I'm not sure we are really disagreeing so much as it being a matter of emphasis. We can objectify consciousness or the I in terms of its activities and come to understand and explain it, but it is nonetheless always I, the consciousness, that is doing the understanding and explaining. Consciousness is fundamental to all knowing. Of course what is known is necessary too, and the activity of knowing itself. But it is always consciousness that does the knowing. Or in Peircean terms, it is the interpretant that is the most fundamental element of the sign relation.

I'm not sure we are really disagreeing so much as it being a matter of emphasis. — Janus

That's what I said. All these different bits of jargon - truth, belief, certainty, justification, etc - they are emphasising different aspects of a pragmatic modelling relation.

And the Peircean notion of that is anti-foundationalist in treating the whole kit and kaboodle as emergent - in a mutual, co-arising, fashion. So to the degree that you treat anything as foundational - like I-ness - we would have to disagree.

Consciousness is fundamental to all knowing. — Janus

No. Not unless here you are prepared to re-define consciousness - with all its embedded dualistic substance metaphysics - as the modelling relation itself. It is the modelling relation that is "fundamental" to all knowing.

Or in Peircean terms, it is the interpretant that is the most fundamental element of the sign relation. — Janus

Where does he argue for that?

No. Not unless here you are prepared to re-define consciousness - with all its embedded dualistic substance metaphysics - as the modelling relation itself. It is the modelling relation that is "fundamental" to all knowing. — apokrisis

Yes, why not define consciousness that way? It is modeling that brings about form. Formless matter is not substantive, but incoherent. Just as is incoherent the notion of consciousness as any kind of quasi-matter (thought of as substance in that kind of sense). But consciousness, if defined as the modeling relation itself is foundational and so could also be thought of as being, in that sense, substantial.

Where does he argue for that? — apokrisis

I'm not saying Peirce argues for that (although it might be what he is alluding to with his notion of matter as "effete mind").

If we count the modeling relation itself as being consciousness, then it would be in a restricted sense (as individual consciousness) that the interpretant would be considered to represent consciousness. Taken that way then it would not be right to say the interpretant is fundamental. On the other hand if we think there is a God...then the sign relation would be like the holy trinity, where the interpretant is the father, the object is the son, and the sign is the holy spirit. :smile:

But consciousness, if defined as the modeling relation itself is foundational and so could also be considered to be, in that sense, substantial. — Janus

But that is how I redefine "consciousness" - as a biosemiotic modelling relation. And then beyond that, I would agree with Peirce's project of total generalisation in the form of pan-semiotic physicalism. Even the universe arises from this kind of "mind-full" self-organising relation.

So I am happy to rewrite substance ontology in terms of a process metaphysics. My complaint here is that you still seem to be arguing from a substance metaphysics. I agree, it might only seem that way. We might be in strong agreement in the end.

But consciousness, if defined as the modeling relation itself is foundational and so could also be considered to be, in that sense, substantial. — Janus

That is confusing phrasing. Why would we want to treat consciousness or mindfulness or any "one thing" as fundamental? The modelling relation is irreducibly triadic. It is a process and so the substantial is what emerges in the end, at the limit. It still sounds like you want to make idealism come out right despite endorsing a modelling relations story.

I'm not saying Peirce argues for that (although it might be what he is alluding to with his notion of matter as "effete mind"). — Janus

So you do want to make idealism top dog here! :)

I think you are caught between two metaphysics and you still have to work through to reach a position that is actually self-consistent. That still seems the basic issue here.

If we count the modeling relation itself as being consciousness, then it would be in a restricted sense ( as individual consciousness) that the interpretant would be considered to represent consciousness. Taken that way then it would not be right to say the interpretant is fundamental. On the other hand if we think there is a God...then the sign relation would be like the holy trinity, where the interpretant is the father, the object is the son, and the sign is the holy spirit. — Janus

Again, you want to take a semiotic metaphysics - which is immanent, emergent and irreducibly triadic - and make it fit an idealist metaphysics which permits transcendence, foundationalism and absolute separability.

