Im arguing that the only use to which I've ever seen that kind of theory put is to denigrate animals in such a way as to justify their mistreatment. That is the reason why I'm opposed to it. — Pseudonym

Hmm. So you have adopted a moral position and you demand the science must find a way to support it?

I don't believe that is how it works.

I don't think we're going to make any progress here. We agree that human language is worlds away from other animals, you think that distance is so significant as to affect our thought process and requires a whole new language to describe its effects, I don't. — Pseudonym

Well I flatter myself that I go beyond the usual lumper vs splitter dichotomies. My aim is to be accurate about the continuities, and accurate about the discontinuities. And I don't operate with a preconceived notion of what the "right answers" ought to be.

As I say, this area was also my specialist subject about 30 years ago (while oddly enough, computer science was where I was focused just before that).

So, you want to lose a perfectly valid distinction between believing and knowing? — Janus

No, that's an erroneous inference. I want to maintain the distinction, as well as the relation. They're distinct, but not mutually exclusive. Not only are they not mutually exclusive, belief is a prerequisite to knowledge. And the same is true of the relation between belief and certainty, which is what was actually being addressed. To be certain entails belief, as is understood in common parlance, as can be put to the test.

If you see something there is no doubt, and consequently no need for belief, that you see it... — Janus

What are you talking about? It's not about necessity, or, as I think you mean, perceived utility. It is a matter of fact. If you see something, and there is no doubt in your mind, then, certainly, it is the case that you have a belief to that effect! Or else the whole situation would make not an iota of sense. Certainty is a concept applicable to belief. Whether or not you consider this instance of belief to be redundant is neither here nor there.

...unless you start to question whether what you are seeing is really what you think it is, and this questioning requires language, I would say. I can give an account of how such questioning, in the context of the questioner using language, is done; I cannot give any account of how such questioning could be done, in the context of a percipient not using language to do it. Can you? — Janus

You're straying off course here, I think. I don't agree that doubt requires language. It requires language no more than does belief. But what would be the relevance in pursuing this additional line of thinking that you've introduced to the discussion?

If you see something, and there is no doubt in your mind, then, certainly, it is the case that you have a belief to that effect! — Sapientia

You make the oddest assertions Sapientia. I really don't see how seeing is the same thing as believing.

If you read carefully you will see that I have already made a distinction, and much earlier in previous exchanges with others in this thread as well, between the non-linguistic or non-conceptual activity of believing and linguistic or conceptual state of holding beliefs. — Janus

Okay, let's get the basics straight:

There is no believing without belief. You either believe or you do not believe. And, if you believe, then you have a belief.

Now, nonlinguistic believing is, tautologically, a kind of belief, so why have you been denying that throughout our exchange? The realisation has just dawned on me that this whole disagreement between us is down to your confusing distinctions and lack of clarity. Are you telling me that when you deny that the pre-linguistic human obtains belief, you actually mean something else: that the pre-linguistic human does not obtain linguistic belief? That is bloody obvious.

Do you have anything meaningful to say? Anything which doesn't amount to a tautology?

Earlier you were denying the validity of even this distinction. — Janus

I told you multiple times that I did not make a distinction in those terms, and that I did not properly understand your meaning. That was a signal for you to clarify your meaning, but you never did so in a way that I could easily grasp until just now. You mentioned something about a disposition to act which is different from belief-that, and when I queried this, you just kind of repeated the point instead of explaining it in plainer terms. I remember I replied that what I was talking about was belief-that, and I stand by that claim.

Now apparently you are allowing it, but arguing that my proposal that "expecting" would be a better term than "believing" for any non-propositional cognition doesn't match the "reality". What "reality" would that be, then? — Janus

Well, nonlinguistic belief is of course a type of belief. So, yes, calling it "belief" is more appropriate than calling it "expectation". Why are you even making this distinction between different types of belief to begin with? You're just needlessly complicating things, and that has resulted in confusion. All that matters is that it's belief.

If we take this back to where it began, at least for me, it stems back to Banno's claims that (1) the individual must understand the meaning of the proposition in order to correctly be said to believe that proposition, and (2) the individual thinks the proposition is true.

I have argued that (1) is false, and you should agree with me on that point because of your acceptance of nonlinguistic belief.

Certainty is a type of belief. I’m writing this in Fremantle while eating grilled local sardines.

That’s not just probable, but certain.

Certainty is a type of belief. I’m writing this in Fremantle while eating grilled local sardines.

