, to be found in their theory or anywhere else. I'm inclined to say no, which means the Epicurean ethical theory has to make sense on its own terms, and it's going to make nonsense on its own terms if it founders, no matter what their physics might say. Just as an illustration:

Regardless of what we might give priority to in our reading, though, the physics and the ethics both support one another quite well. The ethics makes sense in a world where we have very little control over said world (it is a random collection of atoms extending infinitely upward and downward), where there is no afterlife (because the soul is a collection of very fine atoms), and where the Gods do not interfere with our lives (various superstitious explanations about nature are false). The physics makes sense in a world where we live as another one of the world's creatures with its own particular habits and needs. — Moliere

None of this seems to impact on the debates we're currently engaging in regarding pleasure. That there are no gods or no afterlife might be practically important: but these are facts that an Epicurean or a Cyrenaic would equally have to react to, and would do nothing to decide between their differing views on pleasure, and does nothing to make the tetrapharmikos, or the question with which this thread started, more intelligible. On these issues the existence of the gods, what our physical makeup is, whether there is an afterlife, are all just irrelevant. The same points would hold even if there were gods and an afterlife, and we were made of eternal spirit-stuff.

I think you're overstating the case here. If a philosophy helps people within those human limits -- including the sage (which, in this case, is not just abstract, because there's Epicurus) -- then it accomplishes all that a philosophy can do. If torture is beyond that limit then what does that matter? Pain, more or less, is still easy to endure. — Moliere

My point is, first, that this is precisely not what Epicurean philosophy claims to do, and far from placing limits on itself, has a Hellenistic machismo that promises, with careful application, to bring about the invincible sage, that is undisturbed by torture. These are not human limits; they are fantasies (barring perhaps, extraordinary feats of asceticism, which are not recommended by Epicurus).

My second point is that you cannot just bite the bullet on this and then just go on affirming that pain is easy to endure. As if the contentless modifier 'more or less' helps? Clearly, pain is not easy to endure, and Epicurean philosophy does not help make it easier to endure, and the sage has no way to free himself from bodily pain by studying the philosophy.

I also doubt very much that Epicurus was anything more than a man. The sage is an ideal of the doxography; we don't expect to actually see sages walking around. Maybe people thought Epicurus was actually such a sage, which again is in keeping with the 'invincibility philosophy' of the Hellenistic schools.

So while it may sound implausible, our goal as interpreters (so I would say) is to figure out how to make it plausible. — Moliere

And our goal is also to acknowledge that when the best of our most generous interpretive efforts still make the philosophy founder, we have to admit the inconsistency rather than continue to deny it. Otherwise, there is no point to inquiry, we can just make up whatever we want. As interpreters and philosophers we are not just neutral historians out to give every side its best shake. Yes we do that, but only to make the arguments as strong as possible to see whether they stand up, and after that we have to leave what falls. These philosophies aren't just intellectual toys to defend and reinterpret, but are supposed to have meaningful impact on people's lives.

Not sure how to make it clearer to you than the example of a child burning themself vs. an adult burning themself. — Moliere

First of all, the claim that an adult burning themselves feels less pain than a child doing the same is very odd, and I'm not sure what supports it. Second, I think I've already said all I needed to say in the quoted paragraph, and I don't know how your response advances the conversation.

Heck, emotional pain is similar, insofar that we deal with emotional pain in the correct way. — Moliere

There is no 'correct way' to deal with emotional pain, in spite of the didactic suggestions we get from the Stoics and yes the Epicureans. To claim that there is robs it, in my opinion, of its status as actual pain (and maybe as actual emotion). Yes, pain is bad. But what follows from that?

I don't deny any of this. — Moliere

Okay, but this seems opposed to what I was responding to, so I don't know what you mean.