The interpretant is talked of as a third element - a habit of mind in the presence of a sign. Yet really, in being identified with Thirdness, we have to remember that Thirdness becomes the third that incorporates the other two - the Firstness that is the uncertainty of the world, the Secondness which is the crispness of a sign, a reaction. So Thirdness stands for the whole of the sign relation, and not just the third element of that relation - the interpretant.

So while Peircian semiotics sounds analytic - three separable parts in relation - it is actually synthetic or holistic. The three parts are irreducibly in a relation that has to involve all three. The relation itself is the three-cornered thing - or the hierarchical organisation.

Thus - even joking - God, son and holy spirit would have to be irreducibly related in a collaboratively causal fashion. So there could be no leftover notions of transcendence, foundationalism or separability to celebrate. That would have to be an explicit outcome of adopting a semiotic metaphysics here, not something that could be fudged for any lingering feel-good reasons.

How different do you consider the Met Office's Cray XC40 supercomputer (capable of over 14,000 trillion arithmetic operations per second, containing a total of 460,000 computer cores) from a 1985 BBC Microcomputer? Personally they are as night and day to me. One can predict the weather five days in advance and make long term climate predictions using thousands of variables, the other can print the word "hello" across the page and run a game of 'bat and ball'. And yet, what word do we give to the thing that makes them do these things - a 'programme', some 'software'. We have not felt the need to create a new set of words to define just how immensely more capable the Cray XC40 is from it's predecessors. It still runs on 'hardware', 'processors', 'RAM'. I'm not a computer expert, but I bet some of it is still programmed in C+.

Why the linguistic consistency? Because there is no functional difference between the the two computers, one is just mind-blowingly better than the other at computing.

So it is with Humans and other animals. We are not unique in out use of language (loads of other animals communicate), we are not unique in our use of symbols (some other animals use them). Deception, abstraction, artistic expression, referencing, all have their representation in animals. We are just mind-blowingly better at it than all other animals. We can communicate stuff with language that is entire worlds away from anything other animals can do, whilst apes are struggling to learn how to ask for food, we can be discussing Aristotle. But how is that any different from the BBC Microcomputer crashing when you ask it to print "hello" and play 'Bat and Ball' at the same time, whilst the Cray XC40 predicts a snowfall next week whilst beating Gary Kasparov at chess? None of this difference requires that we possess something animals do not, it is sufficient that we are just better at it.

The principle of parsimony, therefore, should steer us toward the theory that all the processes in a human brain probably have their equivalent in animal brains unless the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates otherwise.

Thus with beliefs. We know we have thoughts that we identify as beliefs and that they can be very complex ones, like the Cray XC40's current processor state. So it follows, by parsimony, that animals probably have beliefs too, but much more simple ones, like the BBC Microcomputer's. Animals certainly seem to behave as if they have beliefs (the dog runs to where it 'believes' the stick is, even if the owner has in fact only mimicked throwing it). So no evidence presents itself to demonstrate that animals don't have private beliefs. I just cant see how any other conclusion isn't just anthropocentric wishful thinking.

And so it begins.

Talk of places in the mind must be metaphorical - the mind does not have places.

What is it to have a place in the mind? — Banno

Hi. So that 'it' continues, what is it for something to be metaphorical? Could we not ask if 'mind' itself is clear term? Perhaps you would agree here. You would like to avoid 'mind.' But you need 'proposition.' If I ask you what a proposition is, you'll probably give me yet other words.

Can we make completely explicit what it is to share a language? If we have not done so already and yet want to do so, will we not need this inexplicit understanding of a language to get started?

Last point is that philosophers seem unlikely to gain control the use of 'belief.' Even if a few philosophers agree on the elegance of a definition, they'll still need to understand its use among everyone else. (I don't think we can be perfectly explicit about this understanding.)

Consciousness is fundamental to all knowing. — Janus

I read this and thought: consciousness [among other things] is knowing. And the knowing is something like the known itself with an added distance effect. We add a sort of zooming-out and call this the 'I'? or 'consciousness'?

And there cannot be the belief that the sky is blue without "blue". — Metaphysician Undercover

What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. You're just begging the question. I have no more reason to accept your assertion than to accept the assertion that there cannot be the belief that the sky is blue without a cat wearing a poncho and playing a keyboard.