That’s not just probable, but certain. — Banno

How is it a type of belief? It just seems like a highly probably true belief as you're using the term. "I am eating sardines" is a different type of belief than is "Cogito ergo sum" for example.

it’s not just highly probable. It’s true. Doubt has no place here.

So I can’t doubt your statement?

Sounds legit.

you may do as you wish. I’m going to have another gin and tonic. You can join me or not; but you probably will not.

Why? You've been wrong before?

Not in this case.

Yep. You are in a little world all of your own on this one.

Either your comprehension is bad or you are disingenuously distorting what I've written and responding to straw instead of argument. Either way, this and your vacuous posts above are not worthy of any further response.

and again you have not pointed out anything that is wrong with what I said.

Again you are claiming certainty in regard to your assertion?

Sounds legit.

I am certain that I am in Fremantle.

What's your problem with that?

It is that you can't do truth, nor certainty.

And that means that the vast commonplace background of truth that we take for granted is beyond your account.

But,

You are in a little world all of your own on this one. — apokrisis

Hmm. So you have adopted a moral position and you demand the science must find a way to support it? — apokrisis

Come on, a cursory glance over my argument will show that's not the case, you're just being disingenuous for effect. If it's come to that I've really no interest in the discussion any more. If there's one thing we've pretty firmly established in our exchange it's that the 'science' does not yet 'support' any one way of looking at it. It rules out several possible ways, but does not support one. We are therefore left with a choice as to what theory to hold, and to test, until it is refuted. That theory should be parsimonious, it should be based on existing theories, but beyond that the choice is ours as to which one we hold, and test first.

I may have met quite a few Muslims, I may have found them all to be aloof and rude, I may be tempted to form the theory that all Muslims are aloof and rude until such time as it is proven wrong, but aloofness and rudeness are difficult to judge in one meeting, they're complex contextual responses, so I could easily have been wrong. So I have a genuine choice of theory, I could hold that Muslims are aloof and rude, or that Muslims are just like all other cultures, a mixed bag. My choice of theory can then be guided by morality, the costs of being wrong, or the virtues cultivated by my beliefs.

At no point does one belief 'demand' anything of the science, if the science disproves it, then so be it, we move on, make another belief, but the science most definitely has not dis-proven the idea that the belief 'software' in animal's brains is just the same as ours, that our ability with language does not confer some categorical new way of thinking.

So it is entirely reasonable to hold to a theory that has been prompted by a moral sense of duty.

As I say, this area was also my specialist subject about 30 years ago (while oddly enough, computer science was where I was focused just before that). — apokrisis

That's the first time I've seen an appeal to authority fallacy where the authority is the person making the claim. Firstly, 30 years is a long time, most of the studies I've cited have been carried out in the last 30 years. Secondly, none of this relates to any area of expertise. As I said, this is not about whether animal language is different from human language, we both agree it is. This is about whether that difference causes a significant enough difference in our thought processes that the very holding of a belief is a different experience for a human. No amount of research in linguistics is going to tell you that. In fact, no research in the current literature on any subject is going to tell you that. Psychology might one day give us enough evidence to be forced to reject either one of our theories, but today, it's a philosophical discussion (hence the forum) about the merits of each theory, hence the moral dimension.

So you’ve got nothing but the demand I should share your certainty?

Sounds like the epistemology of a solipsist.

Come on, a cursory glance over my argument will show that's not the case, you're just being disingenuous for effect. — Pseudonym

Im arguing that the only use to which I've ever seen that kind of theory put is to denigrate animals in such a way as to justify their mistreatment. That is the reason why I'm opposed to it. — Pseudonym

Disingenuous? Moi?

So you’ve got nothing but the demand I should share your certainty? — apokrisis

But I said nothing of the sort. Again and again rather than honest discussion you disparage those with whom you disagree. This thread had some decent philosophical themes in it, shoved aside by your insistence that we listen to your shit.

what is it for something to be metaphorical? — mrcoffee

Thanks for the questions. Metaphor is a whole new subject; but I think it clear that the mind does not have places. The brain, on the other hand, can provide some interesting material. One will not find a belief by dissecting a brain - but could it be found in an MRI? Sam Harris did some curious stuff relating to this, which I am browsing through at the moment.

My initial stance would be that while an MRI might show that certain brain parts are used when certain beliefs are being contemplated or used, this does not show that a belief has a place in the brain.

Put forward your argument. It’s been years. You still haven’t.

that’s the trouble. You think in terms of a grand plan that answers everything. You expect me to play your game.

I’m interested in discussion, not preaching.

So for you, at the moment, the question is why shouldn’t I be certain I am in Femantle?