It seems to me that anyone who claims hedonism, at least in the philosophical sense (we can be practical hedonists without this, of course), owes their readers a theory of pleasure. — Moliere

I disagree in the sense that pleasure is not a technical concept but a folk concept, and insofar as hedonists make claims about it, they do so in reference to the folk concept (indeed I doubt hedonism has any use at all if it tries to invoke a technical concept of pleasure, which is why utilitarianism in my opinion is a dead end). So no 'theory of pleasure' is going to give you a better grasp of that folk concept, but there can be true or false claims made about that very concept. The assertion that a lack of pain is itself a pleasure, or that there is a static form of pleasure, is such a false claim made by the Epicureans, in my view. Perhaps this comes about as the result of a desire to turn pleasure, a fleeting, temporary, contingent thing, into something immortal, which is always going to be the Epicureans' absurdity. To correct these mistakes, we should not invoke a theory of pleasure, but return to the phenomenon and point out in what way the Epicureans mischaracterize it, and why their philosophy has led them to do so.

Clearly the Epicureans think that physics founds ethics in some way -- they, like the Stoics, were after what is the natural end of human beings, which requires knowledge of the natural world. However you want to put this, as providing a 'justification,' or 'foundation' or whatever, it doesn't matter. The point is that they see physics as somehow integral to ethics, which I'm skeptical of. As to the reference to Lucretius, the question is not whether the Ecpicureans think there is some such tie or attempt to provide one, but whether there is one, to be found in their theory or anywhere else. — The Great Whatever

Then I must say we are talking past one another. In order to do as you say here:

And our goal is also to acknowledge that when the best of our most generous interpretive efforts still make the philosophy founder, we have to admit the inconsistency rather than continue to deny it. — The Great Whatever

We must first be able to state the inconsistency. And if there is some way to make a philosophy work then even if there's a tension (of which any philosphy has) that is not the same as the philosophy simply being inconsistent with itself.

Before being able to judge something true or false, I think you have to understand what is being said first. And in order to understand what is said, we must be charitable. I would say that I am still at the stage of understanding -- where there are some things which are clearly in contradiction to what I believe, and so I am settled (at present, at least), this is not one of them.

So I am asking -- how does the 4th precept fit into the philosophy of epicureanism? How is it possible for it to make sense? Your answer here is simply that it doesn't, because it is false. I find that unsatisfactory because it leaves much to be explained, and because it is uncharitable.

My point is, first, that this is precisely not what Epicurean philosophy claims to do, and far from placing limits on itself, has a Hellenistic machismo that promises, with careful application, to bring about the invincible sage, that is undisturbed by torture. These are not human limits; they are fantasies (barring perhaps, extraordinary feats of asceticism, which are not recommended by Epicurus). — The Great Whatever

I must disagree. The thing is, the torture claim isn't a quote from any Epicurean text. It comes from Diogenes Laertius' description of Epicureanism, and could just as easily have come from the polemical works I referenced as much as Epicurus (in fact, the reference to the brazen bull is in the polemical works). So as interpreters we have to figure out what to do with it -- do we accept it as cannon, or not? If we do, then how does that fit with the claim that pain is easy to endure, and that the sage is one who is happy regardless of the circumstances? If not, then what is being claimed about pain and how do we deal with the problem of pain within Epicurean philosophy?

What is asserted by the quotes, however, is the ability to face death with happiness, even a painful drawn out death -- as Epicurus did. While not a super-human feat, it is also something that must be learned (because not everyone faces death like this) and is actually what philosophy has laid claim to outside of Epicurean texts: learning how to face death.

What your describing is one possible interpretation by the texts, I grant. But it is not the only one. And if there are different interpretations which don't have the philosophy collapsing, then the principle of charity would dictate that we go with them. Especially when dealing with ancient texts where ambiguity and a multiplicity of interpretations are easily on hand given the state of the evidence.

My second point is that you cannot just bite the bullet on this and then just go on affirming that pain is easy to endure. As if the contentless modifier 'more or less' helps?

Why not?

Clearly, pain is not easy to endure, and Epicurean philosophy does not help make it easier to endure, and the sage has no way to free himself from bodily pain by studying the philosophy.

Here I believe you are simply asserting that the Epicurean claims are false. These assertions are not so clear to me.

I also doubt very much that Epicurus was anything more than a man. The sage is an ideal of the doxography; we don't expect to actually see sages walking around. Maybe people thought Epicurus was actually such a sage, which again is in keeping with the 'invincibility philosophy' of the Hellenistic schools.

