Who said consciousness is non-physical? Think of Spinoza's cogitans and extensa being one thing understood two ways. — Janus

I don't see how cogitans helps. It's still got to cause some action in the brain and so we still can't answer the question of what causes it to act if not some other thing. How does it do something but not be caused to do it by some other thing?

I'm saying that the whole rest of the universe apart from our personal experience is demonstrably deterministic — Pseudonym

Ain't so. All modern physics and technology is based upon it ain't so. There isn't one Interpretation of any theory any where on this Earth that holds that the universe we live in is deterministic. What's more there is zero evidence for a deterministic universe which is why there probably isn't a theory for it.

And if the universe was deterministic, then everything becomes irrelevant since there is no Law of Physics that says bouncing particles have to reveal the truth to anyone. It's all an illusion.

You're looking at it the wrong way. Between cogitans and extensa there is a parallelism; it is incoherent to talk of causation between the two because they are the same thing looked at in two incommensurably different ways.

Austin’s analysis belongs to utterances. Beliefs are not utterances. So there are some complexities here.

But here is my main point with regard to reducing a belief to a proposition attitude: it captures some, but certainly not all, of our intuitions about beliefs.

Specifically

• it captures the intuition that a belief belongs to an individual
• It captures the intuition that a belief be expressable in terms of a statement or proposition.
• it captures the intentionality of belief, including our inability to substitute without changing truth value.
• it allows for logical relations between beliefs.

So again I submit it not as the end of the analysis but as a suitable beginning.

don’t look to meaning but to use. How do we use belief?

We use them at least in part, in combination with a desire, to provide explanations for behaviour.

good post.


So we enter into an evaluation of beliefs. Some beliefs are cool, some just too weird.

A common suggestion that I will support is that beliefs are evaluated not on their moral value but on their rational standing. One ought not accept irrational beliefs.

moreover it is the beetle inside the black box. And yet we do talk about beliefs.

They are a back-construct based on behaviour. So, are they anything more than this?

I suspect not.

did I ignore your post? Pretty much. I’m not looking for a definition.

But philosophy consists in words, so a philosophical discussion ought take words seriously.

Is the thread worthy? Watch it grow.

more good stuff


An involuntary belief becomes apparent through action. So that aspect of belief remains.

@Sam26 would put involuntary beliefs at the foundation of his epistemology.

Hm


Some analysis of the negation of “dawn storm believes god exists”


In the structure suggested above, this is a relation between you and the proposition “god exists”. However, there are two possible negations:

1) It is not the case the dawn believes that god exists

This does not commit you to be believing that god does not exist.

2) dawn believes that it is not the case that god exists

This does commit you to not believing in god.


The first is agnosticism; the second atheism.

What evidence? — Pseudonym


The whole legal system is designed around intention and free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

Surely you can see how this is circular? The fact that we think we have free-will (and so have developed a legal system based on it) cannot possibly be used as evidence that we do have free-will, how on earth are you concluding that? We used to think the sun the went round the earth, we used to think that Zeus ruled the world with thunderbolts as weapons, we used to think that the world was determined by Newtonian laws at whatever scale.

I think we know our own actions better than we know "the whole rest of the universe". ... And, it is quite evident that we do not understand the rest of the universe very well, .... — Metaphysician Undercover

I would have thought pretty much the whole of psychology is evidence that we do not know our own actions well at all. I'm not going to list studies because it is literally all of them, you will not find a single psychological study which concludes that what we thought was the case in our minds is spot on and we got it right first time intuitively.

That we have the capacity to consciously prevent a caused physical action from occurring, until the desired time, indicates the existence of free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the Libet experiments did not show that, they showed a consistent pattern of pre-formation, as have subsequent experiments to test the theory, it's not a 'chosen' time, there's not widely varying element in the delay, it's consistently within a similar small time-scale before the action.

I don't see how placing an individual in a hypnotic trance is relevant to the issue of conscious free will. That's like arguing that a person has no conscious free will within one's dreams. — Metaphysician Undercover

It demonstrates that the stories we tell ourselves about what motivated us to act can be so convincing as to seem unquestionably real and yet still be completely false. There have been countless other psychological experiment which show the same thing - we do not know our own minds at all.

You're looking at it the wrong way. Between cogitans and extensa there is a parallelism; it is incoherent to talk of causation between the two because they are the same thing looked at in two incommensurably different ways. — Janus

Right, so how does something occur without a cause? If cogitans and extensa are the same thing, then that which causes changes in cogitans must also cause changes in extensa and vice versa, so we have not got anywhere with the question of how cogitans/extensa can be 'changed' in any way without a prior cause.