And you are stuck. Again.

Is that pretty certain, absolutely certain, cross your heart and hope to die certain, as certain as you can reasonably be?

Anyway, I’m certain you’re not in Femantle.

Unfortunately, your response is predictable. This isn't the first time that you've gone to throw in the towel prematurely without putting any real effort in. Moreover, you've left much of what I've said throughout this discussion unaddressed, yet I have let that be and continued on regardless. Whatever happened to quid pro quo?

I have edited my last reply if you're interested. You'll see at the start that I've picked apart your superficial distinction. The collapse of that distinction ought to make it easier to take in what follows.

Can you at least confirm to me whether or not you agree with me that:

(1) The individual must understand the meaning of the proposition in order to correctly be said to believe that proposition

is false

On account of your acceptance of nonlinguistic belief? Or, do you reject that it is false on the superficial basis that it is "believing", not belief?

Sorry, but I'm more interested in getting to the heart of the issue than in humouring your semantic gymnastics.

So for you, at the moment, the question is why shouldn’t I be certain I am in Femantle? — Banno

Because you could be confused.

What is "certainty" to you other than stubborn insistence? Do you concede that one may be certain yet be wrong? If so, all you've identified is a belief with a certain tinge of smugness. Of what philosophical significance is such a subcatagory of belief?

Of what philosophical significance is such a subcatagory of belief? — Hanover

Well, there's a few books about it.

Sure you can play the game of pedant and claim confusion or evil daemon or whatever you like. There is no reason hereabouts to think I am confused - apart from Hanover wanting to suport an aesthetic that says we ought not be certain.

Calling it smugness is not presenting an argument and does not further the discussion. I might reply by saying that those who refuse to say they are certain are afraid to commit; that the lie inherent in their words is shown by their actions - for example they do not habitually check that they have legs before attempting to stand up, because contrary to their claims they are certain that they have legs.

Here's a basis for an epistemology: Some statements are true. And there are some statements which it is unreasonable to doubt.

Well, there's a few books about it. — Banno

I'm sure there are.

Sure you can play the game of pedant and claim confusion or evil daemon or whatever you like. There is no reason hereabouts to think I am confused - apart from Hanover wanting to suport an aesthetic that says we ought not be certain. — Banno

Pragmatically, it's irrelevant whether you're 99.99% sure or 100%. I don't think that's denied.

Here's a basis for an epistemology: Some statements are true. And there are some statements which it is unreasonable to doubt. — Banno

Very well, we now have a new definition, which is "reasonable doubt." I would agree it is unreasonable to believe your feet you fell asleep with are not beneath you the next morning. Could they be removed? Could you be hallucinating? Sure. What are the chances, very close to 0% but not 0%, right? That's what I mean by certainty.

But the question is why any of this matters. Surely we are agreeing with one another to the basic fact that I can be wrong about most any observed fact, including whether my feet remain beneath me. Our dispute then is whether we wish to attach the word "certainty" to certain items of belief. If I agree to call those facts I'm 98% sure about "certainty," and you are willing to call those facts you're 100% sure about "certainity," are we now in agreement? That is, would you be agreeable to saying that you have certainty your legs are beneath you, but you lack certainity?

And this could matter in some context. A jury is charged they can find a defendant guilty if there is no reasonable doubt as to their guilt. However, they cannot be charged that they can only convict if they find beyond a shadow of doubt that the defendant is guilty, as that is an impossible standard. http://www.yourdictionary.com/beyond-a-reasonable-doubt . I'd think that very few people would be convicted if the charge were " You shall not find the Defendant guilty unless you are certain of his guilt."

I might reply by saying that those who refuse to say they are certain are afraid to commit; that the lie inherent in their words is shown by their actions - for example they do not habitually check that they have legs before attempting to stand up, because contrary to their claims they are certain that they have legs. — Banno

You are confusing habit with certainty. Behaving in a habitual way, in no way indicates that one is certain about one's action. If you take that approach you have no argument against the assumption that doing something by instinct indicates certainty. And clearly it's not true that instinctual actions indicate certainty concerning one's actions. So we must allow a separation between proceeding into an action by instinct or habit, and proceeding into an action with certainty. The former is more of the unconscious, and the latter is of the conscious.

Edit: Does breathing indicate that you are certain that you have lungs?

Sure you can play the game of pedant and claim confusion or evil daemon or whatever you like. — Banno

Is it pedantic to say one is reasonably certain, or justifiably certain, but never absolutely certain, or certain without qualification?

On what argument?