Does your doubt matter, when the sage isn't anything more than a man who has perfected a way of life? Of course he was just a man. His flaws are evident in his writing. Being a sage doesn't exempt one from being a human.

Okay, but this seems opposed to what I was responding to, so I don't know what you mean. — The Great Whatever

I mean that it doesn't really go against anything I said. What is universal to Epicurean philosophy, such as his theory of pleasure, does not forbid sexual activity, or eating cheese, or having money. There are not particular rules or laws which an Epicurean must follow in the sense that you shouldn't have bacon mixed with cheese, that luxury is forbidden, etc. etc. What is universal is a set of categories which holds for people. But within those categories variation can play a part. You mentioned luxury and sex. But neither of these are forbidden, according to Epicurean principles -- not intrinsically. It doesn't work like that. Rather, if your desire for sex is an unnatural and unnecessary one, then you should not act on said desire. But if your desire for sex is a natural and unnecessary one, you can act on that desire.

It's not the particular action which is forbidden.

When Epicurus recommends against luxury and sexual desire it is because people are made anxious by the pursuit of such things. It is the disturbance of tranquility that he is combating, not the particular actions.

I disagree in the sense that pleasure is not a technical concept but a folk concept, and insofar as hedonists make claims about it, they do so in reference to the folk concept (indeed I doubt hedonism has any use at all if it tries to invoke a technical concept of pleasure, which is why utilitarianism in my opinion is a dead end). So no 'theory of pleasure' is going to give you a better grasp of that folk concept, but there can be true or false claims made about that very concept. — The Great Whatever

What does that matter?

Let's go with it being a folk concept. So, you are a hedonist. Meaning, pleasure is what we should pursue -- it is the only good.

OK. So, how do I do that? What is pleasurable, or what is pleasure? These are natural questions to ask of any hedonist.

Even if it is a folk concept, that doesn't mean the philosopher is unburdened to defend their hedonism.

The assertion that a lack of pain is itself a pleasure, or that there is a static form of pleasure, is such a false claim made by the Epicureans, in my view. Perhaps this comes about as the result of a desire to turn pleasure, a fleeting, temporary, contingent thing, into something immortal, which is always going to be the Epicureans' absurdity. To correct these mistakes, we should not invoke a theory of pleasure, but return to the phenomenon and point out in what way the Epicureans mischaracterize it, and why their philosophy has led them to do so.

Again, this only follows if you have a concept of pleasure -- or "the things themselves" -- to contrast against the Epicurean concept of pleasure, or "The phenomena itself" as described by the Epicurean.

So I am asking -- how does the 4th precept fit into the philosophy of epicureanism? How is it possible for it to make sense? Your answer here is simply that it doesn't, because it is false. I find that unsatisfactory because it leaves much to be explained, and because it is uncharitable. — Moliere

First of all, if you a priori don't accept any conclusion to the effect that a tenet of Epicureanism is false, on the grounds that this is uncharitable, then Epicureanism is literally unfalsifiable. I hope that rereading this you see that it's an absurd position. So being charitable I'll assume you can't have meant it, I guess.

I have not simply stated that the tenet is false; I have shown how the Epicurean is led to being forced to make a false claim by a desire on the one hand to maintain a philosophy of invincibility and on the other to tie the end to something naturally occurring and intuitively plausible to hold that position. This requires them to face at some point the intertwined questions of whether 1) bodily pain 'counts' in the freedom from pain that the Epicurean maintains is the end; 2) whether if it does not, the philosophy can genuinely be called a hedonism in any interesting sense, and whether it loses its intuitive plausibility in abstractions as a result, and loses its grip on the notion of pleasure; 3) if it does count, whether bodily pain is entirely avoidable or not; and 4) if it isn't, how then the Epicurean can maintain that the successful application of its philosophy can result in the sort of invincibility from harm that it promises as an ideal. All of these issues are intertwined and I have argued that there is no way to keep all these balls in the air at once. Epicureanism has contradictory impulses and something must give. But it does take criticism to see this, and to realize the ways in which Epicureanism is not workable. So yes, I've said the tenet is false, but of course I've said that! It wouldn't be a criticism otherwise. But it's not that it's 'simply' false, I've explained at length how and why it is, and why the Epicurean is drawn to making the false statement due to contradictory impulses. To throw up your hands after all that and claim that we can't just declare the principle to be false due to charity is absurd. I really don't see how proper criticism is possible by these lights.