The word is not the thing. The concept is not the thing. The belief requires neither. Why would it? The belief requires that the guy has seen the thing; and that, given his abilities and the circumstances, is sufficient grounds to conclude that it's highly likely that he believes what he does. This is already known. We know it by what we know of human nature and of the circumstances in the scenario under discussion. It's not some big controversy. It's down to yourself and the others to bring forward a real challenge.

A Cray is not a souped up microcomputer. A vector processing architecture is very different from a scalar processing one. So bad analogy.

Likewise human language is different in being an articulate and syntactical code. It is capable of unlimited expression from limited means due to its infinite combinational possibilities.

Language in that sense exists in no other species. Fact.

Provide some arguments to back up your assertions and aspersions and if it is good enough I might respond. — Janus

You don't get to dictate terms. See here and here. Better for you to quit our discussion than to send it round in circles.

If someone sees the blue sky that does not entail that they see that the sky is blue; — Janus

It almost inevitably leads to it, which is what I've argued. In reality, there are very few exceptions, and none which are relevant to this debate. Exceptions might include paying a lack of attention to what you're looking at, or some sort of physical alteration to your perception, like seeing yellow as a result of jaundice.

There are a number of steps which I've acknowledged. To break it down a bit and examine the basics, we have that someone sees something. But they don't just see something. They see that it's the sky, and not, e.g. an elephant. They see that it's blue, and not, e.g. pink. I don't see how you could plausibly deny that. Are you suggesting that a primitive human lacking language would lack these abilities? If so, you're going to have to back up such a controversial suggestion which flies in the face of what we know about human perception.

the latter would involve association with other experiences involving blue objects. — Janus

He would have that. Why wouldn't he? Not an issue.

But even seeing that the sky is blue in this associative sense cannot sensibly be said to lead to conviction that something is the case; because the conception of something being the case requires the abstractive ability to consider that it might not have been the case, and it is most plausible that such reasoning is possible only with symbolic language. — Janus

No, that disregards what I've said about belief. I said that to believe is to be convinced, not to hold a conviction. To be convinced of something does not require the abstractive ability to consider that it might not have been the case, and this can be effectively argued by bringing up plausible counterexamples, including beliefs which naturally arise as a result of seeing the blue sky, feeling the cold weather, drinking from a river, being stung by a bee, and many, many more.

In any case conviction or belief is redundant when we see. If we see the blue sky it is redundant to say that we believe the sky is blue unless we are speculating about whether we might be deceived, that it might be an illusion or a dream, and so on. In the presence of such questions it might be appropriate to say we believe. — Janus

Nonsense. That it is so obvious and practically inevitable that certain beliefs will follow from certain experiences does not mean that it's redundant. It's a truism. It's a very strong point in favour of my case, not against it.

You're attempting to define belief as something more intellectually advanced than it actually is. You've mentioned or described abstraction, self-reflection, holding a conviction, counterfactual reasoning, speculation, and perhaps more. Yet none of these are foundational to belief. And, saliently, by making the mistake of including such aspects associated with belief in the foundations of belief, you end up with the absurd consequence of having a human with lived experience, yet no beliefs relating to this lived experience, simply because he has yet to develop a language.

And this kind of belief is different than the kind of expectation your dog, pre-linguistic child or pet troglodyte child might experience when s/he hears the sound of your car arriving in the driveway. Do you seriously believe that she considers the possibility that her expectation might be mistaken? — Janus

This kind of belief - the one which you describe - is indeed different. I accept that. You're throwing in factors for belief formation which are nonessential in the scenario that we've been discussing. We can call your needlessly advanced concept of belief, "Belief 2.0".

Now, tell me, what has Belief 2.0 got to do with belief?

"It is important to remember that the constraint on belief imposed by experience is a negative one. The world affects our beliefs not by our finding out positive things about it, but rather, by providing recalcitrant or surprising things which upset an expectation produced by a belief. The role which the world plays is not one of providing something for our beliefs to correspond to, but rather, one of letting us know when we have a belief that conflicts with it."

