It could be better put into this simpler form:
If it is a consequence of natural law that all swans must be white, then all observed swans will be white. ā Janus
But all this is deduction, not induction, as I was trying to point out. — charleton
Pragmatism is a theory of justified belief — apokrisis
Truth is what we believe in the long run following a process of reasoned inquiry. — apokrisis
Being justified does not make a proposition true. This is a fine example of the sort of confusion that enters into the discussion when you change the meaning of the word "true". Justification leads to belief, not to truth.But how do we get from that truth condition to a belief that is in fact justified and therefore true? — apokrisis
I'm not too sure what objective truth is. Are there subjective truths, to oppose them? And if so, are they amenable to the same pragmatic analysis? Or are there subjective truths but no objective truths? — Banno
If you think I am not offering a theory of truth, how could I possibly answer that? So evidently - despite what you just said - you agree that I'm offering a theory of truth. — apokrisis
One can assent to whatever one likes. The question is how reasonable that assent is....explain the grounds why one would assent to such a statement as if there were an unassailable fact. — apokrisis
Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.
Beliefs range over propositions. (arguably, they might be made to range over statements: Fred believes the present king of France is bald.)
Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition.
This relation is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.
The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap.
______________
We know some statement when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.
The "fits in with other beliefs" is a first approximation for a justification. Something stronger is needed, but material implication will not do.
Discard Gettier. The definition is not hard-and-fast.
It does not make sense to ask if we know X to be true; that's exactly the same as asking if we know X. The "we only know it if it is true" bit is only there because we can't know things that are false.
If you cannot provide a justification, that is, if you cannot provide other beliefs with which a given statement coheres, then you cannot be said to know it.
A belief that is not subject to doubt is a certainty.
Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.
Beliefs range over propositions. (arguably, they might be made to range over statements: Fred believes the present king of France is bald.)
Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition.
This relation is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.
The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap.
We know some statement when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.
The "fits in with other beliefs" is a first approximation for a justification. Something stronger is needed, but material implication will not do.
It does not make sense to ask if we know X to be true; that's exactly the same as asking if we know X. The "we only know it if it is true" bit is only there because we can't know things that are false.
A belief that is not subject to doubt is a certainty.
That's just what induction is though; the assumption that things will be as they have been observed to be, and the underlying assumption is that there is a lawlike regularity in nature that determines that such invariances will obtain. — Janus
The Eiffel Tower
Still unanswered. Is the tower 324m tall, give or take a bit?
I say that it is, and further that it is true that the tower is 324m tall.
But you can't. All you can do is say that you believe that it is 324m tall.
It's a failure to commit on your part. — Banno
You, I and whoever else is reading this are most probably competent users of English. As such we show that we can use "...is true" correctly. Now providing a definition is providing synonyms, and hence leads to circularity - words defining more words. — Banno
It follows that pragmatism is not a theory of truth, although of course it re-defines the word "truth" to its own ends. — Banno
Well, no, it isn't. Truth is quite distinct from belief. Pragmatism leaves truth unaddressed. — Banno
Justification leads to belief, not to truth. — Banno
Pragmatism, together with other substantive theories such as coherence and foundationalism, offer neat ways of justifying our beliefs. But they do not explain what truth is. That's right - I am saying that pragmatism is a good thing. But not as an explanation of truth. — Banno
The issue here is that despite rejecting the notion of truth, you continue to speak of objective truth. — Banno
What would be wrong would be to assert that there is only one method that can be used to decide. As if the way one decided the height of the Eiffel Tower were the same as the way one decides the declaration of human rights or that one loves one's partner. Pragmatism does not answer all such questions. — Banno
Again, what do you mean by "true"? — apokrisis
That you still ask that question is curious.
You, I and whoever else is reading this are most probably competent users of English. As such we show that we can use "...is true" correctly. Now providing a definition is providing synonyms, and hence leads to circularity - words defining more words.
You might recall Wittgenstein mentioning that the meaning of a term is its use? — Banno
do you believe the tower is 324m tall yourself? — apokrisis
Again, how could that be the case in your world of no definitions? — apokrisis
As you seemed to want to believe, justified belief leads to a generalised coherence. Things become "true" as they become so fundamental in that fashion. — apokrisis
My position is that we do not believe that there are patterns in reality because we apply an inductive method.
But rather that we see and become certain of the patterns themselves. — Banno
It's just seeing the pattern. — Banno
But for fun, do you believe the tower is 324m tall yourself? Just tell me yes or no! And how.
And when during the day is it so exactly 324m tall? Are we now talking about the hot Eiffel tower that is 15cm taller in the heat of the midday sun, or the one that is 15cm shorter when night falls and its cools down?
Do we in fact now have two Eiffel towers. Or a vast ensemble - one for every nanometre of variation.
Oh goodness, how do we measure the height as it expands/contracts unevenly as the sun hits only one side. It can bend 18cm away from the sun. So which is its true height now - the actual distance to the ground or the full distance if it were standing up straight?
Of course, Banno the tourist guide doesn't need to care. He just reads his facts off Wiki. But Banno the scientist might want to rely on some more careful process of inquiry. A hand-waving approach always makes for poor philosophy. — apokrisis
It's not a method; its not algorithmic. It's just seeing the pattern. — Banno
My position is that we do not believe that there are patterns in reality because we apply an inductive method.
But rather that we see and become certain of the patterns themselves. — Banno
Again, the issue is that your probabilistic, limited definition of truth is not what we mean by truth. It does not apply to our relationships with our partners and friends; to the rules of the road; to art; to music. — Banno
It's not a method; its not algorithmic. It's just seeing the pattern. — Banno
I am arguing against strict definitions on the semiotic grounds that words can only constrain semantics in useful, purpose-serving fashion. — apokrisis
The truth of the matter depends on how we choose to use words. — unenlightened
Newton saw the patterns of apples falling and of planetary motion, and brought the two together in one set of equations. But that process did not involve induction. — Banno
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