Why not? — Moliere

Because, if you accept that pain is in some cases not easy to endure, then you cannot also accept that pain, as a general principle is easy to endure. I'm not sure how you're squaring this contradiction for yourself, other than by saying 'yeah well that rule of the tetrapharmikos only applies sometimes,' which renders it totally impotent, since then Epicureanism is not only not a universal cure, but only a cure for those seasons in which you're not in serious pain that's hard ot endure -- in which case, who gives a shit, we don't need philosophy for times when everything is easy to endure! The insight of the Epicurean position is presumably that all suffering, even the difficult, can be made easy to endure, or else it has no bite. But this is precisely what you've denied, and then acted as if it isn't a problem! Is Epicureanism really so weak that it amounts to 'life is easy when life is easy?' Is a philosophy even needed for that?

What is universal is a set of categories which holds for people. But within those categories variation can play a part. You mentioned luxury and sex. But neither of these are forbidden, according to Epicurean principles -- not intrinsically. It doesn't work like that. Rather, if your desire for sex is an unnatural and unnecessary one, then you should not act on said desire. But if your desire for sex is a natural and unnecessary one, you can act on that desire. — Moliere

As I said, there's no such thing as necessary v. unnecessary desires. What this amounts to is still an imposition on behavior and a set of moral do's and don'ts. The fact that you've said, no, it's not 'thou shalt not have sex,' but rather 'thou shalt not have unnecessary sex' doesn't change that, it only qualifies the nature of those prohibitions.

When Epicurus recommends against luxury and sexual desire it is because people are made anxious by the pursuit of such things. — Moliere

Sometimes they are, sometimes they aren't. Again, reification.

Again, this only follows if you have a concept of pleasure -- or "the things themselves" -- to contrast against the Epicurean concept of pleasure, or "The phenomena itself" as described by the Epicurean. — Moliere

There is no 'Epicurean concept of pleasure.' There is only one concept of pleasure, which both the Epicurean and other hedonists make claims about. The Epicurean then makes, in my estimation, a false claim -- namely, that freedom from pain is itself pleasant.

To see why this isn't so, we can note that corpses are free from all pain and struggle, yet they feel no pleasure. So it must be that living free from all pains and struggles, and experiencing this freedom is what is good, not simply being free from it. But what is it to experience this? In eating we experience pleasure as a relief from hunger, as well as from the stimulation of our taste buds. But these are both kinetic pleasures by the Epicurean's account. So the taste itself cannot be the pleasure that matters, nor can it be relief from pain. Rather, the Epicurean has to say that the state itself of not being in that pain must be pleasant. But pleasure is a feeling, and so must have some phenomenological quality (which is why corpses don't undergo it, because they feel nothing). So what does not being in any pain feel like? Well, precisely nothing -- there is a feeling to relieving one's bladder, or the taste of a delicious food, but there is no feeling at all of 'not being hungry,' except insofar as it is kinetic satisfaction of, and so removal of, hunger. If you abstract away from all kinetic aspects of pleasure, there results no feeling at all, and so no pleasure. So Epicurus is wrong: it is not pleasant to be free of pain, but rather indifferent.

First of all, if you a priori don't accept any conclusion to the effect that a tenet of Epicureanism is false, on the grounds that this is uncharitable, then Epicureanism is literally unfalsifiable. I hope that rereading this you see that it's an absurd position. So being charitable I'll assume you can't have meant it, I guess. — The Great Whatever

That's not what I said?

As for criticism being rendered inoperable -- Yes, exactly. Until you understand something you can't criticize something. In order to understand something one must interpret charitably. This is especially the case when dealing with ancient texts being translated from cultures we have no tangible familiarity with and who we cannot even so much as ask a question of.

Now, perhaps you already understand Epicureanism. I would say in only some parts I do, but others I do not. Especially how Epicureanism treats pain -- I would say there's a tension in the philosophy here. But I don't think that the entire project collapses in on itself due to the tension, at least not yet, and it seems to me there there is a workable solution to the tension.