Like the example I just raised of being stung by a bee for the first time, having no prior experience or foresight about what would happen.

We know that bees have been around for at least approximately 100 million years, and that our ancestors have been around for about six million years, with the modern form of humans only having evolved about 200,000 years ago. And, according to one source, human language probably started to develop around 100,000 years ago. So, this may be no mere hypothetical. It's quite possible, if not likely, that this has actually happened.

If you're stung by a bee, that's damn well gonna form a belief in a being sufficiently like us, language or no language. How could it not? Why would it not? Here's a counterexample defeating the assertion that language is necessary to obtain belief.

Yes, in fact I was in the process of editing that post to add that maybe it would be better not to say that animals and pre-linguistic humans believe but that they associate and expect. — Janus

No, that wouldn't be better, since they - pre-linguistic humans, at least - do believe. (Unless you're talking about Belief 2.0). And they believe as a result of associations and expectations, much like us. It's in our nature.

What would be better is if you broadened your notion of belief, and untied it from the strings that you've attached, so that it better matches the reality.

I don't think we're going to make any progress here. We agree that human language is worlds away from other animals, you think that distance is so significant as to affect our thought process and requires a whole new language to describe its effects, I don't. It seems to me that evidence for the extent to which human language differs from that of other animals is redundant in this. It is a pragmatic argument about whether the knowledge that our 'beliefs' are fundamentally different from anything other animals have is useful in any sense.

Im arguing that the only use to which I've ever seen that kind of theory put is to denigrate animals in such a way as to justify their mistreatment. That is the reason why I'm opposed to it.

Ethically, I think that if there's even a chance that other animals think somewhat similarly to us (even if a much smaller version), then we owe them the benefit of the doubt, because the harm done by presuming a thinking creature is nothing but an automaton, is considerably worse than the harm done by mistaking an automaton for a thinking creature.

For example I am absolutely certain that I see a blue sky; belief simply doesn't enter into it. — Janus

This seems just like word play over definitions. — apokrisis

I agree with apokrisis. That it's wordplay kills any further point he had. And that it's wordplay could be put to the test. I think that many people would interpret the first quote to be contradictory, and I further think that it's not such a good idea to attempt to dictate meaning to language, instead of going with the flow.

What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

...

The word is not the thing. The concept is not the thing. The belief requires neither. Why would it? — Sapientia

Yes a word is a thing. That's my evidence, the word itself, as a thing. By denying that the word is the thing, you are simply denying the evidence. But the evidence is clear, words are all around us. They clearly exist and are clear evidence.

So, there is no such thing as what a word refers to, without the word. There is no such thing as what "sky" refers to, or what "blue" refers to without those words. In order for there to be a thing which is referred to by "sky", there must be the word "sky". Your ridiculous argument is like insisting that there is something which Bob is doing when there is no Bob.

Yes a word is a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't address what I said. I said that the word is not the thing. I didn't say that a word is not a thing.

That's my evidence, the word itself, as a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Evidence for what? That's either a non sequitur or a red herring.

By denying that the word is the thing, you are simply denying the evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is self-evident that the word, "blue", is not the colour blue. But if anyone were stupid enough to fail to realise that, then one could simply point out that words are composed of letters and colours are not. Or do you deny that as well?

I refuse to be drawn into a debate over something so silly.

But the evidence is clear, words are all around us. They clearly exist and are clear evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is why I don't like debating you. I certainly don't deny that words exist, but that demonstrates nothing of relevance to my point.

So, there is no such thing as what a word refers to, without the word. There is no such thing as what "sky" refers to, or what "blue" refers to without those words. In order for there to be a thing which is referred to by "sky", there must be the word "sky". Your ridiculous argument is like insisting that there is something which Bob is doing when there is no Bob. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already explained your misunderstanding. I refuse to do so repeatedly until it finally sinks in, if it ever does. Please pay close attention to what I'm about to say, because it will be the second time that I will have said it: we are not in the thought experiment, and my use of terms such as "blue" and "sky" is for sake of convenience only. There are no words in the thought experiment, as there's no language in the thought experiment. I am of course using language, but I am not in the thought experiment. There is a blue sky in the thought experiment, but in the thought experiment, it's not a referent, since there are no words in the thought experiment. The words I'm using to refer are outside of the thought experiment. My act of reference takes place from outside of the thought experiment. If you claim to lack the ability to imagine the scenario in the thought experiment, then all I can say in reply is that I do not share your defect.