But philosophy consists in words, so a philosophical discussion ought take words seriously — Banno

In one sense philosophy does consist in words. Philosophical doctrines are always expressed in words. But then, any doctrine is a doctrine expressed in words. Scientific theories are expressed in words. Should they also "take words seriously"? And what is involved in "taking words seriously" anyway? I agree if you mean that a philosopher should take great care to define his terms for his purposes and to be clear about what he is doing and what he is trying to say.

In another sense philosophy does not consist in words. Philosophy isn't about words - or maybe I should say, worthwhile philosophy isn't.

We use them at least in part, in combination with a desire, to provide explanations for behaviour. — Banno

I agree. Is this the kind of thing you want? A list of things that beliefs are used for?

Thinking about extensa we might posit a chain or nexus of causes,thinking abut cogitans we might posit a chain or nexus of reasons. From the point of view of extensa you might think you have come believe X on account of a prior series of neural processes. From the point of view of cogitans you would think you have come to believe X on account of a prior process of reasoning.

Under these definitions: do I have to understand the proposition "God exists," to be an agnostic? Or differently put, is not understanding the proposition "God exists," sufficient to make me an agnostic? Is the difference between not understanding a proposition, and understanding a proposition but believing it to be undecided (or undecidable) relevant?

When faced with a proposition, how do I find out what it is that I blieve? If I believe that two contradictory propositions are true, but I am unaware of the contradiction - do I hold at least one mistaken belief or am I wrong about at least one of my beliefs? Is this meaningful distinction in the first place?

Surely you can see how this is circular? The fact that we think we have free-will (and so have developed a legal system based on it) cannot possibly be used as evidence that we do have free-will, how on earth are you concluding that? — Pseudonym

You're behaving in a ridiculous manner Pseudonym. It was your argument "that ten thousand years of presuming the world is deterministic and having that presumption work is pretty good evidence that it is, in fact, deterministic". The style of argument you are criticizing is your own. I simply pointed out that your premise is wrong, the belief in determinism has not been prevalent for the last ten thousand years.

I appreciate the effort, but it's still no clearer how you get unpredictability out of this. Viewed as extensa there are prior processes, viewed as cogitans there are prior reasons. In each case the prior elements lead to the current state. They do so eiher mechanistic all, or randomly, but where in that process is free-will? Where does something identifiable as 'you' get to affect things without being caused by something else?

I simply pointed out that your premise is wrong, the belief in determinism has not been prevalent for the last ten thousand years. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it has. How do you think we do anything? Any action you take at all is dependent on a belief in determinism, that actions have prior causes. The repeated use of fire was based on a belief that rubbing sticks reliably 'causes' fire, knapping flint reliably 'causes' sharp edges. The agrarian revolution, the industrial revolution and everything you make use of from either, all rely on presuming the universe is deterministic. The only exception is our belief in our own free-will. What I'm saying is that because it is the only exception, we need a very good reason to maintain that it is, I don't see those very good reasons independent of the fact that we believe it.

Of course it has. How do you think we do anything? Any action you take at all is dependent on a belief in determinism, that actions have prior causes. — Pseudonym

You're just spouting random nonsense Pseudonym. I always try to maintain the attitude that I might fail, in any action which I take. This attitude inspires one to proceed with care and seriously consider all one's actions. You demonstrate a complete misunderstand of human actions, when you say that the use of fire is based in the belief that rubbing sticks "reliably" causes fire.

I always try to maintain the attitude that I might fail, in any action which I take. This attitude inspires one to proceed with care and seriously consider all one's actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really, so when hitting a nail in with a hammer you "seriously consider" the possibility that the force from the hammer might not deterministically cause the nail to move if it hits. What do you seriously consider might be the alternative? That the nail simply move the opposite direction of its own accord?

Really, so when hitting a nail in with a hammer you "seriously consider" the possibility that the force from the hammer might not deterministically cause the nail to move if it hits. What do you seriously consider might be the alternative? That the nail simply move the opposite direction of its own accord? — Pseudonym

Yes. Have you ever hit a nail on the side of the head, and watched it go flying off somewhere. Furthermore, I seriously consider the possibility that the hammer might miss the nail and hit my thumb. There are all sorts of possibilities which must be considered when driving a nail. It's not like I think that determinism ensures that the hammer will reliably drive the nail, so I pick the hammer and start swinging away. It is me, making the appropriate actions with my conscious mind which reliably drives the nail, the nail is far from determined to be driven. So I must be very careful to actually make the appropriate actions.

Beliefs are not utterances. So there are some complexities here.

Do you think that beliefs are necessarily derived from utterances?