At the very least, if it be so central -- and given the philosophy, it seems to me pain is quite important -- then it makes sense to figure out how this concept works within the philosophy assuming that it does, in fact, work as a practical rule of interpretation.

These are things I said earlier, but it is worth saying them again because, while it may sound absurd to you that I'm still reading with this sort of thought in mind. If that renders my thoughts a waste of time then I apologise for wasting yours. But, all the same, it has been worthwhile to me thus far because your points have motivated me back to the texts.

Because, if you accept that pain is in some cases not easy to endure, then you cannot also accept that pain, as a general principle is easy to endure. I'm not sure how you're squaring this contradiction for yourself, other than by saying 'yeah well that rule of the tetrapharmikos only applies sometimes,' which renders it totally impotent, since then Epicureanism is not only not a universal cure, but only a cure for those seasons in which you're not in serious pain that's hard ot endure -- in which case, who gives a shit, we don't need philosophy for times when everything is easy to endure! The insight of the Epicurean position is presumably that all suffering, even the difficult, can be made easy to endure, or else it has no bite. But this is precisely what you've denied, and then acted as if it isn't a problem! Is Epicureanism really so weak that it amounts to 'life is easy when life is easy?' Is a philosophy even needed for that? — The Great Whatever

First off, this was just one possible solution to the problem. I'm not necessarily committed to saying that it only works sometimes. Mostly it's a problem I'm trying to work out. Of course if there is no workable solution then, hey, strike against the philosophy. But I'm not yet convinced that this is the case -- especially considering there are workable solutions.

Second, if it works sometimes, most of the time, and even helps to ease pain in times of duress, I would say that "renders it totally impotent" is an exaggeration on your part. Especially considering the frequency of torture. Supposing 100 things happen to you in your life, and 1 percent of those things is torture, and such-and-such a way of life helps you with the other 99 percent of things -- then, clearly, even if you are in error one time, you have a net benefit.

There is no 'Epicurean concept of pleasure.' There is only one concept of pleasure, which both the Epicurean and other hedonists make claims about. The Epicurean then makes, in my estimation, a false claim -- namely, that freedom from pain is itself pleasant.

To see why this isn't so, we can note that corpses are free from all pain and struggle, yet they feel no pleasure. So it must be that living free from all pains and struggles, and experiencing this freedom is what is good, not simply being free from it. But what is it to experience this? In eating we experience pleasure as a relief from hunger, as well as from the stimulation of our taste buds. But these are both kinetic pleasures by the Epicurean's account. So the taste itself cannot be the pleasure that matters, nor can it be relief from pain. Rather, the Epicurean has to say that the state itself of not being in that pain must be pleasant. But pleasure is a feeling, and so must have some phenomenological quality (which is why corpses don't undergo it, because they feel nothing). So what does not being in any pain feel like? Well, precisely nothing -- there is a feeling to relieving one's bladder, or the taste of a delicious food, but there is no feeling at all of 'not being hungry,' except insofar as it is kinetic satisfaction of, and so removal of, hunger. If you abstract away from all kinetic aspects of pleasure, there results no feeling at all, and so no pleasure. So Epicurus is wrong: it is not pleasant to be free of pain, but rather indifferent. — The Great Whatever

Eh, I think this is kind of a strawman account. The distinction between kinetic and static pleasure isn't some kind of central distinction to the philosophy, one (though we have already talked about that, so I feel like we might just repeat ourselves here), and the pleasures you're talking about are clearly necessary and natural pleasures. So they are the one's one is meant to fulfill in order to be happy. Even if "there is no such thing as necessary and natural pleasures", then even by the reifiecation these things are clearly what is meant. This doesn't really speak against anything Epicurus states.