That doesn't address what I said. I said that the word is not the thing. I didn't say that a word is not a thing. — Sapientia

The word is the thing. Words are the subject of this discussion. And, from looking at words we are trying to determine whether there is such a thing as a "belief", which is separate from the words, and if so, what is the nature of that thing, the "belief".

By assuming that there is a thing other than the word, which is referred to by "belief", you are just begging the question.

I refuse to be drawn into a debate over something so silly. — Sapientia

You now recognize the ridiculousness of your argument? How do you derive your presupposition that there would be something which the word "sky" refers to without the word "sky"?

I've already explained your misunderstanding. I refuse to do so repeatedly until it finally sinks in, if it ever does. Please pay close attention to what I'm about to say, because it's the second time that I've said it: we are not in the thought experiment, and my use of terms such as "blue" and "sky" is for sake of convenience only. There are no words in the thought experiment, as there's no language in the thought experiment. I am of course using language, but I am not in the thought experiment. There is a blue sky in the thought experiment. — Sapientia

OK, I'm ready for your thought experiment. There's a blue sky in your thought experiment. What next?

The word is the thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Address my refutation.

I don't see a refutation

Where's your thought experiment?

I don't see a refutation. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's curious that you quoted large parts of my post, and even a statement directly below the part to which I'm referring, yet you left out that crucial part.

Here it is again, even though all you had to do was look up above at my post and what you left out in your reply:

But if anyone were stupid enough to fail to realise that, then one could simply point out that words are composed of letters and colours are not. Or do you deny that as well? — Sapientia

Where's the refutation?
Where's the thought experiment?
Let's go, get on with it,. I haven't got all day.

Where's your thought experiment? — Metaphysician Undercover

Stop trolling. If you read the discussion, what I'm referring to should be clear.

To be convinced of something does not require the abstractive ability to consider that it might not have been the case, and this can be effectively argued by bringing up plausible counterexamples, including beliefs which naturally arise as a result of seeing the blue sky, feeling the cold weather, drinking from a river, being stung by a bee, and many, many more. — Sapientia

You're not really saying anything here. What you term "beliefs", and cite as "plausible counterexamples" would, in my view, be better termed 'believings' or 'expectations', to distinguish them from beliefs proper, which are linguistically formed (or at least formable) propositions. Really all we are arguing over is which would be the better, clearer terminology. The way I see it, to be convinced that something is the case just is to hold a conviction, and naturally entails that you are convinced that the negation of the "something" is not the case, and even, in extremis, could not be the case. An animal or pre-linguistic human would probably be, for example, surprised if one day the sky was red in the middle of the day, because habit would have caused them to expect it to be either blue with or without more or less clouds, or grey and overcast with or without more or less rain. But they would quickly accept it and move on. How do you think a linguistically cultivated human would react?

I don't think it is plausible that a percipient could form such an abstract concept in the absence of linguistic capacity. In any case how could we ever know that they were able to formulate abstract concepts in the absence of symbolic language? — Janus


These two statements are self-contradictory. In the first you claim that it is not plausible that something could form an abstract concept in the absence of linguistic capacity, then you state that we would know whether they had or not anyway. — Pseudonym

That's not right, I asked how we could know.

So, you want to lose a perfectly valid distinction between believing and knowing? If you see something there is no doubt, and consequently no need for belief, that you see it, unless you start to question whether what you are seeing is really what you think it is, and this questioning requires language, I would say. I can give an account of how such questioning, in the context of the questioner using language, is done; I cannot give any account of how such questioning could be done, in the context of a percipient not using language to do it. Can you?

No, that wouldn't be better, since they - pre-linguistic humans, at least - do believe. (Unless you're talking about Belief 2.0). And they believe as a result of associations and expectations, much like us. It's in our nature.