In each case the prior elements lead to the current state. — Pseudonym

The unpredictability follows if you don't assume (as Spinoza did assume, being entranced by the Newtonian paradigm) that prior elements lead inexorably to current states. The causes that operate in the extensa domain ars probablistic not deterministic. The reasons that operate in the cogitans domain are influential, not dictatorial.

The causes that operate in the extensa domain ars probablistic not deterministic. — Janus

I have no problem with that. I don't agree, as quantum indeterminacy tends to resolve at a macro level, but I'll grant you its possible. Still doesn't get you to free-will though. Randomness isn't free-will.

The reasons that operate in the cogitans domain are influential, not dictatorial. — Janus

Setting aside the obvious question of how on earth you know this, if the reasons are only influential, then the state of the cogitans is not determined by prior reasons, fine. This still doesn't get you free-will. It gets you a space for free-will, the space left by the underdeterminacy of the prior reasons, but that's just a space where some other thing can cause the cogitans to become what it is in the present moment. You're claiming that the will causes it. I'm asking how, if you are not a dualist, does the will cause the cogitans to enter some other state what does it do to it?

Also, if the cogitans and the extensa are the same thing, then even if the cogitans is put into some state by the will, then how does it ensure that the extensa is put into a matching state? You've just admitted that the extensa's state is caused entirely and sufficiently by probabilistic prior causes, so how come it matches the cogitans, which is not?

Randomness isn't free-will. — Pseudonym

You're still falling into a conflation of domains. Of course acting for reasons is not random; but it is also not deterministic; I can choose which reasons to act or believe on account of. That freedom to choose is just what is meant by free will.

You're claiming that the will causes it. I'm asking how, if you are not a dualist, does the will cause the cogitans to enter some other state what does it do to it? — Pseudonym

Ironically it seems to be you that is falling into a Cartesian dualism in imagining that cogitation and will are ontologically, as opposed to merely heuristically, separate.

You've just admitted that the extensa's state is caused entirely and sufficiently by probabilistic prior causes, so how come it matches the cogitans, which is not? — Pseudonym

I have not admitted that; that would be you falling into your own presuppositions and reading tendentiously. Prior events are probablistically, not deterministically, related to subsequent events; that is a way we can understand what we think of as physical reality; it is merely a human understanding, that should not be reified into some ontological absolute.

This still doesn't get you free-will. — Pseudonym

Why would I need to get something I already have?

You're still falling into a conflation of domains. Of course acting for reasons is not random; but it is also not deterministic; I can choose which reasons to act or believe on account of. That freedom to choose is just what is meant by free will. — Janus

Fie, so what causes you to choose the option you choose. How could you choose other than the option which seems like the right one? If you're choosing between vanilla and chocolate ice cream, at what point in the process do you tell your brain to choose vanilla, despite the fact that it registers a preference for chocolate? when do you tell your brain to create that thought to tell your brain to do that?...and so on.

Ironically it seems to be you that is falling into a Cartesian dualism in imagining that cogitation and will are ontologically, as opposed to merely heuristically, separate. — Janus

I'm trying to understand your position that genuine free-will exists without dualism, it's a very unusual position. Every philosopher I've ever read on the subject has either been a dualism or a compatibilist, I've never encountered such a view as yours and I don't understand the mechanism you're proposing at all.

Prior events are probablistically, not deterministically, related to subsequent events; that is a way we can understand what we think of as physical reality; it is merely a human understanding, that should not be reified into some ontological absolute. — Janus

So you're suggesting now that states are not probabilistically determined by prior states, that this is only a "human understanding", so what does determine current states of the extensa then?

at what point in the process do you tell your brain to choose vanilla, despite the fact that it registers a preference for chocolate? — Pseudonym

You're still falling into dualist presuppositions here. In effect you're asking me to give an account that accords with presuppositions I don't accept.

I don't understand the mechanism you're proposing at all. — Pseudonym

Again you cannot escape your prejudice. If freedom could be explained in terms of a "mechanism" it would not be freedom, would it?

So you're suggesting now that states are not probabilistically determined by prior states, that this is only a "human understanding", so what does determine current states of the extensa then? — Pseudonym

It is not the understanding that subsequent states are probablistically related to prior states that I am questioning, but your deterministic understanding of it, and the way you reify that into an absolute against which you want to claim that freedom is an "illusion".

In any case, all this is going well off-topic re the thread.

No; but could there be a belief that is unutterable? No. The propositional content of a belief implies that it can be stated. Mind you, that does not mean that it has been or must be stated.

The question is, is it the belief which is uttered or something which has the same propositional content?

Either is utterable.