That's not what I said? — Moliere

Sure it is, and in fact you just said it again:

it makes sense to figure out how this concept works within the philosophy assuming that it does, in fact, work as a practical rule of interpretation. — Moliere

I disagree that we ought to go into interpretation assuming that what we're interpreting works or is correct; I hold that such a view amounts to making a position unfalsifiable and has allowed you to disregard my criticisms on the simple grounds that they declare Epicureanism false in some way, which is an absurd maxim to abide by. You seem to think charity requires of us that we assume as a working rule that our interlocutor is right, which is obviously ridiculous. That's not what charity is, and it makes decent criticism impossible. Yes this conversation is a waste of time if you continue, as you have, to disregard what I say just on the grounds that it disagrees with Epicureanism. Read what you've written and tell me that's not exactly what you've done -- not dismissed it because it's wrong, but because it results in Epicureanism being in some way incoherent as a whole. Well then, why am I wasting my breath, since all roads lead to the Garden for you, and this is an a priori constraint on your interpretation of the philosophy?

I'll get to the rest later.

I disagree that we ought to go into interpretation assuming that what we're interpreting works or is correct; I hold that such a view amounts to making a position unfalsifiable and has allowed you to disregard my criticisms on the simple grounds that they declare Epicureanism false in some way, which is an absurd maxim to abide by. You seem to think charity requires of us that we assume as a working rule that our interlocutor is right, which is obviously ridiculous. That's not what charity is, and it makes decent criticism impossible. Yes this conversation is a waste of time if you continue, as you have, to disregard what I say just on the grounds that it disagrees with Epicureanism. Read what you've written and tell me that's not exactly what you've done -- not dismissed it because it's wrong, but because it results in Epicureanism being in some way incoherent as a whole. Well then, why am I wasting my breath, since all roads lead to the Garden for you, and this is an a priori constraint on your interpretation of the philosophy? — The Great Whatever

If all roads lead to the Garden for me then I couldn't even disagree with the philosophy. I certainly do. My disagreement has been with your interpretation on the basis that it is uncharitable, not because I think Epicureanism must be correct. Correctness is a different sort of judgment from interpretation. Further, I wouldn't criticise your interpretation on the basis of whether your are correct or not because there are multiple interpretations -- I'll emphasize again that we're dealing with an ancient text written in a culture we have no tangible contact with, and merely translations of said text, and on top of that we aren't even dealing with an entire text, but fragments. Clearly there are going to be multiple interpretations, even of the fair variety. However, I think there are certainly more charitable interpretations at hand than what you present thus far.

If you've read Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy you'd get similar treatments in his chapters on Nietzsche and Hegel. If, in fact, Russell's interpretation of Nietzsche or Hegel were correct then his criticisms would have a lot more weight. As they are, however, it reads better as a joke book of sorts and a good example of why interpretation is so important prior to criticism.

Sure it is, and in fact you just said it again: — The Great Whatever

And perhaps this is where we are crossing paths, too -- as I emphasized above, I am not dealing in correctness here as much as I am dealing in interpretation of belief. "Working", in this sense is just "coheres together".

How does the Epicurean deal with the problem of pain? How does the Epicurean philosophy make pain easy to endure?

Not "Does the Epicurean philosophy make pain easy to endure" -- but "How does it. . ."

See the difference? The first is after a fact. The latter is after a meaning.

I think there are two things two remember: 1) great pain does not usually last long, 2) physical pain need not result in emotional or psychological pain. While I am tortured on the wrack, there is no need to distress about being tortured on the wrack.

I have found that a simple attitude adjustment takes care of all my great physical pains (which are short and few): I look at it from the point of view of an adventuring ascetic. My pain is both holy and exciting. Now, it might take a little more than a simple act of will to don this attitude, but if you can manage it, it works. It totally takes the sting out of it, and renders it almost fun!

The only thing I have left to conquer is emotional or psychological pain. Last time I checked there were no ascetics purposefully inducing panic attacks or heartbreak. I believe this is the only reason I am not also insulated from this type of disturbance as well.

I have, however, learned how to beat fear: I study it. I categorize and describe it, and it takes the sting out.

Couldn't an Epicurean borrow from Stoicism to deal with the occasional pain and maintain an Epicurean lifestyle? I think that's what I do. It seems possible to use both schools.