What would be better is if you broadened your notion of belief, and untied it from the strings that you've attached, so that it better matches the reality. — Sapientia

If you read carefully you will see that I have already made a distinction, and much earlier in previous exchanges with others in this thread as well, between the non-linguistic or non-conceptual activity of believing and linguistic or conceptual state of holding beliefs. Earlier you were denying the validity of even this distinction. Now apparently you are allowing it, but arguing that my proposal that "expecting" would be a better term than "believing" for any non-propositional cognition doesn't match the "reality". What "reality" would that be, then?

They see that it's the sky, and not, e.g. an elephant. — Sapientia

This is nonsense. They see the sky and not an elephant, but they don't see that it is the sky and not an elephant because that would entail consciously noticing the distinction between the sky and an elephant. If you want to say that they see that it is the sky and not anything else, then they would have to notice the distinction between the sky and every other possible thing in that moment of perception which is obviously impossible.

Alternatively, they could notice that the sky is not 'anything else', taking 'anything else' in abstracto; but that would require language. A pre-linguistic percipient could associate the sky with something more or less similar like, for example the sea, as mental images, but to think, to believe, that one is not the other arguably requires language capability. It seems obvious to me that you are anthropocentrically projecting your linguistically enabled abilities back onto pre-linguistic beings. Think about your own experience; why do you think it is that you have so few memories from your own pre-linguistic past? I would say it is precisely because you were not able to draw the kinds of clear distinctions between things that language enables, distinctions that form the basis of memories of specific events.

You're not really saying anything here. What you term "beliefs", and cite as "plausible counterexamples" would, in my view, be better termed 'believings' or 'expectations', to distinguish them from beliefs proper, which are linguistically formed (or at least formable) propositions. — Janus

No, you're not really saying anything here. It's just more wordplay on your part. You're just inventing a new term for the beliefs I'm talking about, creating a superficial distinction, and then dismissing what I'm talking about as inapplicable. Belief (which is what I'm talking about) is not merely expectation. The belief that something has happened, for example - that, say, a tree has just fallen nearby - cannot rightly be categorised as an expectation. Expectations are related to belief, but they are distinct from belief. Your attempt to conflate the two will not succeed.

Furthermore, you're begging the question once again by defining beliefs as linguistically formed. The whole debate hinges on whether or not language is necessary for belief, so merely defining it as such defeats the purpose of having this debate and grants you only a hollow victory.

Really all we are arguing over is which would be the better, clearer terminology. — Janus

Mine, clearly. Yours can be shown to lead to absurd, counterintuitive consequences. A human with lived experience, yet no beliefs relating to this lived experience, simply because he has yet to develop a language? He has seen rivers, the blue sky, trees, other animals, has smelt, tasted, eaten and drunk all kinds of things. He has lived through night and day, hot weather and cold weather. He has experienced pain, gone hungry, injured himself. Yet, despite all of this - despite being a human, with human capabilities, and not an ant or a thermostat which obviously lacks the necessary capabilities - astonishingly, he has no beliefs whatsoever!

And your solution? Let's just call them "believings" instead! :lol:

The way I see it, to be convinced that something is the case just is to hold a conviction, and naturally entails that you are convinced that the negation of the "something" is not the case, and even, in extremis, could not be the case. — Janus

No, that would be to confuse belief and logical consequence. That one must commit to the logical consequences of a belief in order to maintain consistency does not mean that one must believe each and every logical consequence of said-belief. For, if it is so that in order to believe that something is the case (e.g. that it is cold), one must also believe that the negation is not the case (e.g. that it is not the case that it is not cold), then why not also that the negation of the negation of the negation is not the case, and so on ad infinitum? That would be absurd: a psychological impossibility. No, on the contrary, it is far more simple than that. To believe that something is the case, one must be convinced that it is. That's all there is to it.

An animal or pre-linguistic human would probably be, for example, surprised if one day the sky was red in the middle of the day, because habit would have caused them to expect it to be either blue with or without more or less clouds, or grey and overcast with or without more or less rain. But they would quickly accept it and move on. How do you think a linguistically cultivated human would react? — Janus

Relevance? That doesn't make these experience-derived beliefs anything other than what they are.