For this to be done, the theory would have to claim objective morality, and thus some sort of a metaphysical explanation and reason for the morality. Most normative ethic theories don't go this far, however. — BlueBanana
I think the difficulty I have with 'objectivity' is that it embodies a kind of implicit normative epistemology. It presumes that the criterion of what is real, is that it can be assessed as an object. So implicitly it accepts that the judgement must be grounded in respect of some truly existing object, or a matter of fact which is amenable to precise quantitative analysis. I suppose it seems a rather positivist attitude, which nevertheless presents itself as impartial or disinterested. — Wayfarer
Maybe this is a bit boring of a thought, but I find it interesting that there are no mentions of classifying these theories of normative ethics as descriptive ones (unless I just made an obvious and huge mistake somewhere there?). — BlueBanana
Any moral theory that wishes to state what is a morally right thing to do should ground this claim on something. — BlueBanana
Any moral theory that wishes to state what is a morally right thing to do should ground this claim on something. For this to be done, the theory would have to claim objective morality, and thus some sort of a metaphysical explanation and reason for the morality. Most normative ethic theories don't go this far, however. — BlueBanana
which are approximately 50% heritable. — LD Saunders
Just as a matter of language use, an ethical theory can be nothing more than a teaching - a cohesive system of beliefs that are accepted by way of persuasion or authority. In this case there is no requirement for the theory to be grounded in anything "objective," in the same sense in which objectivity is claimed for empirical theories. — SophistiCat
But there exist theories as well that make the claim there is an objective universal morality. How are the theories that make a claim but then don't claim that claim to be objectively true different? — BlueBanana
I don't say that is my belief, I merely recognize it as a theoretical possibility.
And reflect that you are also going to fall into Hume's is/ought problem.
— charleton — BlueBanana
Just because killing is painful does not mean it ought to be considered immoral. — charleton
I didn't say that, or any else "is", would be where the "ought" would be gotten from. — BlueBanana
Personally I don't believe in absolute morals, so even though I have an opinion on normative ethics, I consider the thing to be that it's objectively true that I have a subjective opinion, and not that I subjectively believe something to be objectively true (this applies to most other fields of my philosophy as well). — BlueBanana
Like killing people is right if their existence due to huge population causes catastrophe. — bahman
See, you're making an objective claim here. Things depend on situations, but there can still be an objective answer for any given situation. — BlueBanana
Like I said, you do not really appreciate what 'objective' means. — charleton
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.