It probably depends on what you mean by "could" or "possible". I said earlier in the thread that I don't think it's even possible to be an Epicurean today, just because of the disconnect with the ancient practice. We simply do not know what many of those practices were in the garden and have to infer a great deal, and so even if we were to rebuild the garden it would be to overstep our bounds to claim that we are following the same ancient practices -- heck, we have to do that even with doctrine with the state of the evidence. But that clearly differs from what you're saying which seems to me to imply that you are inspired by one philosophy but don't mind grabbing from other's too in your approach to life.

But could you do it consistently, or while still adhering to the epicurean philosophy as presented in the ancient texts? I don't know. The stoics and the epicureans seemed to have disagreed with one another enough to criticize one another and form different schools and compete over disciples/students.

It's certainly possible to be inspired by both or many other lines of philosophical thinking. I wouldn't deny that. I just don't know if I'd call it Epicureanism, in that case. The philosophy is supposed to stand on its own, at least -- not grab from other schools. Otherwise why would they form different schools? It seems to me that since the practioners at the time believed there were differences divergent enough to argue over them that it is better to try to look for what it was those differences were and keep the schools conceptually separate. But I'm looking at it from the point of view of someone who likes to reconstruct arguments in order to understand how said thinker was thinking.

Cool. Don't know how you'd deal with the rack, but I'm not terribly keen on making it into an experiment either. Seems that, for yourself at least, you just don't find the claim implausible due to your experience. It'd be interesting to know what, if anything, could be done to make pain easy to endure just through an attitude adjustment.

On emotional pain -- I'd think it depends on what you'd count as "conquering". Just to never feel emotional pain, when it comes to panic and heartbreak, the Epicurean philosophy is meant to deal with the former, and Epicurus' stance on erotic love is meant to avoid the latter. There's a hillarious passage in Lucretius which gives advice for those who find themselves infatuated with someone by way of erotic love (at least, hillarious to me) such as reciting the flaws of the one you are infatuated with anytime you want to draw close to them or sleeping with random people until your infatuation subsides.

I'm afraid this thread passed me by a couple of months ago, but my old gits' philosophy group has just been talking first about the Stoics and then about Epicurus. Perhaps because we're all older people we focused for a while on Epicurus' apparent belief that dying itself is not to be feared because, in the ordinary course of death, our soul-atoms begin to lose their potency (I'm probably putting this wrongly but this is how we put it). A woman-member gave a remarkable and moving account of her 4-year-old child dying in just such a way - refusing medication even when her mother tried to smuggle it into her, and dying in some sort of peace and accommodation with what was happening to her.

I find the debate about pain earlier in the thread a bit strange. I've had a lifetime of cluster headaches, 40 years of them now, and talked to other people about the experience of pain. I think in an odd way one can enter into the experience of pain. You don't thereby mitigate it but you do develop an attitude towards it, a non-contentious mode which makes a difference. I see that to my mind I'm anti-Stoic and pro-Epicurean, as it were, in feeling this.

I do think 'pleasure' for Epicurus is a descendant of Aristotle's, who's only a generation away, and Aristotle is clear that there is intellectual pleasure, and (if they are different) there is pleasure as a state which is different from appetitive pleasure.

Lastly, I'm interested in 'mental pain' as part of the Epicurean model, again, in contrast to the Stoic-inspired cognitive behavioural model that's all the rage. For the Stoics it seems a question of technique. For Epicureans it's reflection and an accommodation with nature, as Dryden's version of Lucretius (which is great fun in itself, a late revelation to me!) puts it:

For life is all in wandring errours led;
And just as Children are surpriz’d with dread,
And tremble in the dark, so riper years
Ev’n in broad daylight are possest with fears;
And shake at shadows fanciful and vain,
As those which in the breasts of Children reign.
These bugbears of the mind, this inward Hell,
No rayes of outward sunshine can dispel;
But nature and right reason must display
Their beames abroad, and bring the darksome soul to day. — Dryden/Lucretius"

I suppose it's just our different positions in life when it comes to pain. I can say that the worst physical pain I've experienced is not on the level you're describing, even. So it just seems like an incredible claim -- that one can remain tranquil even while being tortured, for instance.

I think it's easier for me, too, to accept that death is nothing to us, but I think that's probably because I was an atheist first for a long long time (having been raised to believe in an afterlife, first) -- so perhaps it's also just a matter of having dealt with different aspects of life which cause people anxiety.


If you are interested in Epicurean psychological pain you may want to try and find:

Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology., David Konstan, in Philosophia antiqua (a series of monographs of ancient phgilosophy), isbn 90 04 03653 9

Which I think confirms your statement, but fleshes it out :).

It really helped clear some things up for me on the differences between Epicureanism and Stoicism and Buddhism; something which, at the time, was not so clear. (Actually, @apatheticynic -- you may also be interested in reading https://www.amazon.com/Stoics-Epicureans-Sceptics-Introduction-Hellenistic/dp/0415110351 for more on those differences. Just remembered that book when I wrote the above reference)

I declare a new school "epic" epicurean/stoic. I might be on to something. Joking aside, thank you for the info, posts, and comments. I'll check them out.

If you are interested in Epicurean psychological pain you may want to try and find:

Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology., David Konstan — Moliere

Thanks. Konstan is the author of the current Stanford entry on Epicurus but doesn't touch on pain much there. I'll look out the book next time I'm back on the trek to the uni library.

My discussion group didn't dwell so much on the attitude to death but the attitude to dying.

The other aspect of Epicurus where he seems to follow Aristotle is in the pro-attitude to philia, usually translated as 'friendship'. That interests me in a socio-political way. As against 'liberalism' in the European sense, the liberalism of Rawls and Mill, I've always believed in 'socialism' broadly constructed. We are mutual animals, there is no individualised 'state of nature' for Rousseau or Rawls to go to, even as an ideal type, for humans always band together in social groups. The strand of non-marxist socialism that runs from the early 19th century, often involving experiments in living together like New Lanark, strongly appeals to me (I remember Barbara Taylor's 'Eve and the New Jerusalem' as a seminal book that made me see history in a different pro-feminist way). Greek philia seems to me to relate to this sense of mutuality, comradeship, which analytic and liberal commentators don't quite know what to do with, so they gloss over it, whereas for Aristotle and Epicurus, I'm interested to find, it was central.

As regards the rack: I would take a lesson from BDSM people. They find pleasure in pain, to the point of not only not avoiding pain, but actually seeking it out. It is true this pleasure is usually sexual, but it doesn't have to be. I am also reminded of that scene in Taxi Driver where he holds his hand over an open flame for a considerable amount of time to either test himself, prove himself or ready himself. Again, the person is not only not avoiding pain, but seeking it out. These two views along with the ascetic and the adventurer suggest that the way to beat the rack is to change our view or attitude or thinking about the rack. Consider martyrs who are willing to be tortured and killed for what they believe in. Many times these acts of martyrdom achieve nothing but only function as a statement. All of these views of pain build up to the view we see in that episode of South Park with Mel Gibson. In it he is portrayed as a looney tune who actually wants to be tortured (on a rack, as luck would have it) for the FUN of it! It seems then that acquiring an insane view of pain would be the best way to beat the rack. Consider the success of the show Jackass. It turned pain into comic relief. Perhaps that is the key.

As regards emotional pain: I myself have somehow already acquired the ability to live completely free of every emotional disturbance, be it sadness, anger, regret, envy, resentment, bitterness, hatred, insecurity, invalidation, non-self-acceptance, self-loathing, restlessness, impatience, or what have you. I belief I acquired this ability from studying every form of philosophy, most noteably Plato, and by concerning myself most with studies in general and with my favorite artform. I live in a state of tranquility. The only two disturbances that ever cross my path are fear (very infrequently) and boredom (less infrequently). My discovery of how to overcome fear (by studying it) gave me the idea of overcoming all disturbances, rather than merely living without them. I would like to be able to endure each of the disturbances mentioned above in a cheery mannor. Currently, I am capable of undergoing frustration while being amused by my situtation (kind of like watching Meet The Fockers and living Meet The Fockers simultaneously). I acquired that talent from a friend of mine who was clever enough to figure out a way to laugh at his own misfortune. The most practical starting place would be boredom. Someday I hope to be able to be bored and also to enjoy myself and my boredom at the same time.